SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET
Political Man

In this book, Lipset explains the conditions which promote democracy, anti-democratic tendencies (working and middle class authoritarianism), and electoral tendencies.

PART I. THE CONDITIONS OF THE DEMOCRATIC ORDER.

CH 2 ''Economic Development and Democracy''

Lipset defines democracy in a complex society as a political system which supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing government officials, and as a social mechanism which permits the largest possible part of the population to influence major decisions by choosing among contenders for office. This definition implies a political formula or body of beliefs specifying which institutions are legitimate (the degree to which institutions are valued for themselves and considered right and proper), as well as implying that one set of political leaders be in office and other sets of recognized leaders attempting to gain office.
The above conditions are needed because if a political system is not characterized by a value system allowing the peaceful play of power, democracy can become chaotic. Furthermore, if the outcome of the political game is not the periodic awarding of effective authority to one group, unstable and irresponsible government will result. And if the conditions for perpetuating an effective opposition do not exist, the authority of individuals in power will steadily increase and popular influence in policy will become a minimum. Once established, a democratic political system gathers momentum and creates social supports (institutions) to ensure its continued existence.
In this chapter, Lipset is most concerned with social conditions like education which serve to support democratic political institutions. He will not be dealing with those which serve to maintain them yet

. Economic Development in Europe and the Americas

Democracy is positively related to the level of economic development in European and American countries. Lipset looks at indices such as wealth, industrialization, urbanization, and education. In each case,these indices are higher in the more democratic countries. Lipset hypothesizes these elements to be functionally interdependent.

Economic development and the class struggle

Economic development, by producing increased income and higher levels of education, largely determines the form of the class struggle by permitting those in the lower strata to develop more gradualist views of political change. Yet, this can only be the case for a fairly well off lower class. In the two wealthiest countries, US and Canada, communist parties are almost nonexistent and socialist parties are not major forces., due to a lack of sufficient lower strata discontent. There is an inverse relationship between nationalist economic development and extremist political groups. A large middle class in a country tempers conflict by penalizing extremist groups and rewarding moderacy. in addition, the propensity to from voluntary associations is a function of wealth. A country without a multitude of organizations separate from state power has a high dictatorial or revolutionary potential. (de Tocqueville -- ''mass society'' theory).

The politics of rapid economic development

Extremist left movements often develop in time of rapid industrialization. This may be due to sharp discontinuities between the industrial and pre-industrial state (concerning a new surplus of unskilled agricultural workers). (e.g., Russian Revolution as documented by Trotsky). In Europe , a cluster of factors led to the development of democracy, such as economic development, and Protestantism. Lipset uses a mulitvariate system where the focus may be on any element, and its conditions and consequences may be stated without the implication that a he has arrived at a complete theory. It seems to me that he takes a largely functionalist view. For instance, open classes lead to the development of democracy which in turn fosters more open classes. Yet on the other hand, democracy can sometime create situations which will later undermine it -- bureaucracy, for instance.

CH4 ''Working class Authoritarianism''

Studies shoe that the lower class way of life produce individuals with rigid and intolerant approaches to politics. The intolerant aspects of Communist ideology attract the low status working class. The low level of education of the working class makes them want the quick and easy solutions of extremist movements.

Democracy and the lower class

The lower class is liberal on economic issues but conservative on non-economic issues such as civil liberties and internationalism. They are less committed to democracy. Authoritarian attitudes are 'normal'' and expected in the lower class.

Extremist religion and the lower class

Millenarianism is a defense mechanism of the disinherited. religious sects are organized dictatorially. Direct connections between the social roots of political and religious extremism have been observed in a number of countries, because rigid fundamentalism and dogmatism are linked to the same underlying predispositions which find another outlet in allegiance to extremist political movements.

The social situation of the lower classes

The following are contributing elements to authoritarian predispositions in lower class individuals:
low education; low participation in political/voluntary organizations; low literacy; isolated occupations/ living communities; economic insecurity; authoritarian family patterns

The degree of education , closely correlated with social and economic status, is also highly correlated with undemocratic attitudes. Psychic deprivation goes with economic deprivation. Tolerance in the lower class is not encouraged, ad the lower class' economic frustrations are often taken out on other minority scapegoats.

Lower class perspectives

The acceptance of the norms of democracy requires a high level of sophistication and ego security. An unsophisticated person has a poor frame of reference (solely a concern with the present and not the future) , emphasizes the concrete and ignores the abstract, and has more volatile expressive behavior. All of these characteristics predispose the lower class to support extremist political and religious movements.

The making of an authoritarian

All of the above characteristics apply. Under normal conditions,political apathy is most frequent among the above described individuals -- but they can be activated by a crisis to support extremist movements.

Extremism as an alternative: a test of a hypothesis

The proposition that the lack of a rich frame of reference predispositions the working class toward authoritarianism doesn't necessarily suggest that the lower strata will be authoritarian -- just that they will choose the least complex alternative. Thus, in situations where extremism represents the most complex alternative, the lower class will be against the movement.

Historical patterns and democratic action

Despite profoundly anti-democratic tendencies in lower-class groups, workers' political organizations and movements in the more industrialized democratic countries have supported both economic and political liberalism. Democratic norms became part of the institutional system because leaders knew they had no choice but to grant them as concessions to increasingly volatile masses. Democratic norms in many countries are now institutionalized, but followers don't necessarily understand them, they just adhere to them. The incorporation of workers into the body politic in the industrialized western world has reduced their authoritarian tendencies greatly, The working class does not always pose a threat to democracy.

CH5 ''Fascism:Left, Right, and Center''

In chapter five, Lipset points out that political extremism occurs in the center, as well as on the left and right. For instance, Fascism is highly correlated with the center and the middle class. It is similar to liberalism (in the 1950-60's sense of the word) in its opposition of big business, trade unions, socialist states, religion, and traditionalism. On the left (aside from those horrid communists) is Peronism, which appeals to the lower strata against the middle and upper classes. It differs from communism in that it is nationalistic. It is the creation of army officers seeking to destroy the corrupt privileged strata that has suppressed the masses. On the right, there are parties such as the Horthyites and the Christian Social Party. They seek to change political institutions in order to preserve cultural and economic ones. (vs. the left and center who use poltical means to change culture and social norms).

Fascism and the middle class

Fascism has the same basic goals as liberalism, except fascists are reactionary vs. reformist. They are anti-centralization, want to reduce the power of big capital and labor, and want to restore the old middle class to power.They appeal to the displaced masses of the middle class. The same criteria for authoritarianism applies to the middle class as it does to the lower (isolation, low education, etc.). The most authoritarian segments of the middle strata are small entrepreneurs in small communities or on farms. Also, the self-employed are more likely to be fascist.

