DANIEL BELL
''Who Will Rule? Politicians and Technocrats in the Post-Industrial Society''

The theme of rationality has been prominent in the works of such classical sociologists as Durkheim, Weber, and Parsons. Bell acknowledges that the development of every advanced industrial society, and the emergence of the post-industrial society, depend on the extension of a particular dimension of rationality. However, he is questioning the definition of that rationality.

A post industrial society is one in which the majority of those employed are not involved in the production of tangible goods. The manual and unskilled worker class gets smaller and the class of knowledge workers becomes predominant. The character of knowledge also changes and an emphasis is put on theoretical knowledge rather than empirical. Theoretical knowledge is the impetus of innovation and growth. Because of this, universities will become central institutions and prestige and status will be rooted in the intellectual and scientific communities.

Another feature of the post industrial society is the speeding up of the ''time machine,'' so that intervals between the initial forces of change and their application have been radically reduced. People now seek to anticipate change, measure the course of its direction and impact, control it, and shape it for predetermined ends.

Symbolically, the birth years of the post industrial society were 1945-50. The developments of nuclear energy established the important relationship between science and government; cybernetics introduced ''social physics;'' and a new ''future-orientation'' arose. During this time, the fundamental themes of the technocratic age (rationality, planning, and foresight) were born.

Technocracy is defined as a political system in which the determining influence belongs to technicians of the administration and of the economy. A technocrat is a person who exercises authority by virtue of his/her technical competence. The technocratic mind view emphasizes the logical, practical, problem-solving, instrumental, orderly, and disciplined approach to objectives, its reliance on a calculus, on precision and measurement, and a concept of a system (pp. 348-349).

The technocratic mode of production is bound to spread in our society because it is so efficient. However, that does not necessarily mean that the technocrats themselves will become a dominant class. The differences between how power is held in society (the nature of the system) and who holds power (the group) is show in the following table (359):

		PRE-INDUST	INDUST	POST-INDUST

Resource	land		machinery	knowledge

Social Locus	farm		business firm	university
		plantation			research inst.	

Dominant	landowner	business		scientists
Figures		military		people		researchers

Means of 	direct control	indirect influ.	balance of techno-
Power		of force		on politics	polit. forces
						franchises, rights

Class Base	property		property		technical skill
		military force	polit. orgz. 	polit orgz
				tech skill		

Access		inheritance	inheritance	education	
		seizure by	patronage	mobilization
		armies		education	cooptation

In post-industrial societies, the stratum of scientists will have to be taken into account in the political process. In addition, the scientific ethos will predispose scientists to act in a different fashion, politically, from other groups.

Class denotes not a specific group of persons, but a system that has institutionalized the ground rules for acquiring, holding, and transferring differential power and its attendant privileges. In American society today, there are three modes of power and social mobility:

Base of Power:	Property		Polit. Position	Skill

Mode of Access:	Inheritance	Machine 	Education
		Entrepren.	 Membership
		Ability		Cooptation

Social Unit	Family		Group/Party	Individual

Increasingly in post industrial societies, technical skill becomes an overriding condition of competence for place and position. Property decreases in importance as ''new'' forms of property arise. These new forms arise from a new definition of social rights whereby people make claims on the community to ensure equality and other rights.

Though the weights of the class system may change, the nature of the political system, as the arena where interests are mediated, will not. Society has become national (i.e., crucial decisions are made by government rather than the market) and communal (i.e., more groups now seek to establish their social rights through the political order). The relationship between technical and political decisions in he post-industrial society will be a crucial problem of public policy.

The conception of a rational organization of society has thus become confounded. Rationality as a means - as a set of techniques for efficient allocation of resources - has been twisted beyond recognition; rationality as an end is confronted with the cantankerousness of politics. The politics of the future will not be quarrels between functional economic interest groups for distributive shares of the national product, but the concerns of a communal society, particularly the inclusion of disadvantaged groups.


ROBERT DAHL
Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City

pp1-10: ''The Nature of the Problem''

Alexis de Tocqueville wrote in Democracy in America that the US was the most egalitarian country he'd ever encountered. However, Jammes Bryceargued that equality did not exist in the US in terms of material conditions and intellectual elitism. Although there were no formal marks of rank, there were grades and distinctiond of inequality in the US. However, he did acknowledge that a universl beleif in democracy still existed.

