RONALD DORE
British Factory-Japanese Factory

CHAPTER 1: Four Factories
A First Look Each company, English Electric Company and Hitachi company, has two plants. Bradford and Liverpool for England, and Furusato and Taga for Hitachi. The companies make the same product, and each company's two factories parallel the other company's. E.g., each company has a factory located in a mainly working class neighborhood, and the other is located in a technology neighborhood.

CHAPTER 7: Industrial Relations

Hitachi's union admits only employees of Hitachi and the 'union shop' rule holds. Workers in EE are members of a variety of different unions, each specialized. White collar technical and lower-ranking supervisory and managerial workers - include. young university grads destined for higher management - belong to the Hitachi union. A smaller proportion of such workers in EE belong to any union, and if they do, it is different from the manual workers' union. the grass-roots basis of the Hitachi union is the workshop department unit within the factory.

British unions have a dual structure. The grass-roots unit is the local branch in which membership is defined by residence: there are also 'weed-roots' workshop units which often exhibit the sturdier growth. The Hitachi union collects more money from its members and has better resources. the Hitachi union has a more formal bureaucratic organization, more explicit rules.

Wage bargaining is the main function of the unions in both firms. Negotiations are remote from the worker and his factory-level representatives, who are called on only for strikes. Negotiations over change in earnings provide frequent opportunity for overt conflict at the workshop level in EE. This doesn't happen in Hitachi. EE's workers have far less detailed contractual regulation of the extent to which union representatives are entitled to share in or exercise veto power over the making and enforcing of work rules. Hitachi has central and plant 'constitutional' contracts which specify the rights and duties of both sides.

The sense of a confrontational division between management and men is more salient in the minds of British workers. the workers of Hitachi are less often mobilized in protest against what is considered unjust exercise of authority by managers and supervisors. The large element of merit-rating in the Hitachi wage system puts power over individual workers in the hands of their supervisors which in Britain has been taken away from them by the unions. The wide membership range of the Hitachi union can make supervisors key men in, and often the formal representatives of, union workshop units. The absence of institutionalized confrontation and the lesser incidence of overt conflict at Hitachi reflect also the greater degree of consensus which exists between managers and union leaders at Hitachi then in EE.

This is hard to pin down in detail but one might hazard the following assertions:
a.) Hitachi managers and union leaders are closer together in the relative values they place on efficiency, on investment for later reward, and on the cooperative integration of different functions in a harmonious whole, than their English counterparts;
b.) Where there is a clash between the values of harmony and obedience to superior on the one hand, and individual dignity, freedom and equality on the other, EE unionists would take a stronger stand on the latter;
c.) Hitachi union leaders share the managers' concern with the growth and prosperity of Hitachi as a corporation in competition with other corporations. Joint productivity councils based on the assumption of shared goals exist at Hitachi. EE does not have this because union workers and managers are hesitant that it might limit their freedom of action in the 'contest' situation. The Hitachi situation is institutionally static, and the EE situation is institutionally fluid. The managers at EE are moving towards what might be called a Hitachi-type pattern of relations. Union leaders have responded with a mixture of pleasurable surprise and suspicion. Unions in both countries have ties to left-wing political parties.

CHAPTER 10: Two Employment Systems

I. The Hitachi system differs from EE chiefly in that it accords to manual workers those privileges - fringe benefits like pensions and sick pay, considerable security of tenure, a rising curve of earnings consonant with the increase in family responsibilities - which in Britain are restricted to middle-class workers and almost entirely denied to those who work with their hands (NM: This is the Japanese large-firm system, and the majority of Japanese manual workers are outside a full version of this Hitachi-type system.)

II. The British system is open, honest and contractual, frankly reorganizing conflicting interests and reconciling them in and adult and masculine (?) way, the Japanese system is a hypocritically devious form of exploitation by paternalism (go West?!?!).

Is the Japanese system exploitative and is paternalistic?

Exploitative: The degree of inequality in the distribution of the proceeds of the companies' operations may well be greater in Hitachi than in EE, but the difference is not very great. It does not seem that the effect of Hitachi's greater 'paternalism' is to brainwash the H workers into a less critical acceptance of the inequalities which exist.

Paternalistic (utilizing Parson's set of dichotomies)
1. Do ascribed characteristics affect the relationship? This deviates from the achievement principle.- Positions in H are achieved, not given on the basis of ascriptive characteristics. Entrance is regulated by strict qualification, which might be bent only very marginally for someone with kin connections.- Authority of the managers does not depend on the aura which attends birth in a hereditarily superior class H managers are mainly of fairly humbler middle-class origins.- Position within the firm is also achieved, by job performance, though here the ascriptive characteristic of age acts as a qualifying factor.
2. Is the employment relation diffuse - affecting the whole man? The paternalistic employer 'takes care of' his employees and they respond with a general loyalty (e.g., voting for his nominees or performing domestic chores for him).- Only in a very limited degree is there any personal discretion involved I the conferral of benefits.- The elements of paternalism in Hi have been incorporated into the specific contractual definition of the employment relationship.
3. Is the loyalty universalistic or particularistic? In traditional forms of personal paternalism, the worker's overriding obligation is loyalty to his employer, or perhaps, in larger firms which retain these patterns, to his particular manager or supervisor.- In H, the emphasis is all on loyalty to the company as a total entity: the employee's chief duty is to foster the interests of the firm as a collectivity.

III. Hitachi's form of organization is not foreign to Britain. It is the pattern of the British army or civil service.

CHAPTER 11: Some Implications

Japanese system: J are less individualist, more inclined to submerge their identity in some large group to which they belong, and more likely to be obsessed by a sense of duty. J are less self-confident and more neurotically preoccupied with retaining the good opinion of others. J are more introverted. J are less men of principle than the B. J are imitative. J are more ambitious. J are more submissive to superiors. J are more slavishly diligent. J care less about what happens outside their own group, and have less sense of social responsibility to correct abuses in their society. J are more childishly naive.