Mc Carthyism,Poujadism, Italian Fscism, german and Austrian N azism

Like other movements appealing to the self employed urban and rural middle classes, these movements were in large part products of the insoluble frustrations of those who felt cut off from the main trends of modern society. In each country, the movements secured more support in provincial areas. In addition, the petty bourgeois supported the movementsbecause of the deprivation they suffered due to the relative decline of their class. Also, they were citizens of communities whose status and influencewithin the larger society was rapidly declining.

Peronism:the ''fascism'' of the lower class

This movement was formed around Peron, the president of Argentina from 1946 to 1955. The Peronists had a strong state ideology similar to that of Mussoloini. They primarily appealed to urban workers, but also impoverished ruralites. They had a string nationalist/xenophopic bent, and they glorified the position of the armed forces.
This movemnt was simlar to the other two extremist camps in that they did glorify the army, but it differed in that it had a positive orientation toward workers, trade unions, and the class struggle. Peronism combined its radical labor party measures with nationalism and demagogy to become an extremist movement. It was ''anti-capitalist populist nationalism.'' As a variant of fascism, it was a fascism of the left because it was based in the social strata whose members would otherwise turn to socialism or communism.
The Social Bases of Fascism
Anti -democratic ideologies and groups can best be classified if it is recognized that ''left,'' ''right,'' and ''center'' refer to ideologies, each of which has a moderate and extremist version -- one parliamnetary, the other extra-parliamentary. Extremist movements appeal to the disgruntled at every level of sociaety. These movements come in many different varieties. For example, a left extremist movement that is working class based may be militaristic, natiuonalistsic, and anti-Marxist.
If we want to preserve parliamentary democracy, we must understand the source of threats to it, and threats from conservatives are as different from those originating in the middle class center as thesesare from communism.

PART II: VOTING IN WESTERN DEMOCRACIES

CH 6 ''Who Votes and Who Doesn't''

The greater the changes in the structure of the society that a governing group is attempting to introduce, the more likely the leadership is to desire and even require a high level of participation by its members. A situation which results in high participation by members of a group normally has a higher potential for democracy -- for the maintenance of an effective opposition - than one where few people show interest in the political process. A society in which a large proportion of the population is outside the political arena is potentially more explosive than one where most citizens are regularly electoral ly active.
Perhaps non-voting is not necessarily apathy, but a response to the decline of major social conflicts, a reflection of the stability of the system, and an increases in cross pressures-- particularly those affecting the working class.
Voting patterns are similar across many countries. Men vote more than women, the better educated more than the less educated, urbanites more than ruralites, high status people more than low status people. Many of the explanations for lower voting among the lower status groups coincide with the various experiences associated with lower status occupations, that have been cited to account for authoritarian values.

Four factors which affect voting tendencies

1) The relevance of government policies
Some groups are more affected by government policies than others -- those groups are more likely to vote (e.g., government employees). Groups which are subjected to economic pressures with which individuals could not cope are also more likely to vote (farmers, miners). Other groups more likely to vote are businessmen, persecuted groups (Jews, Catholics), and people moved by morality issues such as prohibition and gambling Groups affected by proposals for new programs of government (New Deal) will also be more likely to vote.
Yet when a nation faces a crisis -- major changes in its social, economic, or political system or in its international position -- the electorate as a whole takes a greater interest in politics.

2)Access to information
A partial explanation for a low voting rate may be that two groups may have an equal stake in government policies, but one group may have easier access to information about this stake than the other. The low turnout of workers and other low income people may also reflect the relative indirectness and invisibility of crucial economic relations. Components needed for better access to information are :

a)insight resulting from education
b)social-occupational experiences (the relationship of occ. activities to political skills)
c)contacts with others who have more or less identical problems (factory workers vs. isolated farmers)
-related to the factor of high interaction with those of the same needs and background is the development of interest group organizations devoted to organizing participation in politics.
-those participating in one specific type of organization are more likely to be active in others and to attend political meetings. Also contact with an ''opinion leader'' is more important than exposure to formal political propaganda

Class also determines the level of an individual's political participation with regard to time. The wealthier have more time to participate and less immediate, day-to-day constraints on their attention span.

3)Group Pressure to Vote

The variations in voting behavior which correlate with socioeconomic class may also be related to different degrees of conformity to the dominant norms in various societies. Middle class people tend to conform more than working-class people to the dominant values of society and to accept the notion that this conformity will be awarded by attaining one's personal goals.

4)Cross Pressures
Pressures which operate in opposing directions often make potential voters lose interest and withdraw. For the lower strata, though their social and economic inferiority predisposes them against the status quo, the existing system has many traditional claims to legitimacy which influence them,. The lower strata are therefore placed in a situation of not only lass but also conflicting information, and of opposing group interests. On the other hand, the well-to-do live in a relatively homogenous political environment
In addition, because the lower class is exposed to higher strata values, it is able to aspire to them. They are faced with the need to reconcile their lower class values with upper-class values. This creates apathy. The more open the class structure, the more politically apathetic the working class will be.

Conclusions
Advocates of high levels of participation claim that democracies need consent and that consensus shouldn't be weak. Low levels of participation represent an under representation of the lower class. This reflects politicians' neglect and lower status members' lack of loyalty to the system.
But is high participation actually a good thing?might it symbolize mass consensus for the present system? Reisman claims that government bodies function well with citizen apathy. Nonvoters often have cynical, antidemocratic ideas. Why would we want them to vote anyway?
Tingsten's thesis is that a sudden increase in the size of the voting electorate probably reflects tension and serious governmental malfunction. This induce non-democratic voters.
Thus, a high or low voter turn out is not necessarily a bad thing. It depends on the context.
The gradual development of high voter turnout, brought about with the understanding of the relevance of government and education, can be a good thing (I think Seymour's saying that a slow indoctrination to the values of democracy would be a good thing here). The system is only threatened when a crisis quickly draws normally non habitual voters to the electorate.

CH7 ''Elections: The Expression of Democratic Class Struggle''

Conflict among different groups is expressed through political parties which represent a ''democratic translation of the class struggle.'' Parties primarily represent classes and their struggle represents the class struggle. But class is only one of the structural divisions in society which is related to part support. There is also religion, ethnicity, nationality, regional loyalties, sex, and age. These characteristics are sometimes (but not usually) more salient than class). Often, if a group is torn between voting for one party or another, it will vote for the more prestigious party. (This is partly why conservative parties are often more popular).