**But if there is inequality of condition, must there not also be great inequalities in the capacities of different citizens to influence decisions of their various governments?

To answer this question, Dahl looks at the unequal distribution of choices that influences voters in New Haven, Connecticut. He finds that it is not the political parties, interest groups, social and economic elite, or politicians who govern. It is the leaders and the masses who govern together. Dahl gets a large part of this idea from de Tocqueville and Gasset, who aregued that under certain conditions of development, (industrialization) older , strtaified class based structures of development are destroyed. In their place arises a mass of individuals with no secure place in the social system. They lack strong political ties and are thus ready to attach themselves to any political entrepreneur who will cater to their desires. Leaders cater to mass tastes and in return use the obedience and loyalty of the masses to weaken all opposition to their rule.

Hence, instead of asking who governs? We should ask:

Does the way in which resources are distributed encourage oligarchy or pluralism?
What is the relative importance of the most widely distributed resource -- the right to vote?
Are patterns of influence durable or changing?
Is the operation of the political system affected in any way by what citizens believe/ profess to believe about democracy?

Ch 8 : ''Overview: the Ambiguity of Leadership''

To gain legitimacy for their actions, leaders frequently surround their covert behavior with democratic rituals. The distinction between the rituals of power and the realities of power is frequently obscure. First of all, some people influence decisions more directly than others because they are closer to the stage when laws are vetoed. Second, the relationship between leaders and citizens in a plural istic democracy is frequently reciprocal.

The Political Stratum:

The members of the political stratum are a small group of individuals in a locale who are the main bearers of political thought and skills. The are active politically and involved in an inter-community net work of other political enthusiasts. The political stratum is not a static group: itis easily penetrated because competitive elections give politicians a powerful motive for expanding their coalitions.
The members of the stratum are affiliated with different political parties. Although members of the stratum are directly and primarily involved in shaping political issues, they are also easily manipulated by politicians. If a politician sees no payoff in the interest of the stratum, his interest is likely to be small, Also, through reward and deprivation of political favors, the politician can manipulate the stratum to support him on certain issues. He may also find it in his interest to keep a shaky coalition.

Leaders and sub-leaders

Leaders are a relatively small proportion of the people, who exercise relatively great direct influence over all the important choices for the life of the association. To achieve their goals, leaders adopt strategies; however, their actions take place under extreme conditions of uncertainty. Subleaders assist leaders in carrying out their goals. Leaders pay subleaders with financial or political rewards.

Policies

Policies often contain direct or indirect, actual or expected payoffs of some kind to leaders and constituents. In fact, they are an important means by which leaders gain support. Overt policies are not always identical to or consistent with the covert commitments politicians make to their subleaders. Often, there is no conflict in this, because those who reap the benefits of the covert policies (typically subleaders and other political employees) do not care if the overt and covert policies do not match up. However, conflict can arise between overt and covert policies
1) when large elements of the political stratum develop stricter standards of political morality
2)if overt policies with great popularity among constituents require structural changes in the organization of government that would make it more difficult to honor traditional kinds of covert policies.
The keener the political competition, the more likely the leaders will resolve conflicts in favor of their overt commitments.

Democracy, Leadership, and Minority Control

Even if the policies of political associations were usually controlled by a tiny minority of leaders, the policies of the leaders n local government would tend to reflect the preferences of the populace. Citizens have little direct influence on policies, but they have a large extent of indirect influence through means of elections. Nonetheless, the direct influence of leaders on policies extends well beyond the norms implied in the classical models of democracy developed by political philosophers. The relations between leaders, subleaders, and constituents produce a pervasive ambiguity in the distribution of influence that permeates the entire political system.

