Imagined Communities

Chapter 1: Introduction

Nationality, nation-ness, and nationalism are cultural artifacts whose creation toward the end of the 18th C was the spontaneous distillation of a complex ''crossing'' of discrete historical forces; but that, once created, they became ''modular,'' capable of being transplanted to a great variety of social terrains, to merge and be merged with a variety of political and ideological constellations. Theorists of nationalism have encountered three paradoxes: (1)The objective modernity of nations in the eye of the historian vs. their subjective antiquity in the eye of nationalists. (2) The formal universality of nationality as a socio-cultural concepts vs. the particularity of its concrete manifestations. (3) The political power of nationalism vs. its philosophical poverty.

In order to address some of these problems, Anderson proposes the following definition of nationalism: it is an imagined political community that is imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign. It is imagined because members will never know most of their fellow-members, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion. It is limited because it has finite, though elastic boundaries beyond which lies other nations. It is sovereign because it came to maturity at a stage of human history when freedom was a rare and precious ideal. And it is imagined as a community because it is conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship.

Chapter 2: Cultural Roots

Nationalism has to be understood not in relation to self-consciously held political ideologies, but the the large cultural systems that preceded it. Nationalism arose at a time when three other cultural conceptions were decreasing in importance. First, there were changes in the religious community. Nationality represented a secular transformation of fatality into continuity, contingency into meaning. The unselfconscious coherence of religion declined after the Middle Ages because of the effects of the explorations of the non-European world and the gradual demotion of the sacred language itself. The older communities lost confidence in the unique sacredness of their languages (the idea that a particular script language offered privileged access to ontological truth), and thus lost confidence in their ideas about admission to membership in the religious community.

Second, there were changes in the dynastic realm. In the older imagining, states were defined by centers, borders were porous and indistinct, and sovereignties faded with one another. However, in he 17th C, the automatic legitimacy of the sacral monarchy began its decline and people began to doubt the belief that society was naturally organized around high centers.

Third was a conception of temporality in which cosmology and history were indistinguishable. In the Middle Ages, time was thought to be simultaneous; the modern idea was of homogeneous, empty time. They idea of a sociological organism moving calendrically through homogenous, empty time is a precise analogue of the idea of the nation, which also is conceived as a solid community moving steadily through history. These three changes lead to a search for a new way o linking fraternity, power, and time together.

Chapter 3: The Origins of National Consciousness

The preceding elements set the conditions for a new form of cultural consciousness. The reason this consciousness took the form of nationalism is due to the half-fortuitous, but explosive, interaction between a system of production and productive relations (capitalism), a technology of communications (print), and the fatality of human linguistic diversity.

Capitalism was especially important because the expansion of the book market contributed tot he revolutionary vernacularization of languages. This was given further impetus by three extraneous factors: a change in the character of Latin
the impact of the Reformation, which led to the mass production of Bibles
the spread of particular vernaculars as instruments of administrative centralization.

Print languages laid the foundation for national consciousness in three ways:
they created unified fields of exchange and communication
they gave a new fixity to language
they created languages-of-power of a kind different from the older administrative vernaculars
However, the concrete formation of contemporary nation-states is not isomorphic with the determinate reach of particular print languages, one must also look at the emergence of political entities on the world stage.

Chapter 4: Creole Pioneers

Anderson is concerned with determining why it was Creole communities (those formed and led by people who shared a common language and common descent with those against who they fought) that developed early conceptions of their nation-ness well before most of Europe. There are 6 factors of Creole history that contributed to this:
the tightening of Madrid's control on these areas
the spread of the liberalizing ideas of the Enlightenment
the improvement of trans-Atlantic communication
the willingness of the ''comfortable classes'' to make sacrifices in the name of freedom
the ability of the administrative units to create meaning through the religious pilgrimage (refer to Victor Turner) and the internal interchangeability of mean and documents which helped created a unified apparatus of power
the rise of the newspaper which implies the refraction of events, even ''world events'' into a specific
imagined world of vernacular readers

The failure of the Spanish-American experience to generate a permanent Spanish-American-wide nationalism reflects both the general level of development of capitalism and technology in the late 18th C and the ''local'' backwardness of Spanish capitalism and technology in relation to the administrative stretch of the empire. The Protestant, English-speaking people to the north were much more favorably situated for realizing the idea of ''America.''

Chapter 5: Old Languages, New Models

The close of the era of successful national liberation movements in the Americas coincided with the onset of the age of nationalism in Europe. These ''new nationalisms'' were different in two respects: 1.) national print languages were of central ideological and political importance, and 2.) the nation became something capable of being consciously aspired to from early on due to the ''models'' set forth by the Creole pioneers. Vernacular print capitalism is important to class formation, particularly the rise of the bourgeoisie. Prior to this, solidarities were the products of kinship, clientship, and personal loyalties. The bourgeoisie, however, achieved solidarities on an imaginary basis through print capitalism. That is, they didn't know one another because of marriage or proper transactions, but because they came to visualize others like themselves through print. The nobility then were potential consumers of the philological revolution. As soon as the events of the Americas reached the European nobility through print, the imagined realities of nation-states became models for Europe.

Chapter 6: Official Nationalism and Imperialism

From about the middle of the 19th C there developed ''official nationalism'' in Europe. they were responses by power groups threatened with exclusion from popular imagined communities (e.g., Russia, England, and Japan). They were a means for combining naturalization with retention of dynastic power. The model of official nationalism was also followed by states with no serious power pretensions, but whose ruling classes felt threatened by the world-wide spread of nationally imagined communities (e.g., Siam, Hungary).

Chapter 7: The Last Wave

The last wave of nationalism was the transformation of the colonial-state to the national state. This was facilitate by three factors:
the increase in physical mobility
increasing bureaucratization
the spread of modern-style education
It was a response to the new-style global imperialism made possible by the achievements of industrial capitalism. The paradox of official nationalism was that it brought the idea of ''national histories'' into the consciousness of the colonized. In addition, this last wave arose in a period of world history in which the nation was becoming an international norm and in which it became possible to ''model'' nationness in a more complex way that before.

Chapter 8: Patriotism and Racism

Nation-ness is ''natural'' in the sense that it contains something that is unchosen (much like gender, skin color, and parentage). It has an aura of fatality embedded in history. It is not, however, the source of racism and anti-Semitism. Racism erases nation-ness by reducing the adversary to his/her biological physiognomy. Nationalism thinks in terms of historical destinies, while racism dreams of eternal contaminations whose origins lie outside of history. The dreams of racism actually have their origin in ideologies of class, rather than those of nation.

Chapter 9: The Angel of History

Revolutions, such as those in Vietnam, Kampuchea, and China, are contemporary exhibits of nationalism, but this nationalism is the heir of two centuries of historic change. Nationalism has undergone a process of modulation and adaptation, according to different eras, political regimes, economies, and social structures. As a result, the ''imagined community'' has spread out to ever conceivable contemporary society.

Chapter 10: Census, Map, and Museum

These three institutions of power profoundly shaped the way in which the colonial state imagined its dominion. The census created ''identities'' imagined by the classifying mind of the colonial state. The fiction of the census is that everyone is in it, and that everyone has one, and only one, extremely clear place. The map also worked on the basis of a totalizing classification. It was designed to demonstrate the antiquity of specific, tightly bounded territorial units. It also served as a logo, instantly recognizable and visible everywhere, that formed a powerful emblem for the anticolonial nationalism being born. The museum allowed the state to appear as the guardian of tradition, and this power was enhanced by the infinite reproducibility of the symbols of tradition.

Chapter 11: Memory and Forgetting

Awareness of being embedded in secular, serial time, with all its implications of continuity, yet of ''forgetting'' the experience of this continuity, engenders the need for a narrative of ''identity.''


Chapter 1: The Pursuit of Happiness

The book opens with a small set of short bio's taken from the large body of interviews that constituted a major component of the research project from which this book originated. Below is just a brief account of some of the relevant points concerning American cultural values that the authors extracted from these accounts.

-American cultural traditions define personality, achievement and purpose of human life in ways that leave the individual in isolation.
-Values and priorities are not justified by any wider framework of purpose or belief; what is good is what one finds rewarding
-Ethical values as justified as matters of personal preference value system.
-People pursue their own interests as long as it doesn't interfere with others.
-Solving conflicts is treated as a technical, rather than a moral problem.
-Emphasis is placed on honesty and communication.
-There is a vague idea of what makes up a set of values; it always seems to return to a matter of personal preference (which can change over time).
-Some seek a return to older, traditional, small town values of the past. This is, however, an unrealistic objective since it consists of subjective values rather than a true reflection of the past. Small town values can also lead to narrow notions of social justice.
-Many express the idea that the most important thing in life is doing what you chose to do as well as you can
- living up to a set of personal values. The happiness of a fulfilling life cannot be won without the willingness to make the effort and pay the costs.
-Each person is ultimately responsible for her/his own life - accepting responsibility for yourself.
-Some seem to have a much clear idea of what they are against than what they are for.

Different voices in a common tradition:

The central issue of the book is to gain a deeper understanding of the ways in which Americans use private and public life to make sense of their lives - how the resources our transition provides (or fails to provide) for enabling us to think about the kinds of moral problems we currently face as Americans. All of the cases the authors addressed, despite the different traditions they draw from, share a common moral vocabulary - the ''first language'' of American individualism. There is something arbitrary in the goals of a good life. The authors believe that this difficulty in justifying the goals of a morally good life displayed by many of those interviewed is a characteristic problem of American culture.


In small town/business America of the past, requirements of economic success were more easily reconciled with understandings of success in family and civic life. In the present-day corporate/hierarchical workplace it is hard to relate those qualities necessary for economic success with other aspects of life.


Perhaps the most resonant American value is freedom, which in some ways defines the good in public and private life. Implied here is a freedom from having other peoples' values, styles, way of life forced upon you. This issue of what you are supposed to do with freedom once you have it is a harder thing for American's to define. Freedom can tend to become an end in itself with little or no actual content. Since everyone has the right to be free from the demands of others, it can be hard to forge bonds of attachment/cooperation with others - this would imply an obligation that impinges on one's freedom.

Under the influence of modern psychological ideals, to be free is not just to be left alone but to be your own person and to define who you are, what you want from others apart from demands of conformity. A problem is that freedom from provides no vocabulary by which Americans can easily address common conceptions of the ends of a good life of ways to coordinate cooperative action with others. An image of the self-sufficient individual is implicit here. Common ties are made fragile by a freedom of each person to live where, do what, believe what, s/he wants and to do whatever possible to improve his/her material conditions. The American ideal of freedom leaves us with a stubborn fear of acknowledging structures of power and interdependence in a technologically complex society dominated by giant corporations and an increasingly powerful state.


The common conception of justice is that of equal opportunity (guaranteed by fair laws and political procedures applied in the same manner to all)for every individual to pursue their own personal ideal of happiness. This formulation of justice, however, does not tell us what the distribution of goods/wealth would look like in a society where all persons had equal opportunity to pursue their interests. This raises the issue, for example, of whether equal opportunity is enough where some individuals are disadvantaged to start with. Our available moral traditions do not give us as rich resources to think about distributive or substantive justice as it provides for procedural justice.

Chapter 2: Culture and Character - The Historical Conversion

Variations in our individualistic ideal can be found in our cultural tradition - something often overlooked in our forward-facing, future-oriented society. By cultural tradition the authors mean the symbols, ideals, and ways of life of a people that express the meaning of the destiny its members share. The themes of success, freedom, and justice are all present (although take different meanings) in the three central strands of our cultural heritage - biblical, republican, and modern individualistic ideals.

Biblical Standards

Biblical religion has long been cited as an important influence in America from its earliest colonization - by Tocqueville, among others. The Puritans (and the authors primarily cite the views of Winthrop as the standard here) although prone to viewing material property as a sign of God's approval, did have as their primary criterion for success a community in which a quality ethical and spiritual life could be lived. The Puritan settlements were, in a sense, the first of many attempts in America to create utopian communities. Freedom in the sense relevant here is not a ''natural freedom'' (do-what-you-want), but a moral freedom where one has the liberty to do only that which is good, just, and honest in the context of a the covenant between God and humanity. Authorities were expected to live up to the ideal. Justice was a matter more of substance than procedure - moderation in sanction was the tendency. Administration of justice was often subjective.

Republican Ideals

This ideal is typical of a call to service for the good of your community - eg. Washington, Adams, Jefferson. The authors cite Jefferson as their example of republican thinking. The notion of equality in this tradition does not mean that all humans are created equal in all respects, but is a fundamental political equality. Although this is a universal principle, it is only effective politically under certain conditions - ie. in a republic with citizen participation. The republican ideal embraces the idea of a self-governing society of relative equals in which all participate. Jefferson, for instance, believed that this was possible in America because it was not divided into a small powerful aristocracy and a poverty-stricken mass. The ideal was embodied in the idyllic independent farmer and cities and manufacture were feared because they would bring inequality of class and corrupt the morals of the people.

Freedom was the freedom of the individual from arbitrary state action and the freedom of press. the best defense of freedom was an educated people actively participating in government. Formal freedom and procedural freedom were important, but there was also a higher justice in the form of ''the laws of nature and God.''