Left Voting: a response to group needs

Leftist voting is an expression of discontent and an indication that certain needs are not being met. Various groups vote left for the following reasons:

1)insecurity of income
Groups like one crop farmers, fishermen, and miners often face a high security of income. They will typically vote left.

2)unsatisfying work
Factory workers, for instance, often find their work monotonous and subject to arbitrary authority. The more skilled a worker is, the more he finds his work satisfying, and the more he will support conservative parties.

3)status
Sometimes prestige matters more than income. White collar workers who actually make less than some blue collar workers still get more respect. Hence, they are more conservative.

Lipset makes a tentative hypothesis that the more open the status-linked social relations of a given society, the more likely well-paid workers are to become conservatives politically. In a more closed society, the upper level of the workers will feel deprived and hence support left-wing parties.

Social conditions affect left wing v oting

Just because a group is suffering from some deprivation under the existing social system, it dopes not automatically follow that they will support political parties aiming at social change. Yet three conditions would facilitate such a response:

1)Channels of Communication
A good condition for communication is having a common problem. Collective action can reult from this. Two general factors that correlate with leftist voting are the size of industrial plants and the size of the city. (a communications factor may be involved here). In a large plant, there is a higher degree of intra-class communication and less personal contact with people on higher economic levels. In large cities, social interaction is also more likely to be within economic classes.

2)Belief in opportunities for individual mobility
Instead of political action, some try to better their lots within the system by working their way up the ladder of success. If this possibility exists there will be a corresponding reduction in collective efforts at social change. The bulk of the socially mobile vote for the more conservative parties.

3)Traditionalism
Often very poor, backwards regions of countries are politically conservative. Extreme poverty prevents political organization, but most of all, traditional values and ''loyalty to the powers that be'' make the areas so conservative.

The effort to account for variations in the electoral behavior of different groups by pointing out different aspects of the class structure in various societies has involved a discussion of several factors, many of which operate simultaneously. Different variables combine to form a separate pattern in each society.

CH 13 (Postscript) ''The end of an ideology''

A basic premise of this book is that democracy is not only a means through which different groups can attain their ends or seek ''the good society;'' it is the good society itself in operation. Democracy requires institutions which support conflict and disagreement as well as those which sustain legitimacy and consensus.
The differences between the left and right in the western democracies are no longer profound, partly because the fundamental political problems of the industrial revolution have been solved. Some theorists (Reisman, for ex.) have presented a thesis that conflict based on class differencesand left-right issues is ending based on the assumption that the economic class system is disappearing. This means the end of inequality's political significance.
But are these intellectuals mistaking the decline of ideology with the end of class conflict?

The democratic class struggle will cotinue. There is not necaessarily acceptance of the class struggle but rather, increasing agreement on the representation functions of the political parties. Thus, it does appear that conformity is growing in the political systems of western democracies. This conformity is not altogether unhealhty;conformity leads to bureacratization which can cut down on the arbitrary power of authority. Stable democratic institutions in which political freesom is great and increasing will continue to characterize mature, industrialized, western societies.
The conroversies about cultural creativity and conformity reflect the general trend of a shift away from ideology towards sociology. This is due to less interest in political inquiry, yet there is still a real need for political analysis, ideology, and controversy within the world communiuty -- especially in underdeveloped countries. Today, western leaders must communicate and work with non-communist (even ifthey are socialist) revolutionaries in Asia and Africa at the same time they accept the fact that serious ideological controversies have ended at home. To clarify the operation of western democracy in the mid 20th century may contribute to the political battle in Asia and Africa.


SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET
The Continental Divide

This book is about the U.S. and Canada, and political differences between the two countries.

CHAPTER 1: Revolution and Counterrevolution - the Introduction

The formation of Canada was due to people fleeing the US at the time of the Declaration of Independence. Thus, that initial founders of Canada did not agree with the principles on which the US was formed: all ''men'' are created equal.

Free Trade and Cultural Distinctiveness
At the time this book was written (1990), the free trade treaty was being ratified between the US and Canada. Canadians viewed this as scary, they were (and are) afraid that Canada will be ''sucked'' into the US, and just become another state or states of the US. On the other hand, people in the US never viewed the free trade treaty as threatening to the US culture or boundaries.

Organizing Principles
-Canada has been and is a more class-aware, elitist, law-abiding, statist, collectivity-oriented, and particularistic (group-oriented) society than the United States
-The colonists' emphases on individualism and achievement orientation were important motivating forces in the launching of the American Revolution. The crystallization of such attitudes in the Declaration of Independence provided a basis for their reinforcement and encouragement throughout subsequent American history. Thus, the US remained throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries the extreme example of a classically liberal or lockean society, one that rejected the assumptions of the alliances of throne and altar, of ascriptive elitism, or mercantilism, or nobless oblige, of communitarianism.
-By contrast, both English and French speaking Canadians sought to preserve their values and culture by reacting against liberal revolutions. English speaking Canada exists because its people opposed the Declaration of Independence. French-speaking Canada, whose leaders were mostly Roman Catholic clerics, sought to isolate itself from the anticlerical, democratic values of the French Revolution. The elites of both linguistic groups consciously attempted to create a conservative, monarchical, and ecclesiastical society in North America.

Perspectives on the American Revolution
-Is Lipset's perspective of revolution vs. counterrevolution the correct way to look at the US vs. Canada? His answer is that it depends on how revolutionary the American Revolution actually was. Some see it as a moderate revolution which did little to change social relationships and which had little ideological impact.
-Lipset argues that the American Revolution was quite revolutionary indeed. (e.g. as much property was confiscated in the US as in the French revolution on a per capita bases. Many more people were political emigres from America than from France).
-Also, he contends that the US revolution had a large impact on France when the French soldiers from the land phase of the American revolution went home and started radical agrarian reform.
- ''Although the US was a slave society when its leaders declared that all men are created equal, Thomas Jefferson, who wrote that statement, felt - and was eventually proved correct - that it would undermine slavery, that the idea of equality would have a continuing effect, once it was proclaimed as a basis for American independence.''