British system: B are more selfish, more irresponsible, more inclined to tall Jack that they personally are all right. B are more apt to be dogmatic and aggressive, being less sensitive to the feelings of others. B are less hesitant about imposing their views and feelings on others. B are less willing to forego the pleasures of self-assertion in the interests of social harmony. B complacently fail to take opportunities to learn form others. B have less concern with self-improvement. B are more inclined to resent authority by virtue of its very existence and irrespective of its functional necessity. B are more afraid of hard work B are more given to busybodying, less willing to live and let live. B are more suspicious and cynical, less good humored and cheerful. (so much for stereotyping.....)

CHAPTER 15: Late Development

The later industrialization begins:
- the less likely that it will be dominated by a laissez-faire philosophy, the more likely that the state will play a predominant role,
- the less chance of any repetition of the slow evolution of putting-out systems into factory systems or of a slow transformation of peasant into capitalist agriculture preceding industrialization,
- the more likely the development of school systems is to precede the development of a substantial manufacturing sector,
- the bigger the technological leap from traditional skills to those required by the new technology imported from the advanced countries,
- the bigger the organizational leap; the more likely industry is to begin with rationalized bureaucratic forms of organization including specialist personnel managers operating objective recruitment and promotion schemes,
- the more the norms diffused to the late starter from the industrialized countries are likely to stress the rights of trade unions and workers and the need to treat workers as human beings not as mere sellers of a commodity called labor,
- the more secure the big firms (because the state cannot afford to let them collapse) and the more plan-oriented the management (partly as a result of the absorption of advanced-country business techniques) and the longer the time horizon for the cost-benefit calculation of personnel policies,
- the sharper the dualism between the big firm sector characterized above and the small firm sector, the more privileged big sector workers, the more their unions are concerned with job security, and the more likely plant or enterprise-based organization.

PETER FLORA and JENS ALBER
Modernization, Democratization, and the Development of
Welfare States in Western Europe --(Chapter 2)

I. Theoretical Considerations in the Development of the Welfare State

A. Classical Concepts and an Analytic Framework of Modernization Modernization as concerns this analysis refers to an emphasis on the multidimensionality of societal development, or the assumption of causal interrelationships among economic and population growth, social and psychic mobilization, political development, cultural change, and the transformation of the international economic and political order.

Figure 2.1 (see text) illustrates the relationship between the main concepts (dimensions) of modernization. The chapter itself doesn't really elaborate much on the diagram. It probably should be mentioned that the three elements (rights) of citizenship are overlap with the 2 of the 3 regulatory organizational structures with which they are related. For instance, social rights operate in the realm of markets and bureaucracies (bureaucracy refers to state bureaucracy).

Within this framework, the development of the welfare state may be analyzed according to at least the following three aspects:
1) The processes of differentiation (the differentiation of individual and household income, of working and living place) creating specific labor market problems that must be solved by the state.
2) The evolution of social rights as a consequence of (or compensation for) the institutionalization of political rights.
3) The increasing control, substitution and supplementing of markets (and to some degree of associations) by state bureaucracies.

B. Modernization and the Welfare State: A Sectoral Model
Figure 2.2 breaks down the general model into a more specific sectoral model of the three main organizational components of society: markets (I & II), associations (I & II), and (state) bureaucracies
Market I: developmental aspects creating specific welfare and security problems.
Market II: developmental aspects assumed to lead to social mobilization processes.
Associations I: associations in the widest sense that are concerned with welfare and security problems independently of the state.
Associations II: associations that mobilize political support and articulate demands for welfare assurances from the state.

Again, the diagram is just as self-explanatory as the chapter's text.

Government intervention in response to or anticipation of the problem pressure has historically involved several alternatives.
(1) Relationship between welfare state policies directed toward solving social problems and police state policies designed to repress political mobilization processes.
(2) The way governments try to solve social problems: either through direct intervention (markets I) or associative solutions (associations I).

At the more general level, government intervention has probably been shaped prominently by two basic developmental processes:
(1) creation of state bureaucracies and thus administrative capacity; and
(2) creation of mass democracies reflected by constitutional developments and power shifts (bureaucracies)

C. Rokkan's State Model and the Evolution of the European Welfare States
Rokkan's theory consists of two components: a theoretical conception of stages of political development, and empirical typologies which try to explain variation in the respective stages.

Stages of Political Development
1) State Formation: development of fiscal and military states; involves political, economic, and cultural unification at the elite level, creation of organizations for the mobilization of resources (tax bureaucracies), consolidation of territory (army), and maintenance of internal order (police and army).

2) Nation Building: building/growth of nation-states; refers to establishment of direct contacts between the elite and larger sectors of the peripheral population through conscript armies, schools, mass media, religious and linguistic standardization.

3) Participation: development of mass democracy and establishment of citizenship though the equalization of political rights; includes growing participation of peripheral population, institutionalization of civil and political rights, and creation of political parties.

4) Redistribution: development of welfare state and establishment of social citizenship through redistribution of resources, goods, and benefits; involves creation of public welfare systems and public policies for equalization of economic conditions through progressive taxation and transfer payments.

[missing chart of regime typology - see original text]

II. Comparative Description of European Welfare States

A. The Beginnings of the Modern Welfare State While the old European welfare states developed very similarly during the 'poor law'period (16th to 18th-19th Cent), the 'liberal break' of the 19th Cent. produced many divergences. This importance of this second phase lies primarily in the coincidence of new social problems created by industrialization and urbanization with an emerging philosophy that facilitated the destruction of old protective institutions.

The take-off period occurred in the last two decades of the 19C and is characterized by:
(1) increase and structural change of public expenditures with respect to social welfare (social expenditure ratio). This is evident in the widening scope of income redistribution through social transfer payments.
(2) institutional innovations; especially the social insurance (or security) systems developed in relation to different risks: industrial accident, sickness (and invalidity), old age (and invalidity, survivors), and unemployment.

