NEIL BENNETT, DAVID BLOOM, AND PATRICIA CRAIG
''The Divergence of Black and White Marriage Patterns''

This article looks at determinants of first marriage among black and white women. There are three major differences between the two groups:
1. lower proportions of blacks marry than whites;
2. the proportion of women who ever marry has declined substantially across cohorts for blacks but only modestly for whites; and
3. increased education is positively associated with probability of ever marrying among blacks and slightly negatively among whites (i.e. the more education a black woman has the more likely she is to marry, the more education a white woman has the less likely she is to marry).<

This racial divergence is consistent with three factors differentially experienced by black and white women:
1. The marriage squeeze; given traditional age differences, there are far fewer eligible mates for black women than for white women among cohorts born before the late 1950s.
2. Labor market success: for both groups employment success is positively associated with propensity to marry, but for young blacks the labor market situation is generally poor and has deteriorated over time in comparision with other groups.
3. Out-of-wedlock childbearing: having an out-of-wedlock child at any age is strongly negatively associated with the likelihood that a woman will ultimately marry.

These are their findings and they say that what is clear is that there are no simple explanations for decline in marriage rates and differences between the races. In applying their findings to more general issues they say that for many young women marriage plays a less significant role than it did a generation ago. Formal marriage is a weaker institution and it occupies a less central place for blacks than for whites. Other trends indicate that the marriage squeeze may be coming to an end and the prospects for fuller employment are better (written in the mid 80s so we can ignore this false optimism). Consequently, they conclude in a 'you-never-know' type way that they cannot predict the trends with certainty and there are cultural factors, and endemic class situation to be taken into account.

This article is good in that it shows marriage trends and differences and offers plausible hypotheses as to why the trends are as they are and differ between black and white women. Worth noting are the three differences and the hypotheses used to explain them.

RICHARD BERK and SARAH FENSTERMAKER BERK
''Supply Side Sociology of the Family: The Challenge of the New Home Economics'' (1983)

This article is supposedly one of the most influential and respected criticisms of Becker's New Home Economics (NHE). It describes the strengths and weaknesses of the 'household production function.'

I. What is the New Home Economics?

Theory:
Microeconomic approaches to household production assume that the well-being (i.e., utility) of families depends indirectly on goods and services purchased in the market. The immediate sources of family well-being are 'household commodities' that household members produce by combining their time with market goods and services. These commodities cannot be purchased in the marketplace, but are produced as well as consumed by households using market purchases, own time, and various environmental inputs. These commodities include children (?), prestige and esteem, health, altruism, envy, and pleasures of the senses, and are much smaller than the number of goods consumed.

For example, health is a function of meals that are in turn prepared through the efforts of a cook using the market inputs of groceries, kitchen appliances, electricity, and a number of production factors. Vital work is performed without which the family could not survive. Within the NHE, these activities are represented by 'household production functions,' one for each commodity. In the model, families are assumed to seek their highest level of well-being possible (i.e., maximize their utility), subject to two constraints: their financial resources and the amount of time available. In both cases, however, households can over time increase their wage rates and/or effective time available for household production by investing in their human capital. They can also improve production efficiency by introducing technological advances.

In trying to achieve the highest level of well-being, households grapple with how to best routinely allocate their time among work in the market, production of household commodities, and investment inhuman capital. According to NHE, households solve such allocation problems much as small factories do trying to maximize output in the least costly fashion. And with this assumption, the standard microeconomic relationship for optimality follow as a matter of deductive logic. For example, under equilibrium conditions, the marginal utility per unit cost is the same for all household commodities. In other words, the returns from the next commodity produced divided by the cost of producing the next commodity are the same for all household commodities.

Now consider the 'behavioral implications' of this economic analysis. With an increase in real wages, three processes are set into motion. First, there will be on the average an increase in demand for all household commodities. This is nothing more than the usual income effect transported to the household: with greater real wages, more consumption can be supported. Second, there will be substitution in consumption through which households reduce the intake of time intensive household commodities. In effect, the price of these commodities has increased relative to the price of time used in consumption is the wages foregone. Finally, there will be a substitution in household production through which labor intensive methods are replaced with goods-intensive ones, where possible.

'Efficient households' capitalize on the comparative advantages of members and extensive specialization can be expected over time. Thus Becker proves the following theorem: ''At most one member of an efficient household would invest in both market and household capital and would allocate time to both sectors.''

Empirical Support:
Broadly speaking, empirical work within the NHE is consistent with the generalized theory of demand: overall, price and income perform roughly as advertised. Yet, often the effects are small and serious measurement problems undermine compelling conclusions. There are also severe specification problems since there are no reasonable measure of family members' preferences. many empirical findings are inadequate because they allow various sociological interpretations. To sum, Beck and Beck argue that the theoretical side of NHE has more to offer sociologists than the empirical side.

II. The Challenge in Emphasis

One can remain profoundly skeptical about the scientific value of the NHE and still find ideas of genuine merit. Distancing oneself somewhat from many of the details reveals, in particular, an emphasis on certain properties of households that are too often ignored or misconstructed by sociologists. In effect, the NHE asserts that family sociology has too often looked for the wrong think in the wrong place. Families are really 'about' the production of household commodities; instrumental activities are alive and well in he household; and all family members are implicated.

The challenges to sociologists: Families could not exist if what we loosely call household work were not routinely accomplished. One cannot understand families without understanding household work: its content, organization, management, and implications. Since time spent in household production cannot be allocated to the market, and time spent in the market cannot be allocated to household production, neither household nor market activities can be studied isolation. One can invest in human capital that enhances productivity in the market and/or one can invest in productivity in the household. Again, the household and the market are given equal conceptual status, implying that one cannot study one without the other. The kinds of rational decision making that many sociologists find easy to accept when modeling consumer decisions or labor force participation apply equally well to the allocation of time to household production. To take only one example, how couples choose to have children is no different from how couple decide whether one or both members should hold full time jobs in the market . (??)

To summarize, even if formal results of the NHE are totally without merit, the emphasis on household production as the central family activity fundamentally challenges much of the existing sociological literature on the family.

III. The Challenge of Premises

The central premises of the NHE represent major challenges to sociological thinking, especially: Since the household is assumed to maximize utility, the NHE relies on the same kinds of behavioral assumptions that lie beneath all neoclassical microeconomics. In brief, the NHE assumes that families must closely approximate the optimal allocation of their resources. Implicit in this is the assertion that household optimization should be widespread because inefficient households will not survive. There exists a kind of winnowing process such that household partnerships falling short of optimal production will be dissolved.

Sociologists have been challenged to determine whether some kind of 'natural selection' actually favors efficient households, and if so, how it works. Households are always at the margin. This implies either that households are able to adjust quickly to a changing environment or that the environment is stable. Thus, households' attempts to maximize are often unsuccessful or fleeting. It might be worthwhile to reorient this premise toward dynamic processes in which the optimal allocation of resources is a target toward which families strive. The decision making unit is the household as a whole. Thus it is the household's well-being that is maximized, not the well-being of any individual.