The Canadian Identity
- ''Canadians feel that monarchy can be viewed as a superior 'guarantee of liberty and freedom.'''
-The presumed grater political intolerance in the US is a consequence of the Revolution, that repression of minority opinion must occur in a society with unlimited popular rule.
-British and American Tories fought for the protection of the role of law and traditional values including the rights of dissidents, eccentrics, and cranks.
-Canada has the ability (due to unified and influential elites) to control the system so as to inhibit the emergence of populist movements expressing political intolerance. (e.g. McCarthyism, KKK)

CHAPTER 2: The American Ideology
-the reason you are an American is not because you line within its borders, rather because you accept what it ideologically stands for. (like religion)
- ''In Europe and Canada, nationality is related to community; one cannot become un-English or un-Swedish. Being an American, however, is an ideological commitment. It is not a matter of birth. Those who reject American values are un-American.''

Antistatism
-No other country has as weak (limited) national government as the US. It has a system of checks and balances, and divided government. Citizens indicate in public opinion surveys that they prefer the House to be of one party and the president to be of the other, overwhelmingly.
-The country was founded in opposition to a strong state.

The Revolution Continued
The writers of the constitution, whether or not they believed in equality themselves, ''had started and legitimated a process that grew out of their control.'' (i.e. women, black, everyone used this concept to become equal)

Meritocracy
Hard work and economic ambition were perceived in the US as the proper activity of a moral man. (N.B. similarity to what Weber has to say). Whereas in European countries economic materialism was viewed as vulgar and immoral.

The Ideology
-Subsumed in four words: anti-statism, individualism, populism, and egalitarianism.
-Socialist party movement have failed to catch on in the US because they have little appeal since the social content of socialism property relations apart, is identical with what American think they already have - namely, a democratic, socially classless society that is anti-elitist.

Individualism
''The American radical is much more sympathetic to anarchism, libertarianism, and syndicalism than to state collectivism. If the US ever gets a major radical movement, it will be closer to anarchism than to socialism.''

Populism
-The will of the people should dominate elites. Public choice is superior to professionalism.
-Populism was not part of the original revolutionary ideology, but has become part of the American creed.
-Populism is much stronger in the US than Canada (e.g. use of referenda, elections of more officials rather than appointment.)

Liberalism
-In the US, conservatism is associated with the national tradition of suspicion of government, with classical liberalism. (e.g. Ronald Reagan and Milton Frieman) Most importantly, the American Left also adhere to these values.
-H.G. Wells: ''the Americans' right-wing and left-wing are just different species of liberalism.''


NICO POULANTZAS
The Concept of Politics

On the whole, this is a repetitious, foggy, somewhat boring chapter that deals with how the state fits into a Marxist revolutionary programme. It is chock-full of a wide variety of marxist-babble and theory-jargon that makes it hard to follow/understand at points. In fact, it is not even clear at first that NP only has a couple points that he repeatedly rehashes - his ideas are camouflaged pretty well in his writing. Anyhow ... I would strongly recommend not to read this article and to just look at this summary. I have tried to retain some of the original jargon so you can have a feel for it (painful as it may be) since I could see that Steinmetz might dig NP in the original Poulanteese

i). POLITICS AND HISTORY
NP opens the chapter with a couple preliminary remarks:
1) Social classes are the effects of certain levels of structures, of which the state forms a part.
2) There is a distinction between:
a) the political: the jurido-political superstructure of the state
b) politics: political class practices (political class struggle)

Crucial to the analysis at hand is the historical component of Marxist theory, exemplifies by the following propositions:
1) Every class struggle is a political struggle
2) The class struggle is the motive force of history
{this is no newsflash to anyone who has read any Marx at all}

According to a historicist reading of these propositions, the field of the political would include not a particular structural level and a specific practice, but in general, the 'dynamic/diachronic' aspect of every element, belonging to any level of the structures or practices of a social formations. In short, the political is a generalized term in Marxist theory that can transcend more particular or local formations. Further, the historicist view of Marxism is as a ''genetic'' science of growth in general and, politics being the motive force of history, it is ultimately a science of politics, or even a science of revolution - identified with a simple unilinear growth. There are several consequences of the last idea:
1) an identification of politics with history
2) an over-politicization of the various levels of structures and of social practices
3) an abolition of the very specificity of the political
{i.e. by conceiving the political as historical, the political takes on some of the generalized characteristics of history within the Marxist framework.}

NP uses two quotations to support his analysis here. The first is from Gramsci - and although I couldn't tell what it was saying - NP says that it suggests ''an over-politicization of a voluntarist kind; it provides the counterweight to economism within the same problematic.'' (whatever).
The second quotation is from Parsons and highlights the political as the centre of integration for all the aspects of the social system (this little part makes a lot more sense in terms of the rest of this reading than does that mysterious thing from Gramsci). NP believes that on an epistemological level, there is a continuity between the general conceptions of historicism and functionalism. Particularly, the political becomes the simple principle of social totality and the principle of its development, in the synchronic-diachronic perspective which is characteristic of functionalism.

According to Marxism, the political must not only be located in the structure of a social formation as a specific level, but furthermore as that critical level in which the contradictions of a formation are reflected and condensed.

From Althusser, the Marxist concept of the process of social transformation can be understood not as a universal and ontological type of history, but rather as a theoretically constructed concept of a mode of production as a complex whole in dominance. The concept of history no longer has any connection with simple linear growth. Further, the various levels of a social formation are characterized by an uneven development and dislocations which are the basis for understanding a formation and its development.

NP then turns his attention the issue of political practice. By practice, he means transformation of a definite object (raw material), resulting in the production of something new (the product) which often constitutes a break with the given elements of the object. The big question with regard to political practice is: What is its object? NP says: It's the 'present moment' (you dummy). {What the hell is that supposes to mean? You think he could use better terminology.} Basically the 'present moment' is that strategic point (in time and space, I suppose) that various contradictions fuse in the sense that they reflect a certain structure of dominance. This is the starting point from which you can begin to interrelate the nature of various social levels (as pertains to the evils of capitalism, for instance) into a coherent concept. Then (and only then) are you able to act upon this social situation order to transform it.

Starting to beat a dying horse, NP states that political practice is the ''motive force of history'' only in so far as its product finally constitutes the transformation of the unity of a social formation in its various stages and phases according to a strategic objective.

ii) THE GENERAL FUNCTION OF THE STATE

The big question: Why is the basic problem of every revolution that of state power?

Inside the structure of several levels dislocated by uneven development, the state has the particular function of constituting the factor of cohesion between the levels of a social formation and maintaining equilibrium for the social complex. ,p> Given this function of the state, political practice may possess two very different aspects/results:
1) Non-transformation: political practice of the state as agent for maintenance of unity of a social formation; state as stabilizer
2) Transformation: political practice produces/brings about social change by recognizing the state as locus of conflict and cohesion (and thus the key to breaking social unity).