Chp. 19 ''On the Species Homo Politicus ''

Sometimes the actions of governments may threaten the primary goals of homo c ivicus. He may then deliberately set out to use the resources at his disposal in order to influence the actions of governments. However, after the danger passes, he'll revert to non-political strategies for attaining his primary goals. Homo civicus is not a political animal.
Homocivicus can change into homopoliticus when the primary goals that animate him become durably attached to political action. Political man invariably seeks to influence civic man, but even in democratic systems, civic man only occasionally seeks to influence political man directly. Like civic man, political man develops strategies that govern the ways in which he uses the resources at his disposal. In pluralistic, democratic political systems, the range of acceptable strategies is narrowed by traditions of legitimacy.

Resources

A resource is anything that can be used to sway the specific choices or the strategies of another individual. It is anything that can be used as an inducement. Resources are not permanently fixed in amount. Political man can use his resources to gain influence and then use his influence to gain more resources.

Hypotheses

1)A number of American cities have passed through a transition from where a system of resources of influence were highly concentrated to one in which they were highly dispersed.
2)dispersion does not represent equality of resources of resources, but fragmentation.

Six characteristics of dispersed inequalities:

1)many different resources for influencing officials are available to different citizens.
2)these resources are unequally distributed
3)individuals best off in their access to one kind of resource are often badly off with respect to many other resources.
4)no one influence resource dominates all the others in all or even most key decisions
5)with some exceptions, an influence resource is effective in some issue areas or in some specific decisions but not in all.
6) Virtually no one is entirely lacking in some influence resources.

The Use of Political Resources (Bk V)
Ch 24 ''Overview: Actual and Political Influence''

An elementary principle of political life is that a political resource is only a potential source of influence. The extent to which individuals use their varying resources to gain influence over government decisions varies:

1) over the life cycle of the individual (highest is in the prime of life)
2) as different events take place and different issues are generated in the political system
3)with different issue areas
4)with different kinds of individuals

Why individuals vary in their use of political resources:
1)variations in access to resources
2)variations in political confidence: estimates as to the probability of succeeding in an attempt to influence decisions
3)differences in alternative opportunities for using one's resources in order to achieve other goals
4)differences in estimates as to the value/''reward'' of a successful effort

(the above four reasons are caused by subjective reasons such as personality, as ell as objective reasons such as class and wealth)

Stability and Change (Bk VI)
Ch 27 ''Stability, Change, and the Professionals''

There are three characteristics of great importance to the operation of a political system:

1)Slack in the system
Political resources are ''slack in the system'' when most citizens use their resources for purposes other than gaining influence over government decisions. There is a great gap between people's actual influence and their potential influence.

2)The Professionals
There are two contrasting groups of citizens in pluralistic liberal systems:
a) those who use their political resources at a low level
b) a tiny body of professionals within the political stratum who use their political resources at a high level.

The professional political man has much more influence on political decisions than the average citizen. He has labor time devoted to politics, more resources, and more skills.

3)Skill
Skill in politics is the ability to gain more influence than others, using the same resources. However, skill is not always enough, even for professional political men. They work in a context of high uncertainty. Professionals vary in the extent to which they use all the resources at their disposal. some are driven to ''pyramid'' their influence.

The art of ''pyramiding''
Localities can change from conditions of petty sovereignty to executive centered orders. This happens when local leaders engage in ''pyramiding.'' First, the leader must have access to resources not available to his predecessor (these can be slack resources). by using these resources with higher efficiency, the new leader moves his actual influence closer to his potential influence. Because of this greater influence, the new leader improves his access to more resources. However, the policies of the leader must not provoke so strong a counter-mobilization that he exhausts his resources with no substantial increases in his influence. He could provoke a minority in the community to use its political resources at a markedly higher rate in opposition to his policies.
The distribution of resources and the ways in which they are/are not used in a pluralistic system constitute an important source of both political change and political stability. The distribution of resources can actually prevent a leader form running away with the system. Widespread consensus on the American creed of democracy and equality is also a stabilizing factor.

Ch 28 ''Stability, Change, and the Democratic Creed''

Theorists have usually assumed that stability in a democratic system must have widespread agreement on ideas about democracy (including de Tocqueville). However, stability dose not necessarily depend on widespread belief that the system is preferable. A democratic system can be stable if a substantial part ofthe electorate accepts the rules. In fact, often the majority of citizens will not employ their potential influence, and they have little skill, so a political system supported by a minority of leaders can conceivably be more stable. If any of the characteristics of power would shift to the majority, the system would become unstable.