Becker uses the notion of altruism to creatively deal with the idea of a household unit. That is, all family members, even if they are interested in maximizing their own (individual) utility, will nevertheless act as if they are altruistic toward the single altruistic benefactor. This implies that the altruist (usually the head of the household) and all family members will maximize their joint income, and that the household can be said to have a single family utility function. However, this model requires that the altruist has complete and accurate information about each member's ongoing welfare in the face of strong motives among selfish members to withhold such information.

Households are assumed to have full, perfect and costless information about all factors affecting their utility. No one knows how complete such information is, what sorts of errors are made, or how much the info costs. The decision maker's a priori preferences play only a cameo role. According to Becker, preferences are assumed not to change over time, nor be very different between wealthy and poor persons, or even between persons in different societies or cultures. The model assumes that there are not institutional constraints. For example, labor markets, marriage markets, capital markets, and markets for gods and services are assumed to function perfectly.

Becker excludes ''joint production'' from his model. Thus, nothing formal can be said about how efficient households manage to maximize their well-being. Household utility function is weakly separable into the goods and times used to produce the same commodity. However, the production process needs to be explored in order to ascertain if this separability is realistic. Household production must evidence constant returns to scale. First household commodities need to be clearly defined and then one must explore whether these returns to scale actually exist.

IV. The Challenge of Method

Resting fully on neoclassical microeconomics, NHE can, in principle, capitalize on modern theory-building strategies and can draw on an enormous array of powerful econometric techniques. NHE attempts to simplify (oversimplify?) the world in order to extract the barest of essentials (much like Weberian ideal types).

Conclusion:
The importance of Becker's work lies in its emphasis on household production, its provocative assumptions, and its methods. The theory's formal structure includes so many problems and ambiguities that its account of family phenomena is difficult to swallow. The NHE has ''marched up to the brink of absurdity and , without a backward glance, jumped over the edge.'' Yet, despite its problems, the NHE may well be the most instructive approach to the family that social scientists have yet devised.

NANCY BIRDSALL
''Analytical Approaches to the Relationship of Population Growth and Development''

In this article, Birdsall looks at the 'macro- and micro- consequences' school-- which claims that in countries with high fertility rates, the net costs attached to meeting development objectives in such areas as education, health, and employment could be reduced by increasing expenditures on explicit programs to reduce fertility (family planning programs). She also looks at the micro consequences of large numbers of children, and the macro and micro determinants of fertility. She states that different types of research are more or less important for different types of countries, depending on their demographic situations.

The Macro Consequences of Population Growth

Population growth is no longer seen as an unequivocal benefit, because it is no longer favorable to production, especially in developing countries. Nelson and Leibenstein saw population growth as an endogenous variable influenced by income.
This is a Malthusian perspective:
increasing income --) increase in population growth --) pop growth
exceeds income growth --) per capita income falls --)low level equilibrium trap.

Coale and Hoover found that over a 30 year period, percapita income could be as much as 45% lower under high fertility. This and many other studies view mortality and fertility rates as exogenous to the model, although they can be affected by policies which are not incorporated into the model. The government can affect fertility trends.

The macro-economic consequences of high population growth are:
1)high education expenditures or decreased effectiveness
2)increased health care expenses
3)w/o policy adjustments, rapid rates of natural increases condemn a large portion of the labor force to low production, low wage jobs in agriculture, or informal urban services
4)high fertility may exacerbate unequal distribution of income, yet there is little evidence for this. Income distribution may be more dependent on soc, ec, and polit, factors.
5)high pop also creates an increased need for food and resources, as well as putting strain on the environment. This still needs more research from geographer, scientists, etc.

Studies in the 1950's and 60's showed that as population increases, so do social welfare costs. Working out the consequences of this growth, however, must be carried out on a country be country basis, because each region has different needs. The next steps in research for these countries , instead of generalizations of past trends and future projections should be to design effective fertility reducing programs based on research of the determinants of fertility.

The Micro Consequences: Family Size and Welfare

Large families have detrimental effects on maternal and child health and development. The lower a country or region's income, the greater the aggregate effect of large family size on the health and capabilities of the population Medical care decreases and morbidity increases.

The micro consequences of population growth include:
1)maternal health negatively affected by frequent pregnancy
2)larger families have lower per person food consumption
3)high inequality of income distribution among families
4)large families are often in low income, low education brackets, and tend to reproduce these qualities.
unequal distribution of income --) unequal distribution of skill --) low income
This evidence has important implications for ''population policies'' in developing countries.

Macro and Micro determinants of fertility
Research on determinants has sought to identify other factors besides the availability of contraceptives that may influence fertility decisions

Macro-determinants research
There is a relationship between fertility and socio-economic development. Certain indicators of advanced development are consistently correlated with low rates of fertility:
high rates of literacy
high per cap consumption of energy
high urbanization
low infant mortality
high per cap income

However, what are the mechanisms through which these indicators affect fertility? In addition, other studies show that there is no particular relationship between these indicators and changes in fertility. Two studies go beyond simple correlation to identify how fertility change fits into the complex of other socio-ec. changes that development entails. Oeschli and Kirk claim that fertility and mortality can't be disentangled as indicators from the development process. It is just that there are certain values of indicators above which countries experience fertility decline (e.g.: literacy at 75%, etc.) Gregory and Campbell have the same findings, except with urbanization rates.

Micro determinants research
Micro-determinants research takes the household as a unit. it looks at how individual fertility decisions are affected by environmental changes. Especially in underdeveloped countries, children are seen as economic assets. Economic development actually increases the costs of children (higher education and medical expenses, etc. ). Fertility decisions are often made within the community. Social norms dictate how many children are acceptable per family. In LDC's, the 'clan' ( I love this terminology.) may influence fertility behavior. Another interesting question is, do villages with higher or lower levels of access to services (health, water, etc.) have different patterns of fertility?

Some Critical Variables
There are certain variable which affect population growth which can be affected by public policy. The strength and direction of these effects are very different for countries at different stages of development and with different cultural environments.

1)Infant Mortality and Fertility
High mortality leads to high fertility (child replacement, anticipation of child loss). High fertility leads to high mortality (birth spacing difficulties, premature weaning). Sometimes lower mortality leads to lower fertility because as the 'quality' of children improves, parents try to lower their 'quantity.' Policy objectives of reducing mortality and fertility can be mutually reinforcing.

2)Female education and labor force participation
This variable has a negative relationship to fertility because women will have more information on family planning and it will reduce their interest in having large families. Women's earning opportunities increase, an their age at marriage goes up. Policy objectives here can also be mutually reinforcing.

3)Family Planning Services and Fertility
Within countries as well as across countries, estimates of the cost-effectiveness of family planning must take into account differential responses depending on development levels.

4)Income distribution and fertility
An improvement in income distribution could rely on a fall in fertility rates, but this could rely on a simpler argument that once a certain level of economic and social well-being is achieved, fertility will begin to decline

All four of the above areas of policy intervention may contribute to reducing fertility and provide benefits in addition to fertility reduction.

Summary and Conclusions
Rapid population growth can exacerbate development problems. Studies of macro consequences must be done on a country specific basis. Demographers must also consider the micro consequences on family welfare High fertility slows efforts to redistribute income for the poor. There are policy interventions in some developing countries that have been effective at tolerable cost . Important policy objectives are family planning, mortality reduction (which can lower fertility rates), female education and occupation, and welfare services. No one intervention can affect fertility in a simple downward direction. Variables have a joint effect.