The cohesive function of the state takes on different forms depending on the mode of production and social formations being considered, and is particularly crucial during periods of transition between dominant modes of production.

iii) MODALITIES OF THE STATE
Although the function of order or organization of the state presents various modalities related to the levels on which it is exercised in particular cases (i.e. the economic, political, ideological, etc. level), the global role of the state is political. However, NP interprets Marx and Engels as believing that the function of the state primarily concerns the economic level, and particularly the labour process (the productivity of labor). He, of course, says this after finishing a long jag about how that state doesn't really have any true particularistic functions, but rather exists and operates as an essentially generalized phenomenon. I suppose we can chalk this up to a general Marxist belief that the economic is it (ergo, the state as a universalistic social unity must have an economic function).

From the recognition of the various facets of the state's function (i.e. judicial, ideological, organizational, and strictly-political roles), NP concludes that these functions are political to the extent that they aim primarily at the maintenance of the unity of a social formation based in the last analysis on political class domination.

Just a couple concluding points to this lovely piece:
1) The state's role as the cohesive social factor is not reducible to ''intervention'' by the state at various levels, and particularly at the economic level.
2) Though the state has the global function of cohesive factor in the social unity, this does not mean that it always maintains the dominant role at any particular time, not that when this dominant role is held by the economic that the state no longer has the function of cohesive factor.


STEIN ROKKAN
Dimensions of State Formation and Nation Building: A Possible Paradigm for Research on Variations in Europe

This article contained of a lot of snippets of the political history of Western Europe, recounted with a quiet ''as everyone knows'' undertone. Well, I'm admittin', a lot of that stuff I didn't know (the history of linguistic divisions in Finland, for instance), and so I can't put in any coherent story for you. Thus, I'm leaving most of it out. Rokkan's model is supposed to be a synthesis of the insights of Parsons and Hirschman (Exit, Voice and Loyalty). I'm not entirely sure I understood this article.

Main Argument:
The main reasons for variation in the timing and the quality of transition to mass politics in the nation-states of Western Europe are: 1) remoteness from or closeness to the central trade belt, leading to distinctiveness or sharedness of legal, religious and linguistic standards 2) within the central belt, whether there was a certain degree of autonomy from the center. The key reason for the smoothness of the process of nation-building in European states, as compared to the postcolonial states, was the low level of overall political mobilization at the time of state-building in Europe.

Rokkan breaks down the development of a nation-state into four phases: two center-generated thrusts through the territory, the first military-economic, the second cultural; and two phases of internal restructuring opening up opportunities for the periphery, the first symbolic-cultural, the second economic.

Phase I: Penetration: the state-building process. A period of cultural, political and economic unification at the elite level (eg., Western Europe from the High Middle Ages to the French Rev.)

Phase II: Standardization: brings in larger and larger sectors of the masses (conscript armies, compulsory schools, emerging mass media create channels of contact b/t the elites and those in the periphery; this fosters a sense of identity with the total political system—sometimes through conflict with other identities (linguistic, religious, etc.)).

Phase III: Participation: brings the masses into active participation in the workings of the territorial political system through extended franchise, organization of political parties, etc.

Phase IV: Redistribution. Expansion of administrative apparatus of the territorial state: growth of agencies of redistribution, including public welfare services, taxes, etc.

The strongest of the early European nation-states were built up around territories with a long history of concentration in the ownership and control of land. Cities depended for their survival on the freedom of the trade networks which often went against the interests of the centralizing states. When the states were remote from the central trade belt, such conflicts of interest were minimal; there were fewer occasions to defend the state's boundaries and an early growth of distinctive legal, religious and linguistic standards (England, Norway, Sweden). In the central trade belt, whenever cities were relatively autonomous, there was scope of participation (Netherlands, Switzerland); in both those cases, participation and redistribution phases (III and IV) were easily reached. In those regions of the trade belt where cities were weak, the necessity on the part of the central agency to protect its border choked trade and, consequently, representation.

To put it only slightly differently, the cities depended for their survival on the freedom of trade networks, and, controlled the greatest resources against the centralizers. But the ability of cities to resist depended heavily on the structure of alliance options within each territory: who else needed exit options? Wherever cities were weak and isolated, the territorial centralizers succeeded: the result was a reduction in exit opportunities and a corresponding increase over time in the pressures for voice. However, these absolutist-centralist states not only tried to close off their borders, they also blocked channels of representation within the territory. As Hirschman says, you cannot cut off both exit and voice options without endangering the balance of the system: thus, these absolutist-mercantilist states had to go through much more violent transitions to mass democracy (phases II-IV—e.g., France, Spain).

What turned out to be crucial in the development of nation-states in Europe was that the fragmented center belt was made up of territories at an advanced level of culture, both technologically and organizational (can you say, ethnocentrism boys and girls). The main facilitators of smooth nation-building in Western Europe were: a well-developed agricultural economy; a network of highly autonomous cities institutionally distinct from the surrounding agricultural lands; the fact that these cities, as well as rural areas, were linked together culturally through a common religion as a cross-territorial corporate church, through the operation of a major organization for long-distance communication through craft literacy in one dominant standard language, Latin; and, the transactions across these varied territories were controlled under a body of inherited normative precepts, those embodied in Roman law.

The development of these states was further facilitated by the development of literate bureaucracies and legal institutions; the growth of trade and the emergence of new industries, developments which allowed the military-administrative machineries to expand without destroying their resource base; the development of a national script and consequent attempts to unify the peripheral territories culturally through a standard medium of internal communication.

The extraordinary synchrony of all these developments during the years from 1485 to 1789 is key in the rapid growth of consolidated nation states in Europe. What proved decisive for the further growth of these political systems were the low levels of overall mobilization at the time of state-building. The decisive thrust toward consolidation took place before the lower strata could articulate any claims for participation. This gave the national elites time to build up efficient organizations before they had to face the next set of challenges (standardization, participation and redistribution). The western states got to take care of the task of state building before they had to face the ordeals of mass politics.


CAROLYN WEBBER AND AARON WILDAVSKY
from A History of Taxation and Expenditure in the Western World (what could be more exciting)

Chapter 10: A Cultural Theory of Governmental Growth and (Un)balanced Budgets
Political life may be thought of as an ongoing referendum on the existing regime. The various political cultures compete for shares of victory in that referendum. Although the depression of the 1930s was originally perceived as an outcome of not adhering to the precepts of neoclassical economics, there appeared within the framework of neoclassical economics a new doctrine that belied earlier orthodoxy. There was a new advocacy of governmental intervention through varying rates of taxation and especially by varying expenditure to manage the economy. This Keynesian economics was dominant in the bulk of the Western world by the end of WWII. The new economics strengthened governmental hierarchy by increasing its capacity to affect market forces so as to protect the populace against adversity. Budgeting, which in the past was largely concerned with achieving balance at relatively low spending levels, became associated wit securing a therapeutic imbalance. Keynesian budget theory was part of the social change that gave budgeting greater significance, and fundamentally altered its direction by infusing with moral legitimacy high spending for social purposes.

