Grusky Part III - The Structure of Modern Stratification
Theories of Class
Marx and Post-Marxists
Karl Marx - "Alienation and Social Classes"
Since this section is somewhat repetitive of the theory section, I will try to be brief. The selections included in this book are from various parts of Marx's work.
Marx argues that "the devaluation of the human world increases in direct relation with the increase in value of the world of things" (pg. 65). The object that labor produces stands opposed to it as an alien object independent of the producer. The product is the objectification of the labor.
1. So, the first characteristic of of alienated labor is the relationship between the worker and the product. The worker is alienated from the object that she/he produces.
2. The worker is also alienated from the act and process of production. The work is external to the worker. It is forced labor: not a satisfaction of a need, but only a means for satisfying other needs. A favorite quote: "We arrive at the result that man (the worker) feels himself to be freely active only in his animal functions . . . while in his human functions he is reduced to an animal. The animal becomes human and the human becomes animal"(pg. 66).
3. Man is alienated from nature or his species-life. Man's productive life, his life-creating ability is reduced to an animal level of simply a means for individual physical existence. Humans advantages over animals (who are only concerned with physical existence) is changed into a disadvantage.
4. A direct consequence of the above listed characteristics of alienation is that man is alienated from other men. It is from this that the classes come out of. If my labor does not belong to me (I am alienated from it), then to whom does it belong? "If the product of labour does not belong to the worker, but confronts him as an alien power, this can only be because it belongs to a man other than the worker" (pg. 68). Private property is the necessary result of the above four alienated relationships (alienated man, alienated labor, alienated life, and estranged life). We thus have two classes, both representations of the same human self-alienation: owners who reap the benefits of labor and own the products and the workers who are simply trying to survive. One final note on private property: it is the product of alienated labor on the one hand and the means by which labor is alienated on the other.
Marx - "Classes in Capitalism and Pre-Capitalism"
In these selections, Marx discusses the development of the modern class struggle between the bourgeoisie (B) and the proletariat (P). He sees class struggle as existing throughout history in all types of societies. In earlier societies the classes were different (freeman/slave, lord/serf, etc). In the modern capitalist society the opposition has been simplified into two great camps: the B and the P.
He gives a little history to the B describing how the class gained control and put an end to all feudal and patriarchal relations. He says that it has replaced the veiled exploitation of these relations for direct, brutal and shameless exploitation. The means of production that the B is founded upon were created in feudal society. The feudal property relations became unable to deal with the developing means of production and were "burst asunder. Into their place stepped free competition, accompanied by a social and political constitution adapted to it, and by the economical and political sway of the bourgeois class" (pp. 71-72).
Marx argues that a similar movement is going on in his modern society. The productive forces are no longer compatible with B property relations and the B order is threatened. The B have responded to this threat exploiting new markets, exploiting old ones more thoroughly, etc., thereby making way for even more destructive and extensive crises and creating the weapons of their own destruction. And not only have they created the weapons of their own destruction, they have also created their executioners - the working class.
The P or working class are focused almost entirely on simple survival. Marx argues thatall workers become similar (age, sex, etc. no l onger relevant) and the lower middle class are subsumed into the P. The P goes thru a series of stages all of which involve struggle with the B. First the struggle is only fought by individual workers, then by workers in individual factories, then those in a trade, etc. The unification of these individuals into a class is made possible by the B who throw them together and also by the improved communication that modern industry makes possible. Eventually, the clash between individual workers and individual owners becomes a battle between two classes. The unification of the workers into a class is continually disturbed by conflicts and competition between workers, but it continues to rise and grow stronger. When the time of revolution nears, the B will experience a process of dissolution during which a small section of the ruling class will join with the revolutionary class, the class of the future.
Finally, Marx describes the P as the unique and essential product of modern capitalism. It is the only truly revolutionary class ever. It is not a movement of a minority for minority interests like all preceding movements. Rather, it is "the self-conscious, independent movement of the immense majority, in the interests of the immense majority. It will first be a national struggle, but will develop into a global one. The fall of the B and the victory of the P Marx sees as inevitable.
The next section mainly describes the political nature of the P. Marx argues that capital creates for the mass a common situation and common interests. This is a class of itself. With the development described above, the P becomes a class for itself. It defends its own interests in a political struggle. He also notes that the condition for the emancipation of the working class, unlike previous oppressed classes, is the abolition of all classes. Until the day that classes and class antagonisms no longer exist, social movements will always be political.
Karl Marx - "Ideology and Class"
This is a fairly short selection for point that we are probably all pretty comfortable with. Here, Marx is just discussing ideology and how the ideas of the ruling class in every era are the ruling ideas. These ideas tend to get separated from their source and made to appear as universal, natural, and rational. Within the ruling class there is a division of labor between those who are the thinkers, the ideologists and those who are more active and therefore have less time to dwell on these ideas and illusions and simply accept them. Each new class that comes to rule is compelled to put forth its own interests as the interests of all members of society. So each revolutionary class appears to represent all of society against the current ruling class, which of course it is not. Marx points out, though, that this charade ends with the abolition of class rule which the P revolution will bring about.
Karl Marx - Value and Surplus Value
The common social substance of all commodities is labor. A commodity has value because it is a "crystallization of social labour. The greatness of its value, of its relative value, depends upon the greater or lesser amount of the social substance contained in it; that is to say, on the relative mass of labour necessary for its production" (pg. 80). Quantities of labor are measured in time.
The value of laboring power is determined by the value of the necessaries needed to produce, develop, maintain, and perpetuate the worker (who is the laboring power). So a worker may need to work say 6 hours a day to produce the value needed for necessities. But the worker works for a capitalist, who is interested in surplus value. Surplus value is the difference between what the worker needs to exist and reproduce and what the worker produces. Surplus value goes completely to the boss, the capitalist. In order to profit, the capitalist makes the worker work for 12 hours, for example, and pays the wage equal to the value needed for survival. "Over and above the six hours required to replace his wages, or the value of his labouring power, he will, therefore, have to work six other hours, which I shall call hours of surplus labour, which surplus labour will realize itself in a surplus value and a surplus produce" (pg. 81). Such a system always results in reproducing the worker as a work and the capitalist as a capitalist. The rate of surplus value always depends on the proportion between the part of the day necessary to reproduce the value of the laboring power and the extra or surplus labor performed solely for the benefit of the capitalist.
Ralf Dahrendorf - "Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society"
In this selection, D. questions Marx's belief that class conflict is based on an antagonism between owners and workers. He argues that subsequent developments have made this distinction an inappropriate basis for the separation of classes. The most important development that marx did not seem to expect was the separation of ownership and control that has occurred since the introduction of joint-stock companies. This separation created a new group of managers that Marx did not account for well. Marx described it as a complete alienation of capital, but D. argues that "the separation of ownership and control involved both a change in the structure of social positions and a change in the recruitment of personnel to these positions" (pg. 83). Basically, it was a process of role differentiation. The roles of owner and manager were once combined into a single position, but have now been distributed over two. This differentiation also changed the roles themselves. The owner becomes a "capitalist without function" and the manager a "functionary without capital", changing the basis of legitimacy completely. The old capitalist had authority because he owned the means of production. The manager exerts authority on the basis of the property rights delegated to him by the shareholders as well as consensual support from her subordinates.
D. argues that the separation of ownership and control produces two sets of roles whose incumbents' outlook and attitude on society are increasingly different. They have different reference groups and thus different values. The manager shares two important reference groups with the capitalist: peers and subordinates, but her attitude toward these groups differ significantly from the capitalist attitude. The manager's success depends on being like and being alike. Regarding Marx's theory, D. points out that "in taking this view, one does of course agree with Marx against himself. For it follows from this that the homogenous capitalist class predicted by Marx has in fact not developed" (pg. 85). Rather, capital has given way to a plurality of partly agreed, partly competing, partly different groups. This development affects class conflict in 3 ways: 1) by changing the composition of participating groups; 2) changing the nature of the issues that cause conflicts; 3) changing the patterns of conflict. We must remember however, that these changes do not mean that there is no conflict. Class conflict still exists, just in a different form than previously expected.
Regarding the working class, D. says that Marx was "genuine child of his century" and thus completely wrong about his prediction that the technical development of industry would lead to a growing homogeneity of labor. Up until the end of the 19th c. this prediction seemed reasonable, but since then it has been necessary to distinguish 3 skill groups: a growing stratum of highly skilled workers, a relatively stable group of semiskilled laborers, and a dwindling stratum of unskilled workers. This skill hierarchy appears to coincide with hierarchies of wages, authority, responsibility, and prestige. So Marx was apparently mistaken. Rather than increasing homogeneity, the working class has experienced increased differentiation. The consequences of this mistake are quite devastating to Marx's theory since the increasing uniformity of the proletariat was a necessary condition for the intensification of class struggle that would eventually lead to revolution. "For conflicts to be intense, one would indeed expect its participants to be highly unified and homogenous groups. But neither capital nor labor have developed along these lines. Capital has dissolved into at least two, in many ways distinct elements, and so has labor" (pg. 87).
At this point, D. addresses the issue of "the new middle class" (NMC) (white collar/salaried employees, etc.). He lays out two theories generally used to describe this stratum which he refers to as "the group that is no group, class that is no class, and stratum that is no stratum" (pg. 88). 1. The Ruling Class Theory posits the NMC as simply an extension of the capitalist ruling class. They are simply positions of delegated authority. 2. The working class theory sees the NMC as closer to the working class than the ruling class. The structural position of white collar workers is more similar to that of wage labor because both are propertyless.
D. finds it reasonable that both of these theories are true. That, in fact, the NMC consists of two groups, each fitting one of the above theories. He argues that the ruling class theory applies to the social position of bureaucrats, whereas the working class theory applies to the position of white collar, non-bureaucratic positions. Again this makes the capital and the labor class more complex and diverse since the bureaucrats extend the bourg. and white collar workers extend the proletariat. More reason to believe the failure of Marxian theory in explaining the structure and conflicts of advanced industrial society.
Another failure of Marx's that D. notes is his "sociological naivete when he expressed his belief that capitalist society would be entirely unable to cope with the class conflict generated by its structure" (pg. 90). D. argues that class conflict has been institutionalized so that society can regulate and survive it. To do so, the weapons of class conflict have been legitimized and thereby brought under control. Contending parties are recognized and legitimate interest groups which removes the threat of "guerilla warfare" and makes the regulation of conflict possible.
Finally, D. proposes an alternative to Marx's unsatisfactory determinant of class and class conflict (property ownership). D. argues that "Authority is both a more general and a more significant social relation" (pg. 92). Authority is used in a very specific sense. It is differentiated from power by the element of legitimacy (authority may be thought of as legitimate power). And it is understood "in the restricted sense of authority as distributed and exercised in imperatively coordinated associations" (pp. 92-93). D. says we should study class and class conflict based on this concept because authority always involves only two groups: the one who dominates and the one who subjects. "Within the framework of this model, (1) the distribution of authority in associations is the ultimate 'cause' of the formation of conflict groups, and (2) being dichotomous, it is, in any given association, the cause of the formation of two, and only two, conflict groups" (pg. 93). Remember, the two groups are what is necessary for intensified conflict.