EVELYN KITAGAWA
''On Mortality''

Neglect of mortality studies - demographers view research in terms of policy relevance of results (govts are expected to spend all they can to extend longevity - it is a universal value). Actually, govts spend more money on making life more pleasant while we are alive (schools, roads, houses).

Mortality levels are a product of social choices made under budget constraints and alternative. Mortality levels are more responsive than fertility levels to policy. Although health and longevity are near-universal values, we don't all spend all our resources on it (e.g., giving up cigarette smoking).

Rather than policy relevance, demographic research can be evaluated according to whether or not it contributes to understanding of causes and consequences of population trends.

Historical Trends

Developed countries:
-end of 17th C - mortality rates high and fluctuating
- 18th C mortality in European countries began to decline
- since 1950 most improvements in developed countries have been small (mainly in infant mortality; some decreases for women and children; some countries, death rates for older men have risen; convergence)

Developing countries:
- Africa, Asia and Latin America have had a different pattern
- transition began about 1900 - 1940 (slowly), after W.W.II (fast)
- lack of convergence in life expectancy

Factors in Mortality
Average levels of living, public health programs, social, political, cultural factors. Individual levels of income, education, occupation, access to medical care, personal habits, nutrition, diet, etc.

3 Models of Epidemiological Transition:

Classical/Western Model
- gradual, progressive transition from high to low mortality and fertility accompanying modernization (socioeconomic factors, sanitary revolution, medical and health progress).

Accelerated/Japan model
- same as above, quicker

Contemporary/Delayed model
- declines in mortality began after W.W.II --> explosive population growth.

LARRY A. SJAASTAD
''The Costs and Returns of Human Migration'' (1962)

Sjaastad proposed to identify some of the important costs and returns to migration - both public and private - and to devise methods for estimating them. This treatment places migration in a resource allocation framework because it treats migrations as a means in promoting efficient resource allocation and because migration is an activity which requires resources.

Migration:
Too Much or Too Little? Demographers have been interested in figuring out how large income differences persist in the face of such massive movements of population. Sjaastad has three suggestions: Net migration is not necessarily a useful measure for testing the labor market's ability to remove earnings differentials. Disaggregation of both the migrant and parent population by at least age and occupation may be required to confirm or deny the alleged failure of migration to achieve a reasonably equal income distribution over space. The 'perverse' behavior of gross migration is consistent with observed income differentials being generated by occupational as well as geographic mobility.

Differences in Earnings:
Many demographers have concluded that high earnings are associated with net in-migration, and low earnings with net out-migration. However, the qualifications to this observation are numerous and the observed relationship is usually quite small and weak.

Occupational composition can account for some, but not all of the differences in earnings among states. The results of a study by Frank Hanna show that: 1.) the low income states are dominated by occupations with relatively low earnings at the national level, and 2.) the earnings within particular occupations in the low-income states tend to be lower than the national average. This supports the hypothesis that migration does not constitute a response to spatial earnings differentials; moreover, this evidence is consistent with he hypothesis that migration is a search for opportunities in higher-paying occupations.

Studies of net migration have only revealed the fact that net migration is in the right direction. Sjaastad proposes that demographers treat migration as an investment increasing the productivity of human resources, an investment which has costs and which also renders returns. The difficulty of the method is that it is necessary to identify and measure the costs as well as the returns to migration; its credit is the possibility of meaningful comparisons between migration and alternative methods of promoting better resource allocation.

The Private Costs of Migration:
The money costs of migration include the increase in expenditure for food, lodging, transportation, etc., necessitated by migration. The order of magnitude of these costs is surely sufficiently small that it cannot account for the large earnings differentials encountered in the data. Non-money costs include opportunity costs - the earnings foregone while traveling, searching for, and learning a new job. In addition, there are psychic costs from leaving familiar surroundings, family, friends, etc.

The Private Returns to Migration:
Money returns encompass not only those returns stemming from earnings differentials between places, but also the returns accruing to the migrant in his capacity as a consumer. In addition, there will be a non-money component, positive or negative, reflecting his preference for that place as compared to his former residence. Finally, there is the pure consumption return that should be regarded as the satisfaction or dissatisfaction the migrant receives in the course of his actual travel.

Migration, training, and experience should be viewed as investments in the human agent. Whether or not additional investment is worthwhile depends crucially upon the age of the individual. Younger people tend to migrate more.

The Private versus Social Costs and Returns Migration also involves costs to non-migrants, such as changes in the tax structure or charges for services such as schools. Also, when assessing the returns of migration, the migrant must consider the returns to his progeny from the resulting change in the latter's location.

Conclusion:
Migration cannot be viewed in isolation. Complementary investments in the human agent are probably as important or more important than the migration process itself. Only the estimation of the direct as well as associated costs of migration together with returns can reveal the extent of resource misallocation created by the frequently alleged barriers to mobility. The following additional conclusions require further empirical study: Gross rather than net migration is a more relevant concept for studying the returns to migration as well as the impact of migration upon earnings differentials. Migration rates are not an appropriate measure for estimated the effect of migration. Age is significant as a variable influencing migration and must be considered in interpreting earnings differentials over space among occupations. the relation between private and social costs of, and returns to, migration at best depends upon market structure, resource mobility in general, and revenue policies of state and local governments.

MAYONE J. STYCOS, ed
Demography as an Interdiscipline, 1987.

NOTE: This book contains 8 articles by different authors. Each should be read as its own essay. Also not that I did not summarize the Thorton and Fricke article on the bibliography b/c the essay by Thorton and Fricke contained in this book is a later, more refined version of said article.

SAMUEL H. PRESTON
''The Social Sciences and the Population Problem''

Four essentially independent conceptions of the population problem are visible in current discussions.

1. Macroeconomics school. The conception of the problem that is rooted in macroeconomics is that rapid population growth produces slower economic growth, as measured by output per capita or per worker. This outcome, it is typically argued, is produced by an increased ratio of labor to other factors of production that results when populations grow faster (the law of diminishing returns).

2. Microeconomics school. This school of thought argues that there are serious costs to high fertility that are not borne by the childbearing couple, but rather by the larger society. Therefore, social intervention in the childbearing process is desirable. To micro economists, this is an example of market failure. This way of framing the problem is much more congenial to liberal democracies than is the first. The population problem as perceived here is not a problem of population growth, but rather, it is a problem of equalizing the social costs and benefits from childbearing.

3. Medical definition. Derived primarily from the health sciences. In this view, the problem is that many couples around the world are having more children than they want because they are unable to practice effective contraception, and these unwanted children carry with them serious consequences for the mother and for the family as a whole. Excess fertility becomes analogous to a disease, and the cure is contraception. This approach is particularly appealing to those who study the relative status of women. there is also much quantitative support for the view that much unwanted childbearing occurs in LDCs. (Strange that Lee and Bulatao didn't find this strong evidence. )

4. Environmental definition. This viewpoint has developed primarily over the past several decades with the growth of the environmental preservation movement. Too many people severally stress the environment and the natural resources of the earth. There are many different strands of this theory, all center on the idea that people view the environment as an instrument of human gratification. The solution is some sort of 'environmental enshrinement.'