Utilitarian and Expressive Individualism

Ben Franklin was the epitome of the poor kid made good. This ideal places emphasis on success through hard work and careful calculation - utilitity-modifed Christian virtues (Poor Richard's Almanac, etc.). Franklin gave classic expression to what many felt (and still feel) to be the most important thing about America: the chance for an individual to get ahead on her/his own initiative. Although he never espoused it per se, Franklin was influential in the development of utilitarian individualism in its pure form: in society where each vigorously pursues his/her own interest, the social good would automatically emerge. The mid-19th Cent. saw a reaction against this utilitarian individualism. Writers of the ''American Renaissance'' (Melville, Emmerson, Thoreau, Hawthorne, etc) put aside the search for wealth in favor of deeper cultivation of the self. Walt Whitman, for example, viewed a life of strong feeling as above all a successful life. Freedom here is that to express oneself against all constraint. Despite his unconventionality, an element of the republican tradition was strong in Whitman's work. The ultimate use of American independence was to cultivate and express the self and explore its vast social and cosmic identities.

Early Interpretations of American Culture

Hector de Crevecour - Letters from an American Farmer

Believed that Americans acted with greater personal initiative and self-reliance than Europeans and tended to be unimpressed by social rank and long usage. His sketch of the American approximated the rational individual concerned with personal welfare, the model of Enlightenment thought - thought that was at the time receiving renewed emphasis from the writings of political economists like Adam Smith. The idea here is rational self-interested humanity - ''Economic Man'' so-called. Crevecour focused almost exclusively on this single aspect of American life, ignoring other important issues - eg. religion, republican political culture.

Alexis de Tocqueville - Democracy in America

Visited American in the 1830s and sought to understand the mature of the democratic society - exemplified by America. A particular concern of his was whether democratic society could maintain free political institutions or whether it would break up into some new kind of political despotism. He recognized the commercial/entrepreneurial spirit emphasized by de Crevecour, but found it to have ambiguous and problematic implications for the future of American freedom. While physical circumstances of the U.S. contributed to maintenance of the democratic republic, laws have contributed more, and mores most of all. For Tocqueville, mores are loosely defined as ''habits of the heart''; notions, opinions, and ideas that shape mental habits; the sum of moral and intellectual dispositions of individuals of society. These involve not only ideas and opinions, but also habitual practice - things like religion, political participation, and economic life. Stressed here is an isolated individualism along the vein of Franklin. Tocqueville thought that this isolation to which America tended left it prone to despotism. He was particularly interested in the ways that mores draw individuals into social community. Active Civic organizations are key to democracy and overcome isolation. Associations and decentralized local administration mediate between individuals and the central state. Tocqueville also stresses the widely shared Protestant Christianity as a general cohesive factor in American culture.

The Independent Citizen

19th Cent. individual initiative in service of common good strengthened moral life of the community and simultaneously increased material welfare and nourished public spirit. The authors employ the term representative character: a public image that helps define, for a given group of people, just what kind of personality traits it is good and legitimate to develop. For Tocqueville the representative character was the independent citizen - who held strongly to biblical religion; knew duties and rights of citizenship; especially a self-made ''man.'' Representative characters are not an abstract ideals or social roles, but are realized in the lives of those who fuse their individual personality with public requirements of those roles. They are often the mainstay of myths and popular feeling, important sources of meaning for people in a particular culture. RC's are also focal points at which society encounters its problems as interpreted though a specific set of cultural understandings.

Although the focus of the new American democratic culture was on male roles, this achievement was sustained by a female-shaped moral ecology/environment (cf. Republican Motherhood). Male and female roles were seen as unequal in power ad prestige but largely complementary in rural America. With the increase of urbanization, however, women were more and more deprived of an economic role and the nature of their inequality became more visible and pronounced.

The Entrepreneur
Tocqueville saw two dangers in Jacksonian democracy:
1) the slave society of the South, which degraded both blacks and whites
2) the industrial system of the Northeast - rise of an industrial aristocracy
Between the Civil War (or ''The War Between the States,'' as they say in the South) and WWI America underwent a transformation from which it emerged a new national society. New technologies (esp. transportation, communication, and manufacture) drew previously semi-autonomous local societies into a vast national market - a process carried out primarily by private individuals and financial groups. This period saw the rise of the business corporation as a new powerful social form. Old local government organization and earlier social and economic ways of life (ie. small town) lacked the capacity to deal with problems that were increasingly national in scope. New politics of interest developed with powerful economic interests of corporations, banks, and eventually the labor movement pitted against old regional, ethnic, and religious interests.

The most distinctive aspect of 20th Cent. American society is the division of life into separate functional sectors: home/workplace, work/leisure, white/blue collar, public/private. These divisions suited the needs of bureaucratic industrial corporations. With the industrialization of the economy, working life became specialized, organization tighter, and functional sectors of the economy more interdependent than before. With these changes, major problems of life seemed to be essentially individual matters - negotiating a reliable, harmonious balance among an individual's various sectors of life. The concept of ''peer'' also underwent a change in meaning; those who share some specific mix of activities - occupational and economic position, but also attitudes, tastes, and style of life.

The Manager

Despite the importance of the self-made entrepreneurs as a continuing feature and symbol in American life, it has not represented the dominant direction of economic and social development. Bureaucratic organization of the business corporation has been the dominant force in the 20th C. and its crucial factor is the professional manager. The manager's task is to organize human and non-human resources available to an organization so to improve that organization's position in the marketplace - according to the various criteria of effectiveness set by the market, supervisors, and the owners of the organization. The public/private split becomes more pronounced and correlates with the split between utilitarian and expressive individualism. With the coming of managerial society, the organization of work, place of residence, and social status came to be decided by criteria of economic effectiveness - criteria which further facilitated growth of national mass marketing and expanded consumer choice and styles of consumption.

The Therapist (cf. the manager)

The therapist is specialized in mobilizing resources internal to the individual for all effective action, with effectiveness measured by the elusive criteria of personal satisfaction. At the center of the culture of the manager and therapist is the autonomous individual, presumed to be able to choose the role s/he will play and commitment s/he will make. The moral language and images of this culture of utilitarian and expressive individualism influences the lives of most in modern society. The therapeutic orientation seeks a cure for the discontinuity between organization of the self and organization of work/interest/meaning in such a way that it enables a person to think of commitments as enhancements of a sense of individual well-being rather than as moral imperatives. The new culture provides a way for the individual to develop techniques for coping with the contradictory pressures of public and private life, but in doing so extends the calculating managerial style into areas of life formerly governed by norms of moral ecology.

Some Recent Interpretations

Robert and Helen Lynd in a study of Muncie, Ind. of the 20s and 30s sought to identify the effects of industrialization and the accompanying social changes (using 1890 as a base-line). They found evidence of a split between a dominant business class and a worker class. They also saw a decline of cultures of the independent citizen with its strong religious and republican elements in the face of a rising business (manager) class with an ethos of utilitarian individualism.

Riesman (The Lonely Crowd, 1950): the old independent, ''inner directed'' American was being replaces by new ''other-directed'' corporate personality types. There are four types of character: transition-directed, inner-directed, other-directed, and autonomous character (this individualistic type of character seems to be becoming increasingly more important in post-war America.

Varennes - Americans Together (1977) - stresses the dominance of utilitarian and expressive individualism as modes of modern character and cultural interaction. Especially emphasized is the delicate balance between them and their mutual dependence.

In American culture today, the authors state that there is a strong rejection of the managerial-therapeutic ethos, in which we can see not only the discontents of the present economic and social order, but also remainders of the continuing importance of the biblical and republican cultural traditions in American politics.

Chapter 3: Finding Oneself

Self Reliance
This value goes all the way back to the earliest periods of the American nation and is evident in all of the traditions examined in Ch 2. In the case of biblical and republican ideal self-reliance is a communal value, while for utilitarian and expressive individualism it is an individualistic value (big surprise).

Leaving Home
Issues of separation, individuation, and leaving home are recurrent themes in American life - but only the last is unique to American culture as an expected part of the life course/development. John Locke fostered some influential views on child rearing: The father should exercise authority firmly in the early years of a child's life with a view to the child's developing the self-discipline that will allow independence later on. By adolescence, the parents should abandon coercive authority and treat the child as a self-governing friend. The ideal of self-reliance, like other core elements in our culture, is nurtured within families, passed-on from parent to child, and binds American culture together.

Leaving Church
This may not literally involve leaving the church of one's parents, but there is an expectation that at some point in adolescence or early youth a person will decide what church s/he wants to belong to. One must defend one's views and choice as uniquely one's own, not one's parent's (this is a traditional Protestant ideal). Liberalized versions of biblical morality, however, tend to subordinate themes of divine authority and human duty, while under importance of human choice and freedom and the possibility of self acceptance. Often, rejection of institutional religion itself is a by-product in a personally determined set of values. The notion that one discovers one's deepest beliefs in and through tradition and community (institutionalized religion) is not every congenial to Americans. The irony of the strong emphasis placed on self-reliance and -determination is that here, too, just when we think we are most free, we are most coerced by the dominant belief of our own culture.

The demand to ''make something of yourself'' through work is one that most Americans coming of age hear as often from themselves as from others. This encompasses several different notions of work:
-job: making money/a living; economic success and security
-career: broader type of success where one traces progress through life by achievement and advancement in an occupation with increase of social standing and prestige as the objective
-calling: work as practical ideal of activity and a characteristic that makes a person's work inseparable from his/her life; a calling links a person not only to work but also to a larger community where the calling of each contributed to the good of all

The idea of a calling has been largely attenuated in the modern industrial economy in favor of a private job/career. The absence of calling means the loss of a sense of moral meaning; but when not found in a calling people tend to search for it through expressive individualism, through the ties of the lifestyle enclave. A person will also tend to focus on family and friends around mid-life where her/his career trajectory flattens out and advancement (and therefore fulfillment) in work becomes more difficult or impossible.

The Lifestyle Enclave
''Lifestyle'' is linked closely with leisure and consumption, usually unrelated to the world of work; it brings together those who are socially, economically, or culturally similar. Rather than a community (which attempts to be an inclusive whole, celebrating the interdependence of public and private life), the authors believe that lifestyle as an enclave essentially celebrates the narcissistic and is segmental - explicitly involving a contrast with others who do not share their lifestyle. The lifestyle enclave is an important outgrowth of the sectoral organization of American life as resulting from emergence of industrialization and the national market, with the associated renewal of the importance of social class and status. The authors tend to view lifestyle enclaves as a form of collective support in an otherwise radically individuating society.

Grounding the Self
The big Q: If the self is defined by its ability to choose its own values (which is what the authors believe), on what grounds are these values based?
A: One's own idiosyncratic preferences are their own true justification because they define the true self
A: the right act is simply the one that yields the agent the more exciting challenge or most good feeling about the self.
Against the possibility of individualistic self-knowledge arises the issue of how to be sure that our own feelings are not compromised by those of others and are truly independent of their values. The modern conception of the self is one of a series of experiences imprinted on a blank slate - expressed in its most extreme form by the work of Goffman, there is no self at all. Modern attempts to escape radical individualism such as a belief in universally felt (perhaps biological) needs or the belief that all persons are part of a cosmic whole, are all rooted in non-social, non-cultural conceptions of reality that provide little guidance beyond private life and intimate relations.

The Meaning of the Life Course
The authors contend that despite contemporary popular thought on the subject, the idea of a life course must be set in a larger generational, historical, and probably religious (as opposed to individualistic) context if it is to provide any richness of meaning. The authors further believe that despite the radical individualism that has achieved hegemony in universities and middle class life, and which is based on and supported by inadequate social science, impoverished philosophy, and vacuous theology, all of our activities go on in relationships, groups, associations, and communities ordered by institutional structures and interpreted by cultural patterns of meaning.

Chapter 7: Getting Involved
Rather than being automatically included in social relations that impose obligations externally, Americans are expected to get involved - choosing for themselves to join social groups, generally because of self interests or a felt affinity for certain others.

The Free and Independent Township (more Tocqueville)
Although individual self interest initially led people to participate in local civic associations, the experience of local self-government transformed them. It gives an understanding of republican responsibility that transcends individual self-interest and turns them into ''orderly, moderate, and self-controlled citizens.''

The Town Father
Like a contemporary incarnation of the ideal of the independent citizen. In the end, however, the town father advocates ideals that are unable to guide him/her through the maze of economic interdependence and political conflict that defines the modern social world. In its economic aspect, the town father advocated a certain way of doing business: the ''personal way''; stressing honesty and hard work with incentives to work efficiently; business prospects should be linked to the well-being to the town. The town government should provide an efficient framework within which self-reliant individuals can earn their livelihood by providing useful things to other persons and the community. In the town father's vocabulary, the ''public good'' is defined in terms of the long-term ability to individuals to get just what they have paid for in terms of time and taxes - no more, no less.

From Town to Metropolis
Due in part to the separated demands of work, family and community in the modern world, and in part due to the rise of lifestyle enclaves, the associational life of the modern metropolis does not generate the kinds of bonds or second language of social responsibility in the same way as the independent townships (of the past).