Consensus as a process

Democratic beliefs, like other political beliefs, are influenced by a recurring process of interchange among political professionals, the political stratum, and the great bulk of the population. ''Consensus'' is a variable element in a complex and continuous process.

Characteristics of the process of Consensus:

1)over long periods of time the great bulk of the citizens possess a fairly stable set of democratic beliefs at a high level of abstraction: ''the democratic creed.''
2)most citizens assume that the American political system is consistent with the democratic creed.
3)widespread adherence to the democratic creed is produced and maintained by powerful social processes, such as formal schooling.
4)despite wide agreement on a general democratic creed, however, citizens frequently disagree on its specific applications. Nonetheless, they can adhere to inconsistent beliefs because the creed is so vague. Citizens can qualify universals in application while leaving them in tact in rhetoric. Also, most citizens know very little of political theory.
5) members of the political stratum are more familiar with the ''democratic'' norms, more consistent, and more explicit in their political attitudes. They are also more often in agreement on the norms.
6)political professionals have access to extensive political resources which they employ at a higher rate and with superior efficiency.
7)sometimes disagreements over the prevailing norms occur within the political stratum and among professionals, but they rarely involve the public.
8)among the procedures supported by the legitimists in the political stratum are some that prescribe ways of settling disagreements (e.g., appeals to judiciary authority)
9)ordinarily then, it is not difficult for a stable system of rights and privileges to exist that does not have widespread public support and occasionally even lacks majority approval.
10)occasionally, a sizable segment of the political stratum develops doubts that it can ever achieve the changes it seeks through the accepted procedures internal to the professionals. Dissenters attempt to arouse public support so professionals will have to change.
11) an appeal to the populace may terminate in several ways. It may fail to create a stir, the legitimists may win, or the dissenters will win -- in which case they will become the next generation of legitimists.

The Role of Democratic Beliefs

Beliefs of ordinary citizens only become relevant when professionals engage in an intensive appeal to the populace. Even then, majority wishes are filters throughthe political stratum and public officials before they become policy.

Consequences of consensus on the democratic creed
1)the creed gives legitimacy to an appeal to the populace
2)it insures that no appeal is likely to succeed unless framed in terms consistent with the creed.
The consensus on political beliefs and practices has much in common with other aspects of the democratic system. Leaders lead and are led. Citizens extend unequal levels of influence over the content of political consensus. The widely held belief in the creed limits ways in which leaders can shape the consensus. The creed is not immutable, but open to the processes of change that constitute the relations of leaders and citizens in a pluralistic democracy.


ANTHONY DOWNS
An Economic Theory of Democracy, Cbs 4 and 8

Chapter 4, The Basic Logic of Government Decision-Making

Traditionally, economic theory assumes that the social function and private motive of government both consist of maximization of social utility or social welfare. Anthony's hypothesis differs from this standard econ view in three ways: 1) in Tony's model, government's social function is not identical with its private motive; 2) Tony is interested only in the latter, which is the maximization of votes instead of utility or welfare (gov't's private motive is to get re-elected); 3) the gov't is a party competing with other parties for control of the electorate.

Fundamental Principles of Gov't Decision-Making
A. The concept of marginal operations.
1. The gov't in our model wishes to maximize political support, so it carries out those acts of spending which gain the most votes by means of those acts of financing which lose the fewest votes. Since the gov't is competing with other parties not currently in office for control of the governing apparatus, its planning must take into account not only the voters' utility functions (what they want to maximize) but also the proposals made by its opponents.
2. Assume that the new gov't makes only partial alternation in the scheme of gov't activities inherited from the preceding administration; it does not recreate the whole scheme.
3. A vote against any party is not a vote against government per se, but is net disapproval of the particular marginal actions that party has taken.
4. Both the gov't and the voters are interested in marginal alternations in the structure of gov't activity. Marginal alternations are partial changes in the structure of gov't behavior patterns each administration inherits from its predecessor (that is, no one is interested in total revolution, just change).
B. The Majority Principle
Under conditions of certainty, the gov't's best strategy is to adopt choices favored by a majority of voters. If it fails to do so, its opponents will do so and will fight the election on this issue only, thereby insuring defeat for the incumbents.
1. The gov't subjects each of its decisions to a hypothetical poll and always chooses the alternative which the majority of voters prefer. It must do so because, if it adopts any other course, the opposition party can defeat it. Thus, to avoid defeat, the government must support the majority on every issue.