These 4 definitions are not mutually exclusive, however, the approach one adopts determines research strategy and policy implications. Often researchers and other concerned parties have vested interests in seeing their orientation used to define the population problem. One solution consistent with all of the above strategies is family planning.

Social scientists who deal with population problem are still concerned with the two economic orientations above and the presumed economic effects of population growth. The effects of population on economic growth has been a big issue of concern, and has become alarmist in past decades. However, after reviewing recent research, Preston claims that this concern is misplaced and there are several findings which directly go against predictions of the classic models. These findings should affect the tone of the current discussion about the population
1. Rapid per capita econ. growth in developing countries has continued despite unprecedented rates of population growth
2. Fertility levels are declining in many developing countries.
3. There has been increased enthusiasm for market solutions and less excitement about government regulation and intervention.
4. There is evidence that childbearing in LDCs is purposive, this goes against that the idea that high fertility is a product of ignorance.
5. Most importantly, there is evidence that non quantifiable factors such as knowledge are the principal sources of gains in human well-being, not economic gains.

Preston finds the economic models full of shortcomings. They have held for so long b/c gains in knowledge (technology and science) and the evolution of social institutions have occurred at the same time as demographic transition and economic growth, and these other factors are ones responsible for increased standard of living and quality of life. Since the necessary technology is already developed, many LDCs do not need to experience the classic demographic transition to experience economic growth and reap its rewards. These intangible factors are the true catalysts of change, and they are hard to quantify, so heavily quantitative research is misdirected.

As far as extra familial costs of high fertility, Preston claims that more rapid population growth tends not to impose additional direct costs on others, but it does worsen income inequality in the aggregate.

Preston looks at the contribution of other disciplines to the discussion of the population problem. They have had little influence on how the problem is conceived, but they have played a major role in clarifying the dimension of the problem and mapping out the array of possible solutions. Finally, The US is currently faced with a population problem consistent with the microeconomics school. That is, a problem of resources and individual costs as the population ages rapidly and the balance of dependents shifts form the young to the old. It is a problem of the purse strings.

SUSAN COTTS WATKINS
''The Fertility Transition: Europe and the Third World Compared''

This article compares the declines in fertility in Europe and the Third World. Lower levels of fertility were largely due to the adoption of innovative behavior within marriage. So far this transformation of reproduction has been monotonic and rapid. Socioeconomic development is associated with the timing of the onset of the transition and is responsible for differences among groups during the transition, although it is not yet possible to rule out alternative explanations such as ideational or institutional change. The pace and pervasiveness of the declines, however, suggest that a mechanism of diffusion is involved.

Watkins focuses on marital fertility, arguing that this is still the foremost context of fertility and that any changes in marital fertility have historically been irreversible. Watkins cites recent challenges to the demographic transition theory as her jumping off point. Watkins claims that an examination of the pre-transition period suggests (1) the regulation of marital fertility was an innovation and (2) orientation to individual economic gain may have played a smaller role in the past than is usually assumed. Pre-transition data suggest that couples made no attempt to regulate fertility or control family size, through contraception, abortion, spacing, abstinence, or any other method, across the physically able reproductive period.. Breast feeding and postpartum abstinence were practiced mainly for the increased chances of child survival, not to prevent future births. Thus, fertility was not controlled through individual practices, but it was regulated on the societal level. Social norms regarding sexual practices, timing and appropriateness of marriage, and postpartum practices (The duration and intensity of suckling) regulating fertility on a societal level.

Watkins reviews the traditional explanations of fertility transition and the causes of it. She assents that almost all studies find that some measures of economic change are important. However, there are examples of the transition without strong indicators of economic change, such as France, China, and Sri Lanka. The findings are also compatible with several alternative explanations. Watkins emphasizes a major alternative perspective which emphasizes ideational or institutional change, such as a shift to individualism or implication of family-planning programs. Such an approach is consistent with her earlier assertion that individual choice is not as important in determining fertility as is society.

The largest challenge to traditional explanations of fertility transition however, concern the pace and pervasiveness of change. There is some support for claims that the later a transition begins, the faster it proceeds. Watkins claims the pervasiveness determines the pace. This is supported by findings concerning the relatively short lag between the onset of the transition in some groups and its adoption by others in some countries. Lag is shortest when language and physical barriers are minimized and information flows most freely. It appears to transcend social class. Watkins says that ethnicity was often an important variable in previous studies, but its effect operated mostly through language and conflicting cultural patterns. All of these findings suggest that some sort of a mechanism of diffusion was involved, though the precise mechanism is as yet unknown.

CALVIN GOLDSCHEIDER
''Migration and Social Structure: Analytic Issues and Comparative Perspectives in Developing Nations''

There are profound relationships between migration and social structure, reflecting the varieties of migration types, the complexities of social structure, and the reciprocal ways migration and social structure are interrelated over time, in different societies, for different communities and social groups. Almost every thread of social structure may be linked to migration patterns at macro- and micro-levels of analysis, cross-sectionally and longitudinally, with variation over the life cycle, connections to levels of socioeconomic development, and relationships to social class and subject to political control. This paper focuses on several propositions that identify and illustrate the complexities of these linkages in developing nations and suggests some of the ways in which our understanding of social structure enhances the analysis of migration processes and vice versa.

(1) What are the relationships between migration and other demographic processes, and how are these relationships linked to changes in the social structure?

It has often been suggested that rural-urban migration has adversely negative effects on socioeconomic development in both the cities and the countrysides of Third World nations. Goldsheider says that it is time to reevaluate this oversimplified claim. Migration is linked to social structure through its effects on both the changing size and the composition of populations and through the fundamental relationships between demographic size-composition and social structure. These effects are mechanical. In contrast, there are demographic connections the are behavioral and involve choices and goals.

Migration may act as a diffusion mechanism for new ideas, attitudes and behaviors. It does this by bringing 'traditional' people in contact with 'modernity.' Migration may also uproot and affect social linkages by altering the familial control over resources and status, or freeing the individual from certain obligations or constraining norms. Such changes may breed future migration, and it certainly affects not only migrants, but non-migrants. these effects tend to be localized.

(2) What have been the social and economic adjustments of migrants in the cities of the developing nations?

Goldscheider acknowledges that the economic motive figures prominently in migration, but he sees it as a pulling force. Particular sectors of the economy within large cities draw on the supply of rural surplus labor. And even when jobs are scare, the potential is greater in cities than it is in places of origin. But what of the life migrants lead in the cities? They are often employed in low-wage, nasty jobs, and they reside in some of poorest conditions. Goldshceider that this is not because of the experience of migration per se, but rather it is a result of educational background and skill level. It may be embedded in the process of selection to migrate. Thus it is the broader sources of poverty, not the factors of migration, which need to be addressed.

(3) What are the conditions generating rural out-migration? Are there alternatives to viewing migration in the context of rural pushes on individuals who are rational choice actors?

Goldscheider is critical of the rational choice theory of migration. He bases his conclusions primarily on comparative studies and focuses on the community of origin. First, the determinants of migration vary with the type of migration involved. He also finds that the decision -making unit is not the individual but the household. Migration then becomes one strategy of social and economic survival of rural households. It is classic diversification of risk argument. Land ownership figured prominently, differently affecting farmers and non-farmers. There was no consistent or conclusive findings with respect to the effects of social class.