Erik Olin Wright - "Varieties of Marxist Conceptions of Class Structure"
This brief article lays out Wrights "theory of contradictory locations within class relations". He starts out with an analysis of 3 interconnected dimensions of domination and subordination within production involving a particular resource: money capital, physical capital, and labor. These are dimensions of social relations that are characterized as relations of domination and subordination because each defines the positions that have the capacity to control the particular resource and the positions that do not. It is important to remember that these are not independent dimensions or types of relations. They are all necessary conditions of each other and can never exist autonomously. However, there is a hierarchy of determination. "The social relations of control over money capital structure, or set limits upon, the relations of control over physical capital, which in turn limit the direct control over labor within production" (pg. 94).
Relations of Money Capital
Relations of Physical Capital
Relations of Labor
The class relation between capital and labor can be seen as a polarized antagonistic relation along all three of these dimensions. Capital holds the dominant position in relations of money capital, physical capital, and labor while Labor holds the subordinate position in all three relations.
Some "classes" (Marx would call them 'social formations') do not fit this characterization well: "petty bourgeois" is a class location that involves control over money capital, physical capital, but not over labor (because they have no employees), for example.
In addition, within concrete capitalist societies, the three dimensions do not always coincide perfectly. It is these noncorresponding positions that Wright terms contradictory locations within class relations (CL). Three such locations are particularly important:
1. Managers and supervisors - occupy a CL between the working class and the capitalist class. Like the working class, they do not have control over money capital, but they do have a certain amount of control over physical capital and labor. Within this group, top managers are closer to the capitalists and foremen are closest to the working class.
2. Small employers - CL between petty bourgeoisie and capitalists. They have a control over some labor unlike the PB, but are workers themselves unlike capitalists and don't control enough labor to accumulate large masses of capital.
3. Semiautonomous employers - CL between PB and working class. Like working class, they do not have control over money and labor, but they do have some control over physical capital.
The Tables and diagrams on pp. 96-97 lay this discussion out more graphically. The key thing to remember is that these class locations are contradictory because "they simultaneously share the relational characteristics of two distinct classes. As a result, they share class interests with two different classes, but have interests identical to neither" (pg. 95).
In closing, Wright notes that this schema is not without its difficulties. It is somewhat arbitrary, the definition of "autonomy" is a bit ambiguous, and only positions directly engaged in economic production are presented. Housewives, students, state employees, etc. are left out but should the be considered outside the class structure? Probably not.
Erik Olin Wright - "A General Framework for the Analysis of Class Structure"
In this more extensive piece, Wright addresses the "embarrassment" of the middle class for Marxists. Regardless of the variations in their theories, all Marxists share a commitment to a concept of class relations that is polarized. So what do we do with the middle class? It just doesn't fit. Wright identifies four Marxist strategies for dealing with this problem: a) the middle class is simply an ideological illusion, class structure really is polarized (this is simply a denial of the problem); b) the middle class is just a segment of some other class, a "new petty bourgeoisie" or "new working class"; c) the middle class is actually a new class in itself, thereby radically altering the conception of class structure; d) the middle class are not really a class at all, rather they are simultaneously in more than one class. This is Wright's earlier position (see previous page). He refers to these positions as contradictory locations within class relations.
In this paper, though, he says he no longer feels this approach (d) is satisfactory. He sees now that it suffers from two important problems "that it shares with most other neo-Marxist conceptualizations of class structure: it tends to shift the analysis of class relations from exploitation to domination; and it implicitly regards socialism-a society within which the working class is the "ruling class"-as the only possible alternative to capitalism" (pg. 99).
The shift to domination undermines the claim that classes have "objective" or material interests. The concept of domination does not imply an specific interests of the actors. Exploitation, on the other hand, implies intrinsically opposed material interests. Thus, domination centered concepts of class erode the very theoretical justification for Marxian class analysis.
The second problem, socialism as the only alternative, is equally troublesome. Actual historical experience has called into question Marx's prediction of the inevitability of working class rule followed by communism. The possibility of other post-capitalist class structures should be considered. In fact, he argues that the conceptual frameworks adopted by marxists for analyzing capitalist class relations are inadequate for an analysis for post-capitalist arrangements.
So what do we do to overcome these problems? Wright sees two alternatives: 1) celebrate the shift to domination and use this conceptualization to analyze both capitalist and post-capitalist society; or 2) "restore exploitation as the center of class analysis in such a way that it can both accommodate the empirical complexities of the middle class within capitalism and the historical reality of postcapitalist class structures" (pg. 100). It is the second strategy that Wright supports and pursues in the rest of this paper.
Wright bases his reconstruction of an exploitation-centered concept of class on the work of John Roemer. He argues that with modification and extension, Roemer's strategy can resolve the problems in the concept of contradictory class locations (Cls).
Roemer's approach
"Exploitation implies both economic oppression and appropriation of at least part of the social surplus by the oppressor" (pg. 100). In other words, we can say that the rich exploit the poor when two conditions are met: the rich are rich because the poor are poor, and the welfare of the rich depends upon the effort of the poor. Wright notes that the traditional Marxist concept of exploitation is a special case of this more general concept. Roemer elaborates this approach using two strategies:
1) The labor transfer approach or formal mathematical models that track the flow of surplus labor from one category of actors to another through various exchange relations. By doing this he shoes that exploitation can occur in an economy in which all producers own their own means of production meaning the only things traded are products. In such an economy some workers are able to work less for the same subsistence and they are able to do so because others have to work more. He also demonstrates a complete symmetry in the structure of exploitation in systems in which capital hires wage laborers and in systems in which workers rent capital. He argues that market-based exploitation is strictly a consequence of unequal distribution of the means of production. This exploitation usually plays out in a labor market, but that is not a necessary condition for exploitation to occur.
2) The game-theory approach is used to compare different systems of exploitation. Roemer uses this strategy to define three kinds of exploitation: feudal exploitation, capitalist exploitation, and social exploitation. He poses the question of whether one would be better of leaving the "game" (capitalism, feudalism, socialism) using the "withdrawal rule": for capitalism, leaving the game with one's per capita share of society's total productive assets; for feudalism, leaving the game with one's personal assets; for socialism, leaving the game with one's per capita share of inalienable assets (skills). He argues that in capitalism, the workers would be better off leaving and capitalists would be worse off. In feudalism, peasants would be better off leaving and feudal lords worse off (You can see the pattern of exploitation clearly here). Finally, in socialism, the highly skilled would be worse off leaving. This means that high skill levels receive higher income no by virtue of their higher level of skill, but as a result of the differential distribution of skill across society. This is why their income is exploitative. They depend on the less skilled and have an interest in maintaining the skill differential.
The main message of both of these strategies is that "the material basis of exploitation is inequalities in distributions of productive assets, or what is usually referred to as property relations. . . Classes are then defined as positions within the social relations of production derived from these relations of exploitation" (pg. 102). Wright admits that he previous disagreed with Roemer on this issue, but now accepts and supports Roemer's position. He thought that it blurred the distinctions between Marxist and Weberian definitions of class. He now realizes that what is important is control of productive assets.
Toward a General Framework of Class Analysis
Wright extends Roemer's analysis by including labor power as a productive asset. Roemer's analysis is focused on the linkage between the distribution of productive assets of various kinds and exploitation. However, he only considers physical assets and skill assets. Wright characterizes feudal exploitation differently than Roemer by adding labor as a third type of productive asset. Feudal exploitation is the exploitation that results from inequalities in the distribution of assets in labor power. This makes the game theory specifications of exploitation symmetrical:
Based on inequality Class
Type of Exploitation in the distribution of relation
Feudal Labor Power Lords and Serfs
Capitalist Ownership of Bourgeoisie and Proletariat
Alienable Assets
(Private Property)
Socialist Ownership of Experts and Workers
Inalienable Assets
(Skills)
But really existing socialist societies are problematic within this scheme. Experts do not appear to be the ruling class in such societies and they do not seem to be based on skill inequalities. Roemer solves the problem with the concept of "status exploitation" whereby holders of certain positions gain extra remuneration simply by virtue of holding the position and not by virtue of the skill required to carry out its responsibilities.
Wright finds status exploitation unsatisfactory because it is outside the logic of the rest of Roemer's analysis of exploitation. It has no relationship to production, no material base. Also, it is hard to distinguish status exploitation from feudal exploitation. Wright argues that the problem with status exploitation is that it is based on a fourth element of productive assets that Roemer does not include: organization. Both Adam Smith and Marx note that the division of labor among producers is itself a source or productivity. Including this fourth element resolves the difficulties with analyzing socialism. We end up with 4 types of class structure and exploitation, the above three plus state bureaucratic socialism:
Based on inequality Class
Type of Exploitation in the distribution of relation
State Bureaucratic
Socialism Organization Managers/bureaucrat and nonmanagement
In such societies, exploitation is based on bureaucratic power: control over organizational assets define the basis for class relations and exploitation. This may seem similar to the discussion of authority (like Dahrendorf discusses), but it is a distinct approach. Organization is the asset. Authority is not, but organization is controlled through a hierarchy of authority.
The table on pg. 105 is a more detailed version of the typology of class structures that I have described in the above table so I have included it here. He also briefly notes in his discussion of that table that "the actual class power of a socialist technocratic exploiting class will be much weaker than the class power of exploiting classes in other class systems" (pg. 106). This is consistent with the spirit of Marx's idea that socialism is the precursor to communism. Communism, then would be a society in which even skill-based exploitation had disintegrated and control over skills as a productive resource would be equalized.
Finally, Wright returns to the non-polarized, class locations. He says that the above scheme defines two types: 1) class locations that are neither exploited nor exploiters, such as the petty bourg. or self-employed producer; 2) positions that are exploited along one dimension of exploitation relations and exploiters along another, since real societies are never characterized by a single mode of production. Instead, real class structures are characterized by complex patterns of intersecting exploitation relations. He argues that these positions can still be described as contradictory class locations because they will typically hold contradictory interests in capitalist society regarding the struggle between labor and capital. More precisely, they are contradictory locations within exploitation relations. The principle forms of these CLs will vary according to the combinations of exploitation relations in a given society (Table 3 on pg. 108 demonstrates).
One of the most useful aspects of this framework is that it no longer requires that the proletariat is the only or even central rival the capitalist class. It makes room for other possibilities as Marxism could not. Socialism is not the only alternative. This conceptualization makes it clear that "the process of class formation and class struggle is considerably more complex and indeterminate than the traditional Marxist story has allowed" (pg. 108).
Immanuel Wallerstein - "Class Conflict in the Capitalist World Economy"
This is another very brief selection. W. states that capitalism is the only mode of production that rewards the maximization of surplus creation. Producers are rewarded in terms of the exchange value they produce, and penalized for neglecting it, through a structure we call 'the market'. The market is a structure but not an institution. It is the principal arena of economic struggle and is molded by many institutions (political, economic, social, cultural).