The Concerned Citizen: some people feel the need to get involved in politics - especially when their privated sanctuaries are threatened; such participation is perceived in self-sacrificial terms, rather than as a matter of duty.

Urban Cosmopolitanism: a view generally held by those whose backgrounds give them the opportunity for social mobility; a sophisticated person is thought of as one who tolerates or enjoys diversity, and used reason rather than passion to resolve conflicts. Modern professionals, who tend to move from position to position and cultivate complicated radial networks of friends, are prime examples.

Civic-Minded Professional: believe that public decisions concerning competing claims should be resolved peacefully on the basis of neutral technical solutions that are beyond debate, since this perspective contends that a valid decision cannot be made on the basis of goal-values, interests, or opinions. Careful research into the consequences of different courses of action is needed - this implied a rational, utilitarian standpoint. This peace via neutral technical solution rests on 2 assumptions: 1) interests of parties are not fundamentally incompatible, and 2) technical expertise incontestably qualifies one to be a leader.

The Professional Activist: a variation of the civic-minded professional dedicated to political action in the interest of more radical forms of social change; believe that a fair chance can only come about when all groups have equal power, so they favor special initiatives to support the disadvantaged. They view the community as a context in which a variety of interests should be expressed and adjudicated.

From Volunteer to Citizen: involves a sense that the public good is based on the responsibility of one generation to the next and holds the idea that short-term interests are often detrimental to our society in the long-run. This outlook primarily develops through a pattern of volunteer work and the network of emotional ties it creates with a variety of people in different circumstances. The key is a generosity of spirit as the ability to acknowledge our interconnectedness - our debt to society.

PETER BERGER AND THOMAS LUCKMAN: The Social Construction of Reality

Intro: ''The problem of the Sociology of Knowledge''

Reality is socially constructed and the sociology of knowledge must analyze the processes in which this occurs -- ''the sociology of knowledge is concerned with the analysis of the social construction of reality.'' The sociology of knowledge is concerned with the relationship between human thought and the social context in which it arises.

Scheler had a ''relative-natural world view'' for the sociology of knowledge, which was a moderate statement that claimed that society determined the presence but not the nature of ideas. On the other hand, Mannheim held the more ''radical'' view that with the general concept of ideology the sociology of knowledge is reached -- the understanding that no human thought is immune to the ideologizing influences of its social context. Mannheim also had the concept of 'relativism' - that knowledge always comes from a certain position, and that the object of thought becomes progressively clearer with this accumulation of different perspectives on it. Merton also contributed to the study of the sociology of knowledge with his concept of manifest function - intended conscious functions of idea - and latent functions - the unintended, unconscious functions of ideas.

''Common-sense,'' everyday knowledge, rather than ''ideas'' must be the central focus for the sociology of knowledge. Durkheim argued that we must consider social facts as things. Weber claimed that the object of cognition was the subjective meaning complex of action. Society has a dual character: objective facticity and subjective meaning. This is reality sui generis. Berger asks, how do subjective meanings become objective facticities? How is it possible that human activity should produce a world of things?

An adequate understanding of the ''reality sui generis'' of society requires an inquiry into the manner in which this is constructed. This is the task of the sociology of knowledge.

CHAPTER 1: ''The Foundations of Knowledge in Everyday Life''

1) The reality of everyday life

Phenomenological Analysis is the method best suited to clarify the foundations of knowledge in everyday life -- it is a purely descriptive method. Consciousness is capable of moving through different spheres of reality. We are conscious of the world as consisting of multiple realities. Reality pare excellence is the reality of every day life as an ordered reality. Phenomena are prearranged in patterns that seem to be independent of our apprehension of them and that impose themselves on it. Things are pre-designated. Common sense knowledge is the knowledge ''I'' share with others (''inter subjective'') in the normal, self-evident routines of everyday life. The problem is the translation of ''non-everyday'' finite spheres of reality. More important for this analysis is the temporal structure of every day life. Temporality is an intrinsic property of consciousness. The temporal structure of every day life is exceedingly complex - because the different levels of empirically present temporality must be ongoingly correlated. This same temporal structure determined much of our own situations in the world of everyday life.

2) Social interaction in everyday life

In relations between people, there are face-to-face situations and all other cases are derivative of them. In face-to-face relations, the other's subjectivity is available to ''me'' through a maximum of symptoms. Reflection about ''myself'' is typically occasioned by the attitude toward me that the other exhibits.

While it is comparatively difficult to impose rigid patterns on face-to-face interaction, even it is patterned from the beginning if it takes place within the routines of everyday life. The social reality of everyday life is apprehended in a continuum of typifications which are progressively anonymous as they are removed from the ''here and now'' of the face-to-face situation. Social structure is the sum total of these typifications and of the recurrent patterns of interaction established by means of them, social structure is an essential element of the reality of everyday life. 3) Language and knowledge in everyday life

Signs are objectivations in the sense of being objectively available beyond the expression of subjective intentions ''here and now.''

Language is the most important sign system of human society. The common objectivations of everyday life are maintained primarily by linguistic signification. The detachment of language lies in its capacity to communicate meanings that are not directly expressions of subjectivity ''here and now.'' Language is an objective repository of vast accumulations of meaning and experience, it crystallizes subjectivity, and it typifies (i.e. everybody knows what the connotations of ''She had to go to the doctor for 'female trouble' are, etc.). Any significative theme that spans spheres of reality may be defined as a symbol, and the linguistic mode my which such transcendence is achieved is by symbolic language.

Interaction with others in everyday life is constantly affected by our common participation in the available stock of knowledge. An important element of the knowledge of everyday life (often transmitted by language) is the knowledge of the relevance structure of others. Yet knowledge in everyday life is socially distributed. We don't know everything known to our fellow man, etc. Thus, the knowledge of how the socially available stock of knowledge is distributed is an important element of that same stock of knowledge (where to turn for certain types of knowledge, what to hide from whom, i.e. ask a U of C professor about the social construction of reality, but then don't go to a whine and cheese party and tell them you just snuck back stage at an Urge Overkill concert to meet Nash).

CHAPTER 2: ''Society as Objective Reality''

1) Institutionalization

a) Organism and activity
Man's relationship to his environment is characterized by world openness. In the ''process of becoming,'' man takes his place in an interrelationship with the environment. Humannes is socio-culturally variable. The self cannot be adequately understood apart from the particular social context in which it was shaped. Man's specific humanity and his sociality are inextricably intertwined.
World openness is always pre-empted by social order, which is a product of human activity. (The inherent instability of the human organism makes it imperative that man himself provide a stable environment for his conduct.)

b) Origins of institutionalization
Institutionalization occurs whenever there is a reciprocal typification of habitualized actions by types of actors. Institutions control human action by setting up patterns of conduct -- social control. The process of institutionalization starts with reciprocal institutionalization. Then the DofL and other innovations lead to new habitualizations. Institutions become crystallized and are experienced as possessing an objective reality of their own, which was originally humanly produced.
A dialectical relation between man and the social world exists. There are three dialectical moments in social reality:
1) society is a human product
2) society is an objective reality
3) man is a social product
Hence the product acts back on its producer.
The institutional world requires legitimation, which is learned by the new generation during socialization. The new generation posits a problem of compliance, and its socialization into the institutional order requires the establishment of sanctions.
The ''logic'' attributed to the institutional order is part of the socially available stock of knowledge and is taken for granted as such. Thus, institutions are integrated de facto through socially shared universes of meaning.
Knowledge is borne out of experience and systematized as objective truth, then internalized as subjective reality, thus shaping the person.

c) Sedimentation and tradition
Experiences become sedimented in that they congeal in recollection as recognizable and memorable entities. Inter subjective sedimentation occurs when several individuals share a common biography, the experiences of which become incorporated in a common stock of knowledge. This sedimentation is social when it has been objectivated in a sign system -- when the possibility of reiterated objectification of the shared experiences arises.
Language becomes the basis and the instrument of the collective stock of knowledge. It becomes the depository of a large aggregate of collective sedimentations.
The objectivated meanings of institutional activity are conceived of as ''knowledge'' and transmitted as such. There is not a priori consistency of functionality between institutions and the forms of transmission of knowledge pertaining to them. The problem of logical coherence arises first on the level of legitimation and secondly on the level of socialization.

d) Roles
A segment of the self is objectified in terms of socially available typifications (the ''social self''). The actor identifies with the socially objectivated typifications of conduct in action, but reestablishes distance from them as he reflects about his conduct afterward. This distance between the actor and his action can be retained in consciousness and projected to future repetitions of the actions. In this way both acting self and acting others are apprehended not as unique individuals but as types, which are interchangeable.
Institutions are embodied in individual experience by means of roles. Origins of roles lie in the same fundamental process of habitualization and objectivation as the origins of institutions. One must be initiated into the various cognitive and even affective layers of the body of knowledge that is directly and indirectly appropriated to a give role. This implies a social distribution of knowledge. The analysis of roles is of particular importance to the sociology of knowledge because it reveals the mediations between the macroscopic universe of meaning objectivated in a society and the ways by which these universes re subjectively real to individuals.

e) Scope and modes of institutionalization
If many or most relevance structures in a society are generally shared, the scope of institutionalization will be wide. If only a few relevance structures are generally shared the scope of institutionalization will be narrow.
The relationship between knowledge and its social base is dialectical; knowledge is a social produce and is a factor in social change. Rates of change of institutions are differential. This simply created a greater need for legitimation.
Both the institutional order as a whole and segments of it may be apprehended in reified terms. The objectivity of the social world means that it confronts man as something outside himself. Reification is an extreme step in the process of objectivation, whereby the objectivated world loses its comprehensibility as a human enterprise and becomes fixed as a non-human facticity. Roles may be reified in the same manner as institutions. The sector that has been objectified in the role is also apprehended as an inevitable fate, for which the individual may disclaim responsibility.

2) Legitimation

Legitimation explains the institutional order by ascribing cognitive validity and normative dignity to its subjectivated meanings. Legitimation not only tells the individual why he should perform one action and not the other; it also tells him shy things are what they are. In fact, knowledge precedes values in the legitimation of institutions. With the development of specialized legitimating theories and their administration by full-time legitimators, legitimation begins to go beyond pragmatic application to become 'pure theory.'
The next level of legitimation, beyond the are, the should, and the theory, is the symbolic universe. Symbolic universes are bodies of theoretical traditions that integrate different provinces of meaning and encompass the institutional order as a symbolic totality. The symbolic universe is conceived of as the matrix of all socially objectivation and subjectively real meanings. In the SU, the reflective integration of discrete institutional processes reaches ultimate fulfillment. A whole world is created. Institutional roles become modes of participation in a universe that transcends and includes the institutional order. Experiences belonging to different spheres of reality are integrated by incorporation in the same, overarching universe of meaning. The nomic function of the SU allows one to return to the reality of everyday life.
The SU provides the ultimate legitimation of the institutional order by bestowing upon it the primacy in the hierarchy of human experience. It assigns ranks to various phenomena in a hierarchy of being, defining the range of the social within this hierarchy and integrates all discrete institutional processes. It makes sense of the entire universe.
In the process of externalization, man projects his own meanings into reality. SUs which proclaim that all reality is humanly meaningful and call upon the entire cosmos to validate human existence, constitute the farthest reaches of this projection.

b) Conceptual machineries of universe maintenance
If the institutional order is to be taken for granted in its totality as a meaningful whole, it must be legitimated by ''placement'' in a symbolic universe. It becomes necessary to legitimate symbolic universes by means of conceptual machineries of universe maintenance when the SU has become a problem. This happens when socialization challenges the SU. This calls for the repression of these groups, through various conceptual machineries designed to maintain the 'official universe.'
The SU is not only legitimated by also modified by the conceptual machineries constructed to ward off the challenge of heretical groups within a society. The conceptual machineries of universe maintenance are themselves products of social activity, which can be variable.
The conceptual machineries that maintain symbolic universes always entail the systematization of cognitive and normative legitimations. Mythology is a conceptual machinery which in closest to the naive level of the SU. It was developed to reintegrate inconsistencies in peoples' environments. There are actually four types of conceptual machineries: mythology, theology, philosophy, and science. Unlike mythology, the other three historical forms of conceptual machinery became the property of specialist elites, whose bodies of knowledge were increasingly removed from the common knowledge of society at large. The lay person no longer knows how his universe is to be conceptually maintained, although he still knows who the specialists of universe maintenance are presumed to be (i.e. the 'experts').
There are two applications of universe-maintaining machinery: therapy and nihilation. Therapy resocializes the deviant individual into the objective reality of the symbolic universe of the society. Nihilation liquidates conceptually everything outside the SU, by denying the reality of those external objects. The ultimate goal here is to incorporate. The negation of one's own universe is subtly changed to an affirmation of it. External terms must be translated into more 'correct' terms. If the symbolic universe is to comprehend all reality, nothing else can be allowed to remain outside its conceptual scope. Its definitions of reality must encompass the totality of being.

c) Social organization of universe maintenance
Reality is socially defined. concrete individuals and groups serve as definers of social reality. Some members of society become experts at being full-time legitimators (priests, politicians). These experts can conflict with each other and with lay people on definitions of reality. There will always be a social-structural base for competition between rival definitions of reality; the outcome of the rivalry will be affected by the development of this base.
The distinctiveness of ideology is that the same overall universe is interpreted in different ways, depending on the concrete vested interests within the society in question. Frequently an ideology is taken up by a group because of specific theoretical elements that are conducive to its interests. Modern societies have become pluralistic and there is little outright conflict between ideologies. Pluralism occurs in conditions of rapid change and is inherently subversive of traditional reality. Yet theories are created to legitimate social institutions.
Nonetheless, social institutions are also changed to fix existing theories and to make them more legitimate. Hence the process is a dialectic. Definitions of reality have a self-fulfilling prophecy. Theories can be realized in history. Social change must always be understood as standing in a dialectic between changes in theories to match institutions and vice-versa.
All symbolic universes and all legitimations are human products; their existence has its base in the lives of concrete individuals and has no empirical status apart from their lives.