Emerging research and issues 3 important guidelines should shape future research:
(1) the new analytic questions that are associated with a household focu
(2) a dynamic view of migration, its determinants and it consequences, in generational perspective
(3) a reexamination of the adjustments of migrants in a framework of competition and conflict

Methodological issues center primarily around questions of measurement and determination of certain phenomenon.

JANE MENKEN
''Proximate Determinants of Fertility and Mortality: A Review of Recent Findings''

Social, cultural, and economic factors that influence fertility work through the intermediate variables or proximate determinants that directly affect reproduction. This analytical framework for the study of fertility has long been the accepted one. In it, fertility is governed by two types of proximate determinants or immediate variables, those that affect exposure to risk of childbearing, and those that affect the rate of fertility during the period of exposure, or , equivalently, the interval between births in the period. The exposure variables are of two types, those that demarcate the biological reproductive span, and those that establish the social reproductive span.

The effective reproductive span, during which a woman is both fertile and sexually active, is the overlap of these two periods; it begins at menarche or marriage, whichever occurs last, and ends at menopause or marriage dissolution, whichever occurs first.

The biological reproductive span. The onset of menarche is variable across and within countries, both genetics and environmental influences contribute to the variation. An inverse relationship between SES status and age at menarche characterizes many populations, the link has long bee expected to act through nutrition, though this finding is currently under question. It is more difficult to determine age at menopause or sterility, since it is generally recognized only in retrospect. Though malnutrition has long been suspected to lower age at menopause, there is no concrete evidence. Disease induces sterility may be more widespread in some developing countries though.

Although biological factors delineate the boundaries of the effective reproductive span, in that hey establish the maximum feasible reproductive span, societal patterns control how much of this span is available for childbearing. Within the effective reproductive span, the rate of childbearing is determined by three variables: (1) the postpartum infecundable period, determined mainly by breast feeding patterns (2) waiting time to conception, determined by postpartum norms of sexual activity and fecund ability (3) probability of intrauterine mortality, uninduced - increases with age of the mother, however it is more likely the result of induced abortion

Watkins fins the proximate determinants framework to be a useful one for the study of fertility, and advocates its application to mortality studies. There is evidence that the maximum age is not reached among humans, much be some influencing factors as to why.

KAREN OPPENHEIMER MASON
''The Impact of Women's Social Position on Fertility in Developing Countries''

This paper examines ideas about possible ways in which the extent of women's autonomy, women's economic dependency, and other aspects of their position vis-_-vis men influence fertility in Third World populations. The paper takes an eclectic approach to the definition of women's position, but it is always in reference to their position in relation to men. Unfortunately, precisely what involves an inter-gender rather than an intra-gender comparison is often unclear. Mason focuses on measures of education and employment, using ideas or evidence only if the posited relationships to fertility seem likely to involve the power, resources, or prestige of women in relation to men. Her discussion is organized according to the National Academy of Science's framework of fertility determinants, which includes a list of intermediate fertility determinants that are potentially influenced by women's social position.

1. Supply of Children
In developing countries, female age at marriage usually has an inverse relationship to fertility, primarily through increased length of time in which women are sexually active. The extent of women's freedom of action or decision making is though to influence age at marriage through four intermediate variables:
- size of dowry ( where practiced, the larger the dowry, more time spent in accumulating it, increases marital age),
- arranged marriages (where practiced, decreases marital age in attempts to insure sexual purity), - women's desire or ability to work ( the greater a woman's desire/ability to work before, but more importantly, after marriage, the less economic aspirations and increased personal aspirations, will tend to increase marital age), and - parental desires to prolong daughter's employment ( daughters who work for wages before marriage and contribute them to the general household, will be more economically desirable for the parents if she remains unmarried, will tend to increase age at marriage.

Other influential factors include marital disruption and remarriage, and breast feeding. It is often suggested that women's increased economic autonomy encourages or facilitates marital disruption, which may be true. It also may be that increased disruption necessitates higher labor force participation for women. Whether women's gainful employment influences breast feeding and whether such effects operate through female autonomy or dependency are equally controversial.

2. Demand for Children
This is determined by three factors - gender preferences, value of children, and costs of children.
- Gender preferences for children are usually used to gauge the position of men and women in a society, but this procedure is questionable b/c data yields mixed results.
- Four possile values of children to parents which may influence the total demand for children have beeen argued to reflect some aspect of gender inequality. they are children as insurance against divorce, as validators or securers of women's position in the family, as contributors to economic gain, and as risk-insurance against old age support. The pros and cons of these theories are bettered covered in other articles.
- All of the child costs thought to be linked with female status (not all of tehm necessarily monetary) are opportunity costs, rather than direct costs. three main paths of influence here are the equlity/restriction of the husband-wife relationship, patterns of female education, and female post-marital employmnet opportunities.

3. Fertility Regulation and Decision Making
This can be assessed mainly through use of contraception and factors entering into fertility decisions. Decisions about fertility and its regulation are greatly influenced by both supply and demand of children, as outlined above. there is good evidence that women's education and autonomy promotes the use of contraception in most developing countries outside of tropical Africa. Aforementioned factors also affect effectiveness of use. Where a sexual double standard exists concerning sexuality and sexual affairs, women's contraceptive use will be frowned upon. As for the effects of gender inequalities on fertility, results are again mixed. Equality and egalitarianism are expected to give women greater control over and participation in decision -making. However, women have been observed to participate fully in fertility decisions in some known unegalitarian societies.

Summary The most plausible hypotheses about the paths through which aspects of women's position may influence fertility in developing countries can be summarized by 5 models.

1. Women's autonomy is likely to be inversely related to importance or urgency of marriage, something that should influence age at marriage and hence supply of children.
2. Where women want fewer children, or are more open to fertility control, and the greater their autonomy, the more likely it is that they will engage in innovative modern contraceptive use. This should decrease the demand for children or the psychic costs of fertility regulation.
3. the greater women's economic dependency, the more important children will be as security assets and the stronger the preference for sons. This will likely keep fertility high.
4. Seclusion of women is likely to lower opportunity costs of children. Insofar as women's autonomy leads to higher levels of education, it should increase opportunity costs of children. Both of these should affect the demand for children.
5. The greater gender equality, the more a wife's health and well-being will factor into fertility decisions. This means that where health dictates limit child-bearing, and female status is higher, fertility may be lowered.

Mason concludes by bemoaning the quality and quantity of data on this subject and advises more studies.

ARLAND THORNTON AND THOMAS E. FRICKE
''Social Change and the Family: Comparative Perspectives from the West, China, and South Asia''

As Bill Axxin reminded us many times, this is an approach, not a theory. This paper asks: how do social and economic transitions such as industrialization, urbanization, demographic change, the expansion of education, and the long term growth of income affect the family structure and relationships? The answers are important for both theory and policy reasons. The question is an old one, and in this paper Thornton and Fricke draw upon recent substantive findings to make some generalizations about the influences of social and economic change on the family.