Those who use their surplus to accumulate more capital are additional rewarded, thus there is a pressure for constant expansion. There are addition structures and institutions that reward that segment of producers that use only part of the surplus value for their own consumption and reinvest the rest. Therefore, the bourgeoisie are those receive part of the surplus value that they do not create themselves and use a portion of it to accumulate capital. A great variety of organizational arrangements can permit it, but the specific organizational arrangement that exists in particular states is a function of: 1) the state of development of the world-economy (and that state's role in the world-economy); and 2) the consequent forms of class struggle in the world-economy (and in the particular state).
The fundamental role of the state (as an institution) in the capitalist world-economy is to increase the advantage of some over others, or to reduce the freedom of the market. States are special kinds organizations with a claim to the legitimate use of force within its borders and interfere effectively with the flow of factors of production. "It is this realistic ability of states to interfere with the flow of factors of production that provides the political underpinnings of the structural division of labor in the capitalist world-economy as a whole" (pg. 111). Also, the ability of states to interfere becomes differentiated. Core states become stronger than peripheral ones and use this difference in power to maintain a different degree of interstate freedom of flow. The core states then receive the benefits of unequal exchange. In addition, states intervene to allow the bourg. of core states a greater share than even the bourg. of lesser states. One of the consequences of this is the uneven distribution of bourg. and proletariat across states, core states having a higher percentage of bourg. than peripherals. Wallerstein summarizes:
"To oversimplify, capitalism is a system in which the surplus value of the proletarian is appropriated by the bourgeois. When this proletarian is located in a different country from this bourgeois, one of the mechanisms that has affected the process of appropriation is the manipulation of controlling flows over state boundaries. This results in patterns of 'uneven development' which are summarized in the concepts of core, semiperiphery, and periphery. This is an intellectual tool to help analyze the multiple forms of class conflict in the capitalist world-economy" (pg. 112).
Weber and Post-Weberians
Max Weber - "Class, Status, Party"
Weber addresses the issue of power in this selection. He defines power as "the chance of a man or of a number of men to realize their own will in a communal action even against the resistance of others who are participating in the action" (pg. 113). He points out that economic power is not the same as power in general. Economic power is the consequence of power that is based on other grounds. Power is not simply a means to economic enrichment, it can also be valued in its own right. Often it is accompanied by social honor or prestige, but this is not necessary. Weber distinguishes between the economic order, the social order, and the legal order. The legal order can enhance the chance of holding power or honor, but it does not guarantee it. The economic order is the way in which goods and services are distributed. The social order is the way in which social honor is distributed. The social order is conditioned by and reacts to the economic order.
From this we get the concepts class, status, and party which are the phenomena of the distribution of power in the community.
CLASS
Weber says a class is: 1) a number of people who share a common causal component of their life chances and this component 2)is presented exclusively by economic interests in ownership of goods and opportunity for income and 3) is represented under the conditions of the commodity or labor market. So, a class is any group of people that is found in the same class situation (i.e. similar life chances, experiences, resources, etc). This is based on the economic order. Weber defines two basic categories of class: property and lack of property. However, these two basic categories are further differentiated according to the kind of property that is usable for returns and the kind of services that can be offered in the market (by the propertyless).
Although "class" is unambiguously based on economic interest, the concept of "class interest" is an ambiguous one. It is something like the average interest of the class members, individual members' interests will always deviate. Weber describes to types of action that can grow out of a class situation. 'Communal action' is oriented to the actors' sense of belonging together. "Societal action' is oriented to a rationally motivated adjustment of interests. The rise of either type of action from a common class situation is not universal. In addition, 'mass action' is simply the similar reactions of people in the same class situation and this can be the only type of action to occur. For 'class action' (by this he means communal action by the members of a class) to emerge from the mass actions of the members, there must be some moment that life chances and the results of the class situation are made recognizable to them. Only when the differences in life chances are seen to result from the distribution of property or the structure of the economic order are people able to react against the class structure in the form of rational association.
Now it must be made clear that a class does not constitute a community in and of itself. However, they do emerge on the basis of communalization. But that communal action is not between the members of the same class. Rather, it is an action between the members of different classes. Tje communal actions that determine the class situations of the worker and the entrepreneur are: the labor market, the commodities market, and capitalistic enterprise.
STATUS GROUPS
Status groups, unlike classes, are normally communities. Whereas classes were purely economically determined, 'status situations' are those in which the life chances or fate of the members are determined by a specific social estimation of honor, either positive or negative. This can be linked to class situation, but it is not necessarily linked to it. Propertied and propertyless people can belong to the same status group.
Status honor is generally expressed through a specific lifestyle that is expected of all who are members of the group. This means restrictions on social relationships (marrying the right people and being seen with the appropriate people). Stratification is expressed by where one lives, fashion, who one knows and where one is seen.
"Where the consequences have been realized to their full extent, the statu group evolves into a closed 'caste'. Status distinctions are then guaranteed not merely by conventions and laws, but also by rituals" (pg. 118). Such extremes usually only occur where there are underlying ethnic differences. Weber says the Jews are the most impressive example. However, a status segregation that grows into a caste is not the same in structure as a purely ethnic segregation. Ethnic segregation merely reflects a mutual repulsion or disdain between groups. The caste structure transforms these "horizontal and unconnected coexistences of ethnically segregated groups into a vertical social system of super- and subordination" (pg. 118). In other words, it creates a hierarchy.
Weber notes that political membership or class situation has always been a common source of status groups. Today, class situation is clearly the most important factor since the style of life one can expect is very much conditioned by one's economic situation. Status stratification is based on the monopolization of material and ideal goods and opportunities. This monopolization can be positive in that only status group members are entitled to own or use these goods/opportunities. Or it can be negative in that the status group is prohibited from owning or using certain things. There are usually some typical principles of status conventions such as the performance of physical labor as a status disqualification in privileged status groups. Weber notes that all groups with an interest in the status order react strongly against the idea that status is based purely on economic acquisition. The 'new rich' will never be accepted because they are not versed in the status conventions of the status group. Their children, however, will gain acceptance because they will be raised and educated in these conventions and will not have sullied the status group's honor with their own economic labor.
Weber notes the general effect of the status order: "the hindrance of the free development of the market occurs first for those goods which status groups directly withheld from free exchange by monopolization" (pg. 120). So direct participation in the economic world is taboo for some status group usually the most influential.
So finally, we summarize: Classes are stratified according to relations of production and acquisition of goods. Status groups are stratified according to principles of their consumption of goods represented by specific lifestyles.
PARTIES
Classes exist within the economic order. Status groups exist within the social order. Both influence one another and the legal order and are influenced by it. Parties, however, are different. They "live in a house of power" (pg. 121). The action of parties is focused on the acquisition of social power. In other words, they seek to influence communal action no matter what the specific content of the action is. They are only possible in societies that have some sort of rational order and staff of persons who enforce that order. It is this staff that parties aim to influence and if possible they hope to recruit that staff from their own party membership. "Parties may represent interests determined through 'class situation' or 'status situation' and the may recruit their following respectively from one or the other. But they need be neither purely 'class' nor purely 'status' parties" (pg. 121). Sometimes they are neither. Parties vary according to the type of communal action they are trying to influence, by whether the community is stratified by classes or statuses, and according to the structure of domination within the community. Parties are always structures struggling for domination.
Max Weber - "Status Groups and Classes"
This selection continues the discussion of class. Again, a class is any group of persons that occupies the same class location. Class situation refers to the probability that a given state of a)provision with goods, b) external conditions of life, and c) subjective satisfaction or frustration is possessed by an individual or a group.
Types of classes: 1. Property classes are those in which the class situation of its members is primarily determined by differentiation of property holdings. 2. Acquisition classes are those in which class situation is determined by opportunity for the exploitation of services on the market. 3. Social classes are the class situations that involve an interchange of individuals on a personal basis or over generations. Any of these three types can form the basis of corporate class organizations or associations between those sharing the same class interests, but this development is not necessary. Class and class situation refer only to typical situations, actual individuals' interests may vary extensively. In other words, no one has absolutely identical class situations except completely unskilled, propertyless persons who are dependent upon employment but do not have a consistent occupation.
Weber says that the primary significance of the positively privileged property class may involve its monopoly in the following ways: a) monopoly of the purchase of high-priced goods; b) control of the opportunities of pursuing a systematic monopoly policy over the sale of goods; c) monopoly of opportunities for the accumulation of property through unconsumed surplus; d) monopoly of opportunities to accumulate capital by saving, such as the ability to invest property in loans and control over executive positions in business; e) monopoly of the privileges of socially advantageous kinds of education as they involve expenditure. This property class generally lives off of property income.
Weber also notes there are class interests that are negatively privileged with respect to property. They are: the unfree, outcasts, the debtor class, or the poor. In between are the 'middle' classes. These are groups who have various types of property or marketable abilities and can support themselves from these resources.
What is important to remember is that the differentiation of classes on the basis of property does not necessarily result in class struggle or revolution (as Marx argues). Many other scenarios are possible: peaceful coexistence, conflicts that simply redistribute wealth. He gives the example of the non-antagonistic relationship between poor whites to the rich planters in the U.S. South.
The primary significance of the a positively privileged acquisition class is found in its ability to monopolize the management of productive interests in favor of its members and its insurance of its economic position through influence on the economic policy of political bodies and other groups. These positively privileged acquisition class members are usually entrepreneurs, but can also be members of the liberal professions and workers with special skills. Negatively privileged acquisition classes include workers: skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled. The 'middle' classes here are peasants and craftsmen.
Social classes include: a) the working class; b) the petty bourgeoisie; c) the unpropertied intelligentsia and those whose social position depends on technical training; d) classes that are privileged on the basis of property and education. Weber describes movement as most likely going from skilled and semiskilled working class positions to the technically trained classes. In the very privileged classes, he notes that money is becoming overwhelmingly decisive.
Several circumstances determine the possibility of organized activity by class groups: 1) the possibility of an immediate conflict of interest; 2) a class situation that is similar for a large number of people; 3) the technical possibility of being brought together; and 4) leadership focused on easily understandable goals.
We now return to status: Status is based on the positive or negative privilege regarding social prestige based on one or more of the following: a) mode of living; b) education; c) prestige of birth or occupation. Status may be directly related to class situation or related in a more complex way, but it is never solely determined by class alone. In addition, status may partly or wholly determine class situation, but not be identical to it.
A status group is "a plurality of individuals who, within a larger group, enjoy a particular kind and level of prestige by virtue of their position and possibly also claim to certain special monopolies" (pg. 125). The most important sources for distinct status groups are: a very particular and peculiar style of life, including occupation; a hereditary charisma as a result of successfully claiming a privileged position by virtue of birth; an appropriation of political or hierocratic authority.
The key consequence of status groups is that they create economically irrational conditions of consumption as a result of the conventions described above. They hinder the development of free markets through monopoly.
Max Weber - "Open and Closed Relationships"
This is pretty straightforward. Open relationships are those that do not deny participation to anyone who wishes to join. Closed relationships are those in which the participation of certain individuals is excluded, limited, or subjected to conditions. The decision between open or closed is based on which is perceived by the members to improve their situation. Some different types of closed relationships: communal relationships in which membership is determined by the family relationship are closed on a traditional basis, personal emotional relationships are affectually closed, groups sharing a system of religious belief are closed on a value-rational basis, economic associations are examples of groups closed on a rational basis.