The sequence in which these insurance systems were developed and implemented corresponds to the degree to which each represented a break with the liberal ideas concerning the assignment of guilt and responsibility among individuals, groups, and the state. Evidence puts the general chronological order as follows:
industrial accidents - sickness or old age - unemployment

B. Development of the Social Insurance System
Based on data for the individual types of insurance, a general scheme of development for the social insurance system as a whole can be attempted:

1) Classic Introductory Phase (about 1880s to 1914): introduction provision for at least some of 4 types of insurance at some (often limited) level of coverage in most countries. Workman's compensation, and voluntary sickness insurance programs, for example, were fairly common at this point.

2) Phase of Extension (WWI-WWII): Social insurance adopted in additional countries, and extension of coverage to new risks (esp. unemployment and occupational disease) and new groups (non-employed and family members) in those countries with a pre-existing system.

3) Phase of Completion (immediate post-WWII): extensive reforms in a number of countries produced comprehensive programs for all the four main risks.

4) Phase of Consolidation and Reorganization (post 1950): two major changes:
(a) extending social insurance program to self-employed persons, often via universal insurance systems; and
(b) coordination and even unification of existing schemes bases on a more comprehensive conception of social security.

III. Determinants of Social Insurance Legislation

This section concerns itself with an empirical explanation of the variation in the introduction and institutional development of social insurance systems. They look at three main independent variables here:
1) Socioeconomic development: industrialization and urbanization; assumption - these processes generate and intensify social problems leading to the introduction of the social insurance systems.
2) Political Mobilization of the Working Class: electoral participation of the working class; assumption - working-class mobilization is a measure of pressure for implementation of social insurance programs as a defense against working-class mobilization.
3) Constitutional Development: a) extension of suffrage with respect to social stratification or social class (i.e. sex and age held constant), and b) parliamentarism - constitutional-dualistic monarchies v. parliamentary democracies (both only relevant up till WWI).

The authors consider the possibility that there may be at work a diffusion process: influence of early implementation of the relevant programs in one country (Germany in this case) influences its subsequent adoption in other nations. F&A conclude that there is no diffusion process at work here, finding that follower societies have introduced social insurance systems at consistently higher levels of political mobilization and at slightly higher or similar levels of socioeconomic development (which would contradict a diffusion hypothesis).

Q: Do thresholds of socioeconomic development or political mobilization exist that make establishment of social security programs highly probable or even mandatory?

A: No. Variation in developmental levels at the time of establishment of s.s. systems is too great to allow any generalization about thresholds.

On the basis of determining propensity to introduce social insurance schemes (using a ratio of s.i. realization) for the set of early adopters, the following conclusions can be reached:
1) Propensity to introduce s.i. schemes was much higher among constitutional-dualistic monarchies than in parliamentary democracies.
2) This difference in propensity seems to be primarily a function of the type of regime and not the level of enfranchisement.
3) In parliamentary democracies the extension of suffrage clearly increased propensity to introduce insurance systems, while no such influence is apparent in constitutional-dualistic monarchies.

JACK GOLDSTONE
''State Breakdown in the English Revolution: A New Synthesis''
AJS 92 (1986): 257-322

Goldstone develops and tests a formal time-series model of the pressures leading to state breakdown in England in 1960-42. The model has several novel features:
1.) it applies a quantitative analysis to the logic of structural-historical studies of revolution that generally proceed in a qualitative fashion;
2.) it yields a strong prediction of political crisis in mid-17th century England of relative stability in the preceding and succeeding centuries;
3.) it helps resolve several problems in the historiography of the English Revolution and the current theory of revolutions.

First, Goldstone criticizes the old models of revolution:
1.) The orthodox Marxist view: conflicts between the rising capitalist class and the old feudal class caused the revolution. Problems: It was impossible to identify a distinct bourgeois class in 17th C England. There was no conflict between classes but conflicts within classes and shifting coalitions that cross and obscure class lines.
2.) The neo-Marxist view: The diffusion of capitalist economic relations, especially the spread of enclosures, undermined the traditional life, provoking sharp conflicts. Problems: The enclosure held to have this consequence constituted only a small portion of enclosures and took place primarily from 1450-1520. The crown, far from opposing enclosure, was by 1630 perhaps the largest encloser in England.
3.) Wallerstein's world system theory: changes in oversees trade and crisis in the whole capitalist world economy in 1590-1640 created the critical conflicts leading to revolution. Problems: neither the rise of the gentry nor conflicts within the gentry could be traced to expansion and contraction in the world economy at that time. Many 'new capitalists' were not enemies of the crown, but rather its close allies because oversees trade was in the hands of royally chartered monopolies.

In examining the outbreak of English Revolution, Goldstone argues that three factors are crucial:
1.) The fiscal distress of the state: it was a shortage of money that led the crown into policies and projects that created opposition
2.) The existence of multiple, often localized, intra-class conflicts.
3.) The growth of popular disorder among the lower classes.

Next, Goldstone makes his major contribution: demographic change as a fundamental variable. He shows that there is a connection between demographic change and state fiscal distress, between demographic trends an conflicts both of the elites with the Crown and within the elites. the population boom in 1500-1640 produced a sharp rise in prices a sustained inflation which had three results:
1.) state fiscal distress: while the crown required a massive increase in revenues for military campaigns, its resources and revenues remarkably diminished due to price changes.
2.) conflicts and disaffection among the elites: population growth and sustained inflation led to larger families and upward social mobility. more and more new families entered the elites, which resulted in heightened competition and factionalism.
3.) popular disorder: there was a vast body of traders, artisans, apprentices, and workers that parliamentary leaders could marshall against the king and his allies in London.

Goldstone develops a formula as conclusion:

political stress indicator = fiscal distress * mobility / competition * mass mobilization potential

One sentence summary: population growth and sustained inflation led to state fiscal distress, elite conflicts, and popular disorders, which were conducive to the English Revolution.