Thornton and Fricke begin with the assertion that the family is central to social structure throughout the world, yet it is also difficult to define and delimit. They provisionally define the family as a social network, not necessarily localized, that is based on culturally recognized biological and marital relationships. This definition allows fro a lot of variance. For most people of the world, the basic principle of social organization has been family. The family has been responsible for the fundamental activities of society, including production, distribution, consumption, reproduction, socialization, co-residence, and transmission of property.

Kinship groups generally pooled resources and responsibilities and participated in a specialization and division of labor among group members. Kinship relations also served as vital links in binding individual family groups into larger communities. the family mode of organization is also consistent within a wide range of economic environments. Their perspective on family change is actor-based in the sense that they see such transformation as emanating from the behaviors of individuals and families in response to changing cultural and economic constraints and in pursuit of a hierarchy of goals. Primary causal factors considered are the shifts in the structure of production; the expansion of schools and education; increases in income; migration; and the uses of time. This list is admittedly incomplete.

Thornton and Fricke look at the familial mode of social organization in Taiwan, South Asia, and the West. This comparison aims to highlight common features of this mode in widely divergent cultural areas, and to hint at the potential for variations within a basic organizational type. The familial mode of organization was the primary org. mode in the West prior to the 18th century, in Taiwan prior to the 20th century, and is encompassed in a wide array of forms existing in South Asia today.

A typical feature of this familial mode of social organization in all three cultural setting is that the household organizes, directs, and manages its internal sources of labor to produce its means of existence. Several features are common to all three. The senior generation controls the options of young family members. Economic activities are generally distributed among age and gender lines. Children are included at young ages. All wages and benefits are contributed to the family, thus incurring economic dependence of those who do not directly control the resources. Economic dependence is limited most in the case of the young. this disparity in status, wealth and power between parents and children makes the transfer of rights to the means of production an important process. For many children, it marks the transition to independence and adulthood; for many parents, it marks the transition to retirement. Education was often limited to the household. In addition, this mode is characterized by high rates of fertility, which are balanced by high rates of mortality.

Cultural variations have been many among types. the Western model has been primarily nuclear, with no more than one married couple of the same generation occupying a household. Multiple married couples of mixed generation were also rare. Young children often resided in the homes of their employers, where they often worked as domestics, laborers, or apprentices. The Chinese family often included a young married son' parents, and sometimes included multiple married brothers. South Asian family forms vary dramatically among regions and castes with respect to the vertical and lateral integration of the household, but in general they were more generationally integrated than were Western households. These patterns of household organization affected the natures of the dependence of young people on the household, and, subsequently, marriage patterns. In the West, children often married only when able to financially support their own households, which meant later marriages. In China, as well as South Asia, children were able to marry before they achieved financial independence, integrating into their parents households. Thus, marriage occurred fairly early. These differences in marriage coincide with social attitudes concerning the role and meaning of marriage - a focus on romance and individualism in the West, and an extension of the family group in China and South Asia.

This outline suggests that the substantial changes outside and within the family are intricately related. Thornton and Fricke go through each of the processes referred to earlier: education, non family employment, urbanization and migration, and wage income.

Virtually all societies have striven to develop Western-style educational systems in response to the needs created by industrialization and urbanization. This means increased time spent in school and away from home for children. Most directly, expanded enrollment decreases the amount of time a child may be engaged in productive labor activities of the family. Children also spend less time in the socializing environment of the family. Schooling also increases the direct economic costs of children. It widens children's exposure to new ideas and methods, possibly affecting children's ability and willingness to challenge parental authority. Education also affects the interactional patterns of parents and older children. In the West, higher education most likely increased length of time till gainful employment, increasing age at marriage; and in Asia, where children reside with parents till older ages, schooling decreases time spent with family.

Large-scale industrialization took more and more people out of the home to work. In the beginning of such change though, research indicates that both parents and children in the West continued to view the economic activities of young people as family contributions. Once begun, the transition to non family wage work has been rapid and dramatic, inclusive of both women and the young. As with school enrollment, non family employment shifts the locus of primary activities out of the household. Again, this reduces the amount of time children spend with parents. In the West though, such a trend, especially in and near cities, probably increased the proportion of children who resided with their parents.

The special requirements of large-capital industry include large-scale organization and worker concentration. Industrialization is often accompanied by urbanization, which is often, in turn, accompanied by migration from country to city. Some families move as units, but more often, young people take jobs outside of the family and migrate to urban areas while their parents maintain their original economic unit and residence. Young migrants may live with extended family, in work dormitories, or as boarders with non-kin. Migration can be disruptive to family organization and parental control by removing young people from adult supervision and family and local community norms and values. In China and South Asia, the outcome is usually a diversified and dispersed family economic unit which stresses lateral extension and continued economic interdependence. Even some Western countries, such as the US initially experienced similar outcomes, but recent trends have been towards young migrants establishing independent economic households.

Although the long-term effect of wage income for children is diminished control by their parents, in the early stages of change, parental control over the output of children remains strong. Early paid employment of children sometimes represents a direct expansion of the domestic economy and is often seen as a diversification of risk. Many of the problems of wage labor overlap those of migration - lack of parental supervision, exposure to new ideas, etc. Directly leads to decreased economic dependence of children on elders.

As young people spend more time in school and in work outside of households, and as they establish their residences apart from parents, opportunities for interaction with the opposite sex increase while opportunities for parental supervision diminish. This will have effects on mate selection and marriage patterns. B/c Western patterns were more individualistic to begin with, Thornton and Fricke look at China and Asia, where significant trends can be easily detected in the parental control over such life choices of their children. In Taiwan, the pace of the decline in the control of parents over choice of marital partners has been dramatic. Education and employment opportunities outside the home have been determined to be the most influential factors. Both lead to increased independence for young people and increased autonomy. In Indonesia, marriages are still arranged, but the children are more often consulted. This benefits daughters more than sons. Throughout South Asia, there is also evidence for increased decision making autonomy on this level, but the effects seem to benefit sons more than daughters. The analysis for all three case examples suggest that the influence of social change on marriage age depends on parental authority over children, Children with more freedom to spend their earnings and more say in spouse selection probably have greater ability to translate expanded job opportunity into earlier marriage. Conversely, when parents have control over the marriage and earnings of their young adult children, increased earning power by those children can motivate parents to postpone their weddings. Incidence of premarital sex and pregnancy are also affected by the changed patterns of interaction, education and earnings. Their rates have generally increased.

Conclusion:
Many aspects of family structure , particularly those concerning young adults, have changed throughout the world. Many of these changes have also been remarkably similar in the three settings. The review suggests that there is no single developmental pattern or sequence that all societies will experience. Careful attention needs to be focused on the precise causal mechanisms and processes of change, avoid 'grab bag' concepts such as 'industrialization and 'urbanization'.

STANLEY LIEBERSON AND MARY WATERS
''The Location of Ethnic and Racial Groups in the United States''

This article covers much of the same data which can be found in the Lieberson and Waters article under the Urban section, so this summary will be brief.

