Adam Smith, Theory of Moral Sentiments

Chapter 1:

1. The point of this paragraph is that people are not only selfish. They

have interest in the fortune of others beside themselves. Furthermore the

person will not derive anything from the benefits others receive except

that of seeing their friend happy. Pity and compassion fall into this

category. This is the emotion with which we feel the misery of others.

2. We have no way of knowing exactly how another person is feeling, because

we are not them. Therefore we have to conceive of how we would feel if we

were in their position. The tool that allows us to do this is our

imagination. Only through the imagination can we gain any conception of

what another person is feeling.

3. In this paragraph he gives examples of how we do actually put ourselves

in another "person's shoes" and are able to feel their suffering and

identify with them.

4. Smith expands this idea of compassion and pity beyond the emotions of

suffering. Not only the person who experiences the original emotion, but

also within the spectator the same feeling can arise. "In every passion of

which the mind of man is susceptible, the emotions of the by-stander always

correspond to what, by bringing the case home to himself, he imagines

should be the sentiments of the sufferer." (pp. 10)

5. Pity and compassion are identified with suffering, but sympathy is the

word used to denote the fellow-feeling regardless of the emotion (passion).

6. Sympathy can arise simply from viewing the emotions of another person.

7. However this is not universal. Only on certain occasions can the

feeling arise from simply viewing the person's emotions or rather the

expressions of those emotions. Instead we first need to understand the

reason for the feelings in order to have sympathy for them. People might

even look on with disgust before they understand the reasons behind the

feelings.

8. If the mere appearance of emotional expression inspires sympathy in us,

then it is because it give us some general idea of good or bad fortunes

that have happened to a person. However, other emotions do not

automatically inspire the recognition or identification of a general idea

of good or bad fortune- such as anger.

9. However just because we see the grief or joy of a person doesn't mean

that we have perfect identification with the feelings. Further explanation

might be required in order for us to have the full feeling of sympathy.

Upon seeing someone who is upset, the first question that will come to mind

can be, why are they so upset.

10. Because of these considerations, Smith asserts, "Sympathy, therefore,

does not arise so much from the view of the passion, as from that of the

situation which excites it." (pp. 12) It is our ability to put ourselves

in the other person's situation that allows us to have sympathy.

11. In this paragraph Smith brings in reason. Reason, and its ability to

control passions is supreme. For him the loss of reason is one of the most

dreadful things that a person can experience. We need reason in order to

have sympathy. Sympathy is created from putting ourselves in the other

person's "shoes" and at the same time having the capacity to view the

situation with reason and judgement.

12. When we view someone we join to their pain, our own conception of that

pain if we were in the same situation, along with the judgement of the

consequences and meanings of that pain. Once again reasons comes into play

through the aspect of judgement. Reason is what seeks to protect us from

anxiety and fear.

13. Sympathy is then a combination of the feelings of the other person, our

own consciousness of those feelings and our judgement of the situation and

the feelings in that situation. (Smith talks about our feelings towards

the death of someone)

Chapter 2:

1. We, as humans, find happiness in having sympathy with our fellow humans.

It is not our of pure self interest that we feel these feelings.

2. The pleasure also doesn't arise purely from whether the reactions of

others please or flatter our own feelings. What is the source of pleasure

is the correspondence of sentiments with other people. The sharing of

similar feelings is what matters.

3. Sympathy enlivens joy and alleviates grief. We are more likely to share

our grief with others rather than our joy.

4. When a person shares their sorrow they have to relive the pain.

However, in the act of this sharing the pain is at the same time lessened.

Smith writes, "the sweetness of his sympathy more than compensates the

bitterness of that sorrow". (pp. 15) What hurts people is if their

suffering is not ignored.

5. The reason for wanting to share our pain more than our joy is that joy

in itself is enough to make the heart happy. No other pleasure is needed.

However, pain and suffering require more the help and healing of sympathy.

6. Furthermore, humans find pleasure in meeting the "emotional needs" of

others. When we are able to help a person who is suffering, by giving them

sympathy, we find pleasure. If we ever feel that we have been less than

able to give them this sympathy then we feel displeasure ourselves.

Chapter 5:

1. In order for this correspondence of sentiments to occur the sufferer

needs to have the virtue of candid condescension. The bearer of sympathy

needs to have the virtue of indulgent humanity. Both of these virtues rest

upon one single virtue. This virtue is that of, "self-denial, of

self-government, of that command of the passions which subjects all the

movements of our nature to what our own dignity and honor, and the

propriety of our own conduct require". (pp. 23)

2. Not much of great importance in this paragraph.

3. People are not brought to a feeling of sympathy when we see a person

with all their "passions a' flaming". Instead it is the reserved and

controlled sentiments that evoke passion in us the most. "we reverence

that reserved, that silent and majestic sorrow, which discovers itself only

in the swelling of the eyes, in the quivering of the lips and cheeks, and

in the distant, but affecting, coldness of the whole behavior." (pp. 24)

4. We detest passion without restraint. Example of anger.

5. Now Smith brings in the ideal of human nature. It is when we are

unselfish, we are benevolent, and feel much for others that we start to

reach perfection. Within this perfection there is harmony of the

sentiments and the passions.

6. Then Smith puts forth that it is not enough to just have these virtuous

feelings and actions. In order for them to be virtuous they need to be

beyond the ordinary and everyday expressions of them.

7. The ordinary command of the passions is propriety. However, the beyond

the ordinary self-restraint and sympathy is virtuous. Note: reason is what

enables us to act virtuous.

8. In order to distinguish between mere propriety and virtue, it is

necessary to understand the situation in which the action occurred.

9. He notes that we make use of two different standards with which to judge

the propriety/virtue distinction. The first is the idea of complete

propriety and perfection. Standards which humans can never achieve. The

second is the degree of proximity or distance from complete perfection.

10. Smith seems to encourage us to use the second standard lest we miss the

goodness and virtue of an action. If we continually measure against the

idea of perfection, then all we will see is the faults and imperfections.

Both need to be used.