CHAPTER 3: ''Society as Subjective Reality''

1) Internalization of Reality

a) Primary socialization
Society exists as both objective and subjective reality. These aspects receive their proper recognitions if society is understood in terms of an ongoing dialectical process composed of the three moments of externalization, objectification, and internalization. The individual also simultaneously externalizes his own being into the social world and internalizes it as objective reality. To be in a society is to participate in its dialectic.
The individual is not born a member of society, but becomes a member through a temporal sequence. The individual internalizes the outside world. Individuals mutually identify with each other and participate in each others' beings. The self is a reflected identity.
Primary socialization involves translating the roles and attitudes of specific others to roles and attitudes in general, or those of the ''generalized other.'' Primary socialization involves learning sequences that are socially defined. When the generalized other has been crystallized in one's consciousness, a symmetrical relationship is established between objective and subjective reality. At this point, primary socialization ends.

b) Secondary socialization
Secondary socialization becomes necessary with the D of L and the distribution of knowledge. It is the internalization of institutional ''sub worlds'' and the acquisition of role-specific knowledge -- roles directly and indirectly rooted in the D of L. Whatever new contents are to be internalized in secondary socialization must be superimposed on the already present reality (from primary socialization). To establish maintained consistency, secondary socialization presupposes conceptual procedures to integrate different bodies of knowledge. There is a formality and anonymity in relationships in secondary socialization as opposed to those close (especially child-parent) relationships in primary education.

c) Maintenance and transformation of subjective reality
Since socialization is never complete and the contents it internalizes face continuing threats to their subjective reality, every viable society must develop procedures f reality maintenance (legitimation) to safeguard a measure of symmetry between objective and subjective reality. The more artificial character of secondary socialization makes the subjective reality of its internalization even more vulnerable to changing definitions of reality because their reality is less deeply rooted in consciousness and thus more susceptible to displacement.
Reality is maintained by the accumulation and consistency of casual conversation which can afford to be casual because it refers to the routines of a taken-for-granted world. In conversation, the objectifications of language become objectifications of individual consciousness. Subjective reality is thus always dependent on specific plausibility structures, i.e. the specific social base and social processes required for its maintenance. There are specific social sanctions against reality disintegrating doubts, such as ridicule. In other words, an individual is made to reel ridiculous for raising doubts about the reality structure. In crises, reality confirming procedures need to be explicit and intensive. For collective or individual crises, society has certain procedures (funeral rites, etc)
Subjective reality can be transformed. To be in society already entails an ongoing process of modification of subjective reality. Alternation requires re-socialization, which must radically reassign reality accents and resembles primary socialization by replicating the strongly affective identification with role models. Successful alternation requires social and conceptual conditions such as new significant others with whom the individual can identify, and a new legitimating apparatus.

2) Internalization and the Social Structure
The micro-sociological or the social psychological analysis of the phenomena of internalization must always have as its background a macro-sociological understanding of their structural aspects. Successful socialization is the establishment of a high degree of symmetry between objective and subjective reality. Maximal success in socialization is likely to occur in societies with very simple D of L and minimal distribution of knowledge.
Yet socialization is very often unsuccessful. Unsuccessful socialization could be the result of heterogeneity in the socializing personnel (mother and father each have different effects on child). The need for therapeutic mechanisms increases in proportion to the structurally given potentiality for unsuccessful socialization.
Unsuccessful socialization may also result from the mediation of acutely discrepant worlds by significant others during primary socialization. A child may be raised partly by parents from one social class and partly by a nurse from another social class. Hence the child is presented with a choice of profiled identities and can have two different 'selves.' The possibility of 'individualism' is directly linked to the possibility of unsuccessful socialization. The 'individualist' emerges as a type who has the potential to migrate between a number of available worlds and who has deliberately constructed a self out of the 'material' provided by a number of different identities.

Discrepancies between primary and secondary socialization can also result in unsuccessful socialization. Secondary socialization may not match with primary. Then, the subjectively chosen identity becomes objectified in the individual's consciousness as his 'real self.' Individuals play at what they are and are not supposed to be (Goffman). Such a situation cannot be understood unless it is ongoingly related to its socio-structural context, which follows logically from the necessary relations between the social D of L and the social distribution of knowledge.

3) Theories About Identity
Identity is a key element of subjective reality and is dialectical. Identity is formed by social process, and then these identities (attached to people, of course) react back on society. Hence, identity emerges from the dialectic between the individual and society. Psychological theories serve to legitimate the identity-maintenance and identity repair procedures established in the society, providing the theoretical linkage between identity and the world, as these are both socially defined and subjectively appropriated. these theories may arise because the old ones no longer adequately explain the empirical phenomena at hand.

4) Organism and Identity
The organism continues to affect each phase of man's reality-constructing activity and the organism, in turn, is itself affected by this activity. Another dialectic here: the organism and soeity mutually limit each other. the social channeling of activity is the essence of institutionalization, which is the foundation for the social construction of reality. Social reality then acts back to influence activity. In the dialectic between nature and the socially constructed world, the human organism itself is transformed. Man produces reality and thereby produces himself.

Conclusion: The sociology of knowledge and sociological theory
There is a dialectical relationship between structural realities and the human historical enterprise of constructing reality. The sociology of knowledge understands human reality as socially constructed reality. Sociology must be carried out in a continuous conversation with both history and philosophy or loose its proper object of inquiry. This object is society as a part of a human world made by men and making men in ongoing historical process.

Outline of a Theory of Practice
Chapter 2: Structure and the Habitus

Habitus: systems of durable, transposable dispositions. It is the principle of generation and structuring of practices and representations.
Structure: is conceived as the structure of the consequences of human practices. It should not be reified. On the other hand, because of the existence of the habitus, actors are not as free-will actors.
The habitus produces practices which tend to reproduce the regularities immanent in the objective conditions of the production of their generating principle. As both a cognitive and a motivating structure.

Habitus or dispositions are, in some sense, the internalization of the objective structure. The causal relationship is: the habitus, as a product of history, produces individual and collective practices, and hence history, in accordance with the schemes engendered by history. Habitus and structure mutually produce each other, and the dispositions and the social positions are mutually congruent, the dialectic relations.
As an acquired system of generative schemes objectively adjusted to the particular conditions in which it is constituted, the habitus engenders all the thoughts, all the perceptions, and all the actions consistent with those conditions, and no others.

Chapter 4: Structures, habitus, power: basis for a theory of symbolic power
The system of classification of practice: ages, sexes, occupations, different time, space, under the recognized appropriateness, tempo, moments, and rhythms of life. The order of practices tends to naturalize its own arbitrariness by this classification. Out of which arises the sense of limit, and the sense of reality.
The system of classifications reproduces the objective classes and the corresponding power relations by securing the misrecognition, and hence the recognition of the arbitrariness on which they are based.
Doxa: when there is a quasi-perfect correspondence between the objective order and the subjective principles of organization (as in ancient societies), the natural and social worlds appear as self-evident ----this is called doxa, so as to distinguish it from orthodox and heterodox which imply the awareness and recognition of the possibility of different or antagonistic beliefs.

Against Durkheim: it is erroneous to consider only the cognitive or speculative functions of mythico-ritual representations (because they the system of classification), these mental structures, a transfigured reproduction of the structures constitute a mode of production and a mode of biological and social reproduction, contribute at least as efficaciously as the provisions of custom, through the ethical dispositions they produce, such as the sense of honour or respect of elders and ancestors. The theory of knowledge is a dimension of political theory because the specifically symbolic power to impose the principles of the construction of reality - in particular, social reality - is a major dimension of political power.
The world of doxa: conditions of existence are very little differentiated, the dispositions (little differentiated) are confirmed by institutions, collective consciousness such as language, myth and art, self evidence, collective attested, authority. Objective world conforms to the disenchantment...goes without saying...
The field of opinion, the locus of the confrontation of competing discourses - whose political truth may be overtly declared or may remain hidden, critique, breaking the fit between subjective structure and the objective structures, raise the question of social facts. The drawing of the line between fields of doxa and opinion is the struggle for the imposition of the dominate systems of classification.
Then, comes the overt opposition between the right, or orthodoxy, and the wrong, the heterodoxy, which limit the universe of possible discourse.
Symbolic Capital in the forms of prestige, honours, etc. is readily convertible back into the economic capital and is perhaps the most valuable form of accumulation where the natural environment is severe. The restrictive definition of the economic interest is the historical product of capitalism. The unthinkable, unnamable, disinterested interest. It is a transformed and thereby disguised form of physical ''economical'' capital, produces its proper effect when it conceals the fact that it originates in ''material'' forms of capital.
Mode of domination: the most successful ideologies are those which have no needs of words. The dominating class justify themselves no only by ideology, but by it practical functioning. Gentle, hidden exploitations, symbolic violence is in the gentle, hidden form, when the overt form is impossible.

The History of Sexuality

Background Info:

From Postmodern Theory: Critical Interrogations, Steven Best and Douglas Kellner, 1991

Foucault rejects the equation of reason, emancipation, and progress of modern theory and argues that an interface between modern forms of power and knowledge has served to create new forms of domination. His project is to write a ''critique of our historical era,'' to write about subjects that seem natural but that are contingent on sociohistorical constructs of power and domination. Systematizing methods of study produce reductive social and historical analyses; knowledge is perspectival in nature, requiring multiple viewpoints to interpret a heterogeneous reality. Modern theories see knowledge as neutral and objective (positivism) or emancipatory (Marxism), but Foucault emphasizes that knowledge is indissociable from regimes of power. Power is ''a multiple and mobile field of force relations where far-reaching, but never completely stable effects of domination are produced.'' It is plural, fragmentary, differentiated, indeterminate, and historically and spatially specific. He rejects the idea that power is anchored in macrostructures or ruling classes and is repressive in nature. Power is dispersed, indeterminate, heteromorphous, subjectless, and productive, constituting individuals' bodies and identities. It operates through the hegemony of norms, political technologies, and the shaping of the body and soul. In this book, Foucault argues that power operates not through the repression of sex, but through he discursive production of sexuality and subjects who have a ''sexual nature.''

Part I: We ''Other Victorians''

Repression is a sentence to disappear, an injunction to silence, an affirmation of nonexistence, and by implication, an admission that there was nothing to say about such subjects. Repression has been seen as the fundamental link between power, knowledge, and sexuality since the classical age and nothing less than a transgression of laws, a lifting of prohibitions, an irruption of speech, a reinstating of pleasure within reality, a whole new economy in the mechanisms of power will be required to free ourselves from it. If sex is repressed, then the mere fact that one is speaking about it has the appearance of a deliberate transgression.

It has been argued that repression coincides with the development of capitalism. Sex is repressed because it is incompatible with a general and intensive work imperative. However, according to Foucault, the essential thing is not the economic factor, but the existence of a discourse in which sex, the revelation of truth, the overturning of global laws, and the promise of a new felicity are linked together. Foucault's objective is to define the regime of power-knowledge-pleasure that sustains the discourse on human sexuality.

Part II: The Repressive Hypothesis
Chapter 1: The Incitement to Discourse

The 17th C was an ''age of repression.'' But since that time there has been a steady proliferation of discourses concerned with sex. Christianity played a large role in this by emphasizing the importance of confession and of verbalizing sexual matters. In the 18th C, sex became a ''police'' matter, not in the repression of disorder, but in an ordered maximization of collective and individual forces. It was deemed necessary to regulate sex through useful and public discourses. These discourses on sex did not multiply apart from or against power, but in the very space and as a means of its exercise. Mechanisms in the areas of economy, pedagogy, medicine, and justice incited, extracted, distributed, and institutionalized sexual discourse. A wide dispersion of devices were invented for speaking about it, for having it spoken about, for inducing itself to speak, for listening, recording, transcribing, and redistributing what is said about it. Rather than massive censorship, there has been a regulated and polymorphous incitement to discourse.

Chapter 2: The Perverse Implantation

Has increased discourse been aimed at constituting a sexuality that is economically useful and politically conservative? Foucault doesn't know if this is the ultimate objective. But reduction has not been the means employed for achieving it. The 19th and 20th C have been an age of multiplication: a dispersion of sexualities, a strengthening of their disparate forms, a multiple implantation of ''perversions.'' the discursive explosion of the 18th and 19th C led to an emphasis on heterosexual monogamy and a scrutiny of ''unnatural'' forms of sexual behavior. These polymorphous conducts were drawn out, revealed, isolated, and incorporated by multifarious power devices. The growth of perversions is the product of the encroachment of a type of power on bodies and their pleasures. It is through the isolation, intensification, and consolidation of peripheral sexualities that the relations of power to sex and pleasure branched out and multiplied, measured the body, and penetrated modes of conduct.