Lieberson and Waters hypothesize, and find support for, that the forces generating distinctive ethnic locational patterns are strongest at the time of initial settlement; thus the longer a group has been present in the United States, the less geographically concentrated it will be. This is found to be true for almost all ethnic groups except blacks and American Indians. Additionally, early ethnic settlement patterns still affect the ethnic makeup of various areas of the nation (duh). Finally, ethnic groups differ in their propensities to leave or enter an area in a way that reflects the existing ethnic concentration of the area. Thus, ethnic residential patterns tend to be cumulative over time. The ethnic and racial make-up of the US today is the result of many events , immigration policy, time of immigration, previous immigrants, countries of origin, and native residents of the land.

Lieberson and Waters look at current spatial patterns in two ways: the numerically important ethnic groups in each region, and the specific concentration of each ethnic group. They use 1980 census data. They found the most reported ancestries to be English, German and Irish, followed by Black. The oldest and most plentiful immigrant groups thus claimed the most descendants. American was also a popular ethnic group response. They list the top 10 ethnic groups in each of the 9 US regions. Each region's top 10 reflects specific historical ethnic patterns of settlements, i.e. the Midwest is still rich in Polish. In addition, current distributions also reflect the historical settlement patterns. Lieberson and Waters develop a measure of dispersion which gauges how much an ethnic group has spread out since its arrival. Not surprisingly, the most dispersed groups are those who have been here the longest, with the exception of Blacks and native Americas, who have often been prevented, or have chosen not to, fully integrate into the America population at large.

Last interesting finding, immigrant groups may unify for political or other reasons. Small, dense immigrant often have an upper hand over groups who are in larger in number, b.c they form a more cohesive, easily mobilized group.

RONALD RINDFUSS, JAMES PALMORE, LARRY BUMPASS
''Analyzing Birth Intervals: Implications for Demographic Theory and Data Collection''

The results emerging from individual level, empirical studies of birth interval dynamics do not correspond with the predictions of standard demographic theory. This paper reviews a series of individual level studies that find substantial socioeconomic variation in child spacing after controlling statistically for the major intermediate or proximate variables. The study of spacing was often overlooked, but the authors argue that it is important b/c what determines the length of time between marriage and first birth might be quite different from the determinants of the length of interval between higher and lower parity children. Rindfuss, Palmore and Bumpass begin by referencing Bongaarts (1982) and the conventional wisdom about proximate determinants.

Socioeconomic variables do not act directly on fertility, but through proximate determinants. Bongaarts demonstrated that virtually all of the important variation in fertility was captured by differences in marriage, breast feeding, contraception, and induced abortion.

The men use cases from the World Fertility survey, a multivariate study which controlled for all of the standard sociodemographic and intermediate variables such as education, SES, etc. . Korea, Peru, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines all showed an education effect on fertility when the model predicts that the education effect does should approach zero as expected. Differences also tend to be associated with class. They suggest that individual level results suggest that either important intermediate variables have been omitted or that measurement error frustrated their ability to demonstrate the intervening effects of breast feeding and contraception on fertility differentials. Finally, they also looked at a study on first birth intervals, that time between marriage and first birth, which was also based on the World Fertility survey. Results yielded substantial variations also not accounted for by the standard models. The authors of that study also suspected missing intermediate variables.

Discrepancies in data fit to the conventional model tend not to be so great on the macro-level. What then is likely to explain the discrepancies in the micro-level results? There are 3 possibilities: The first is that the measures of the 4 proximate determinants are inadequately operationalized. Second could be the omission of important intermediate variables. Lastly, it is possible that there are specification errors embodied in the multivariate analyses used on the data. the men conclude that specification errors in all 4 cases were unlikely, since each case was done by independent researchers. More likely is poor data quality and omitted proximate variables. One obvious omitted variable is coital frequency. Others might include the role of sexually transmitted diseases and their repercussions, and sperm quality.

MICHAEL TEITELBAUM
''Population and Development: Is Consensus Possible?''

The Demographic Transition is the name for the process of change from high mortality (high death rate)/high fertility (high birth rate) to low mortality/high fertility, and finally to low mortality/low fertility. This historical process has proved to be much easier to describe than to explain.

By the 1970's. fertility rates in nearly all developed countries had dropped below replacement (replacement level fertility would be fertility where people were on average having just enough children to replace themselves. )

The population history of developing nations has been markedly different. The decline in mortality in developing countries began only 40 or 50 years ago, and has been far faster than the earlier decline in Europe. Mortality declines in developing countries have by in large been unrelated to economic development, but are due instead to the importation and rapid implementation of modern and relatively inexpensive public health measures and medical technologies. These technologies and health practices had been developed only gradually during the 19th and early 20th centuries. Additionally, birth rates in developing countries were much higher than those in pre-industrial Europe at the time of the mortality decline; this is due primarily to the prevalence of earlier and more universal marriage in the developing countries.

Perhaps the least widely understood aspect of population growth is its tendency to continue even after fertility has declined. This is because of momentum. There are two components to population momentum: 1) the social and economic forces encouraging high fertility have been established over the millennia, and cannot be eliminated overnight; and 2) the inexorable logic of mathematics: the age structure of a rapidly growing population is wider at the bottom (see nifty graphic below), since there are relatively more young people -- the population is said to have a 'young' age structure. There are many more young people than adults, and as young people enter reproductive age, there will inevitably be more parents. Thus, most developing countries, because they have young age structures, are virtually assured of major population increases, whatever happens to fertility levels. Because of momentum, good population programs require long-term planning.

[missing Nifty Graphic]

Young Age Structure
Tietlebaum then lists 16 different positions for and against population regulation programs. He then says he subscribes to an amalgamation of several of the positions, and calls his the consensus position. His consensus position has the following components:
1) Frank recognition that population growth is not the only, or even the primary, source of the inequality, poverty, disease, etc. which now characterize the world.
2) The population problem is not uniform throughout the world, nor can a single characterization be correctly applied to all countries.
3) Many population concentration problems arise from distribution and rural-urban migrations, as well as overall increase.
4) barring catastrophe, the population of the world, and particularly of developing countries will increase dramatically no matter what policies are adopted.
5) Note the happy convergence of most voluntary population programs with the goal of maximizing the basic human right of each person to determine his/her own fertility.

Summary
Current pop'n growth is not intrinsically a problem. It becomes a problem to the extent that it is in conflict with human values. These conflicts arise when popn growth is too rapid to be effectively prepared for, or when it represents additional population for which resources for a decent and productive life are not available.

Great caution must be exercised in accepting the European experience as a model. Both economic growth and popn growth have been more rapid in the developing countries than in Europe.

The effects of popn policies are characterized by exceptionally long lag times. No matter what happens to fertility trends in countries with young age structures, popn will continue to grow substantially over the coming decades.

Population programs are a necessary but not sufficient component of an enlightened strategy for economic and social development. They work, but are not the total solution. ??

MICHAEL TEITELBAUM
''Relevance of Demographic Transition Theory for Developing Countries''

The theory of demographic transition is a descriptive interpretation of the transformations that took place in European demographic patterns during the 19th Cent. Its seeks to characterize three ''stages'' of fertility and mortality levels:

Stage I: equilibrium of population size; high birth rates and high death rates; infant mortality and fertility are both high. Absence of modern forms of sanitation, agriculture, transportation and medicine account for high mortality; maintenance of high fertility through strong pronatalist norms;gradual decline in mortality by adopting new techniques as they become available; over all a potentially unstable equilibrium.