But fiscal questions were not invented in this century, they are as old as government itself. During most of history, correspondence between receipts and expenditures has been an aberrant condition. Only within the past 100 years or so have societies achieved the technical-organizational capacity (if they wished) to sustain that correspondence. Earlier rulers relied heavily on such expedients as taxation, debasing the currency, confiscation, or sale of offices, lands, and titles to make ends meet. These tactics, however, were seldom (if ever) carried out as part of a significantly future-oriented budgetary policy or forecast, and often had very negative results for the government - alienation of subjects, debasing public morality, and trade instability.

W and W believe that what stands out as a significant feature in the history of financial developments is problem succession. Basically, old solutions give rise to new problems that are in their turn superseded. No policy instrument is good for all seasons, as it were.

Only in the past fifty years of taxing and spending have governments been willing (able) to move quickly, where development of budgetary techniques are concerned. W and W cite two probably causes:
1) The ever larger proportions of national product consumed by governments, and
2) The increasing interrelatedness of the world economy.
Combined, they mean that the consequences of actions rebound on decision-makers more swiftly than before, so budgets matter more to more people and their consequences are more immediately felt.

Taxing and spending are (no surprise) never a straightforward matter - no solution is ever perfect for everyone, and even if it were changing condition will bring up new problems and make the old solution obsolete or even dysfunctional (ie. problem succession). W and W want to concentrate in this chapter on 3 big questions: 1) Why does government grow? 2) Why are budgets so seldom balanced? and 3) Why has expenditure control collapsed in the West? Their thesis is that when people choose how to construct their institutions, they also create different kinds of budgetary dilemmas.

Why Government Grows
This big question can be decomposed into several smaller issues:
1) Why government spending in Western democracies may grow in small or large steps, but never declines as a proportion of GNP
2) Why governments in some nations grow faster than others
3) Why political parties maintain or even increase the general level of prior commitments rather than reduce them, even if they pledged to reduce spending to get into office
4) Why most of the growth of government is attributed to programs that contain a significant redistributive component - eg. health, education.
5) Why Western nations and the USSR spend approximately the same proportion of GNP on social-welfare programs
W and W argue that a cultural theory of governmental growth is the best explanation. This approach asks the cultural question: ''Which political cultures - shared values legitimating social practices - would reject ever greater governmental growth, and which would perpetuate it?'' They hypothesize that the size of government is a given society is a function of its combination of political cultures.

Wagner's Law
''Law of increasing state activity'': as per-capita real income increases in particular nations, their governments will spend a higher proportion of national product than before. Assumed here is a logic of industrialization that pushes the development process in only one direction - forward. Wagner maintained that some investments require public funding because more capital is needed than private enterprise can or will provide (Olson says something very similar in Rise and Decline of Nations). Public intervention may be justified for ''public goods,'' services for which no market exists or is likely to emerge. The nature of what is considered a public good and the extent to which they are financed through user charges, of course, varies greatly from one society to another.

Wilensky's Law
Makes arguments for an economic determinism underlying governmental growth, believing that such economic or ideological categories as capitalist/socialist, collectivist/individualistic are all but useless in explaining the origins and general development of the welfare state. According to Hinrich, two elements (structural change and ideological change) are involved in a growing government share of national income in the course of social mobilization.

W and W come down on the side of ''ideological systems'' (values and practices) of a nation as an explanation for government growth. When it becomes necessary - either in times of adversity or because government grows faster than the economy - spending does not decline because the commitment to equality (a cultural factor) requires even greater governmental effort to maintain social-welfare programs.

Marxist Theories
According to Marxist accounts (as we have heard several thousand times by now), the state is merely and only the repressive arm of the capitalist class. Welfare programs in capitalist societies could be conceived of as a disguised form of oppression - buying off discontent by getting people used to living off the dole. There is a contradiction here, since such a program that helped the worst off could not be considered entirely exploitative. Capitalist contradiction arises from deficit spending and governmental growth in an attempt to increase welfare programming as the same time as the state seeks to increase the profits of capitalists.

Tax Hypotheses
To explain supply of public revenue, Peacock and Wiseman propose a ''displacement-effect hypothesis'': major crises expand public tolerance for higher levels of taxation, after which spending floods in to make up the difference between older and newer levels of revenue. Spending expands to use up available revenues. This hypothesis, however, does not explain ''why?''.

On the subject of contradictions of capitalism, Goldscheid contends that capitalism created the ''tax state'' - in which government is dependent on taxes raised through the private sector. Therefore, the private sector exploited the public, which had to work for it. He would resolve the contradictions of capitalism by overcoming the state's alienation from property.

According to Schumpter, the ''crisis of the tax state'' is that capitalism sets the stage for its own destruction because it is too successful. Increasing Affluence has the following effects:
-supports sectarianism - groups who want government to do more but would not support it
-leads to a downgrading of the profit motive on which productivity depends
-leads to increasing social sympathies. Government improves welfare, eventually resulting in excessive taxation
-leads to moral collapse as the bourgeoisie ceases to believe that capitalism is worth defending.
This effect may be dampened by what is know as the ''fiscal illusion'' - basically, indirect taxation hides the total amount of taxes paid, so citizens are misled into paying more than they otherwise would pay.

Olson's Law and Other Political Hypotheses
Mancur Olson seeks to explain the growth of government not for its own sake, but as a part of a larger theory accounting for the rise of nations to economic prominence and their fall from that lofty estate. He contends that a gradual but pervasive cause of economic decline in the political organizational mechanisms of modern democracy arising from the entrenchment of interest groups which seek benefits favorable to themselves, but which slow down economic growth.

What is important is determining national differences in governmental spending (esp. on welfare) is not dominance of ''right'' or ''left'' factions of a particular country's political spectrum, but the range of attitudes represented on that spectrum (esp. the presence of a strong anti-statist party). The range of the political spectrum minimized economic and technological factors and instead focuses on different ways of life - this is what is meant by political culture.