Part III: Scientia Sexualis

While there has been a proliferation of discourse on sex and an increase of awareness of a multiplication of sexual conducts, it nonetheless seems that by speaking of it so much, one was simply trying to conceal it: a screen discourse, a dispersion-avoidance. One also claimed to be speaking about it from the rarefied and neutral viewpoint of science, a science subordinated to the imperative of a morality whose division it reiterated under the guise of the medical norm.

Throughout the 19th C sex has been incorporated into two distinct order of knowledge: a biology of reproduction and a medicine of sex. There was no real exchange between them, no reciprocal structuration. This disparity indicates that there was no aim to state the truth but to prevent its very emergence.

Historically there have been two great procedures for producing the truth of sex. Many societies endowed themselves with ars erotica (erotic art), whereby truth is drawn from pleasure itself. Western society, however, has scientia sexualis, procedures for telling the truth of sex which are geared to a form of knowledge-power found in confession. In confession, the agency of domination does not reside in the one who speaks, but in the one who questions and listens.

How did this immense and traditional extortion of the sexual confession come to be constituted in scientific terms?
through a clinical codification of the inducement to speak
through the postulate of a general and diffuse causality
through the principle of a latency intrinsic to sexuality
through the method of interpretation
through the medicalization of the effects of confession

Thus, 19th C society did not confront sex with a fundamental refusal of recognition. On the contrary, it put into operation an entire machinery for producing true discourses concerning it. It set out to formulate the uniform truth of sex. It created a new kind of pleasure: pleasure in the truth of pleasure.

*** A hypothesis of a power of repression exerted by our society on sex for economic reasons is inadequate for explaining the proliferation of discourse, the solidification of the sexual mosaic, and the production of confessions and an establishment of a system of legitimate knowledge and of an economy of manifold pleasures.

Part IV: The Deployment of Sexuality
Chapter 1: Objective

The aim of this inquiry is to move less toward a ''theory'' of power than toward an ''analytics'' of power, i.e., toward a definition of the specific domain formed by relations of power, and toward a determination of the instruments that will make possible its analysis. This analytics can be constituted only if it frees itself completely from a certain representation of power called ''juridico-discursive.'' This power is characterized by the negative relations between power and sex, the insistence of the rule, the cycle of prohibition, the logic of censorship, and the uniformity of the apparatus. Foucault wants to get rid of a juridical and negative representation of power, and cease to conceive it in terms of law, prohibition, liberty, and sovereignty. Instead he wants to advance toward a different conception of power through a closer examination of an entire historical material - the history of sexuality.

Chapter 2: Method

The analysis, made in terms of power, must not assume the sovereignty of the state, the form of the law, or the overall unity of a domination are given at the outset; rather, these are only the terminal forms power takes. Power must be understood as the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organization. Power's condition of possibility is the moving substrate of force relations which, by virtue of their inequality, constantly engender states of power, but the latter are always local and unstable. Power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere.

Propositions of Power:
Power is not something that is acquired, seized, or shared, something that one holds on to or allows to slip away; power is exercised from innumerable points, in the interplay of nonegalitarian and mobile relations. Relationships of power are not in a position of exteriority with respect to other types of relations (economic, knowledge, sexual), but are immanent in the latter. They re not in superstructural positions, with merely a role of prohibition or accompaniment; they have a directly productive role, whenever they come into play. Power comes from below (I'm not quite sure what he means by this); i.e., there is no binary and all-encompassing opposition between rulers and ruled at the root of power relations. Power relations are both intentional and nonsubjective. They re imbued with calculation: there is no power that is exercised without a series of aims and objectives. Where there is power, there is resistance and yet this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power.

One must analyze the mechanisms of power in the sphere of force relations. As far as sex is concerned, the important question, then, is: In a specific type of discourse on sex, in a specific form of extortion of truth, appearing historically and in specific places, what were the most immediate, the most local power relations at work? We must immerse the expanding of production of discourses on sex in the field of multiple and mobile power relations. There are four rules to follow in order to carry this out: Rule of immanence: one cannot assume that there exists only a certain sphere in sexuality to be studies. instead, one must start an inquiry with the ''local centers'' of power-knowledge. Rule of continual variation: Relations of power-knowledge are not static forms of distribution, they are ''matrices of transformations.''

Rule of double conditioning: No ''local center'' or ''pattern of transformation'' could function if it did not eventually enter into an overall strategy. And inversely, no strategy could achieve comprehensive effects if it did not gain support from precise and tenuous relations serving as its prop and anchor point. Rule of the tactical polyvalence of discourses: There exists a multiplicity of discursive elements that can come into play in various strategies. Discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a point of resistance, and a starting point for an opposing strategy.

Chapter 3: Domain

Sexuality is a dense transfer point for relations of power: between men and women, young and old, parents and offspring, teachers and students, priests and laity, and an administration and population. Since the 18th C there have developed four strategic unities which formed specific mechanisms of knowledge-power centering on sex:
a hysterization of women's bodies
a pedagogization of children's sex
a socialization of procreative behavior
a psychiatrization of perverse behavior

These strategies led to the production of sexuality. Relations of sex thus gave rise to two systems: the deployment of alliance (marriage, kinship, etc.) and the deployment of sexuality. The deployment of alliance is built around a system of rules defining the permitted and the forbidden, whereas the deployment of sexuality operates according to mobile, polymorphous, and contingent techniques of power. The deployment of alliance aims to produce the interplay of relations and maintain the law that governs them; the deployment of sexuality engenders a continual extension of areas and forms of control. The deployment of sexuality was constructed on the basis of a deployment of alliance. The family is the interchange of sexuality and alliance: it conveys the law and the juridical dimension in the deployment of sexuality, and it conveys the economics of pleasure and the intensity of sensations in the regime of alliance. Because of this interchange, the family became a major factor of sexualizatio

Chapter 4: Periodization

The chronology of the techniques relating to sex (i.e., in the fields of medicine, pedagogy, and demography) do not coincide with the hypothesis of a great repressive phase of sexuality in the 17th century. Rather there was a perpetual inventiveness, a steady growth of methods and procedures. In addition, it seems that the deployment of sexuality was not established as a principle of limitation of the pleasures of others by the ruling classes. Rather the first deployment of sexuality occurred within these upper classes. This is because the primary concern was not repression of the sexuality of the classes to be exploited, but rather the vigor, longevity, progeniture, and descent of the classes that ruled. It was a question of techniques for maximizing life. What was formed was a political ordering of life, not through the enslavement of others, but through an affirmation of self. Sexuality then is originally, historically bourgeois, and in its successive shifts and transpositions, it induces specific class effects.

Part V: Right of Death and Power Over Life

Over time the ancient right to take life or let life was replaced by a power to foster life or disallow it to the point of death. Starting in the 17th C, the power over live evolved in two basic forms: an anatomo-politics of the human body (the body as a machine) and a bio-politics of the population (regulatory controls on the species body). Sex was a means of access both to the life of the body and the life of the species. The politics of sex revolved around the fours issues outlined in chapter 3 because they were at the juncture of the ''body'' and the ''population.'' Thus sex became a crucial target of a power organized around the management of life rather than the menace of death. The blood relation long remained an important element in the mechanism of power; but slowly the symbolics of blood have been replaced with an analytics of sexuality. The mechanisms of power are addressed to the body and to life.

Civilization and Its Discontents

Chapter I

The ego - our feeling of our own self - appears to us as something autonomous, unitary and set off distinctly from everything else. This appearance is deceptive, however, because the ego actually continues inwards without any sharp delimitation into an unconscious mental entity - the id. The ego serves as a kind of facade for the id. Usually the ego appears to maintain clear and sharp lines of demarcation, but sometimes (being in love, for instance) the boundary between ego and object threatens to melt away. In general, Freud sees pathology as a kind of condition where boundary lines between the ego and the external world become uncertain or in which they are actually drawn incorrectly.

With the recognition of an external world (external to the ego, that is) the tendency arises to separate from the ego everything that can become a source of unpleasure, to throw it outside and to create a pure pleasure-ego which is confronted by a strange and threatening 'outside.' This process of distinguishing what is internal and what emanates from the outer world is one of the first steps towards the introduction of the reality principle that dominates future development of the individual.

Freud, if nothing else, cannot be faulted for ignoring the importance of developmental phenomena. In fact he launches on a big example (a couple pages worth) of what it would be like if the city of Rome kept on growing without tearing down old buildings to make room for the new. His point is that unlike physical processes or entities, only in the mind (a psychical entity) is a preservation of all earlier stages along with the final (or current) form possible. Ie. we carry around our old baggage with us.

In the opening of the chapter Siggie mentions that a friend to his had described religious feeling as having some kind of ''oceanic''(a cosmic or eternal) quality. If such a thing is actually felt by all humans (or 'men' as the 'big S' would say), Freud thinks that is actually derives from an early phase of ego-feeling. So, the origin of the religious attitude can be traced back in clear outlines as far as the feeling of infantile helplessness and the concomitant need for the father's protection.

Chapter II

Religion provides a system of doctrines and promises which on the one hand explains the riddles of the world with enviable completeness, and on the other assures humanity and a careful Providence will watch over people's lives and compensate them in a future existence for frustrations suffered in the present. Freud contends (surprise, surprise) that ''the common man cannot imagine this Providence otherwise than in the figure of an enormously exalted father.''

Life, however, is hard and brings with it pain and difficulties. Therefore, we tend to construct palliative measures to help us cope. He cites three: powerful deflections that cause us to make light of our misery; substitutive satisfactions which diminishes misery; and intoxicating substances, which make us insensitive to it. Freud then brings up the big question: ''What is the meaning of life?'' Luckily he doesn't really try to answer it (and I don't think I would want to hear his answer if he had one). But he does address the question of what people themselves show by their behavior to be the purpose and intention of their actions. Freud believes that we all obviously strive after happiness. This endeavor has both a positive side (experiencing strong feelings of pleasure) and a negative side (absence of pain and unpleasure). What decides the purpose of life is the programme of the pleasure principle, but there is in reality no possibility of its being carried - all of the regulations of the universe run counter to it (presumably Freud is an expert on all of the physical and mathematical laws of the universe). More specifically, we are threatened with suffering from three directions: our own bodies, the external world, and our relations to other persons.

There are a wide variety of ways in which we can deal with these pressures. We may choose to isolate ourselves from others to avoid any unhappiness that may flow from others, but on the other hand but might choose to become a member of the human community. This latter option might allow us to take part in the subjugation of nature to human will through techniques guided by science. A more internal strategy might be an attempt to control our instinctual impulses. Displacement of the libido, for instance, shifts instinctual aims in such a way that they cannot come up against frustration from the external world. A more extreme rejection of the external world would be the attempt to gain satisfaction through illusions (a hermit's attempted ideal recreation of the world and religions of mankind as mass-delusions of humanity are both counted among this strategy).

Others pursue a way of life that makes love the center of everything. Sexual love, according to Freud, has given us our most intense experience of an overwhelming sensation of pleasure and has thus furnished us with a pattern for our search for happiness. Although some may exhibit an aesthetic attitude, Freud believes that 'beauty' and 'attraction' are originally attributes of the sexual object. {A little tidbit of Freudian wisdom: ''it is worth remarking that the genitals themselves, the sight of which is always exciting, are nevertheless hardly ever judged to be beautiful; the quality of beauty seems, instead, to attach to certain secondary sexual characters.''}

Although the pleasure principle in its pure form is unattainable, we do adopt a sort of reality principle according to which we seek to gain as favorable a balance of happiness as we can by a combination of experiencing pleasure and avoiding pain. People tend to hedge their bets, however, and seldom look for the whole of their satisfaction from a single aspiration.

Chapter III

Freud believes that we basically resign ourselves to the fact that the external environment and our bodies are inevitable as potential sources of suffering. We, however, tend to refuse to admit that our relations with other people should not actually be a protection and a benefit. According to this latter contention, what we call our civilization is largely responsible for our misery and we should be much happier is we gave it up and returned to primitive conditions - ie. an attitude of hostility toward civilization. For instance, people have observed that since the Industrial Revolution, the newly-won power over space and time, the subjugation of the forces of nature (which is the fulfillment of a longing that goes back thousands of years) has not increased the amount of pleasurable satisfaction which they may expect from love and has not made them feel happier.

By civilization, Freud means the whole sum of the achievements and the regulations which distinguish our lives from those of our animal ancestors and which serve two purposes - to protect people against nature and to adjust their mutual relations. An early stage of the process of civilization recognizes as cultural all activities and resources (ie. tools) which are useful to people for making the each serviceable to them, for protecting them against the violence of the forces of nature, etc (ie. the notion of cultivation). With every tool humanity prefects its own human organs, whether motor or sensory, or is removing the limits to their functioning.