Weber makes several further comments: 1) many relationships tend to shift from a phase of expansion (openness) to a phase of exclusion (closure). 2) The extent and methods of regulation and exclusion may vary widely, so the above shift is gradual. 3) In addition, closure within the group may also appear in many forms. In other words, within group relationships may vary from a free market to strictly assigned advantages. 4) Principle motives for closure: a) maintenance of quality often combined with the interest in prestige, honor, profit; b) contraction of advantages in relation to consumption; c) growing scarcity of opportunity for acquisition. Usually a) is combined with b) or c).
Weber makes one final note regarding economic relationships. He says that a frequent determinant of closure is the competition for a livelihood. When the number of competitors reaches a certain point, the competing groups involved become interested in limiting competition. "In spite of their continued competition against one another, the jointly acting competitors now form an 'interest group' toward outsiders" (pg. 128). They tend to set up associations with regulations, etc. If their monopoly persists, they are eventually able to establish a legal order that limits competition through formal monopolies. When this happens the interest group has developed into a 'legally privileged groups' with 'privileged members.'
Max Weber - "The Rationalization of Education and Training"
Again, another brief selection. Here Weber discusses the effect of rational bureaucratic structure of domination upon the nature of training and education. He argues that this bureaucratization leads to the development of 'rational matter-of-factness' and a 'professional expert' type of personality rather than the previous 'cultivated man' type of personality. He points to two main symptoms: the special examination and the diploma. He says that educational institutions "are dominated and influenced by the need for the kind of 'education' that produces a system of special examinations and the trained expertness that is increasingly indispensable for modern bureaucracy" (pg. 130). He notes that 'democracy' battles with the merit system based on exams and certificates in fear that it will result in a privileged 'caste'.
He points out that prestige on the basis of education is not specific to bureaucracy. Rather it is the foundation of this educational prestige that is different. In other systems, education leads to the development of a 'cultivated man', focusing on the quality of a person's bearing in life. This type of education aims at a chivalrous type, an ascetic type or a literary type. In contrast, the foundation of educational prestige in the bureaucratic system is 'the specialist or expert'.
Anthony Giddens - "The Class Structure of the Advanced Societies"
Giddens begins this article with a discussion of how Weber's analysis of class has been generally misrepresented, as has Marxism. They are set up in opposition to one another, but Giddens argues that the true similarities and differences between the two approaches are difficult to disentangle.
Giddens argues that Weber supplies what is missing from the Marxist theory, namely, an explicit discussion of the concept of class. Two primary differences from Marx's abstract model: the differentiation of class from status and party, and an emphasis on a pluralistic conception of classes As discussed in the previous sections, Weber distinguishes between the propertied and the propertyless, but points out that the class situations within these groups are further differentiated.
Another important aspect of Weber's work is the very clear distinction between class 'in itself' and class 'of itself'. Class refers to market interests, it is an objective characteristic that affects life chances. Only under certain conditions do people of the same class situation become conscious and act upon these mutual interests.
Regarding the differentiation of class, status and party (or power), Giddens clarifies a few more things. The difference between class and status is between production and consumption (styles of life), although it is often portrayed as the difference between objective and subjective. Weber sees class and status has very closely linked in many cases through property. Property is a primary determinant of both class situation and style of life. But remember that class and status are not two dimensions of stratification. Rather, "classes and status communities represent two possible, and competing, modes of group formation in relation to the distribution of power in society" (pg. 133). Also, it becomes clear that power is not simply a third dimension of stratification. Classes, status groups, and parties are all a result of the distribution of power. Unlike Marx, Weber does not equate power with economic domination. Finally, the party is a characteristic of the modern state. It is a group focused on the acquisition and maintenance of political leadership.
When reading the above selections by Weber, I found the distinction between classes and social classes to be a bit confusing. Giddens is kind enough to clarify this issue as well. "A social class, in Weber's sense, is formed of a cluster of class situations which are linked together by virtue of the fact that they involve common mobility chances, either within the career of individuals or across the generations" (pg. 133). These clusters create a certain social interchange between individuals. So, class is simply a market position, which can be one of almost unlimited possibilities. Social classes involve relationships and is therefore somewhat closer to the concept of status groups than is the purely economic concept of class. Weber distinguishes four main social classes in capitalist society: the manual working class, the petty bourgeoisie, propertyless white-collar workers, and those privileged through property and education. Remember, though, the social classes are not necessarily communities, they may be fragmented as result of the variation in market position (class) that exist within them. In this way, Weber does for us what Marx did or could not: recognize a pluralistic view of classes without sacrificing recognition of the unifying ties between these innumerable class situations.
Giddens argues that what we need to do now is rethink the theory of class. He feels that Weber did not go far enough and did not pursue the implications of his ideas. Most of class theory, including Weber's work, has focused on revising Marx's ideas. But this is not the significant issue that needs to be addressed. "The most important blank spots in the theory of class concern the processes whereby 'economic classes' become 'social classes,' and whereby in turn the latter are related to other social forms" (pg. 136). Giddens refers to this as the structuration of class relationships: how economic relationships translate into non-economic social structures.
Briefly Giddens addresses the ambiguity and conceptual confusion about the term 'class'. Giddens uses the term to refer to what Weber called social classes. So, there are only a limited number of classes (or social classes) in any society. Giddens makes a few notes about what class is NOT: class is not a specific entity (like a business or a school) and has no publicly sanctioned identity; class is not a stratum and class theory is not the study of 'stratification', a stratum is a gradational scale the ranks individuals, the boundaries between stratum can be defined rather precisely for analytical use, class boundaries cannot be separated so easily; class is not the same as the elite.
The Structuration of Class Relationships
Finally, Giddens discusses his own propositions. First he distinguishes between mediate and proximate structuration of class relationships. Mediate structuration refers to "the factors which intervene between the existence of certain given market capacities and the formation of classes as identifiable groupings" (pp.136-137). Proximate structuration refers to localized factors that condition or shape class formation.
Mediate structuration is governed by the distribution of mobility chances. The greater degree of closure of mobility chances, the more the formation of identifiable social classes is made possible. "In general we may say that the structuration of classes is facilitated to the degree to which mobility closure exists in relation to any specified form of market capacity" (pg. 137). Giddens gives three such market capacities that are usually important: ownership of property in the means of production; possession of educational or technical qualifications; possession of manual labor power. These three market capacities provide the foundation for a basic three class system in capitalism. Each class corresponds (in order) to the above listed market capacities: upper, middle and working class.
However, to account for the structuration of classes, we must also consider the proximate sources. The three most important of these Giddens lists as: the division of labor (or allocation of tasks) within the productive enterprise; the authority relationships within the enterprise; and the influence of distributive groupings. The DoL can be a source of fragmentation as well as consolidation. It separates individuals by giving them different jobs, but consolidates some because of the similarity of their occupations. It separates the non-manual or administrative employees from the manual workers. The effect of the DoL is heavily reinforced by the authority system which separates administrative workers, who tend to be involved in the enforcement or framing of commands, from the manual workers, who are subject to those commands. The third source of proximate structuration, the influence of distributive groups, comes from the sphere of consumption rather than of production. Distributive groupings involve common patterns of consumption. Status refers to conscious evaluation of the groupings honor/prestige relative to others and a status group is a set of social relationships that uses such evaluations to derive its coherence. Distributive groupings interrelate with the other proximate sources of structuration to reinforce the typical separations between forms of market capacity.
Giddens summarizes: "to the extent to which the various bases of mediate and proximate class structuration overlap, classes will exist as distinguishable formations. I wish to say that the combination of the sources of mediate and proximate structuration distinguished here, creating a threefold class structure, is generic to capitalist society. But the mode in which these elements are merged to form a specific class system, in any given society, differs significantly according to variations in economic and political development" (pg. 138). In closing, he notes that if classes become social realities, there must be a common pattern of behavior and attitude that goes with them. In this way, he distinguishes 'class awareness', the recognition and acceptance of similar attitudes and beliefs, from 'class consciousness, which involves recognition that these attitudes and beliefs signify a particular class affiliation and that there exist other classes with different attitudes and beliefs. The fundamental difference is that class awareness can involve the denial of the reality or existence of classes.
Grusky Part III, Continued- The Structure of Modern Stratification
Theories of Class
Weber and Post-Weberians, Continued
Frank Parkin - "Marxism and Class Theory: A Bourgeois Critique"
Parkin finds the distinction between manual and non-manual labor, which is utilized by empirical researchers as a measurement of class, unsatisfactory. It is not generally described in class theory is the primary line of class conflict. Parkin feels that "the current sociological model does not fulfill even the minimal Weberian claim that the relations between classes are to be understood as 'aspects of the distribution of power'" (pg. 142). Rather than focusing on class antagonism, we seem to be focusing merely on social differentiation. Parkin finds the Marxist approach problematic because: 1) the great variety of Marxist interpretations make it difficult to speak of a "Marxist theory of class"; 2) the difference between Marxist and bourg. approaches is blurred even more by the tendency of Marxists to use familiar sociological categories but under substitute names. The role of authority is an ex. For some Marxists, managerial authority has superceded property ownership as the defining characteristic of the capitalist class. This is quite problematic for the theory. The difficulty of distinguishing professionals from other white-collar workers is an additional problem. Parkin argues that "the one notable thing about this kind of analysis is that despite its avowedly Marxist provenance it is indistinguishable from the approach of modern bourgeois social theory. . . . Inside every neo-Marxist there seems to be a Weberian struggling to get out. . . ." (Pg. 143).
So what about Weber? Parkin begins with a discussion of Weber's concept of social closure. Social closure is "the process by which social collectivities seek to maximize rewards by restricting access to resources and opportunities to a limited circle of eligibles" (pg. 143). Those excluded tend to resist the pattern of dominance governed by the exclusionary principles. So one group is attempting to secure a privileged position at the expense of another through a process of subordination. So we have a downward use of power by the privileged and exclusionary group to protect its position (exclusion) and an upward use of power by those excluded to win a greater share of resources (usurpation). Usurpation is always a collective response to and consequence of exclusion.
Methods of closure can be understood as different means of mobilizing power in order to participate in the distributive struggle. Parkin says that the distinction and conflict between the bourg. and the proletariat is not based on their place in the productive process. Rather, it is based on their modes of closure, exclusion, and usurpation. In modern capitalist society, Parkin lists two main exclusionary devices by which the bourg. maintains itself as a class: 1) the institution of property; 2) academic or professional qualifications and credentials.
Property - This does not mean a focus on the primacy of property ownership as Marx and others have conceived of it (in several problematic ways). Rather, it is the most important for of social closure common to industrial societies. Rights of ownership is a specific form of exclusion, not a special case of authority. Parkin points out also that it is important to distinguish between property as possessions and property as capital. Property as capital is what class analysis is concerned with. Although both possessions and capital entail rights of exclusion, only the exclusionary rights in property as capital has important consequences for the life chances and social condition of those excluded. "The relevant question is not whether surplus extraction occurs, but whether the state confers rights upon a limited circle of eligibles to deny access to the 'means of life and labour' to the rest of the community. If such exclusionary powers are legally guaranteed and enforced, an exploitive relationship prevails as a matter of definition" (pg. 147).