ALEX INKELES
Exploring Individual Modernity

I think this guy is the demon spawn of Talcott Parsons and Kingsley Davis. I hated Becoming Modern when I read it, and I hated this reading; this book went flying across the room at least three times in my tortured attempt to read it.

However, it does link up with some of the demography stuff, regarding development and fertility practices, in addition to being a (yucky) perspective on modernization.

He doesn't call it modern man for nothing; he only talks about and questions males. Men from Argentina, Chile, India, Israel, Nigeria and East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) (note geographic diversity) were questioned in order to produce, Alex hoped, a reliable cross-national measure of individual modernity. Initial interviews were conducted in 1963 and 1964.

CHAPTER 2: A Model of the Modern Man

What makes men modern?
The modern man's constellation of characteristics (which Inkeles calls a 'syndrome') has an internal component (attitudes, values and feelings) and an external component (dealing with modern man's environment). Inkeles was particularly interested in the psychological characteristics that distinguish the Modern Man from more traditional men.

Inkeles' theory of social influences combines three models: the analytical model (testing theories about modernity), the topical model (Alex thinks modern man will have certain attitudes about certain topics not necessarily addressed in any larger existing theory), and the behavioral model (not only will modern man think differently, he will act differently).

The analytical model.
A syndrome or complex (is that like 'Cinderella Complex' or a 'Peter Pan Syndrome'?) of attitudes and values that constitute the core concepts of modernity. They are:
1) Readiness for new experience and openness to innovation and change.
2) Growth of opinion: Modern Man has a disposition to form or hold opinions over a large number of problems and issues that arise not only in his immediate environment but also outside it. If that were all, modern man would just be an opinionated pig (like I should talk), but, no, modern man also shows awareness of the diversity of attitude and opinion around him, rather than closing himself off in the belief that everyone thinks alike and thinks as he does. Modern man puts a positive value on variations in opinion.
3) Time: A man is more modern if he is oriented to the present or the future rather than to the past.
4) Efficacy: Modern man believes that, to a substantial degree, man can learn to dominate his environment in order to advance his own purposes and goals, rather than being dominated entirely by that environment (this is what Parsons calls 'instrumental activism').
5) Planning: Modern man is oriented toward planning and organizing affairs, and believes in planning as an approach to both public affairs and to his own personal life.
6) Calculability: Modern man has confidence that his world is calculable, that other people and institutions around him can be relied upon to fulfill or meet their obligations and responsibilities.
7) Distributive justice: Modern man believes that reward should be proportionate to skill and measured contribution (modern man believes in the meritocracy) to the purposes of the organizations in which he participates. He believes that rewards should be according to rules rather than whims, and that the structure of rewards should, insofar as possible, be in accord with skill and relative contribution.
8) Aspirations, education and new learning. Modern man has an interest in and places a higher value on formal education and schooling in skills such as the 3 r's. Modern man feels that modern learning and science are not intrusions into the sacred realm, which should be left a mystery or approached only through religion, but rather that science and technology will benefit mankind by providing solutions to pressing human problems.
9) Dignity. Modern man will not only be more protective of weaker and subordinate persons in the work setting, but will extend this principle to other relationships, and thus would manifest such behavior in his treatment of all those inferior in status and power, such women and children.

Doesn't modern man sound cool! Let's invite him to our next party! As much as I despise this syndrome, and the use Inkeles' puts it to, note interesting similarities between this syndrome and Weber's analysis of modern, western rationality.

The topical model discusses factors identified as preconditions, accompaniments or consequences of modernization. Inkeles assumes that unless the 'precondition' issues are resolved, a society's successful attainment of modernization (and we all know they all want it, and they all want Inkeles' brand, and, of course, it has to happen the same way for everyone) will remain highly problematic.

1) Kinship and family. Increasing urbanism and industrialism has tended to diminish the vigor of extended kinship relations (says A.I.). When urbanism increased the physical distance between kin, and individual employment decreased economic dependence, the strength of kinship ties as manifested in common residence, frequent visiting, and mutual help in work declined. AI argues that, while extended kin ties should be attenuated, nuclear family ties should be strengthened. Also, because modern man, with his wonderful new factory job, is making more money, he may be more likely to help out his extended family financially when they need help.

2) Women's rights. The liberating influence of the forces making for modernization should affect men's attitudes and incline them toward according women status and rights more equal to their own.

3) Birth control. Modern man in developing countries will want to limit his fertility. He needs to, because his country's population is larger than it can support.

4) Religion. Religions are major obstacles to modernization, since they are a bulwark of traditionalism and a repository of beliefs and values incompatible with modern science, technology and the idea of progress. Nevertheless, modern man may be more likely to participate regularly in the formal, ritual aspects of his religion since he has more money to pay for ceremonies, etc., and because, if he is no longer rural, he may have easier access to the appropriate religious institutions.

5) The Aged. Nothing in urban living per se requires a person to show disrespect for the aged, and nothing in industrial experience tells a man to fear age or to despise the aged. Many old women and men in villages have been abandoned by their children because their children, unlike modern man with his steady factory job, are unable to support them. Steadier wages and generally more stable conditions of life for those gainfully employed in industry could well enable those who enjoy these benefits to be more exacting in their fulfillment of obligations to old people. These lucky working men might well be as respectful of the aged as their more traditional counterparts farming in the villages.

6) Politics. The citizen of a modern polity will take an active interest not only in those matters that touch his immediate life, but also in the larger issues facing his community. His allegiance is supposed to extend beyond his family and friends to the state and its political leaders. He is expected to join political parties, support candidates, and vote in elections.

7) Information media. A modern man would more often expose himself to the media of mass communication. Modern man will have greater confidence in and rely more heavily on the newer mass media, whereas the less modern man will rely more heavily on more traditional sources of information.

8) Consumption. Less modern man will be guided by his tradition and encouraged by his poor or uncertain economic circumstance to consider frugality a virtue and the chasing after goods a frivolous and perhaps even slightly immoral preoccupation. Modern man, encouraged by his stable economic situation, might be more likely to buy consumer goods.