At the risk of wasting time and killing trees, I thought I would share this jag Freud goes off on about fire and its importance to civilization. This should give you a pretty good indication about why I think this guy is for the most part full of shit. This quote is taken from one of the footnotes (where he tries to sneak in his really outlandish stuff) - I might have to put on my hip-waders for this one:

It is as though primal man had the habit, when he came in contact with fire, of satisfying an infantile desire connected with it, by putting it out with a stream of his urine. The legends that we possess leave no doubt about the originally phallic view taken of tongues of flame as they shoot upwards. Putting out fire by micturating ... was therefore a kind of sexual act with a male, an enjoyment of sexual potency in a homosexual competition. The first person to renounce this desire and spare the fire was able to carry it off with him and subdue it to his own use. By damping down the fire of his own sexual excitation, he had tamed the natural forces of fire. This great cultural conquest was thus the reward of his renunciation of instinct. Further, it is as though woman had been appointed guardian of the fire which was held captive on the domestic hearth, because her anatomy made it impossible for her to yield to the temptation of this desire.
Call me crazy, but I kinda doubt that this was how human civilization got off the ground.

Another general (and early) characteristic of the process of civilization is the tendency to create ideal conceptions of omnipotence and omniscience which are embodied as gods. These gods are cultural ideals in the sense that peoples attribute to them everything that seemed unattainable to their wishes, or that were forbidden to them. Among the other requirements of civilization, Freud stresses: beauty which we recognize and value in nature, and seek to (re)create in our handiwork; cleanliness - dirtiness of any kind seems incompatible with civilization; and order - establishing once and for all a set ways of doing things.

Freud feels that perhaps the best feature to characterize civilization is its esteem and encouragement of mankind's higher mental activities - intellectual, scientific, and artistic achievements - and the leading role that it assigns to ideas in human life. If we assume quite generally that the motive force of all human activities is a striving towards the two confluent goals of utility and a yield of pleasure, we must suppose that this is also true of the manifestations of civilization.

The final characteristic feature of civilization that Freud addresses is the manner in which the relationships of persons to one another - ie. their social relationships - are regulated. Human life in common is only made possible when a majority comes together which is stronger than any separate individual and which remains united against all separate individuals. The power of this community is then set up as 'right' in opposition to the power of the individual, which is condemned as 'brute force.' Members of a community restrict themselves in their possibilities of satisfaction, whereas the individual knows no restrictions. Building upon justice as a requisite of civilization, there should develop a rule of law to which all community members have contributed by a sacrifice of their instincts and which leaves no one at the mercy of brute force. The development of civilization imposes restrictions on individual liberty and justice demands that no one shall escape those restrictions.

Chapter IV

Once primitive humans discovered that they possessed the ability to improve their lot by working, other humans came to acquire value as fellow-workers with whom it was useful to live together. Freud believes that the communal life of human beings had a two-fold foundation: 1) the compulsion to work with was created by external necessity; and 2) the power of love, which made the man unwilling to be deprived of his sexual object (ie. the woman), and made the woman unwilling to be deprived of the part of herself which had been separated off from her (ie. her child).

Although love is important here as a source of satisfaction, it can be powerful source of suffering as well. Therefore, people make themselves independent of their object's acquiescence by displacing what they mainly value from being loved on to loving; they protect themselves against the loss of the object by directing their love, not to single objects but to all man (ie. mankind) alike; and they avoid the uncertainties and disappointments of genital love by turning away from its sexual aims and transforming the instinct into an impulse with an inhibited aim. Both sensual (ie. sexual) and aim-inhibited (non-sexual) love extend outside the family and create new bonds with people who before were strangers. A prominent character of the civilization process is a progressive increase of restrictions placed on sexual relations - in terms of who you can do it with and who you can't. This takes the form of narrowing circles of potential sexual partners across the developmental stages of civilization, ranging anywhere from polymorphous perverse bisexuality to heterosexual monogamy.

Chapter V

Neurotics, who cannot tolerate the frustrations they experience their sexual lives, create substitutive satisfactions for themselves in their symptoms. These symptoms wither cause suffering in themselves or become sources of suffering by raising difficulties in relations with the environment and society. Freud traces the difficulty of cultural development to the inertia of the libido. the antithesis between civilization and sexuality can be derived from the circumstance the sexual love is a relationship between two individuals in which a third can only be superfluous or disturbing, whereas civilization depends on relationships between a considerable number of individuals. Civilization summons up aim-inhibited libido on the largest scale to strengthen the communal bond by relations of friendship.

In the context of a discussion of the concept of ''love thy neighbor as thyself'' Freud has the occasion to relate a little passage originating with a writer named Heine. It goes a little like this:
''Mine is a most peaceable disposition. My wishes are: a humble cottage with a thatched roof, but a good bed, good food, the freshest milk and butter, flowers before my window, and a few fine trees before my door; and if God wants to make my happiness complete, hew will grant me the joy of seeing some six or seven of my enemies hanging from those trees. Before their death I shall, moved in my heart, forgive them all the wrongs they did me in their lifetime. One must, it is true, forgive one's enemies - but not before they have been hanged.''

So what is the moral of the story? Freud believes that ''men are not gentle creatures who want to be loved, and who at the most can defend themselves if they are attacked; they are, on the contrary creatures among whose instinctual endowments is to be reckoned a powerful share of aggressiveness.'' This inclination to aggression is the factor which disturbs our relations with our neighbors and which forces civilization into such a high expenditure of energy to prevent the disintegration of civilized society. One technique for managing this aggression (particularly in smaller cultural groups) is directing outward in the form of hostility against intruders.

Chapter VI

Freud seeks to the concurrent existence of Eros (a libidinal instinct) with a death instinct, which he believes act in opposite directions but are difficult or impossible to distinguish as discrete items in reality. Freud thinks that the most fruitful way of conceptualizing the death instinct is as being directed toward the external world, so that it comes to light as an instinct of aggressiveness and destructiveness that can be directed at some external object rather than the individual (ego). The death instinct when directed inward cannot usually be isolated - the exception would be when it is alloyed with Eros and turns up in something like masochism.

Freud believed that the evolution of civilization amounts to the struggle between Eros and Death, between the instinct of life and the instinct of destruction, as it works itself out in the human species; it can be described as the struggle for life of the human species.

Chapter VII

What means does civilization employ in order to inhibit the aggressiveness which opposes it? Aggressiveness is introjected, internalized; it is sent back to where it came from - that is, it is directed towards the individual's own ego. There it is taken over by a portion of the ego, which sets itself over against the rest of the ego as super-ego, and which now, in the form of 'conscience,' is ready to put into action against the ego the same harsh aggressiveness that the ego would have liked to satisfy upon other, extraneous individuals. The tension between the harsh super-ego and the ego that is subjected to it, is what we call a 'sense of guilt' - this expresses itself as a need for punishment.

Guilt comes from the intention of a deed of doing something 'bad.' Obviously the issue of right/wrong is a complicated one. Freud believes that there is an influence extraneous to the individual at work in determinations of good/bad. The individual's motive in submitting to this extraneous influence is a fear of loss of love, a consequence of that person's helplessness and dependence on other people. The larger human community constitutes this extraneous influence, an authority which is eventually internalized through the establishment of a super-ego. The guilt arising from fear of the super-ego (ie. fear of loss of love) is particularly persistent since even after renunciation of a forbidden wish, this wish still persists and cannot be hidden from the super-ego. In formation of the super-ego and the emergence of a conscience, innate constitutional factors (biological/genetic) and influences from the real environment act in combination. And of course he wouldn't be Freud if he didn't say ''We cannot get away from the assumption that man's sense of guilt springs from the Oedipus complex and was acquired at the killing of the gather by the brothers banded together.'' {This last bit is apparently something he went into a lot of detail about in Totem and Taboo, but is basically referred to as a primordial symbolic thing here} ''It was the same act of aggression whose suppression in the child is supposed to be the source of his sense of guilt.''

In response to the remorse felt after the act of aggression against the primal father, the super-ego is set up by identification with the father. Agency is given to the father's power as though a punishment for the deed of aggression against the father, and also created are restrictions intended to prevent a repetition of the deed. Chapter VIII

Freud contends that the sense of guilt is the most important problem in the development of civilization and it shows that the price we pay for our advance in civilization is a loss of happiness through the heightening of the sense of guilt. In the end guilt is a form of anxiety. Remorse is the general term for the ego's reaction in a case of sense of guilt. It contains sensory material of the anxiety which is operating behind the sense of guilt; it is itself a punishment and can include the need for punishment.

Owning to the omniscience of the super-ego, the differences between an aggression intended and an aggression carried out looses its force. When an instinctual trend undergoes repression, its libidinal elements are turned into symptoms, and its aggressive components into a sense of guilt.

Freud makes explicit a connection that implicitly runs through much of the book: the process of human civilization and the development or educative process of individual human beings are very similar in nature, if not the very same process applied to different kinds of objects.

The development of the individual seems to be a product of the interaction between two urges: the urge towards happiness - egoistic urge; and the altruistic urge toward union with others in the community. The analogy between the process of civilization and individual development can be extended in an important respect, by asserting that the community also evolved a super-ego under whose influence cultural development proceeds.

Ethics can be regarded as a therapeutic attempt, an endeavor to achieve by means of a command of the super-ego something that has not been achieved by any other cultural activities.

Studies in Ethnomethodology

Chap. 2 ''Studies of the routine grounds of everyday activities''

From the point of view of sociological theory the moral order consists of the rule governed activities of everyday life. A society's members encounter and know the moral order as perceivedly normal courses of action - familiar scenes of everyday affairs, the world of daily life known in common with others and with others taken for granted. Garfinkel is concerned with the activities of everyday life and that which is taken for granted, he is interested in how things are perceived and defined. He wishes to explore it as a topic and as a methodology. Sociologists commonly overlook the socially standardized and standardizing, ''seen but unnoticed'' expected background features of everyday life. This is a glaring oversight because the member of society uses background expectancies as a scheme of interpretation. Garfinkel bases his arguments and conclusions concerning ethnomethodology on a series of 'breaching' experiments, in which students deliberately breech the understood, but unspoken, rules of everyday encounters. These experiments are not really experiments, but more like demonstrations.

We begin first by exploring common understandings. Understandings cannot possibly consist of a measured amount of shared agreement among persons on certain topics. Garfinkel illustrated this point with an example of conversation between two people. When one examines the exchange, one realizes that there are many things that are understood between two people, especially those who have a standing relationship, than are actually mentioned. Also, many understood matters were understood on the basis of what was unspoken, the temporal series of utterances determined what was understood, and matters that were understood in common were understood only in and through a course of understanding work that consisted of treating an actual linguistic event as document or representation of some other real, experienced event. Of course, understanding also hinges on prior relationships and events, as well as the form of conversational interaction. Sometimes what is said is specifically vague and what is expressed may only be understood through further exchange.

Garfinkel argues that all of these realizations about conversation point to underlying properties of conversational exchange and the rules which govern them in daily life. Persons require these properties of discourse as conditions under which they are themselves entitled and entitle others to claim that they know what they are talking about, and that what they are saying is understood and ought to be understood. To test his hypotheses, Garfinkel sent forth a legion of students to conduct conversational breaching experiments. Students were instructed to question everything they were being told by asking what was meant. Example:
(S) I had a flat tire.
(E) What do you mean you had a flat tire?
When these experiments were conducted, the students often received responses of puzzlement, anger, concern, and frustration. Such responses demonstrated the importance of shared knowledge and understanding, as well as the rules which govern exchanges in conversation.

Other experiments and their conclusions included the following. In no one experiment was student participation 100%. There were also some variations in responses in all cases.

- Undergraduate students were asked to spend 15 mins. - 1hr. in their homes viewing its activities as if they were boarders with no history in the household. Persons, relationships, and activities were described without respect for their history, for the place of the scene in a set of developing life circumstances, or for he scenes as texture of relevant events for the parties themselves. Students were surprised to see how personal the interactions and treatments of others were, and how formal manners and protocol were often disregarded. Family members were confused, angered and often hurt by students' formal behavior. Students were often relieved when the experiment was over. Conclusion: Background understandings (mutually recognized texture) are necessary for adequate recognition of commonplace events.

- In a variant, students were asked to act as boarders in their own homes for the same length of time. They were supposed to be formally polite, and again unassuming in regards to relationships, common patterns of behavior, and the set up of the household. Familial response again involved anger, suspicion, frustration, and the like. In most cases, families vigorously sought to make the strange actions intelligible and to restore the situation to normal appearances. Explanations by family members were sought in previous, understandable motives of the student: overwork, sickness, personal troubles. When offered explanations by family members went unacknowledged, there followed withdrawal by the offended member, attempted isolation of the culprit, retaliation and denunciation. At the end of the experiment, students filled their families in on the little experiment, and while he families were forgiving, many were not very happy about playing the role of the guinea pig. Unlike the first experiment, relief was often only partial, and anticipatory fears were low. Conclusion: This too supports the idea that background knowledge is important and is understood as such when it is shared.