Credentialism - an equally important set of closure practices is the used of educational certificates as a way of restricting entry to key positions in the division of labor. Professionalization and the invention of diplomas are such strategies. Credentials are usually distributed based on tests designed to measure class-related skills rather than practical skills and aptitudes (take a look at the DiMaggio article on cultural capital, for example). The best advantage of occupational closure based on credentialism is that all those who are allowed in are considered competent for the rest of their professional lives. There is no retesting. So credentialism is doubly effective because it restricts entrance into the profession and masks the variation in level of ability of the members and shielding the least competent from economic failure. Parkin points out that manual trades have also attempted occupational exclusion through qualifications, but they were not successful like the white-collar professionals who were able to achieve a legal monopoly over the services through state licensing.
So, Parkin finds both the institution of property and credentialism to be very important forms of exclusionary social closure. "Both entail the use of exclusionary rules that confer benefits and privileges on the few through denying access to the many, rules that are enshrined in law and upheld by the coercive authority of the state. It follows from this that the dominant class under modern capitalism can be thought of as comprising those who possess or control productive capital and those who possess a legal monopoly of professional services" (pg. 149).
So what does all this mean for class reproduction? Parkin says that "succession along kinship lines must be accomplished in conformity with the application of criteria that are ostensibly indifferent to the claims of blood" (pg. 150). The bourg. family must deal with powerful forces that are more interested in maintaining bourg. values than bourg. blood. So there is some tension between the predominant forms of closure and the desire to transmit privilege to one's children (they still have to earn the credentials, for ex.). Parkin distinguishes between collectivist and individualist criteria that underlie all forms of exclusion. He says that the nature of the subordinate class will differ according to which set of criteria predominates. Ideal-typically, collectivist types of exclusion will produce a communal subordinate class, one defined in terms of an all-encompassing negative status. The opposite, individualistic types of exclusion will result in a subordinate group that is fragmented and incoherent. In concrete societies, however, individualist and collectivist criteria are usually applied in some combination. Classes are presented as a combination of the two types of criteria and they may be located in various positions between communal groups and segmental status groups depending on the relative weight of the two sets of criteria (see diagram, pg. 151). Parkin argues that as class subordination becomes increasingly less communal, political ideals tend to be preoccupied with issues of distributive justice rather than with moral order and emancipation.
In closing, Parkin offers a few remarks on the explanatory status of the closure model: 1) it is not really a 'theory' of class, but a way of conceptualizing it that is different from both Marxist and bourg. approaches. He argues that most 'theories' of class are in fact such systems of conceptualization. Conceptual models are ways of presenting social reality and so choosing one involves making a personal judgment about the moral standing of society. What Parkin suggests in this neo-Weberian model is that relations between classes are not characterized by harmony or contradiction. "Rather, the relationship is understood as one of mutual antagonism and permanent tension; that is,, a condition of unrelieved distributive struggle that is not necessarily impossible to 'contain'. Class conflict may be without cease, but it is not inevitably fought to a conclusion. The competing notions of harmony, contradiction, and tension could thus be thought of as the three broad possible ways of conceptualizing the relation between classes, and on which all class models are grounded" (pg. 153). The best contributions of the closure model is that it emphasizes the role of class cleavages and proposes that intra-class relations should be treated similarly to inter-class relations, as conflict phenomena. Finally, it allows us to define classes in reference to their modes of closure rather than in reference to their place in the productive process or division of labor.
The Ruling Class and Elites
Gaetano Mosca - "The Ruling Class"
All societies are made up of 2 classes: a class that rules and a class that is ruled. The ruling class is smaller, performs political functions, monopolizes power and enjoys its advantages. The class that is ruled is much larger, is controlled by the ruling class and supplies the RC with the material means of subsistence.
Two political facts: 1. There is one individual who is chief of the RC and this person is not always the person who has the most powerful position according to the law (like the president). This position may occasionally be held by 2 or 3 people. 2. The RC does feel some pressure from the discontent of the masses that somewhat influences their rule.
t The structure of the RC is a key factor in determining the political type and level of civilization of a society.
t Although it seems unlikely, the dominion of an organized minority over an unorganized majority is inevitable. Also, the larger the community, the smaller the proportion the RC makes up.
t Ruling class members usually have some distinctive characteristic that sets them apart. In primitive society, this characteristic was military valor. Eventually, as a society develops, wealth replaces military valor.
t Once the bureaucratic state emerges, wealth produces political power and political power produces wealth.
t Hereditary castes - this is when the ruling class is limited to certain families.
Two observations: 1) all ruling classes tend to become hereditary castes. The concept of inertia explains this: once a group gains control, it protects its position by legitimizing its right to rule and extending that right across generations. 2) The hereditary castes must have completely monopolized political power at some point in order to proclaim their exclusive and hereditary right to that power.
t Every ruling class justifies is power on some universal moral position.
"One might say, indeed, that the whole history of civilized mankind comes down to a conflict between the tendency of dominant elements to monopolize political power and transmit possession of it by inheritance, and the tendency toward a dislocation of old forces and an insurgence of new forces; and this conflict produces an unending ferment of endosmosis and exosmosis between the upper classes and certain portions of the lower"' (pg. 160).
C. Wright Mills - "The Power Elite"
Mills argues that "As the means of information and of power are centralized, some men come to occupy positions in American society from which they can look down upon, so to speak, and by their decisions mightily affect, the everyday worlds of ordinary men and women" (pg. 161). This power elite is in the command of the major hierarchies and organizations of modern society. Their actions as well as their inactions have major consequences for everyone in the society.
Immediately below the elite are the professional politicians and the professional celebrities also mingle here. These celebrities and consultants are "part of the immediate scene in which the drama of the elite is enacted. But that drama itself is centered in the command posts of the major institutional hierarchies" (pg. 162).
There is some disagreement over the existence of the elite. Some say there is no elite and base their argument on the reports of those in positions of power who deny the existence of such a group. Others say that there is a compact and powerful elite that determine the course of history with their decisions. Mills finds both views important, but inadequate. He argues that the major institutions of modern society link the decisions of men and the events of history. These institutions are the means of power.
In American society, there are three domains in which major national power resides: the economic, the political, and the military. Within these domains, the typical institutional unit has become large, administrative and centralized. The institutions have also incorporated and guide the technology of our society.
The economy - once a scatter of many small units, it has now become dominated by 200 or 300 giant corporations that are administratively and politically interrelated.
The political order - once a decentralized set of states, is now a centralized, executive establishment that has absorbed many of the previously scattered powers and enters into every nook of the social structure.
The military order - once a scattered, distrustful group fed by state militia, is now the largest and most expensive part of our gov't, a large sprawling bureaucracy.
As each domain becomes large and centralized, the consequences of its activities increases as well as its traffic with other domains. There is an ever growing interlocking of the economic, political, and military structures. Mills refers to this as a triangle of power that "is the source of the interlocking directorate that is most important for the historical structure of the present" (pg. 163). Decisions (and indecisions) in one domain ramify into the others. So, top decisions either become coordinated or turn into a commanding indecision. Within each domain, there is a higher circle: the economic (CEOs), political (political directorate), and military elite (the Joint Chiefs of Staff). These men come together to form the power elite of America.
At this point, Mills discusses and critiques other conceptions of the elite, which are intricately bound up with one another:
1. The elite are conceived of as simply those who have the most of what there is to have. Mills says that this is not right because they would not have the most were it not for their positions in the great institutions. These institutions are the basis of power, wealth and prestige as well as the means of exercising power, acquiring wealth, and benefitting from prestige.
2. The elite are conceived of as the top social classes. A set of groups whose members know one another, do business together, and take one another into account when making decisions. They make up a self-conscious group. Mills says that since America never had a feudal period, these overlapping circles or cliques do not stem from a set of noble families. This does not mean that the upper classes do not exist, it simply makes them less visible in American than in other countries. The American elite entered as a virtually unopposed bourgeoisie and not other bourg. has had the level of advantages and opportunities that the American has.
3. The elite may also be conceived of in terms of psychological or moral criteria. In other words, people of superior energy and character. Mills argues that this conception is based on the ideology of the elite themselves. People who rule like to think that there is something special about them that makes them better suited to be in charge and worthy of the advantages they possess. This ideology may be made up by the elite or by others. Mills says that this ideology and the expectations it leads to does in fact often lead to the development of the character that it defines the elite as inherently possessing.
Mills says that we shall use all three of these conceptions of the elite in our examination of them, but what we are most interested in is "the power of those who now occupy the command posts, and with the tole which they are enacting in the history of our epoch" (pg. 166). This elite can be considered omnipotent, as in vulgar Marxism, or as being so scattered as to have no coherence whatsoever as an historical force. He argues that, internationally, the omnipotent conception is the dominant one. In the U.S. however, people of power tend to deny that they are powerful. ("I run for office to serve not to rule", "I am a public servant", etc.). Mills argues that the people in power may not be omnipotent, but neither are they impotent. "It is the form and height of the gradation of power that we must examine if we would understand the degree of power held and exercised by the elite" (pg. 167). No gradation of power exists when every one shares equally the power to decide national issues. At the other end of the scale, no gradation of power would also exist when decision-making power was completely monopolized by a small group. American society represents neither extreme. Within each of the powerful institutional domains, there is some gradation of power. We can define the power elite as "those political, economic, and military circles which as an intricate set of overlapping cliques share decisions having at least national consequences" (pg. 168). But no matter how we define the elite, the extent of the power of its members is subject to historical variation.
Finally, Mills points out that the course of historical events in our era depend more on human decisions than on any inevitable fate. Like Weber, he sees history as simply a series of one thing after the next, not the realization of any determined plot. He also argues that there is no precedent for the future power of the elites. "As the institutional means of power and the means of communication that tie them together have become steadily more efficient, those now in command of them have come into command of instruments of rule quite unsurpassed in the history of mankind. And we are not yet at the climax of their development" (pg. 169).
Anthony Giddens - "Elites and Power"
Giddens defines the elite group as "those individuals who occupy positions of formal authority at the head of a social organization or institution" (pg. 171). A major aspect of the structuration of the upper class involves processes of recruitment and degree of solidarity. So, mediate structuration concerns how closed the process of recruitment to elite positions is. Proximate structuration depends on the frequency and nature of social contact between members. (Refer to pp.136-137, The Structuration of Class Relationships). Combining these two aspects of structuration, Giddens creates a typology of elite formations (see diagram on pg. 172): uniform elite, established elite, abstract elite, solidary elite. A uniform elite has a restricted pattern of recruitment and relatively tight-knit unity. An established elite has a restricted pattern of recruitment, but a low level of integration. An abstract elite has open recruitment and low integration. And a solidary elite has open recruitment and high integration.