9) Social Stratification. Along with the changed social structure of modern, open society (ie, fewer statuses and roles ascribed from birth), attitudes and values about stratification should change as well. Prestige should come to be assigned more on the basis of education and technical skills, and the belief that mobility is possible for one's self and especially for one's children should become widespread.

10) Psychic adjustment. Studies rather consistently have shown an inverse relationship between mental illness and status within society, as well as status within industrial organizations. In other words, those higher in skill and income generally have better mental health. In developing countries, the experienced worker, well integrated into the industrial system should be better adjusted than one still on the farm.

The behavioral model examines the actual behavior of the subjects to see if they actually do what they say they do; do their practices match their supposed world views? The model included such tests as whether or not a respondent knew Moscow was the capital of the Soviet Union (this was supposed to be a test of whether R read newspapers, etc.).

CHAPTER 3. Factors Producing Individual Modernity: A Theory of Effects

Theory of Effects: process whereby exposure to modernizing institutions and situations produces qualities of the sort we have identified as individual modernity.

Theory of educational effects.
Since men who received more education displayed qualities of modern men, there must have been a good deal of learning in the school incidental to the curriculum and to formal instruction in an academic subjects. Less the content of school than its form and organization is supposed to have effects. The school is not only a place for teaching, but a setting for the more general socialization of the child. The school modernizes through a number of processes other than formal instruction in academic subjects. These processes are: reward and punishment, modeling, exemplification, and generalization (if you know any soc. of ed.; this should remind you of Bob Dreeben's stuff on how schools work and what is learned in them). Schooling laid the groundwork which made it possible for later life experiences to give concrete content to a more general disposition established in childhood.

Generalization occurs when an individual enjoys so satisfying an experience in one specific relationship or performance that he is led to believe that be can attain comparable success in other contexts. Life provides some opportunities outside school to have such experiences (one of Inkeles' examples is the joy of learning sphincter control), but the school provides a lot of them, and at a crucial period of life. Exemplification refers to the process whereby the individual incorporates into himself not a personal model, but an impersonal rule or general practice characteristic of the social organization or institution as such (eg., the imminently meritocratic school should rub off on our little modernizing guy, when he internalizes meritocratic achievement norms and stuff like that). Reward and punishment, are ,well, reward and punishment. Modeling means the child's incorporation into his own role repertoire of the ways of behaving, feeling and thinking which he observes in significant and powerful persons in his milieu (eg, he models his teacher's impartial treatment of him and his classmates).

The Factory as a School in Modernity: Theoretical Foundations.
[comment: this is the part where Inkeles' reveals that the true purpose of his study is to show how kickass awesome capitalism is for people in developing countries.]

The essential feature of I's modernization study is its emphasis on the change in the social and physical environment which men experience as they shift from the more traditional settings of village, farm and tribe to city residence, industrial employment, and national citizenship. AI et al. believe that in such circumstances the stability of personal characteristics commonly observed under conditions of social and cultural continuity must give way to a more profound and rapid rate of personal adaptation. They assume that personality can continue to develop and grow well into adulthood, and that basic change, even in such fundamental characteristics as the sense of efficacy, is more than merely possible. They assumed such change to be highly likely, at least when men lived under social conditions conducive to personal transformation, such as those prevailing in the sectors of developing countries experiencing the process of modernization.

The factory's effect, because of its imminently modern organization (like the modern school; impersonal rules and procedures, which institutionalize protection of individuals from employers' and supervisors' whims, etc.) should make men more modern. Traditional men will be open to the lessons the factory has to teach, incorporating and adapting as their own standards the norms embodied in modern factory organization. This learning will come about by the same process as described for the school (generalization, etc.).

CHAPTER 5, Results of the First Phase: A Summary.

Four Central Issues:

1)How far is there an empirically identifiable modern man, and what are his outstanding characteristics? Inkeles assures us Modern Man exists, and that he looks basically like the analytic model above. Further, these characteristics have a stable core of indicators (survey questions) that showed up in all 6 countries.

2) What are the influences that make men modern? Can significant changes be brought about in men who are already past the formative years and have already reached adulthood as relatively traditional men? The factory did not have as strong modernizing effects as Alex had hoped. It appears that most of the modernizing of guys takes place in schools. However, there are changes in modern-ness in adult life, through late socialization experiences (which include factory work). There is some small effect of factory work experience, over and above schooling and over and above that due to selection (that is, factories do not select only modern men to work in them). Factory experience was more salient for men with a rural background and little education. Mass media exposure had effects (about equal in size to the effects of work experience). Urban residence didn't seem to matter. It also appeared that the relative modernness of the school and factory was less important than the man's sheer length of time of exposure to its influence.

3) Are there any behavioral consequences arising from the attitudinal modernization of the individual? Does Modern Man act differently than Traditional Man? Men with high modernity scores compared with men with low modernity scores but equal levels of education were more likely to know about the world (for instance, they were more likely to know that Moscow is the capital of the Soviet Union); thus, they were inferred more likely to pay attention to the mass media.

4) Is the consequence of individual modernization inevitably personal disorganization and psychic strain? Or, can men go through this process of rapid sociocultural change without deleterious consequences? Modernization does not lead to individual stress; contact with modern institutions does not increase an individual's stress. Social disorganization, in general, which attends modernization, may cause psychic strain to individuals, but the evidence on that is inconclusive. ??

GUILLERMO O'DONNELL
Reflections on the Patterns of Change in the Bureaucratic Authoritarian State

His major interest lies in the study of certain authoritarian domination patterns that he has called 'bureaucratic authoritarian.' The central contention holds that the rise, social impact, and dynamics of these phenomena cannot be understood without exploring their close and systematic relationship with the structure and change patterns of a particular type of capitalism. It is a matter of complex linkages, varying over time and nonreducible to a single causal direction, among economic and political factors -- ones that decisively influence the general direction of change in societies sharing a certain type of political domination and capitalism. The aspects of dimensions that typify those societies should also be the elements that help explain those directions.