Stage II: declining mortality with fertility remaining at previous high levels under control of traditional social institutions; 'population explosion;'

Stage III: individuals begin consciously to control their fertility; birth rate gradually declines to equilibrium with now low death rates; this stage cannot occur until traditional social and economic institutions supporting fertility are weakened and new ones emerge favoring a reduction in fertility;

Although the demographic transition theory is essentially plausible as general description of complex social and economic phenomena, it lacks such components as specific mechanisms of causation and definite time scale. For instance, a group of Princeton studies found that overall fertility levels in pretransition Europe were far from uniform, rather displaying considerable variation from one region to another. This could have resulted form a combination of: differences in marriage patterns; differential fecundity as a function of nutrition; prevalence levels of nursing. Evidence also shows that the onset of demographic transition occurred at different points in the various countries of Europe and that certain socioeconomic patterns associated with transition in some countries were absent in others.

Coale finds that 3 preconditions are necessary for a substantial decline of fertility within marriage: 1) fertility must be within the calculus of conscious choice 2) reduced fertility must be seen as advantageous 3) effective techniques of fertility reduction must be available

Relevance of Transition Theory for Developing Countries
The theory's general explanatory difficulties are compounded by very substantial differences between developing countries and 19th Cent. Europe in certain of the socioeconomic and demographic variables central to the theory.

On the one hand, there are differences that militate against 'natural' and timely fertility declines in the developing countries:Due in large part to imported technology, the mortality rate in developing countries (DgC) is much lower than that of early industrial Europe; further, this decline in DgC is only marginally related to the pace and level of general development in these nationsDue to the prevalence of early and near universal marriage in DgC (not present in 19C Europe) fertility is much higher in most DgCContemporary political and economic realities to not provide DgC with international migration as a means of easing population burdens as was the case in 19C EuropeThe rate of population growth in DgC is historically extraordinary, causing a demand for basic necessities that can impede social and economic development. The momentum for further growth in DgC will be harder to halt due to such factors as its more rapid pace of growth and younger age structureReduced opportunity for occupational and rural-to-urban migration in DgC limits the hypothesized effects of urban life upon family and reproductive valuesFewer opportunities for female participation in the labor force in DgCDifficulties of providing universal education

On the other hand, some factors tend to favor more prompt and rapid fertility declines in DgC:Higher pace of social and economic development in many DgCImproved methods of fertility control in DgCGreater latitude of deferment of marriage and increased nonmarriage: ie. the extreme states of these two factors in DgC can only change in the direction favoring decreased fertilityIncreased legitimacy of small family norm: DgC have the benefit of the 'demonstration effect' of the European transition, which shows the plausibility and effectiveness of small familiesIncreased interest and planning capabilities of government in DgCDgC administrative and technical infrastructure gives government the ability to permeate subnational linguistic/cultural barriers.DgC may call upon international assistance for resources and expertise. In some cases a more rapid fertility decline has been observed among some DgC

E. A. WRIGLEY
''Population and History''

This book is basically a text, but since there was an existing summary, I thought y'all might like to have it.

Largely, this book is concerned with the contrast between pre-industrial and industrial society as regards population. In pre-industrial society, economic, social and demographic factors are in negative feedback, with a tendency toward stability. In industrial society, these factors are positive and mutually reinforcing.

Demographic equilibrium is a position in which fertility and mortality are roughly in balance with one another. In pre-industrial society, their relationship looked like this:

[missing graphic - something of a Malthusian parameter]

Social custom can induce low fertility by raising the marriage age, restricting the timing and frequency of intercourse, etc, either directly or indirectly (eg., there can be actual customs, norms, and/or prescribed practices explicitly regulating intercourse (directly) or there can be customs of, say, men herding the sheep up into the mountains for six months out of the year, thus effectively limiting the timing and frequency of intercourse).

Technological developments can release tension and enlarge the population limit (eg., advances in agricultural technology).

Population Fluctuations in Pre-Industrial Populations
Short-term fluctuation: A sudden surge of mortality is not necessarily evidence of over-population. Other causes for this may be: bad harvest years, epidemic disease, other illnesses, as well as social and political events (eg, wars). An erratic and sometimes violent fluctuation around the trend line was characteristic of pre-industrial populations. Long-term fluctuation: Other things being equal, each advance in material culture should have made possible a further increase of population.

There were differences in age at marriage and other marriage customs in different regions of the world, which affected fertility levels in those regions (and, thus, the whole world). Urban areas had higher mortality, due to a greater prevalence of disease (concentration of people, sucky sanitation, etc.)

Society and Economy in Pre-Industrial Populations
In one vital aspect, pre-industrial societies were by definition in a position of negative feedback. Each period of economic growth was eventually cut short before reaching the point at which it was self-sustained and progressive. The interplay of demographic and other variables worked to preserve a rough balance between births and deaths. Whether fertility was personally or socially controlled or not depended on the society.

Population and Industrial Revolution
The characteristic distinguishing pre-industrial and industrial populations is the breaking of the negative feedback loop by technological progress. There are positive reinforcing relationships between the demand for labor, industrial development and demographic change. Mortality is reduced by elimination of the old types of 'crisis' mortality (eg, famines), and especially by improvements in the infant and childhood mortality rates. The immediate effect of the industrial revolution was increasing fertility. Eventually, fertility dropped due to the decisions of individual families, greatly influenced by growing family planning techniques.

In the twentieth century, developing nations have population problems due the fact that the reduction in mortality has not been followed by a corresponding reduction in fertility (as the European model predicts). In wealthier countries, Wrigley identifies inverse relations between wealth and fertility (that is, the richer you are, the fewer kids you have, and vice-versa). ??

MORRIS ZELDITCH
''Role Differentiation in the Nuclear Family''

While there are egs of the nuclear family almost everywhere, should look forst at the more highly differentiated society of the US. This work is heavily functionalist in character and is in the tradition fo Parsons and the boys. He uses much of the functionalist jargon and gives a number of hypotheses: if the nuclear family is a social system stable over time, it will differentiate roles such tht instrumental leadership and expressive leadership of the system are discriminated. Further if nuclear family has male adult, female adult and children then male will be instrument leader and female the expressive leader. Has a sample of 56 cases from 75 ethnographic reports of soceities. Most of the detail is long winded as he moulds different ethnographic reports from the likes of Margaret Mead into his own framework.

In conclusion, he looks at the American middle clss saying that in the distribution of tasks the Am family maintains a more flexigle pattern than most societies, but when it all boils doen Zelditch says that the man is boss, leader, and provider first and formost and the woman provides th love and affection for all (JPS adds: GAG!!!).

This chapter is very badly written and it seems that there is no one point to it all. however, I think that it is an example of a functionalist analysis of family structure, which basically says that across most societies with a nuclear family structure, the man is in the instrumental role and the woman in the expressive. Moreove, this is seen as contributing to the stability of society by maintaining solidarity, a la Durkheim. the best thinnkg to do with this is to reduce it to one sentende: an example of a functionalist view of the family, where across societies in the nuclear family, the man holds the insturmental role and the woman the expressive role.