This typology of elite formation is not sufficient for us to be able to conceptualize power. In addition, Giddens uses two aspects of effective power to form a classification of power structures: how far power is consolidated in the hands of the elite groups and the breadth of the range of issues they have control over. Again we have a four type classification (diagram pg 173). When the issue strength is broad and power is consolidated, we have autocratic power-holding. When power is consolidated but this issue strength is restricted, we have oligarchic power-holding. Hegemonic control is when the issue strength is broad, but power is diffused. And, democratic control is when the issue strength is restricted and power is diffused.
Combining these two typologies allows us to create an overall typology of elite formations and power within the class structure (See diagram pg. 174). This clarifies the four concepts that have previously created much confusion: ruling class, governing class, power elite, and leadership groups. In this classification, the strongest case of a ruling class is that where a uniform elite has autocratic power. The weakest is when an established elite has oligarchic power. A power elite is distinguished from a ruling class by the pattern of recruitment, just as a governing class is distinguished from leadership groups. A hierarchy among elite groups exists based on the breadth of issue strength. Below is the final classification:
Elite Formation Power-holding
Ruling Class uniform/established elite autocratic/oligarchic
Governing Class uniform/established elite hegemonic/democratic
Power Elite solidary elite autocratic/oligarchic
Leadership Groups abstract elite hegemonic/democratic
Michael Useem - "The Inner Circle"
Useem begins with a discussion over the debate about whether the elite are a unified, coherent group or not. Some of the proponents of the unified side are William Domhoff and Ralph Miliband. Those on the non-unified side include, Ivar Berg, Mayer Zald, Daniel Bell, Leonard Silk, and David Vogel. The same debate is going on in Britain, too. Useem says that this debate is reflected even in social sciences textbooks (some say its unified, others that it is not). Useem argues that both sides are incorrect, but are yet partly true.
Useem argues that a politicized leadership of a number of major corporations does indeed play a major role in defining and promoting the shared needs of big business. He refers to this group as the inner circle and says that most business leaders are not a part of it because their interests do not extend beyond their own firms. But some people are in positions that make them sensitive to the welfare of a wide range of businesses and have become of voice for the entire business community. "Though defined by their corporate positions, the members of the inner circle constitute a distinct, semi-autonomous network, one that transcends company, regional, sectoral, and other politically divisive fault lines within the corporate community" (pg. 177). The inner circles is at the forefront of business outreach to the government, non-profit orgs., and the public. Useem argues that the inner circle has assumed a critically role in the last decade (I think he means the 1980s). It has created a coherence and effectiveness to the political voice of business never before seen.
Useem describes a progression in business from family capitalism in which upper class interests informed business and political activity, to managerial capitalism, in which individual business interests were increasingly addressed in the political arena, and now we have institutional capitalism. In institutional capitalism, it not family or individual business interests that define the business political activity. Now, the shared interests and needs of all large corporations taken together are the focus for political activity. This means that corporations may take actions that are not in their individual interests, but rather are in the interests of all large companies. "The inner circle is the carrier of this extracorporate logic; the strategic presence of its members in the executive suites of major companies allows it to shape corporate actions to serve the entire corporate community" (pg. 178).
Useem describes three main (there are other less significant ones) principles of social organization that simultaneously structure business organizations and has implications for how the business enters the political arena. Each principle, however, seems to match one of the three forms of capitalism listed above in which that principle takes the dominant position.
1. The Upper Class Principle - defining element is a social network of established wealthy families that share a distinct culture, have a common social status, are unified through intermarriage and common experiences in exclusive settings (country clubs, boarding schools, etc.). These people enter politics with the upper class interests as their main agenda, protecting the social boundary, intergenerational transmission of status and wealth, etc. Most of these people hold significant positions in corporations, but these corporate positions are useful but not defining elements.
2. The Corporate Principle - defining element is the corporation itself. Location is now determined by one's responsibilities in the firm and the firms position in the economy rather than by lineage. Upper-class allegiance is incidental. Corporate leaders enter politics to advance the interests of their own companies (not of all companies).
3. The Classwide Principle - "In this framework, location is primarily determined by position in a set of interrelated, quasi-autonomous networks encompassing virtually all large corporations" (pg. 180). Corporate and upper-class credentials and interests are subordinate.
The relative importance of each of these principles is crucial for understanding contemporary corporate activity. Useem argues that "the relative balance long ago shifted in the U.S. from upper-class to corporate principle, and that American business is currently undergoing still another transformation, this time from corporate to classwide principles of organization" (pg. 180).
Finally, Useem revisits Mills' 'Three Pillars of the Power Elite' (business, military and government). He argues that the greatest contribution of Mills' theory is his insight regarding why business as become one of the pillars. The increased centralization and concentration has lead to the emergence of a new breed of corporate executives who are committed to industry-wide concerns. Others have also noted the critical political role played by top executives with multi-firm connections (interlocking directorates).
The inner circle is the top of the business pillar. The pillar's base is powerful, but lacks to means and incentives for shaping classwide policy. The top, or inner circle, however, is not so limited. "It has the power to act through its umbrella of intercorporate connections. It has the unity to act by virtue of its shared social cohesion. Its upper-class connections opens doors when it chooses to act. And at its disposal are the business associations when formal representation is needed" (pg. 181).
Useem is careful to note that the inner circle is not all-powerful. It is simply better prepared to act than other individuals or groups of corporate managers and directors. So to return to the discussion at the beginning: disunity best describes to majority of the business community. Unity, however, best describes the smaller subset known as the inner circle. Finally, he says that the inner circle is made up of a set of horizontally organized networks and vertically structured organizations that act. So the inner circle does not just refer to the CEOs who make up its membership, "but also to the networks that constitute its internal structure. It is the power of these internal networks that propel members of the inner circle into leadership roles on behalf of the entire corporate community" (pg. 182).
Edward A. Shils - "The Political Class in the Age of Mass Society:
Collectivistic Liberalism and Social Democracy"
Shils says that, despite the suspicions of ant-elitists, the study of elites is an evaluatively neutral study. As long as it simply describes the processes that occur, "it is silent at the question as to whether inequality in the distribution of opportunities and rewards is inherent in the nature of societies" (pg. 184).
Mosca certainly saw the inequalities he found in his studies as inevitable. He thought that no society could exist without elites and that elites performed a necessary function for the society. He recognized that they had vices, but he was more concerned, according to Shils, with the conditions under which political elites were effective. Shils finds this to be the appropriate problem to address in the study of elites.
Based on Mosca's ideas, Shils discusses the concept of a political class. This class has a sense of political vocation and share a sense of solidarity despite the many conflicts that go on between its members. "The concept of a political class refers not only to the families, professions, and schools from which politicians and political organizers come; it refers to more than these and to the sense of identity focused on the shared right and obligation to rule. It is also a reference to an accumulating tradition of outlook and skill" (pp. 184-185). Mosca and Schumpeter apparently think that these traditions of ruling provide the elite with the dispositions and attitudes necessary to rule effectively. Shils questions this belief.
He points out that no political class has ever had to cope with a situation like that of contemporary Western society. He says that the present situation requires a huge concentration of power in the government in order to assemble and dispose of resources and cope with very high levels of demands in various parts of the population. He says that there is scarcely any sphere of life that gov't has not entered in response to their conceptions of their obligations.
This situation is quite different from that in which political classes worked, when they still existed. In earlier times, the greatest characteristic of the political class was its inheritance of the traditions of the art of politics. This was not technical knowledge, like that required today. Science was not considered relevant to political decisions. But lack of technology was not the downfall of the political class. As the number of tasks demanded of the elite grew, they had to create bureaucracies to deal with them. And, as Weber says, bureaucracy would be the dominant power in government unless a system of competitive parties could control it by producing charismatic leaders. The inability to produce such leaders has led to an even greater expansion of bureaucracy even within the legislature and the presidency.
Shils says that the Soviet Union is the only country that can be described as having a political class. The USSR's Communist political class has been very successful in some ways: it has remained in power for nearly 2/3 of a century and has avoided subversion and replacement. In fact, it goes beyond the political classes in one sense. PCs assimilate their rivals and bring them into the system. The Soviet political elite were able to simply suppress potential rivals, through ruthlessness and brutal force, for quite a while. However, in those spheres of activity, like the economy, in which force is not sufficient, the Soviet elite has been quite unsuccessful. Shils argues that being a political class has advantages, but it is not a guarantee of success.
Regarding modern Western countries, Shils says that there is very little evidence of political classes. Lineage has ceased to be significant and the political elites have "become less self-enclosed, and their different and rival sectors have become less conciliatory toward each other than when they formed a political class" (pg. 188). Great Britain and France were the only countries in which educational institutions served to form and unite the political class. Germany and the U.S. never had educational institutions that performed these functions. Shils says that the U.S. is too large and still too decentralized interests, functions, and loyalties for a political class to emerge.
Shils' final conclusion: "Modern political life under conditions of popular democracy is too open for the generation and maintenance of a political class" (pg. 189). Mosca emphasized partial closedness of recruitment as a condition for a political class and to this Shils' adds closedness from external scrutiny. Neither condition is found, he argues, in modern society. The 'eye of the public' has a depth of scrutiny never conceived of. What this leads to is the choice of popularity over effectiveness (a main reason for this is the invention of popular surveys of political attitudes). "Popularity of measures becomes a criterion of the success of a measure, long before it has had a chance to become effective. Effectiveness and popularity are not the same thing, and their divergence renders the formation of a political class in Mosca's sense impossible. A political class in Mosca's sense did not have to be continuously on the alert to its popularity, and since it did not try to do as much as contemporary political elites in societies dominated by collectivistic liberal and social democratic beliefs and demands, it was easier for it to be effective" (pg. 189).
t Before going on, here's just a little something that crossed my mind while reading this section on elites. In the gender section, Dorothy Smith argues in The Everyday World as Problematic that the point of view of the rulers is incompatible with a true understanding of the relationships and hierarchies of power involved. A study of elites is possible, but it is appropriately examined from the point of view of "the slave" or the subordinate who is in a position to observe what is really going on. This isn't really important, just a little connection I made that I thought I would share.
Gradational Status Groupings
Reputation, Deference, and Prestige
Warner, Meeker, and Eells - "Social Class in America"
This article appears to be quite old, although I couldn't find a date for it. Basically, it discusses the social class structure of three regions of the U.S.: New England, the Middle and Far West, and the deep South. From this, the authors come up with a few generalities about class in America. They begin by noting that we all recognize the existence of social class, but often tend to deny it and try to pretend class differences do not exist. They give the example of terms like "The Century of the Common Man" as ways in which we insist on our democratic faith.
The New England Yankees - The authors say that studies of communities in this region provide evidence of a well-defined class system. There are 6 classes:
1. The aristocracy, or "old families"who inherit their wealth. The money is inherited from the wife's side, the husband's side or both, but it has been in the family for a long time.
2. The new families, or lower upper class, who came up through the new industries and finance. They are very conscious that their money is too newly earned to be as sacred as the aristocracy. They realize that money alone is not enough.
3. Below the two upper classes is the highly respectable upper middle class. These are the people who are the active front in civic affairs and get things done. They are hoping to gain recognition and move into the lower upper class, although this rarely happens.
These three classes are the strata that are above the 'Common Man'. They comprise half of the class levels, but no more than a sixth of the population. Also, of the three, the new families or lower upper class have the highest incomes.