The defining characteristics of the bureaucratic-authoritarian state are:
*Higher governmental positions usually are occupied by persons who come to them after successful careers in complex and highly bureaucratized organizations - the armed forces, public bureaucracy, and large private firms
*Political Exclusion- in that it aims at closing channels of political access to the popular sector and its allies so as to deactivate them politically, not only by means of repression but also through the imposition of vertical controls by the state on such organizations as labor unions economic exclusion. This reduces or postpones indefinitely the aspiration to economic participation of the popular sector
*Depoliticalization - the BA regime pretends to reduce social and political issues to technical problems to be resolved by means of interactions among the higher echelons of the above-mentioned organizations. This corresponds to a stage of important transformations in the mechanisms of capital accumulation of society, changes that are, in turn, a part of the deepening process of a peripheral and dependent capitalism characterized by extensive industrialization.

The BA state is, to a large extent, a reaction to extended political activation of the popular sector. This activation is perceived by other classes and sectors as a threat to their societies and to their international affiliations. These processes are linked with numerous manifestations of economic crisis which characterize the period prior to the appearance of the BA. Such a situation is antagonistic to the objective needs of stability and social predictability of any complex economy.

However, the economic and political crises that precede the BA admit variations from one case to another that have repercussions on the specific characteristics of the BA that results. The greater the threat level, the greater the polarization and visibility of the class content of the conflicts that precede implantation of the BA.
First, a higher threat level lends more weight, within the armed forces, to the hard-line groups not preoccupied.
Second, a higher threat level leads to a greater willingness to apply and to support a more systematic repression for the attainment of the political deactivation of the popular sector and for the subordination of its class organizations, especially the unions.
Third, the broad alliance that supports the BA's implantation does not take long to disintegrate. In the stage subsequent to the coup, various social sectors make the bitter discovery that hey are not included on the list of the BA's beneficiaries.

Long before the BA's inauguration, these countries were far from the archetypal image of underdevelopment. Instead, they had attained an extended by vertically unintegrated industrialization. They also had a highly modernized urban social structure with an important working class concentration that permitted the emergence of organizational supports for the urban sector's political activation.

This is a key to the BA's core meaning. The BA is a system of exclusion of the popular sector, based on the reaction of dominant sectors and classes to the political and economic crises to which populism and its developmentalist successors led. In turn, such exclusion is the requisite for attaining and guaranteeing social order and economic stability; these constitute necessary conditions to attract domestic investments and international capital and, thus, to provide continuity for a new impulse toward the deepening of the productive structure.

The BA presents itself not only as the political guarantor of an order based on exclusion of the popular sector, but also as executor and promoter of public works, fiscal discipline, and its own bureaucratic rationalization. In other words, the BA state and international capital are in a situation of mutual indispensability that underlies their complex and sometimes tense relationships. The historical moment in which the BA is implanted is a particularly diaphanous moment of dependence. In its initial stage, this state -- which excludes the popular sector, punishes economically many of its allies, is almost deaf to the national bourgeoisie, and strongly expands so as to reorder society -- is highly autonomous with respect to that society. This entails the explicit denial of the state as the site of representation and public presence of a society that is bent upon profoundly shaking up from one end of the social scale to the other.

But this antagonism must be seen in conjunction with another aspect: the initial stage of the BA is simultaneously the moment in which it is most open to deep penetration by international capital, and that in which, buttressed by the state's expanding control over civil society, international capital conquers an unusually wide economic space. The moment of the state's almost limitless opening to international capital is also that of its greatest estrangement from most of civil society. It may be seen that we are once again faced with the duo of the state and international capital during the BA's initial period. But this contains tensions that generate more complex and less diaphanous phenomena.

The domination of the BA lacks, both politically and ideologically a crucial component -- the national and private ingredient that only the local bourgeoisie can contribute.

-----

The foregoing summary basically deals with the development of the BA state. The following will go into what can/does happen to the BA once it is in place.

Neither the BA nor any other modern state ceases to be a national state (no matter how much it caters to international capital or excluded the popular sector). This is why it does not seem possible for the BA long to remain impervious to its own society as it does during the periods of economic orthodoxy and the duo (BA and international capital) when it is under pressure for representation by popular elements.

Eventually, the state must present itself as the incarnation, as the political and ideological expression, of the general interests of the nation, to which the sectors excluded by the BA also belong. Therefore the duo becomes a menage a trois (his phrasing, not mine), as the local bourgeoisie enters into the relationship and provides crucial national and private components to bolster the legitimacy of the regime. The state now must become less orthodox, more nationalist, and more projectionist - it must reserve crucial domestic markets for itself and that national bourgeoisie and restrict international capital. At the same time, however, the BA must continue to be the political guarantor of the order and stability necessary for the operations of international capital in its markets (upon which it continues to rely).

Despite the trumpetings of national grandeur, the BA's continued repression, exclusion, and ruthless capital accumulation show itself all too clearly, especially in the failure to cure the Achilles heel of the BA - the problem of presidential succession. The persistent trouble of the BA on that level is a sure indication of its failure as a hegemony.

So basically it's just like Mr. Miagi (from the Karate Kid) says:
''Walk on right side of road - o.k. Walk on left side of road - o.k.
But, walk in middle of road .... sooner or later....
- *SQUISH* - just like grape.''

Once the BA has established itself through repression of the volatile popular sector and demonstrated to international capital that it can impose order and economically stable conditions, it still faces problems of stability. Part of this pressure comes from the national bourgeoisie whose interests/demands for protection can only be served at the expense (in part, at least) of the rational conditions and favored status expected by international factors. Pressure comes, too, from agitation of the popular sector - to which the BA now acting explicitly as the guarantor of national interests is more vulnerable. And finally, the problem of succession, it seems, is inherent to the regime form. So the BA can only straddle the fence so long before it falls. Evidence presented in the article tends to support this point.