Theories of interest groups politics suggest that the cumulative effect of a large number of interest groups is a multicentered system of government composed of many islands of decision dominated by promoters of those activities. An interest group that opposes another may either seek to override the individual islands of its opponents through direct governmental channels such as through legislative means, or it may create its own island dominated by interests it favors. This latter option is more prevalent and adds to government in order to pit the parts a group control against the parts it opposes. This is a better explanation of why government spending does not decline than of why it goes up in the first place. A pattern of incremental growth does help explain why certain programs are larger than others - they are older and have had more opportunity to build up increments.

Demographic changes are not a convincing explanation for the growth of government, since an increasing in certain items (eg. more medical care for an aging population) does not explain why other items are not reduced to maintain a desired proportion of spending to the size of the economy.

W and W return to the issue of what political culture desires to more toward equality of results (which is a guiding value behind growth on welfare). They believe that hierarchy justifies inequality deriving from specialization and division of labor that is beneficial on the societal level. Hierarchy is, therefore, animated by a sacrificial ethic where by the parts are supposed to sacrifice for the whole. W and W conclude that it is the rise of sectarian political cultures with their passion for equality of condition that best explains the continuous increase in the size of government.

Applying Cultural Theory
W and W compare US and Canada: Canada (with strong markets and hierarchies) follows a public policy that is more egalitarian and redistributive than does the US (which has strong market and weak hierarchies). They contend that the ideological differences between these two nations is responsible for the differences in welfare state development - and thus a support of cultural theory.

Peltzman's Law, or Culture Reconsidered
An empirical test of cultural theory would have to demonstrate the temporal priority of cultural determinants - increased inequality would have to precede government growth. Peltzman's law states the ''reduced inequality of income stimulates growth of government.'' The idea is that people who are doing o.k. economically are not going to favor redistributive spending (which will tend to benefit others more than themselves). The general argument is that the size of government responds to the articulated interests of those who tend to gain or lose from politicization on the allocation resources. W and W would like to broaden this notion to say that cultural change precedes and dominated budgetary change: the size of that state today is a function of its political culture yesterday.

Is the Deficit in the Budget or in Society?
With the exceptions of the US and Iceland, no Western nations set a great value on attaining rough budget balance. For them budget imbalance is regarded as a positive good for managing the economy or redistributing income. W and W believe that the discussions concerning deficits are really surrogates for other issues: size (role and extent of government), equity (who shall pay and benefit), and effectiveness (whether and to what extent governments can govern).

Once the techniques were developed to allow for balancing the budget (modern accounting systems, etc), they were quickly joined to an egalitarian social premise - balance gave way to imbalance, including the modulations of economic swings for the benefit of the entire society. Saving money by budgeting gave way to protecting citizens against adversity (which is where the money went).

Budgetary Balance as a Function of Regime
The following table summarized the most important aspects of this section:
[In the original, this is a 2x2 table]

Table 24: Budgetary Strategies Under Political Regimes

Regime: Slavery
Slaves cannot manage expenditure or revenue

Strategy: (1) Do nothing.
Balance: Spending equals revenue by imposition from above

Regime: Hierarchy
Can manage revenues but not expenditures.
Strategy: (3) Maximize revenue.
Balance: Spending marginally exceeds revenue with both at high levels.

Regime: Market
Can manage both expenditure and revenue at low levels.S
Strategy: (5) Minimize expenditure and revenue.
Balance: Deficit varies at low levels.

Regime: Sect
Can manage expenditure but not revenue.
Strategy: (2) Redistribute resources at high levels of expenditure and low levels of revenue
Balance: High expenditure greatly exceeds low revenue.

This table is generated by combining the ways in which the government can manage spending in relation to their management of resources and projecting the appropriate strategy for the regime.

The Transformation of Budgetary Norms
Budgetary norms of balance, annularity, and comprehensiveness have been inherited from the 18th and 19th centuries as the epitome of rational budgeting. They initially evolved in order to balance budgets at what would today be low levels of spending. They, however, stand in the way of steadily increasing expenditures that characterize contemporary government. From the more current perspective of governmental growth, it is better to have to justify budgets that are unbalanced, noncomprehensive, and continuous. The value previously placed on a balanced budget has been replaced by strategic imbalance of Keynesian economic theory - spending for purposes mandated by a public as a source of economic stability.

Likewise the norm of comprehensiveness is no longer practicable in modern governmental economics. Fragmentation of jurisdiction over spending and complicated mechanisms of spending have turned modern budget into shreds and patchwork. Rather than having the government spend its revenue directly, there are a wide variety of expenditure mechanisms outside the direct control or close supervision of the government: taxpayers may be provided funds to be used for governmentally approved purposes; loan guarantees which appear in the budget only if there should be a default; avenues variously called ''entitlement,'' ''backdoor financing,'' or ''mandatory items'' which appear in the budget only as estimated outlays; as well as off-budget corporations. Taken as a whole these extra-budgetary developments constitute a drastic move away from comprehensiveness. Control of spending has declined with the norm of comprehensiveness, since the government cannot maximize simultaneously in opposing directions.

The norm of annularity still seems fairly intact, although with each passing year even this seems less certain. Pervasive uncertainties regarding expenditures and revenues have led to repetitive budgeting - ie. budgeting is continuously reformulated. With the expectation of annularity comes a fiscal predictability or periodicity. Certainty motivates agencies to cooperate with central controllers, so that the mutual understanding is that because the treasury promises to pay the amount passed in the budget, agencies will exercise restraint in requests and try to stay within the allocated amounts. Once this implied contract is broken (ie. the norm of annularity fails) and the treasury cannot guarantee the allotted amount, agencies enter into more harsh competition with each other for uncertain governmental funds. They employ a variety of means (including backdoor spending and other extra-budgetary routes) to acquire as great a share of available funding as possible. With the demise of the rule of limiting aspirations for spending the initial bids made by agencies are unreliable and of little use in trying to coordinate the budget.

Disaggregative and continuous budgeting both contribute toward and fit in with unbalanced budgets - serving to disguise amounts of total spending. Budgets that are unbalanced, continuous, and disaggregated are meant to be larger than budgets that are balanced, annual, and comprehensive. Changing budgetary norms help to account for governmental growth in a way consistent with the cultural theory advocated by W and W.

Balanced Budgets and Unbalanced Regimes
In one respect the past is relevant to the present state of budgetary development, since it is the result of decades of incremental change. On the other hand, the ideas (norms) that animated past revenue and expenditures seem to be out of synch with present conditions.

Current discourse focuses on the deficit as a structural problem. ''Structural'' here means that built-in spending is expected to exceed built-in revenue. By posing the issue in this way, the implication is that governmental spending is out control. And if there is a structural defect/imbalance, then it must be eliminated by restoring balance.