II. Opposition against the majority principle: the opposition party can sometimes defeat a majority-pleasing government by using one of three possible strategies. The incumbent's defeat by these strategies is predicated on a lack of strong consensus in the electorate combined with the opposition's ability to refrain from committing itself until after the government acts. The strategies are...
A. Complete matching of policies. The opposition party adopts a program which is identical in every way with that of the incumbent party. This manoeuver forces voters to decide how to vote by comparing the incumbent's performance rating with those of previous governments.
B. A coalition of minorities. Under certain conditions (when there is a lack of consensus in the electorate), the opposition can defeat a government which uses the majority principle by taking contrary stands on key issues, i.e., by supporting the minority.
C. The Arrow Problem. Again, there must be a lack of consensus in the electorate. If voters disagree in certain particular ways about what goals are desirable, the government may be defeated because it cannot follow the majority principle even if it wants to. If there are, for instance, three choices on a particular issue, and three voters, and each voter has a different first preference,

Voter
JPG         CBS        JPS
Choice
1st               f           g          h
      
2nd               g           h          f

3rd               h           f          g

then, in such a case, no alternative has majority support for first choice. Any alternative the incumbent chooses can be defeated in a paired election by some other alternative. If the gov't picks f, both Chris and Janet prefer h (they both rank it higher than f). As long as the gov't must commit itself first, the opposition can chose some other alternative, match the government's program on all other issues so as to narrow the election to this one, and defeat the incumbents. The gov't in such a situation cannot adopt a rational policy; no matter what it does, it is wrong because the majority would have preferred some other action.

III. The Prevalence of the Will of the Majority
A. The rule of the passionate majority. In a two party system, both parties nearly always adopt any policy that a majority of voters strongly prefer, no matter what strategies the parties are following. We cannot judge how passionate a majority is by its feelings about any one issue. The members of a passionate majority may only care slightly whether M is chosen rather than N; while the minority may frantically desire N. The crucial point is whether the citizens in the majority have a greater preference for their position on this issue than they do for minority positions they hold on other issues. Parties do not judge passion by comparing voters with each other; they compare the intensity of each voter's feelings on some issues with the intensity of his feelings on others. B.The Political Significance of Passionate Majorities.

Majority rule prevails in government policy formation only when there is a consensus of intensities as well as a consensus of views. Consensus of intensities: most citizens agree on what issues are most important, even if they disagree about what policy to follow on each issue. Consensus of views: a majority of citizens have the same opinion about what policy to follow on a given issue. By encouraging specialization of viewpoint, the division of labor tends to break up passionate majorities and foster minority coalition governments.

Gov'ts are engaged in political warfare as well as maximization problems. When it is following the majority principle, the gov't plans its budget by taking a hypothetical poll on every decision. When it is using some other strategy, it judges every action as a part of its whole plan for the election period. Unforeseen events then will force it to recalculate the whole plan in light of what it has already done. Since gov'ts plan actions to please voters and voters decide how to vote on the basis of gov't actions, a circular relation of mutual interdependence underlies the function of government in a democracy.

Chap 8, The Statics and Dynamics of Party Ideology

If political ideologies are actually the means to the end of obtaining votes, and if we know something about the distribution of voters' ideological preferences, we can make predictions about how parties will change their ideologies as they maneuver to gain power. Conversely, we can state the conditions under which different parties' ideologies come to resemble each other, diverge from each other, or remain in some fixed relationship.