The last point to bring up is the distinction between the BA state and fascism - because the author is quick to point out they are not the same. First, the BA state is associated with the deepening stage of a capitalist economy. This deepening process, more specifically, entails advances toward a higher degree of vertical integration of the productive structure (in close association with international capital), of capitalisms of already extended industrialization, originating in a sequential process springing form a first linkage with the work market as exporters or primary products.

Fascism, on the other hand, corresponds to the situation of ''late industrialism'', not to the sequential pattern of the Bas. In fascism, the relevant duo is the state and national bourgeoisie; and fascism's link with capitalism is not so much one of a deepening through vertical integration of its productive structure, but rather that of eliminating traditional areas left behind by the speed of the early spurts toward basic and highly concentrated industries.

A. The by-product theory of large pressure groups

If the individuals in a large group have no incentive to organize to obtain a collective benefit, how can the fact that some large groups are organized be explained? These groups are also organized for some other purpose. The large and powerful economic lobbies are the by-products of organizations that obtain their support and strength b/c they perform some function in addition to lobbying for collective goods. These economic lobbies can mobilize a latent group with selective incentives when they have the authority to be coercive and/or they have a source of possible inducements they can offer to individuals in a latent group. the lobby becomes a by-product of whatever function the organization performs that enables it to have a captive membership.

The individual in a latent group has no incentive to voluntarily sacrifice his time or $ to help an organization obtain a collective good; thus he would support the organization with a lobby working for collective goods only if 1)he is coerced into paying dues to the lobbying organization; or 2) he has to support this group in order to obtain some other non-collective benefit.

B. Labor Lobbies

Just as there can be little doubt that labor unions are a significant political force, neither can there be little doubt that this political force is a by product of the purely industrial activities that unions regard as there major function. Political power of unions is a by-product of their non-political activities.

C. Professional lobbies

There is a trend toward compulsive membership in these prof. associations. These asscocs. have the authority 'to discipline' members who don't comply with their rules or ethics. They also provide non-collective benefits such as education, journals, malpractice defense, etc. (AMA). These groups offer their members benefits which, in contrast with the political achievements of the organization, can be w/held from non-members and which accordingly provide an incentive for joining the organization. Their political power is a by-product of their non-political activities (ex -- AMA and organized medicine).

D. The special interest theory and business lobbies

The high degree of org. of business interests and the power of these business interests is due in large part to the fact that the business community is divided into a series of (generally oligopolistic) 'industries,' each of which contains a fairly small number of firms. These industries will normally be small enough to org. voluntarily to provide themselves with an active lobby. (Vs. The labor, prof, and agrarian interests of the country which make up large groups that can organize and act effectively only when their latent power is crystallized by some organiz. which can provide political power as a by-product.)

The 'special interests' of the small group tend to triumph over the interests of 'the people.' However, although particular industries have disproportionate power on questions of particular importance to themselves, it does not follow that the business community has disproportionate power when dealing with broad q.'s of national concern. The business community as a whole is not a small privileged or intermediate group - it is definitely a large latent group and not fully organized. The business community in the aggregate is for this reason not uniquely effective as pressure group.

E. Gov't promotion of political pressure

There is little farm organization, except for the Farm Bureau which was first set up in the 1910's in response to financial incentives provided by the government and second as an org, that provided individualized or noncollective benefits to its members.

As the Farm Bureau (FB) took on bloc, economic functions, it increased the competition of the political and business organizations already in the field. The nation began to notice that the FB was a pressure group and a bus. org., subsidized by public funds. The government decided that the county agent should not help the local FB's (the 'True Howard Agreement'). As it became more convenient for farmers who were not members of the FB to get the tech help of a county agent, and as it became harder for the FB to obtain the gov't-subsidized labor of the co. agent, the incentive to join the FB decreased. Later under Roosevelt co. agents were assigned roles which favored the FB and FB membership increased again. When the county agent was the channel through which the farmer got his Gov't aid and his agricultural education, it was often expedient to join the co. agent's org. -- the FB.

F. Farm cooperatives and lobbies

The size and stability of the FB federation has been the result of 2 factors. One is that it was the natural channel through which farmers could get technical aid and education from the Gov't; the other is that it controls a vast variety of business institutions that normally provide special benefits to farm bureau members. The FB is also a lobbying institution, but its membership has often been high even when its policies were unpopular. The lobbying strength of the FB was a by-product of the co. agents and the FB business orig.'s.

G. Non-economic lobbies

The by-product theory of pressure groups seems to explain the lobbying orig.'s that represent agriculture, labor, and the professions. And, in connection with the special interest theory of small lobbying groups, it helps explain the org.s that represent business interests. The theory can be applied whenever there are rational individuals interested in a common goal. However, it is not for explaining philanthropic lobbies or irrational 'lost cause' groups.

In these cases (philanthropy and lost acuses) it is better to turn to social psychology than to economics for a relevant theory. Political parties have low levels of org and are more significant as lobbies. They are not formal orgs. Perhaps this is b/c they seek collective benefits which help many people. In this case, the avg. person will not be willing to contribute to them. However, those with ambitions for political office get non-collective goods out of their involvement. Political machines are orgs, but they do not call for collective goods. They strive mainly for benefits that accrue to particular individuals.

H. the forgotten groups: those who suffer in silence

The large unorganized groups with no lobbies actually have some of the most vital common interests, yet individual's efforts would have no noticeable effects and the individual would receive no benefits, so he has little incentive to contribute. there is no presumption that large groups will act in their common interest. Only when groups are small, or when they are fortunate enough to have an independent source of selective incentives, will they org or act to achieve their objectives.

ANN ORLOFF and THEDA SKOCPOL
Why Not Equal Protection? Explaining the Politics of Public Social Spending in Britain, 1900-1911, and the United States, 1880's-1920.