Background understanding has important social affects, but he role that a background of common understandings plays in the production, control, and recognition of these affects, however, is terra incognita. The existence of a definite and strong relationship between common understandings and social affects can be demonstrated and some of it features explored by the deliberate display of distrust, a procedure that produced highly standardized effects for Garfinkel. Distrust was chosen because on the everyday level, to treat a relationship under a rule of doubt requires that the necessity and motivation for such a rule be justified. Another experiment was in order: Students were instructed to engage someone in conversation and to imagine and act on the assumption that what the other person was saying was directed by hidden motives which were the real ones. Most students tried this with friends or families, and reported little embarrassment, but many hurt feelings on the part of the interactants. The two students who interacted with strangers were unable to complete the interaction.

Enough with the experiments for awhile, Garfinkel returns to the theory behind ethnomethodology. The possibility of common understanding does not consist in demonstrated measures of shared knowledge of social structure, but consists instead and entirely in the enforceable character of actions in compliance with the exigencies of everyday life as a morality. Common sense knowledge of the facts of social life for the members of the society is institutionalized knowledge of the real world. Common sense knowledge acts in the manner of self-fulfilling prophecy, the features of the real society are produced by persons' motivated compliance with these background expectancies.

Garfinkel extends this reasoning to claim that the firmer a societal member's grasp of What Anyone Like Us Necessarily Knows, the more severs should be his/her disturbance when the 'natural facts of life' are impugned for him as a depiction of the real circumstances. This is what the breaching experiments are intended to test. Individuals are presented with events that can only be understood by changing the objective structure of the familiar, they cannot be understood in terms of the understood background structure. Presumably, individuals will tend to try to normalize any incongruities.

Background knowledge often requires assumptions. Garfinkel refers to Schutz and his theories on assumptions, which can easily be compared to Goffman. According to Schutz, the person assumes, assumed that the other person assumes as well, and assumes that as he assumes it of the other person, the other person assumes it of him. (With all this going on, who has time to interact? - JPG) The actual assumptions made center around such things as the 'facts', what is said and what is meant, affectivity of objects or interactions, and various other interactive affects of objects and social structure. Only when one makes all of these assumptions, and the event has for the witness all of enumerated determinations, is it an events in an environment of common knowledge. Such attributions are features of witnessed events that are seen without being noticed.

Now, back to the experiments. Garfinkel came up with a new set of experiments designed to breach common understandings and produce confusion. All of the experiments satisfied 3 conditions: the person could not turn it into a joke or deception of any kind, the person could not 'leave the field' or have sufficient time to redefine the real circumstances, and the person would be deprived of consensual support for an alternative definition of social reality. One experiment was:

- Medical students were interviewed under the pretense of discovering why a med school interview was such a stressful situation. The interviewer posed as a rep from a prestigious school. During the 3 hour interview, the interviewer would play for each student a recorded interview with someone who had bad manners, was pompous and rude, and all in all a general 'bad interview', but the interviewer would act as if the recorded interview was ideal. The med students were then asked for their opinions and analysis. Results: Almost all students fell for the line. They often asked what others thought and after initial derogatory opinions, they worked hard to reconcile their previous statements with the interviewer's positive view of the recorded tape. 22 of 28 students felt marked relief when the experiment was explained to them afterwards.

Garfinkel is very critical of previous studies which treat individuals as cultural dopes who simply reproduce society without being aware of it. Such studies treat common sense rationalities of judgment as epiphenomenal. To test the idea of people being judgmental dopes, another experiment:

- Garfinkel sent out 120 students to stores where they were required to pick an item and offer to pay a price other than the one that was marked on the item. Most trial were conducted by offering a lower price for either an item under $2 or an item over $50. Most students found the most tense part of the experiment to be the anticipation phase, before they approached a sales person for the first time. Anticipatory fears declined for those with multiple trials. There was less discomfort in bargaining for high-priced merchandise, and more results of price negotiation. Sales persons can be dismissed as either having been dopes in different ways than current theories of standardized expectancies provide, or not dopes enough. A few showed anxiety, occasionally one got angry.

Such findings suggest that one can make the member of the society out to be a cultural dope by portraying individuals as those who follow rules when in actuality they have anticipatory fears of alternate situations, by overlooking the practical and theoretical importance of mastering fears, or if upon arousal of troubled fears, an individual strives to avoid the very situations in which they might learn about their fears. The more important the rule, the greater the likelihood that knowledge is based on avoided tests.

In standardized theories, persons may also be made out to be dopes by either over-formalizing, or over-simplifying the effects and texture of the environment, or by portraying routine actions as those governed by prior agreements, and by making the likelihood that a member will recognize deviance depend upon the existence of prior agreements.

In conclusion:
The study of common sense knowledge and common sense activities consists of treating as problematic phenomena the actual methods whereby members of a society, lay or professional, make the social structures of everyday activities observable.

''Deep Play:'' Notes on a Balinese Cockfight.''

Of cocks and men

Balinese men identify with their fighting cocks to a great extent. Their cocks represent their masculine identity and they take immaculate care of them, spend much time grooming them and training them, etc. The cock symbolizes maleness, the penis, as well as being a hated animal (the Balinese find all animals repugnant) and an object of fascination.

The fight

The rules of the cock fight are passed form generation to generation as part of the general legal and cultural tradition of the villages. The cock fight can be viewed as a sociological entity. The people who watch cock fights are not a ''group'' or a ''crowd,'' but a ''focused gathering'' of people -- persons engrossed in a common flow of activity and relating to one another in terms of that flow. There is a connection between Balinese collective life and this sport.

Odds and even money

It is the formal asymmetry between balanced center bets (bets central to the game) and unbalanced side ones (bets made on the side lines of the game and not between players) that poses the critical analytical problem for a theory which sees cock fight wagering as the link connecting the fight to the wider world of Balinese culture. It also suggests the way to go about demonstrating the link. The center bet, with so much riding on it, makes the ''depth'' of the game (Jeremy Bentham). The Balinese attempt to create an interesting, ''deep'' match by making the center bet as large as possible so that the cocks matched will be as equal and as fine as possible, and the outcome as unpredictable as possible.

The question of why such matches are interesting takes us out of the realm of formal concerns into more broadly sociological and social psychological ones, and to a less purely economic idea of what ''depth'' amounts to.

Playing with Fire

Bentham's concept of ''deep play'' is play in which the stakes are so high that, from a utilitarian stand point, to play is irrational. Nonetheless, men do engage in such play both passionately and often, even in the face of the law (it is against the law in Bali to engage in cock fights). In deep Balinese cock fights, much more is at stake than material gain : status. The more money one risks, the more status one risks.

The big players are the focusing element in these focused gatherings. These men generally dominate and define the sport as they dominate and define the society. What makes the Balinese CF deep is thus not the money itself, but what the money causes to happen: the migration of the Balinese status hierarchy into the body of the cock fight.

The CF is a representation of the complex fields of tension set up by the controlled, ceremonial, deeply felt interaction of male (narcissistic) selves in the context of every day life. The CF is deliberately made to be a simulation of the social matrix, the involved system of cross-cutting, overlapping, highly corporate groups - - villages, kin, etc. -- in which its devotees live.

There is a pattern of tiered hierarchy of status rivalries between highly corporate but variously - based groupings. The cockfight is fundamentally a dramatization of status claims. for instance:

Men never bet against a cock owned by a member of their own kin group
Men involved in highly institutionalized hostility relations will bet against each other
Men avoid betting when loyalties are split
Men involved in the center bet are typically leading members of their group (village, kin group)

The Balinese are fully aware of the symbolism in their cock fights.
The more a match is between near-status individuals, the deeper the match. The deeper the match, the closer the identification of cock and man. the greater emotion and absorption in the match, the higher the betting, the less an economic and more a status view, and the ''solider'' the citizens will be who will be gaming.

Feathers, blood, crowds and money

Like any art form, the cock fight renders ordinary experience comprehensible by presenting it in terms of acts and objects which have had their practical consequences removed and reduced to the level of sheer appearances, where their meaning can be more powerfully articulated. The CF puts a construction on death, masculinity, rage, pride, chance, etc. the function of the CF is a means of expression neither to assuage social passions nor to heighten them, but to display them.

The importance of the CF is not, as functionalist sociology would have it, that it reinforces status discriminations, but that it provides a methodological social commentary upon the whole matter of assorting human beings into fixed hierarchical ranks and then organizing the major part of collective existence around that assortment. Its function is interpretive.

Saying something of something

Reading cultural practice as text: the Balinese, by attending a CF, learns what his cultures ethos and his private sensibility look like when spelled out externally in a collective text; that the two are near enough alike to be articulated in the symbolics of such a text; and -- the disquieting part -- that the text in which this revelation is accomplished consists of a chicken hacking another mindlessly to bits. Not only does the CF bring the assorted experiences of everyday life into focus, but it creates the paradigmatic human event -- one that tells us less what happens than the kind of thing that would happen if life were art and could be freely shaped by styles of feeling. Yet art regenerates the very subjectivity it pretends to display. CF's are positive agents in the maintenance of such a sensibility. (WAIT!!! I THOUGHT GEERTZ SAID THE COCK FIGHT SHOULDN'T BE VIEWED FROM A FUNCTIONALIST STAND POINT!???!! -EA).
Anyhow, one way to look at the symbolic forms of the culture of a people is as an ensemble of texts. To ''say something of something'' to someone is at least to open up the paths of analysis which attend to their substance.

''Religion as a Cultural System.''

I. The culture concept to which Geertz adheres denotes a historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life.

II. A paradigm consists of sacred symbols which function to synthesize a people's ethos -- the tone, character, and quality of their life, its moral and aesthetic style -- and their world view. A paradigm is presented as representing/accommodating an actual state of affairs. It objectivizes moral and aesthetic preferences by depicting them as the imposed conditions of life implicit in a world with a particular structure. It supports received beliefs about the world's body by invoking deeply felt moral and aesthetic sentiments as experiential evidence for their truth.

How does religion tune human actions to an envisaged cosmic order and project images of cosmic order onto the plane of human experience?

Religion is a system of symbols which acts to establish a powerful, pervasive and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic.

''A system of symbols which acts to...''

A symbol is used for any object, act, event, quality, or relation which serves as a vehicle for a meaning. Cultural patterns are social events. The symbolic dimension of social events is itself theoretically abstractable from these events as empirical totalities.
Culture patterns are extrinsic sources of info. They are models ''for'' and ''of''. They have an intrinsic double aspect: they give meaning to social and psychological reality both by shaping themselves to it and by shaping it themselves. Symbols can also be models ''of'' and models ''for'''
Two dispositions are motivated by religious activity: motivation and moods. Motivation is a persisting tendency, a chronic inclination to perform certain sorts of acts and experience certain sorts of feelings. Motivations are directional. Moods go nowhere. they vary only as to their intensity and they are induced by sacred symbols. We interpret motives in terms of their consummations, but we interpret moods in terms of their sources.

''By formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and...''

Religion must affirm something. Man depends on symbol systems with a dependence so great as to be decisive for his ''creatural viability,'' and as a result, his sensitivity to even the remotest indication that they may prove unable to cope with one or another aspect of experience raises within him great anxiety.
First of all, men seek out lucidity and experience anxiety when empirical phenomena don't make sense. The conviction that ''the odd'' can be accounted for must be sustained. Second, there is the problem of suffering. The question is HOW to suffer. Religion on one hand anchors the power of our symbolic resources for formulating analytic ideas in an authoritarian conception of the overall shape of reality; on the other hand it anchors the power of our resources for expressing emotions. This helps humans resist the challenge of emotional meaninglessness from pain. Third, religion helps men deal with evil. Our symbolic resources provide us with a workable set of ethical criteria and normative guides to govern our action. It responds to the disquieting sense that one's moral insight is inadequate to one's moral experience. The problem of evil is in essence the same sort of problem as bafflement or suffering -- NO ORDER.
The religious response to each case is the formulation, by means of symbols, of an image of such a genuine order of the world which will account for the ambiguities of human experience. The effort behind religion is not to deny the undeniable, but to deny the inexplicable, through symbols.

''And clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that...''

How is it that the denial mentioned above comes to be believed? Religious belief involves a prior acceptance of authority which transforms that experience. The religious perspective is ''he who would know must first believe.'' This perspective differs from the common sense perspective in that it moves beyond the realities of everyday life to wider ones which correct and complete them, and its defining concern is not action upon those wider realities , but of acceptance and faith in them. The religious perspective differs from the scientific perspective in that it questions the realities of every day life in terms of non-hypothetical truths. It differs from the aesthetic perspective in that it deepens concern with fact and seeks to create an aura of actuality.
It is in ritual - consecrated behavior - that the conviction that religious directives are sound is generated. It is in ceremonial form that moods and motivations which sacred symbols induce in men and the general conceptions of the order of existence which they formulate -- reinforce one another. Religious acts for participants are enactment's, materializations of religion -- not only models of what they believe, but also models for the believing of it. The acceptance of authority that underlies the religious perspective that the ritual embodies flows from the enactment of the ritual itself.

''that the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic''

Religion is sociologically interesting not because, as vulgar positivism would have it, it describes the social order, but because it shapes it. The movement back and forth between the religious perspective and the common sense perspective is actually often ignored by social anthropologists. Religious belief in the midst of ritual, where it engulfs the total person and as a remembered reflection of that experience in the midst of everyday life are distinct. Religion alters the whole landscape presented to common sense, alters it in such a way that the moods and motivations induced by religious practice seem themselves supremely practical, the only sensible ones to adopt given the way things ''really'' are. Hence, religion changes man and his common sense perspective.
It is the particularity of the impact of religious systems upon social systems which renders general assessments of the value of religion in either moral or functional terms impossible.