1. A two-party democracy cannot provide stable and effective government unless there is a large measure of ideological consensus among its citizens. If voter preferences are bimodally distributed, there will be two parties who differ ideologically in significant ways. Whichever party wins will attempt to implement policies which are radially opposed to the other party's ideology. This means that government policy is likely to produce chaos. The appearance of a balancing center party is unlikely, since any party forming in the center will be forced to move toward one extreme or the other to get votes, since there are so few voters with moderate preferences.
2. Parties in a 2-party system deliberately change their platforms so that they resemble one another. Parties in a multi-party system try to remain as ideologically distinct from each other as possible. In a two-party system where voter preferences are normally distributed, parties will grow more and more ideologically similar in an effort to garner votes. The possibility that parties will be kept from converging ideologically depends on the refusal of extremist voters to support either party if both became similar; abstention becomes (in a certain world, if the actor is future oriented) rational as a strategy extremist voters use against the party nearest them to keep that party from moving toward its opponent. Multiparty systems arise where preferences are multimodal.
3. If the distribution of ideological preferences remains constant across voters, the political system will move toward a position of equilibrium in which the number of parties and their ideological positions are stable over time. The number of parties at equilibrium depends on i) the nature of the limit on the introduction of new parties and ii) the shape of the distribution of voters.
i) In order to survive, a party needs some minimum of voters to support it. This minimum depends on the type of electoral system. In a winner take all system, a party must win more votes than any other party running in order to survive. This arrangement encourages parties which repeatedly lose to merge until the survivors have a reasonable chance of winning; this tends to narrow the field to two parties. In a proportional representation system, the minimum amount of support to keep a party going is greatly reduced, so a multiparty system is encouraged.
ii) multiparty systems are most likely to arise when the distribution of voter preferences is multimodal. Because of the distribution of voter preferences, parties will strive to distinguish themselves from one another. Voters in multiparty systems are much more likely to be swayed by matters of ideology and policy than are voters in two party systems (the latter being massed in the moderate range where both ideologies lie, and hence being more likely to be swayed by personality or some other nonideological factor; since they are not really offered much choice between policies, they may need other factors by which to discriminate between parties—see 5 below).
4. New parties can be most successfully launched immediately after some significant change in the distribution of ideological views among voters. There are two kinds of new parties: parties designed to win elections, and parties designed to influence already existing parties' policies. The latter are blackmail parties. Ross Perot's intention was to be a real party (to actually become president of the United States, the little fascist), but his effect was to be an influence party: the Democratic party's (and the Republican's) policy positions were changed because of him. A change in the distribution of voters can effect the development of new parties (eg, the enfranchisement of the working class); it is not the number of new voters, but the distribution of their preferences that matters (eg, women's suffrage didn't create any new parties, though it basically doubled the number of voters).
5. In a two-party system, it is rational for each party to encourage voters to be irrational by making its platform vague and ambiguous. Each party casts some policies into the other's territory (see the Democrats and crime) in order to convince voters there that its net position is near them. In the middle of the scale, where most voters are massed, each party scatters its policies on either side of the middle (this causes an enormous overlapping of moderate policies). Each party will sprinkle these moderate stands with a few extreme stands in order to please its far out voters (as Clinton did originally with the gays in the military thing). It is possible to detect on which side of the ideological continuum a party lies by looking at the extremist policies it espouses (this may be the only way to make such a detection, since both parties are so similarly moderate). Both parties are trying to be as ambiguous as possible about their actual net position. Ambiguity increases the number of voters to which a party can appeal. Since both parties find it rational to be ambiguous, neither is forced by the other's clarity to take a stand. This ambiguity makes it difficult for voters to act rationally: voters are encouraged to make their decisions based on some other factor than the issues (personality, habit, etc.).


RON INGLEHART
Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society

In trying to understand the relationship between politics and economics, the rational choice model is incomplete because it ignores cultural factors. Inglehart argues that different societies are characterized to different degrees by a specific syndrome of political cultural attitudes; that these cultural differences are relatively enduring, not immutable; and that they can have major political consequences.

Culture is a system of attitudes, values, and knowledge that is widely shared within a society and transmitted from generation to generation. It is learned and my vary from one society to another.