Britain had a full range of modern pension and social-insurance programs before WWI, while the United States resisted the possibility of launching modern social-spending measures and, in fact, actually allowed a popular system of old age and disability pensions originating out of the Civil War to pass out of existence without replacement. Socioeconomic development, the rise of the industrial working class and new liberal values were comparably present in both countries. Ann and Theda invoke a state-centered frame of reference to complement the society-centered factors more usually invoked in the literature on modern welfare states. They highlight both the autonomous actions of officials and politicians and the ways in which state structures and their transformations affected the policy preferences of politically influential social groups. They bring that state back in!

It will not do to imagine public social policies as inevitable and irreversible by-products of industrial capitalist development, even with class struggles and value orientations introduced to account for variations and possible delays along the march. Welfare policies are also grounded directly in the logics of state building, in the struggles of politicians for control and advantage, and in the expectations groups have about what states and parties with specific structures and modes of operation should or should not do.

There have been three schools of thought explaining the emergence of modern welfare states: 2) Liberal Values. This historical persistence of these values was supposed to explain the US case, where the gap between industrialization and the state of most modern pensions and social insurance was extreme. These are classical liberal values (like those Bellah et al. identify), which, while they uphold individual liberty, also uphold individual responsibility and deny group rights.
3) Working-Class Strength. These theorists view the welfare state as shaped by class struggles.

All these schools of thought share basic assumptions: that the development of the modern welfare state was an inherently progressive phenomenon, appearing and growing in recognizable stages in all national societies as a natural and irreversible concomitant of fundamental social and economic processes such as urbanization, and demographic change, or else capitalist development and the emergence of the industrial working class. Government activities are understood to be expressions of -- or responses to -- social demands. The overall process is supposed to look something like this:

Socioeconomic and . . . . . . . .Changing class/group formation
cultural changes . . -------) . . and perceived new social needs

Social Groups . ---) . What politically . .--) What governments
and Needs . . . . . . . . . . active groups . .. . . . . . do
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . propose

However, Ann and Theda would like to remind us that policy-making is an inherently historical process in which all actors consciously build upon, or react against, previous governmental efforts dealing with the same sorts of problems. The wise investigator must take into account meaningful reactions to previous policies.

States themselves independently affect policies in two major ways:
1) states may be sites of autonomous official action, not reducible to the demands or preferences of any social group(s). Appointed and elected officials have organizational and career interest of their own, and are also engaged in struggles among themselves. If an existing state structure provides no existing (or readily creatable) capacities for implementing a given line of action, goverment officials are not likely to pursue it, and politicians aspiring to office are not likely to propose it. Conversely, goverment officials or aspiring politicians are quite likely to take new policy initiatives -- conceivably well ahead of social demands -- if existings state capacities can be readily adapted or reworked to do things that they expect will bring advantages to them in their struggles with political competitors.

2) The organizational structures of states indirectly influence the meanings and methods of politics for all groups in society. Going back to the earlier issue of placing policy in historical context, not only do groups react to existing public policies when they formulate their political demands, they also react to existing state structures.

(From Shefter) Some systems of competeing political parties operate by offering followers patronage jobs and other kinds of divisible payoffs out of public resouces, while others operate by offering ideological appears and collectively oriented programs to groups, classes or 'the nation' as a whole. Taking the concrete examples of the United States and Britain: In countries where electoral politics preceeded state bureacratization (as in both US and UK) parties could use government jobs as patronage. Later, there might be struggles over how to overcome 'political corruption' in order to create a civil service free of patronage. If bureaucratic reform succeeded before full democratization (as in the UK) political parties might then change their operating sytles toward more programmatic appeals. However (as happened in the US) if patronage was established in (or survived into) a fully democratic polity, it was harder to uproot later. Mass electorates and the party politicians appealing to them had continuing stakes in using government as a source of patronage, and reformers had to wage uphill, piecemeal battles to overcome democratized 'political corruption' in govt and party politics.

Keeping these state-centered ideas in mind, Ann and Theda's framework looks like this:

STATE FORMATION . . -----) . HOW OFFICIAL . . . .-----) . . POLICY
(seq ueance of bureau. . . . . . . . . . . ORGANIZATIONS AND . . . . POSSIBILITIES and
democratization) . . . . . . . . . . . . .PARTIES OPERATE . . . . . . . .. SELECTED
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .FOR
CHANGING GROUPS . . -----) WHAT POLITICALLY . . -----) . STATE ACTIONS
AND SOCIAL NEEDS . . . . . . . . .. ACTIVE GROUPS
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . PROPOSE

The comparative picture of Britain and the United States looks like this: Encouraged by elite reformers and building on a climate of broad elite and governmental acknowledgements of a problem requiring new public action, British union leaders were able to campaign effectively for noncontributory old age pensions. British unions also went along with contributory unemployment and health-insurance measures devised and pushed forward by intragovernmental elites, politicians and civil servants. In the United States, many union leaders supported social-benefits programs, but for unemployment and health insurance intragovernmental leadership was missing. American elites, including most of the prominent reformers, did not coalesce with unions to campaign for old age pensions; nor did they pave the way for them through official investigations (eg, The President's Commission on Health Care). While the British Liberal Party and government was able to launch modern pensions and social insurance in 1908-11, America's extraordinary post-Civil War pension system (for veterans and widows, eventually extended to people over a certain age -- it was allowed to peter out) did not serve as an 'entering wedge' for a similar modern welfare state. Why?

UK and US were two liberal polities that had moved from patronage-dominated politics toward public bureaucratization at different phases of industrialization and democratization. Britain already had a civil service, programmatically competing political parties, and legacies of centralized welfare administration to react against and build upon. Modern social spending programs complemented the organizational dynamics and parties in early 20th c. Britain. The US, however, lacked an established civil bureaucracy and was embroiled in the efforts of Progressive reformers to create regulatory agencies and policies free from the 'political corruption' of nineteenth-century patronage democracy. At this juncture in American history, modern social-spending programs were neither governmentally feasible nor politically acceptable. State factors interacted with working class movements, socioeconomic development and liberal values to affect the timing and form of welfare state development in the UK and the US. ??