One possible solution often discussed in America is the imposition of expenditure limits to balance the budges (eg. Gramm-Rudman-Hollings bill). These global spending limits are intended to (re)introduce the norms of comprehensiveness and balance by law rather than custom. One result of such approaches is ''the fiscalization of the public policy debate'' - where programs are rarely considered solely on their substantive or political merit, but instead on their contribution to the deficit. By aggregating totals and converting them into symbols of which regime is ahead or behind, this way of budgeting highlights conflict, making differences increasingly difficult to resolve.

Budgeting does not determine political alignments; rather, because budgeting is a subsystem of politics, political cultures shape budgeting. So, in the long run people must alter their ways of life before altering budgetary outcomes in any significant and relatively lasting manner. It is interesting to note that the ''solutions'' currently being offered to the budgetary crisis all depend on increasing the size of the government. W and W project that in the balanced budget arena, a struggle between sectarian and hierarchical regimes would lead to higher imbalances as they compete for credit over who has provided the most benefits. Further, they believe that it is likely that the more cohesive hierarchies will defeat sects and, without challenge, impose greater balance at a cost of reducing liberty.

CLAUS OFFE
''Challenging the Boundaries of Institutional Politics: Social Movements since the 1960's''

Since the 1970's there has been a fusion of the political and nonpolitical spheres of social life. This opinion is based on 3 phenomena: 1.) the rise of ''participatory'' moods and ideologies, which lead people to exercise the repertoire of existing democratic rights more extensively; 2.) the increased use of noninstitutional or nonconventional forms of political participation, such as protest, demonstrations, and unofficial strikes, and 3.) political demands and conflicts concerning issues that used to be considered moral or economic. Thus, the conflicts and contradictions of advanced industrial society can no longer be meaningfully resolved through etatism, political regulation, and the inclusion of ever more issues on the agendas of bureaucratic authorities. New social movements seek to politicize civil society in ways that are not constrained by representative-bureaucratic political institutions and thereby to reconstitute a civil society independent from increasing control and intervention.

The differences between ''old'' and ''new'' politics can be summarized along the lines of issues, values, modes of action, and actors, as seen in the following chart (73):

OLD PARADIGM
Issues: economic growth and distribution; military and social security; social control
Values: freedom and security of private consumption and material progress
Modes of action: external: pluralist or corporatist interest intermediation, political party competition, majority
Actors: socioeconomic groups acting as groups (in the group's interest) and involved in distributive conflict

NEW PARADIGM
Issues: preservation of the environment, human rights, peace, and unalienated forms of work
Values: personal autonomy and identity, as opposed to centralized control
Modes of action: external: protest politics based on demand formulated in predominantly negative terms
Actors: socioeconomic groups acting not as such, but on behalf of ascriptive collectivities

''Old'' politics reigned from 1945-1970. During this time, there was a sharp separation between organization representing societal interests and the political parties concerned with winning votes and office. Collective bargaining and representative party government were the exclusive mechanisms for resolving political and social conflict.

''New'' politics identifies with issues that are neither public or private and its space of actin is noninstitutional politics. New Social Movements (NSM) insistence on the nonnegotiability of their concerns provokes angry reactions from political forces still operating within the old paradigm. They are seen as irrational and politically incompetent, with tactics that are counterproductive. The NSMs cannot negotiate because they do not have anything to offer in exchange for concessions, as with negotiations with labor unions, for example. The movements lack some of the properties of formal organizations, or a coherent set of ideological principles. The most striking characteristic of the NSM actors is that they do not rely for self-identification on either established political codes (left wind, liberal, conservative, etc.) or on socioeconomic codes. Instead, they classify political conflict in categories taken from their issues, such as gender or age.

NSMs consist of 3 segments of the social structure: the new middle class, elements of the old middle class, and those people outside the labor market or peripherally involved (students, housewives, etc.).

There are 2 approaches to analyzing the NSMs:

Psychological Approach:
- emphasizes ''push'' of new values and preferences (''rising demands'')
- major independent variables: formation of motives
- research methods: survey research, neutral outside observer; emphasis on attitudes

The most famous of these theories is Smelsner's Collective Behavior theory. This portrays activists as uprooted, alienated, and irrational. However, the participants of NSMs are generally economically secure, well-educated, and rational.

Note: Inglehart also belongs to this approach because he suggests the spread of value changes as the major variable in the rise of new politics. Offe criticizes this approach as being high unspecific and contingent on the age cohort that experiences prosperity and security.

Structural Approach:
- emphasis on perception of and knowledge about events and developmental tendencies: ''pull'' of interpreted facts
- formation of cognitions and cognitive competence
-participant observer, exploring interaction between events and understanding

This argument is favored by those who see the NSMs in terms of their potential for structural change rather than their ''political deviance.''

This approach traces the origin of issues to circumstances, changes, and events that take place ''outside the actors.'' Three important aspects of the post-industrial society are:

1. Broadening: the negative side effects of the established modes of economic and political rationality are no longer concentrated and class specific; they are disperse in time, space, and kind so as to affect virtually every member of society in a variety of ways.

2. Deepening: there is a qualitative change in methods of domination, making their efforts more comprehensive and inescapable, and disrupting even those spheres of life that so far have remained outside the realm of rational and explicit social control.

3. Irreversibility: both political and economic institutions have lost any self-corrective or self-limiting capacity; they are caught within a vicious circle that can be broken only from outside the official political institutions.

Impact of NSMs:

Survival: In contrast to formal organizations, which can exist for a while even if nothing is happening, NSMs are directly dependent on events in their social environments to provide a catapult for action; this puts them in a precarious position. To overcome this problem, NSMs have defined certain occasions for collective action (e.g., Black Solidarity Day, National March on Washington for Gay Rights, etc.). Conscious reliance on a common cultural background also provides a way to make up for lack of formal organization.

Success:
Substantive success - positive or negative decision made by political elites that conforms to the demands of a new social movement (e.g., a protested construction project is stopped).
Procedural success - changes on the mode of decision making (e.g., referenda are permitted).
Political success - recognition and support are granted by institutional actors such as political parties or the media.

Alliances: Whether the forces representing the new paradigm transcend their marginal power position depends on how the inconsistencies that exist between the members and the old middle class within the NSMs can be resolved. Offe argues that only an alliance between the NSM and the traditional left (unionized working class, elements of the new middle class) can lead to an effective and successful challenge of the old paradigm of politics.