The political culture approach differs from rational choice in arguing that 1.) people's responses to their situations are shaped by subjective orientations (i.e., how they interpret their circumstances), which vary cross-culturally and within subcultures; and 2.) these variations in subjective orientations reflect different socialization patterns and are therefore difficult to undo. Thus action is due not only to external circumstances, but also to enduring differences in cultural learning. This is an attempt to link macro (economic) variables with micro (socialization) ones.

The Relationship Between Economic Development and Modern Democracy:

Three factors are important:
1. the emergence of a politically powerful commercial-industrial bourgeoisie
2. the development of preconditions that facilitate mass participation in politics
3. the development of mass support for democratic institutions, and feelings of interpersonal trust that extend even to members of opposing forces

Inglehart's emphasis is on the emergence among the general public of norms and attitudes that are supportive of democracy, especially interpersonal trust.

Inglehart uses data from the annual Euro-Barometer surveys to examine the role of civic culture in the development of democracy. He measures civic culture with three variables: interpersonal trust, life satisfaction, and percentage of people who support revolutionary change.

Results:

1. There is a broad syndrome of related attitudes that show substantial and consistent cross-cultural variations. (This confirms his original assertion that cultural values are stable and enduring).
2. Nations that are characterized by high levels of life satisfaction, interpersonal trust, tolerance, etc. would be more likely to adopt and maintain democratic institutions than those whose publics lacked such attitudes.
3. Economic development (as measured by GNP) is not directly related to democracy but is mediated by linkages with social structure and political culture. The model looks like this:

			SOCIAL STRUCTURE  
ECONOMIC	-----[			          ]------DEMOCRACY
DEVELOPMENT
			CIVIC CULTURE

Inglehart does not advocate cultural determinism but an interactional model that takes economics, politics, and culture into account.

Cultural Change and Economic Development:

Civic culture is only one aspect of a still broader cultural syndrome, which seems to reflect a long-term process of social and economic change. In the Protestant Ethic, Weber argues that culture is not simply an epiphenomenon determined by economics, but an autonomous set of factors that sometimes shape economic events as well as being shaped by them. In analyzing the relationship of religion to economic development, Inglehart argues that Protestantism led to capitalist development only insofar as the Protestant reformation was associated with a larger system of the breakdown of traditional cultures, which were associated with stability and therefore did not foster growth. While Protestant societies initially industrialized faster, these regions began to slow down relative to Catholic countries in the second half of this century. Why? For one thing, Catholic culture changed and the role of the merchant and profit-maker became less stigmatized. Also, people in Protestant countries that had experienced early economic growth were raised in relative prosperity and this led to the development of postmaterialist values, which in turn changed economic development.

Materialist/Postmaterialist Thesis:

Materialist values are those that emphasize physical sustenance and security. Postmaterialist values emphasize belonging, self-expression, and the quality of life. As modern societies have developed and become more prosperous, there has been a gradual but pervasive shift in values from materialist to postmaterialist and this has led to a diminishing emphasis on economic growth in these societies. This is do to:

1. scarcity hypothesis: people place greatest subjective value on those things which are relatively scarce
2. socialization hypothesis: one's basic values reflect the conditions that prevailed during one's preadult years. Therefore, there is a time lag between socioeconomic conditions and the dominant value system. Postmaterialist values are a cohort effect and not a period effect since people don't go back to materialist values in time of economic scarcity.

This thesis emphasizes the reciprocal relationship between economics and culture.

Postmaterialist values are also associated with a ''New Class'' consisting of students, young professionals, technocrats, and politicians.

New Social Movements:

NSMs are based not on materialist issues (class) but based rather on postmaterialist issues, such as the environment, peace, equality. These issues have less and less to do with the class-split issues that used to be dominant in politics. Since they come from different value sets (PM values), they tend to split existing parties.

The Old Left consists of the working class, who tend to favor economic growth and technological progress. The New Left consists mostly of the middle class, who tend to mistrust economic growth and technological progress. The reason for the growth of the NSMs rests in part of ''cognitive mobilization.'' This occurs when people are familiar with political participation and can be easily mobilized. Because of cognitive mobilization differences, the Old Left is more easily mobilized toward the right, while the New Left is mobilized to the left.

Values, rather than class, are the best predictor of participation in a NSM, even when age, education, and political persuasion are controlled for.