III. Religious concepts spread beyond their specifically metaphysical contexts to prove a framework of general ideas in terms of which a wide range of experiences can be given a meaningful form. A set of religious beliefs is a gloss (makes them graspable) and a template (shapes them) for the mundane world of social relationships and psychological events

Tracing the social and psychological role of religion is a matter of understanding how it is that men's notions of the ''real'' induce in them and color their sense of the practical and the moral.
The anthropological study of religion is two -stage:
1)analysis of the system of meanings embodied in the symbols which make up religious power 2)the relating of these systems to social structural and psychological processes.
Only when we have a theoretical analysis of symbolic action comparable in sophistication to what we now have for social and psychological action, will we be able to cope effectively with those aspects of social and psychological life in which religion (or art, science, or ideology) plays a determinant role.

Presentation of the Self in Everyday Life

''Interaction Ritual''

Goffman is concerned with the study of social interaction; that is, the countless patterns and natural sequences of behavior occurring whenever persons come into one another's immediate presence. This is not the study of the individual and his/her psychology. Rather, it is the syntactical relations among the acts of different persons mutually present to one another.

Chapter 1: On Face-Work

A line is a pattern of verbal and nonverbal acts by which a person expresses his/her view of a situation and his/her evaluation of the participants, including him/herself.

Face is the positive social value a person effectively claims for him/herself by the line others assume s/he has taken during a particular contact. It is an image of self delineated in terms of approved social attributes. A person becomes attached to his\her face (Goffman actually uses the word ''cathects'') and therefore s/he considers participation in any contact with others a type of commitment.

To have, to be in, or to maintain face means a line a person effectively takes presents an image of him/her that is internally consistent and supported by other participants.

To be in wrong face occurs when a person's social worth cannot be integrated into the line that is being sustained for him/her. To be out of face means a person participates in a contact with others without having ready a line of the kind participants in such situations are expected to take. both of these situations usually cause the person to feel ashamed or inferior. Poise is the capacity to suppress and conceal any tendency to become shamefaced during encounters with others.

An expressive order is an order that regulates the flow of events so that anything that appears to be expressed by them will be consistent with the person's face.

A person is not only expected to have self-respect by maintaining his/her own face, s/he is also expected to sustain a standard of considerateness during an encounter with another person to save the feelings and face of that other person.

The maintenance of face is a condition of interaction, not its objective. To study face-saving is to study the traffic rules of social interaction; one learns about the code a person adheres to in his/her movement across the paths and designs of others, but not where s/he is going, or why s/he wants to get there.

Face-work means the actions taken by a person to make whatever s/he is doing consistent with face. All members of society are expected to have some knowledge of face-work and some experience in its use. This is called tact, savoir-faire, diplomacy, or social skill.

Goffman distinguishes between two basic kinds of face-work:
1) The avoidance process: to prevent threats to his/her face, a person simply avoids contacts in which these threats are likely to occur.
2) The corrective process: when a person fails to save face, s/he is likely to try to correct for the effects of this incidence. An interchange is a sequence of acts set in motion by an acknowledged threat to face. There are four elements in an interchange:
a) the challenge: participants call attention to the misconduct
b) the offering: the offender is given a chance to correct for the offense and reestablish the expressive order
c) acceptance: the persons to whom the offering is made can accept it as a satisfactory means of reestablishing the expressive order
d) sign of gratitude: the forgiven person is thankful to those who have given him/her the indulgence of forgiveness

Sometimes an encounter between people is less a scene of mutual considerateness in maintaining face-work, but rather a contest whose purpose is to preserve everyone's line from inexcusable contradictions while at the same time scoring as many points as possible against one's adversaries (e.g. digs, snubs, bitchiness, etc.). Often when face has been threatened, people cooperate to do face-work and thereby save the situation. Resolution of the situation to everyone's apparent satisfaction is the first requirement; correct apportionment of blame is typically a secondary consideration. Examples of this cooperation are social etiquette, polite hints, and reciprocal self-denial (when the person compliments others first to get attention temporarily away from him/herself).

The Self:

Goffman uses a double definition of self: the self as an image pieced together from the expressive implications of the full flow of events in an undertaking; and the self as a kind of player in a ritual game. The rules of social interaction rely on a system of checks and balances by which each participant tends to be give the right to handle only those matters which he will have little motivation for mishandling. The rights and obligations of an interactant are designed to prevent him/her from abusing his/her role as an object of sacred value.

Spoken Interaction:
There is a functional relationship between the structure of the self and the structure of spoken interaction. A person determines how s\he ought to conduct him\herself during an occasion of talk by testing the potentially symbolic meaning of his/her acts against the self-images that are being sustained. In doing this, s/he incidentally subjects her/his behavior to the expressive order that prevails and contributes to the orderly flow of messages. His/her aim is to save face; his/her effect is to save the situation. The person's orientation to face is the point of leverage that the ritual order has in regard to him/her; yet a promise to take ritual care of his/her face is built into the very structure of talk.

Human Nature:
Societies everywhere must mobilize their members as self-regulating participants in social encounters. One way of doing this is through ritual. A person is taught to be perceptive, to have feelings attached to self and a self expressed through face, to have pride, honor, and dignity, to have considerateness, to have tact and a certain amount of poise. These elements of behavior which must be built into the person if practical use is to be made of him/her as an interactant constitute a universal human nature. A person becomes a kind of construct, built up form moral rules that are impressed upon him/her from outside, from social encounters.

Chapter 2: The Nature of Deference and Demeanor

In this chapter, Goffman tries to reformulate a version of Durkheim's social psychology mentioned in the Elementary Forms of Religious Life. He explores the ways in which a person in our urban secular world is allotted a kind of sacredness that is displayed and confirmed by symbolic acts. Durkheim wrote that the individual's personality can be seen as one apportionment of the collective mana, and that rites performed to representations of the social collectivity will sometimes be performed to the individual him/herself. Two examples of these rites are deference and demeanor. Goffman uses data collected from observations of mental patients to elaborate on these points.

A rule of conduct is a guide of action that is suitable or just. Attachment to rules leads to a constancy and patterning of behavior. Rules of conduct impinge upon the individual in two ways: directly as obligations, establishing how s/he is morally constrained to conduct him/herself; and indirectly, as expectations, establishing how others are morally bound to act in regard to him/her. When an individual becomes involved in the maintenance of a rule, s/he tends to become committed to a particular image of self. An act that is subject to a rule of conduct is a communication, for it represents a way in which selves are confirmed. Rules of conduct transform both action and inaction into expression.

There are two classes or rules of conduct:
1) symmetrical: a rule that leads an individual to have obligations or expectations regarding others that these others have in regard to him/her.
2) asymmetrical: rule that leads others to treat and be treated by the individual differently from the way s/he treats and is treated by them

Goffman also distinguished between two types of rules:
1) substantive: rules that guide conduct in regard to matters felt to have significance in their own right
2) ceremonial: rules that have primary importance as a conventionalized means of communication by which people express their character or convey their appreciation to other participant in the situation.
Deference and demeanor are two basic components of ceremonial rules. They illustrate how the self is in part a ceremonial thing, a sacred object which must be treated with proper ritual care and must be presented to others in proper light.

Deference functions as a symbolic means by which appreciation is regularly conveyed to a recipient of this recipient. It has two forms:
1) avoidance rituals: forms of deference which lead the actor to keep at a distance from the recipient and not violate what Simmel has called the ''ideal sphere'' that lies around the recipient.
2) presentational rituals: acts through which the individual makes specific attestations to recipients concerning how s/he regards them (e.g. salutations, invitations, compliments)

Demeanor is conveyed through deportment, dress, and bearing and serves to express that the person is of certain desirable or undesirable qualities. The individual creates an image of him/herself for others.

Deference and demeanor are examples that the Meadian notion that the individual takes toward him/herself the attitude of others is an oversimplification. Rather the individual must rely on others to complete the picture of him/her of which s/he is allowed only to paint certain parts. The urban secular world is not so irreligious as we might think. The individual him/herself remains a deity of considerable importance.

Processing Fads and Fashions: An Organization-Set Analysis of Cultural Industry Systems

I think this is a paper on the organization of the culture industry, rather than a paper on organizational culture. However, it does link up nicely with dudes like Hebdige, and provides a distinctly different perspective on the production of cultural objects than does, say, Geertz.

Organizations engaged in the production and mass distribution of ''cultural'' items are often confronted by highly uncertain environments at their input and output boundaries. They develop three adaptive coping strategies to deal with this uncertainty: the deployment of ''contact men'' to organizational boundaries, overproduction and differential promotion of new items, and cooptation of mass media gatekeepers.

Hirsch thinks analysis of innovation has focussed too little on the throughput sector, consisting of orgs which filter the overflow of information and materials intended for consumers. From an organizational perspective, two questions pertaining to any innovation are logically prior to its appearance in the marketplace: 1) by what criteria is it selected for sponsorship over available alternative? and, 2) might certain characteristics of its organizational sponsor, such as prestige or size of an advertizing budget, substantially aid in explaining the ultimate success or failure of a new product or idea?

Entrepreneurial orgs in cultural industries confront a set of problems interesting to students of interorganizational relations: goal dissensus, boundary-spanning role occupations with nonorganizational norms, legal and value constraints against vertical integration, and, hence, dependence on autonomous agencies (esp mass media gatekeepers) for linking the org to its consumers.

For Hirsch, a cultural organization is a profit-seeking firm producing cultural products for national distribution (ie, Virgin Records, but not the NEA). The cultural industry system is comprised of all orgs engaged in the process of filtering new products and ideas as they flow from creative personnel in the technical subsystem to the managerial, institutional and societal levels of organization (these org levels are from Talcum Powder's work on orgs). Artist and mass audience are linked by an ordered sequence of events: the object dee art must 1) succeed in competition with others for selection and promotion by entrep. orgs and 2) then succeed in receiving mass media coverage in such forms as book-reviews, radio air play, and films criticism.

Cultural organizations constitute the managerial subsystems of the industry systems in which they operate. Cultural industries' technical subsystems are organized along craft lines (from Stinchcombe: location of professionals in the technical subsystem and administrators in the managerial one), and this organization is a function of demand uncertainty and cheap technology. Demand uncertainty is caused by shifts in consumer tastes, legal and normative constraints on vertical integration, and widespread variability in the selection criteria employed by mass media gatekeepers.

Competitive advantage for a cultural org firm lies with firms best able to link available input to reliable and established distribution channels. The mass distribution of cultural items requires more bureaucratic organizational arrangements than the administration of production.

The organizational separation of producers of cultural items from their dissemenators places definite restrictions on the forms of power cultural orgs can exercise over gatekeepers; autonomous gatekeeps present the org with the control problem of favorably influencing the probability that a given new release will be selected for exposure to consumers.

The mass media constitute the institutional subsystem of the cultural industry system. The diffusion of particular fads and fashions is either blocked or facilitated at this strategic checkpoint. Organizations at the managerial level of cultural industry systems are confronted by 1) constraints on output distribution imposed by gatekeeps and 2) contingencies in recruiting ''raw materials'' for organizational sponsorship. To minimize dependence on these elements of their task environments, the three strategies noted above have developed.

1.Contact men. Professional agents on the input boundary (eg, editors who woo authors) must be allowed a great deal of discretion in the activities on behalf of the cultural org, and thus, though essential and duly highly rewarded, pose a control problem. Cultural orgs deploy additional contact men at their output boundaries, linking the org to retail outlets and surrogate consumers in mass-media orgs.

A high ratio of promotional personnel to surrogate consumers (contact men to disk jockeys, for instance) appears to be a structural feature of any industry system in which goods are marginally differentiated, producers' access to consumer markets is regulated by independent gatekeepers, and large scale direct advertising campaigns are uneconomical or prohibited by law.

2. Differential promotion of new items, in conjunction with overproduction. Overproduction is a rational org response in an environment of low capital investment and demand uncertainty. It is more efficient to produce many failures for each success than to sponsor fewer items and pretest each on a massive scale to increase media coverage and sales. Cultural orgs maximize profits by mobilizing promotional resources in support of volume sales for a small no. of items. These resources are not divided equally among a firm's new releases. The strategy of differential promotion is an attempt by cultural orgs to buffer their technical core from demand uncertainties by smoothing out output transactions.

3. Cooptation of institutional regulators. For instance, hit records are featured by radio stations in order to sell advertising. Goal conflict and value dissensus between cultural orgs and gatekeepers are reflected in frequent disputes over the legitimacy and legality of promoters' attempts to acquire power of the decision autonomy of surrogate gatekeepers. Cultural orgs struggle to control gatekeepers to the extent that coverage for new items is 1) crucial for building consumer demand and 2) problematic (eg. Donnie Osmond's new album). Cultural orgs are less likely to deploy boundary agents or sanction high pressure tactics for items whose sale is less contingent on gatekeepers actions (eg, classical music).