4. The lower middle class is the top level of the Common Man and is made up of clerks, white-collar workers, small tradesmen, and a few skilled workers. They have little property but are often homeowners. Some of the more successful members of ethnic groups (Italians, Irish, French-Canadians, etc.) have reached this level, a few have gone higher, but none have reached the old family level.
5. The upper lower class is the hardest to distinguish, but is made up of "poor but honest workers" who are usually semi-skilled or unskilled.
The lower middle and upper lower classes are the 'Common Man'.
6. The lower lower class have a bad reputation for being lazy, shiftless, and unemployed. These people are considered below the 'Common Man'.
The Democratic Middle West and Far West- communities in these areas often do not have the aristocracy or old families. The ones that do tend to be are those that are large and have grown slowly at an average rate. San Francisco is an example. "If it lacks any one of these factors, including size, social and economic complexity, and steady and normal growth, the old-family class is not likely to develop. So, a five-class structure is common in this region (upper class, upper middle, lower middle, upper lower, and lower lower).
The Deep South - Most towns above a few thousand population have a six-class system in which an old-family elite is socially dominant. There is a very distinct separation between the upper upper and lower upper classes. In addition, the South's class structure is "further complicated by a color-caste system which orders and systematically controls the relations of those categorized as Negroes and whites" (pg. 194). The blacks are outside and below the above described class system.
Generalities - Money is not enough to determine class. "Money must be translated into socially approved behavior and possessions, and they in turn must be translated into intimate participation with, and acceptance by, members of a superior class. . ."(pg. 195). These authors take a functional approach and say that even though our democratic values make us disapprove, class order is functional. It is not, however, so rigid that movement is impossible. Vertical mobility is a characteristic of all class systems, but they argue that education, rather than money, is now the way up. And everyone lived happily ever after!
Edward Shils - "Deference"
Deference refers to acts of appreciation or derogation that occur in every social interaction. Appreciation is positive or high deference, derogation is negative or low deference. Everyone has a deference position in reference to everyone else. What Shils calls deference is what others call 'status'. "The disposition to defer and the performance of acts of deference are evoked by perception, in the person or classes of persons perceived, of certain characteristics or properties of their roles or actions" (pg. 197). These characteristics are deference-entitling properties or entitlements. They include: occupation, wealth, education, style of life, kinship, ethnicity, who you know, community service, titles and ranks, etc.
Occupational role is considered to be the most significant entitlement to deference. Here he discusses the center/periphery ideas that the theory selection describes. Occupational roles that are closest to the center are the most deferred to. The centers of society are those positions that exercise power over society as a whole and create and maintain the rules and laws of society. Every occupational role is ranked according to the extent it possesses this power.
Shils argues that the reason he uses the term 'deference' instead of 'status' is because it emphasizes the fact that "status is not a substantial property of the person arising automatically from the possession of certain entitlements but is in fact an element in the relationship between the person deferred to and the deferent person" (pp. 198-199). Acts of deference are judgments of self and other. They exist in the relationships between people, not separately. Acts of def open a sequence of interaction and then they close it. But where does deference go when it is not being expressed in an action? It survives in an intangible form that pervades all sorts of relationships through tone of speech, demeanor, precedence in speaking, frequency and mode of contradiction, etc.
The concept of deference came about in association with the 'objective' conception of stratification. The indicator 'status' was taken to mean a total status including both deference position and entitlements, but constructed by an outside observer. Shils finds this unsatisfactory. Deference, he argues, belongs in the realm of values. It is the result of evaluative judgments regarding positions in the distribution of objective properties. People cannot simply be arranged into a distribution according to the 'amount' of deference they have. Deference is something that people are constantly evaluating, although some people are more concerned about it than others. There is no consensus and if we really want to understand what is going on, we should not use measures that give the appearance that there is such a consensus.
Deference systems tend to become dispersed into local systems, but they are all aware of the center discussed above. "In all societies, the deference system is at its most intense and most continuous at the centre" (pg. 202). There, we find deference institutions which function to add focus and stimulus to deference behavior. Also, within each local system, there are some people who are more in tune with the center and the infuse an awareness of the center into the local system.
So, the deference-strata are formed through the process of mutual assimilation of local deference systems into a national system. These strata are formed through class consciousness. Each strata defines its position and also the position of other strata. Boundary lines are mostly of concern to those who are immediately affected by them. In the national system, the strata are in contact with each other through their presence in each others imagination more than through direct contact. What is important to remember is that the deference system does not have to correlate with any 'objective' distribution of status.
Blau and Duncan - "Measuring the Status of Occupations"
B&D are famous for this measurement and it pops up all over the place in the readings. In this brief piece, they describe two approaches that dominate the study of occupational hierarchies.
1. The attempt to develop a socioeconomic classification scheme for occupations. They refer to Alba Edwards' work on social-economic groupings which led to the Census categories. Basically, this is a scheme based on objective characteristics (like Shils does not like) like education, income, etc.
2. The second approach is the 'prestige' scale in which samples of people are asked to rate the prestige or general standing of occupations. The trouble with this is the small samples sizes and small lists of occupations. B&D say that work in progress in NORC will overcome these problems by supplying prestige ratings for a comprehensive list of occupations.
The socioeconomic index of occupational status is used by B&D in the absence of such comprehensive ratings. In this index, B&D assigned all census occupations scores based on their education and income distributions. The scale ranges from 0 to 96. They have found that this index has a high level of temporal stability and that occupations of very different natures may have similar scores. However, they say that the major occupational group classification (by this I assume they white-collar, blue-collar, and farm, but it doesn't say exactly) account for three-fourths of the variation among detailed occupations.
Finally, they note that they assume that the occupational structure is continuously graded regarding status, rather than consisting of a set of discrete classes. They argue that if we make this assumption, the appropriate analytical model is one that treats status as a quantitative value, as theirs does.
Donald J. Treiman - "Occupational Prestige in Comparative Perspective"
Treiman examines the results of 85 studies of occupational prestige that have been done in more than 60 countries world-wide "in the three decades since World War II". The specific details of these studies vary, but Treiman says that the basic procedure is the same: a sample of the population is asked to rank occupations according to their prestige or social standing. The ratings are aggregated into mean scores which are considered indicators of the relative prestige of the occupations. He observes several significant features of these studies:
1) The results come out the same regardless of the exact wording of the questionnaire. It doesn't matter if the word 'prestige' was used or if the words 'social standing' or 'respect' were used. 2) On average, everyone had the same perception of the prestige hierarchy, from the rich to the poor, the educated and uneducated, urban and rural, young and old. 3) Although the distribution of the labor force varies considerably from one country to the other, the same types of occupations tend to exist everywhere (just different numbers of people have them).
Treiman argues that these three features of the numerous studies make it possible to systematically compare occupational hierarchies among countries, regardless of the different methods and procedures used to attain the data. After measuring the similarity of prestige evaluations between each pair of countries, T. comes to the conclusion that "there is substantial uniformity in occupational evaluations throughout the world" (pg. 209). Therefore, it seems like a good idea to create a standard occupational prestige scale that can be applied to any country. Using the International Standard Classification of Occupations, T. comes up with a prestige scale that he argues is "the best available predictor of the prestige of occupations in any contemporary society" (pg. 209).
Based on this 'universal' classification, T. forms a theory about the determinants of prestige. He argues that: high prestige is given to those occupations that require a high degree of skill or involve authority over others or control over capital. "Skill, authority, and economic control are singled out as the basic resources which differentiate occupations because these are the fundamental aspects of power-they provide the crucial means to the achievement of desired goals" (pg. 210).
The greater the power of an occupation, the easier it will attract competent personnel. Since rewards are the basic mechanism for getting people to do things, it follows that the most powerful positions will also be the most highly rewarded. However, the relationship between power and privilege is not perfect, but the difference is relatively minor. Finally, "not only is the relative power and privilege of occupations essentially similar across societies, but so is the prestige accorded them, for prestige is granted in recognition of power and privilege" (pg. 210).
John Goldthorpe and Keith Hope - "Occupational Grading and Occupational Prestige"
This article is a critical examination of occupational prestige studies. G&H begin with the concept of 'prestige' itself. They say, "prestige can be most usefully understood as referring to a particular form of social advantage and power, associated with the incumbency of a role or membership of a collectivity: specifically, to advantage and power which are of a symbolic, rather than of an economic or political nature" (pg. 212). By advantage and power they mean the ability of a person to exploit meanings and values rather than material resources or position in order to achieve her goals. In a prestige hierarchy, actors defer to their superiors, accept their equals as partners, and derogate their inferiors. Prestige positions are derived from objective attributes of a role or collectivity, but from the way these attributes are culturally perceived and evaluated.
So, occupational prestige follows from this definition of prestige as the chances of deference, acceptance, and derogation associated with incumbency of occupational roles and occupational collectivities. It is related to the objective attributes of the occupation, but only indirectly, in that the attributes carry symbolic significance.
With this understanding of occupational prestige in mind, G&H ask three questions about occupational prestige (OP) research. 1) Is the above described conception of occupational prestige the same as that generally held by authors of these OP studies; 2) whether the results of the studies provide valid indicators of OP as we now understand it; 3) whether the results have been put to appropriate uses.
G&H argue that if prestige in the sense they mean is really being measured in OP studies, then what would have to drawn out is "the symbolic significance of certain features of an occupation with regard to the chances of those engaged in the occupation meeting with deference, acceptance or derogation in their relations with others" (pg. 213). But this does not seem to be what usually happens. Rather, the respondents appear to be assessing occupations by their desirability. This is not sufficient, however. What we need information about is the symbolic criteria that makes an occupation superior or inferior and all the attitudinal and behavioral implications of that judgment. So to return to the three questions: the answers to both 1 and 2 are NO.
What about the uses of occupational prestige ratings? The cross-national comparisons (like Treiman's) and the similarity found have led people to argue that inequality is functional and fits modern society. G&H disagree. The ratings simply rate the desirability of certain jobs over others and therefore the consensus found cannot be used to justify the universality or functionality of the prestige hierarchy. They find previous uses of occupational prestige to support stratification theory to be misguided.
So, what then, do occupational prestige ratings indicate? There are three main positions: 1) ratings may be indicative of the position of an occupation within a prestige order(as the authors conceive of it, involving chances for deference, acceptance, and derogation). This approach implies that mobility involves not simply more resources, but a change in lifestyle and patterns of association. 2) Prestige ratings may be seen as indicative of the generic, or socioeconomic status of occupations as derived from data on income, education, etc. Apparently, in the U.S., income and education can be used to predict prestige ratings fairly accurately. G&H argue that there is no good reason to base mobility research on such a rating. 3) ratings may be taken to be indicative of popular evaluations of the relative 'goodness' of occupations in terms of the whole range of prevailing criteria. G&H argues that, although this approach is rarely taken, it is the grounds from which validity could best be defended.
In closing the authors note: "The general-and rather pessimistic-conclusion to which one is led is, therefore, the following: that to the extent that the meaning of occupational prestige ratings is correctly construed, the less useful they appear to be as a basis for mobility studies which pursue the 'classical' sociological interests of mobility research" (pg. 217).
Featherman and Hauser - "Prestige or Socioeconomic Scales in the Study of Occupational Achievement?"
F&H prefer socioeconomic scales. They find the prestige scale to be less valid indicators of the dimensions of occupations that are relevant to the study of occupational mobility and status attainment processes in industrial societies.
This quote sums it up: "Our provisional conclusion is that prestige scores are 'error prone' estimates of the socioeconomic attributes of occupations. Whatever it is that prestige scores scale- and this does not appear to be prestige in the classical sense of deference/derogation (see Goldthorpe and Hope, 1972)-it is substantively different from socioeconomic status. . .In instances of occupational mobility and related processes of status allocation, socioeconomic dimensions and socioeconomic scores for occupations are the more central, and therefore are preferable over prestige scores" (pg. 220).
Robert W. Hodge - "The Measurement of Occupational Status"
This essay discusses Duncan's SEI scale and problems in its use in occupational mobility studies. First, Hodge presents 3 interpretations of the SEI scale:
1. The first interpretation is based on the technique by which its components were weighted. Since this weighting was based on something called the North-Hatt study, the interpretation is "the expected percentage of excellent plus good ratings an occupation would receive in a prestige inquiry of the North-Hatt type" (pg. 221). This interpretation is problematic for 2 reasons: 1) the prediction equation for the prestige indicator is not satisfactory. It only accounts for 4/5 of the variance. 2) the education and income levels of occupations fail to account for the consensus between raters of different occupations, sex, race, etc. Hodge disagrees with Featherman & Hauser who say the prestige scores are just error-prone indicators of the socioeconomic level of occupations. He argues that the 'errors' appear to be social facts themselves.
2. Since education is typically considered an indicator of 'social status' and income an indicator of 'economic status', Duncan's scale which combines the two is often interpreted as a socioeconomic index of occupational status. This is the most common and appears to be what Duncan intended, although he is somewhat ambiguous about this. Apparently, he wanted an index that was a socioeconomic one, but could be substituted for prestige ratings too. This approach also has its problems: 1) it presumes unidimensionality where there is none. At the individual level, we can see that education have opposite effects and if this occurs at the individual level, we should question the wisdom of combining the two at the aggregate level. 2) An even greater difficulty, though, is the analytical status of the concept of 'socioeconomic' level. Its relationship to well-defined, but poorly measured concepts of stratification theory such as 'class', 'status', and 'power' is vague and imprecise at best.
3. Hodge now offers a third interpretation of the SEI scale: "a linear transformation of the best guess we could make of an the age-standardized percentage of an occupation's male incumbents either with at least a high school diploma or with 1949 incomes of $3500 or more if neither percentage was known" (pg. 224). Although it sounds ridiculous, Hodge argues that it keeps focus on how the SEI index glues education and income together to construct 'socioeconomic status'. In other words, socioeconomic status is simply a concept contrived for convenience, rather than a social fact in Durkheim's sense.
Hodge argues that Duncan's SEI reduces occupation to a contextual variable. This is like an ecological fallacy. Aggregate characteristics are derived from the characteristics of the individual members. The fundamental problem with compositional effects like SEI is that there is no way run an experiment because there are always numerous other factors which can never all be controlled for. Hodge argues that occupation is not inherently a contextual variable, but once occupational information is scored with an index like Duncan's, it becomes a contextual variable. The education component of the index is the most problematic because it is clearly a characteristic of individuals not of jobs.
Hodge says that prestige scores have two advantages over SEI scales: 1) prestige scores are not derived from the characteristics of the incumbents of occupational positions and therefore do not reduce occupation to a contextual variable. 2) Prestige scores flow from a well-defined analytical concept in stratification theory. Hodge argues that its definition should be understood as parallel, bot not identical, to Weber's definition of power, the chance of receiving deference. The benefit of knowing analytically what prestige is enables us to know whether it has been measured correctly. Unfortunately, there is also one disadvantage to prestige scores: whatever the scales of prestige used in empirical studies so far have not performed well relative to the socioeconomic scales. Hodge argues that "whatever socioeconomic scales of occupational status measure more nearly governs the process of intergenerational occupational mobility and the entire process of status attainment than do the occupational differences in prestige scales. This is one very sound reason for preferring the former to the latter, even if one can be less than analytically clear about what it is that socioeconomic scales measure" (pg. 227). He suggests that the poor performance of prestige scales may be a due to their being inferior measures of the underlying analytical concept.
Concluding Commentary to Part III
Aage B. Sorensen - "The Basic Concepts of Stratification Research: Class, Status, and Power"
It is generally agreed upon that class, status, and power are the main variables in stratification research. Weber's essay on "Class, Status, and Party" can be considered the closest thing to a universal required text for sociologists. But little else is agreed upon. There is disagreement over the relative importance of the three variables as well as disagreement over the concepts behind the variables. In this essay, S. attempts to provide some order to the situation. He focuses on class and status and discusses the main distinctions and conceptual properties that dominate the literature. S. notes that to Weber, studies class and status are studies of the bases of power (class and status positions are resources for affecting the action of others). But this is rarely the conception in stratification research. For many sociologists, the choice of study one or the other reflects a choice between basic assumptions about society and/or basic ideological positions.
Basic ideas - S. distinguishes between two concepts of status: the socioeconomic/welfare (SE) concept and the prestige concept. In addition, he describes three concepts of class: a stratum concept of class (which like socioeconomic status, has not theoretical grounding), the market or Weberian concept of class, and the Marxian concept of class (both of which have theories of inequality attached to them). He also reminds us that we must remember to distinguish between positions and the people holding the positions. Structural theories of inequality are concerned with how inequality is created by the relationships between positions (not people). In the rest of the essay, S. tries to show that the basic choice is not simply between class and status, but between concepts that are useful for different research tasks.
Social Status: Welfare or Honor? - Here S. notes that the idea that Weber began the discussion of status groups is weird because Weber never used the word status or status group. His words would best be translated as "estate and honor". S. point is that Weber's ideas are not the source of the concept of SE status used in status attainment research. The true source of this concept is Sorokin who uses a spatial metaphor for society (See first article in Part IV). His status concept (the vertical dimension) has 3 dimensions: economic status, political status, and occupational status. However, Sorokin is much less honored by sociologists than Weber, "so Weber remains the original source of wisdom about status despite the confusion it creates to compare his comments on the topic with the properties of the concept that is most often used in empirical research. This is the concept of socioeconomic status with the properties described by Sorokin" (pg. 231).
S. says that concepts of prestige make more sense as a translation of Weber's actual words. The concepts of Goode and of Shils (see above Shils article "Deference"are similar to the relational concept that Weber described. This concept has more theoretical implications than SE status. Prestige groups should be identified by their practices of exclusion and closure. However, the measurement of prestige and empirical identification of prestige groups are ignored because of the confusion created by the misleading translation of Weber and neglect of Sorokin. Also, empirical research on prestige suffered from loose usages of the concept. The ratings of occupational prestige that have been used do not measure prestige in the sense of honor or deference. Instead, they seem to measure the level of welfare an occupation provides the incumbent. In addition, prestige ratings are the same no matter who is doing the ratings. Both of these suggest that whatever is being measured by these ratings is not a relational concept. Duncan used prestige ratings to create an index of SE status. The problem here is that SE status does not always match prestige ratings.
Class - "In much of modern sociology, class has come to mean nothing more than a homogenous categorical grouping of social positions in contrast to the gradation provided by socioeconomic status" (pg. 232). This is the stratum concept of class. It may be useful in empirical research, but it implies no theory of inequality. The Marxist and Weberian concepts of class, however, are theoretically grounded.
Marxist: S. begins with Marx's own concept, that ownership of the means of production establish the exploitive relationship between the classes. This exploitation takes place in a social relationship regardless of who occupies the relationship. Only by changing the class structure can inequality be changed. So class conflict will produce social change. S. notes two problems with the Marxist concept: 1) it is useless for analyzing inequality and conflict within the labor market. 2) It was based on the labor theory of value which has since been abandoned by everyone.
Weberian: in this approach, classes are people with similar command over economic resources. Market mechanisms are seen as responsible for inequality, not class relations. However, the advantage of some does not always mean the disadvantage of others. "This will only happen when advantage is based on a mechanism of exploitation in the market. Identifying such a mechanism of exploitation is needed for the market concept to be useful in specifying class categories that are conflict groups rather than simply strata" (pg. 234). S. says that Roemer's reformulation of the Marxist exploitation idea is a good starting point (see Erik Olin Wright's discussion of Roemer's ideas on pp. 100-102). Roemer says that defining classes according to absence or amount of property correlates perfectly with amount of exploitation. S. argues that rent-generating assets attached to employment positions must be included in such discussions of exploitation.
Class formation: This approach argues that exploitation does not automatically create the conditions that produce class action. It relies on the theory of collective action. Over time, people with the same class location may realize their common interests and create class movements. This adds an important requirement to the definition of class categories. People in these positions must remain there over time. So, class formation requires both exploitation and permanency.
Employment Relationships and Class Properties of Jobs - In this section, S. discusses the properties of jobs that generate economic rents and stable membership. Jobs are defined by employment relationships. An important characteristic is who has the initiative in terminating the contract. In open employment relationships, the employer has control of termination. In closed employment relationships, the worker has the initiative (see Sorensen and Kalleberg article in Part IV). Open relationships do not satisfy the requirement of permanency needed to create class categories. These types of relationships are what Marx saw as typical in advanced capitalism. In these open relationships, economic rents may be generated, but they are based on ability which is an attribute of individuals not of positions. Closed relationships, on the other hand, do satisfy the permanency requirement. "Furthermore, closed employment creates the positions that have the potential of providing advantages that may be obtained independently of the productivity of persons. However, only when the resulting job rewards systematically differ from the competitive wage over some period of time will these properties be class properties" (pg. 237).
Before concluding, S. briefly discusses classes in internal labor markets. He says that the uses of authority and the use of incentives are properties of closed relationships that are solutions to the employer's problem of matching wage rates and productivity in the absence of competition. Both solutions have also been used to justify the emergence of class categories within the labor market. S. presents a proposal to use authority and incentive structures to define class categories in the labor market. Basically, authority relations are an inherent part of the employment relationship. But it is difficult to come up with a convincing theory for why those with authority have higher wages without the use of an incentive argument. Closed employment relationships are immune to market competition, so how do we keep people productive? Two solutions to the incentive problem are suggested: the efficiency wage (paying above market wages creates an incentive for high performance), and promotion systems in internal labor markets.
In conclusion, S. reiterates his argument: "the choice of basic concepts in stratification research is a question of balancing theoretical power and specificity with empirical requirements of concepts" (pg. 238). The Marxist class concept is the most powerful, but it is the most unsatisfactory for analyzing inequality and conflict among the majority of the population of modern industrialized societies. The stratum concept is the easiest to operationalize, but it is also the least informative about the causes and consequences of inequality. We are not required to pledge our allegiance to one concept over all the rest, which some seem to do. What we should do is choose our concepts based on what we want to study. Each understanding of each concept has different implications. We must treat these basic concepts as tools that are useful for some purposes but not for all purposes.