Schumpeter: A More "Realistic" Conception of Democracy

S.'s Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, from which these selections are drawn, is a meditation, among other things, the relationship of democracy to socialism. Are they necessarily incompatible? Marxist doctrine and the experience of socialist regimes suggest that they may be. But before any conclusion can be drawn, S. asserts, we must methodically define democracy.

S. begins by stressing the fact that democracy is not an end in itself (it does not guarantee the liberty, justice, or decent, compassionate government) it is merely a means, a political method, a "certain type of institutional arrangement for arriving at political-legislative and administrative decisions" (269). With this he strikes a rather cynical tone, one that permeates the piece and which would have been in stark contrast to the democratic boosterism that was rampant in Britain and the U.S. in the early years of WWII when S. was writing.

Is it accurate to characterize democracy as the rule of the people? S. problematizes this conception by identifying the ambiguity of the terms "people" and "rule". He notes that in no country, even that with the greatest democratic pretensions, is every individual permitted to vote, much less actively participate in political decision-making. Every nation draws the line in a different place, identifying various populations-children below a certain age, felons, the mentally ill-that are denied suffrage. As to ruling, it is technically unfeasible for the populace to be involved in every decision that is made within the political realm. Some have proposed "government approved by the people" as a more apt characterization of the democratic process. But this is also rather vague in that it could also encompass even the most brutal dictatorship which enjoys the enthusiastic allegiance of the people. Between this and direct democracy, which no nation practices, there "lies an infinite wealth of possible forms in which the "people" may partake in the business of ruling or influence control those who actually do the ruling" (247). Thus we are back where we started, with the question of What sets democracy apart from other forms of governance? What makes democracy democracy?

S. notes that despite its inadequacy this notion of democracy the Rule by the People has endured. It was reinforced in the legal theories of democracy that evolved in the 17th and 18th centuries which served to link existing governmental forms to just this ideology which S. portrays as having served to fill the void left when monarchical and charismatic authority began to be discredited. This notion was compatible with and reinforced by the revival of Greek political thought in the late 18th century, culminating in the rationalist, individualist, and hedonist (in S.'s estimation) thought of Utilitarianism. The message at the base of the political thought of these "Philosophical Radicals" educate the masses and let them vote.

S. emphasizes that there have been innumerable critiques of this formulation of democracy the more complete, which he terms the Classic Doctrine of Democracy, the most significant of which was Romanticism. S. offers an interesting critique of his own. He observes that the "political will" of the populace can be seen not as the motive process of the political process, but as a product thereof. He stresses the way in which political figures fashion and even create wholesale the will of the people just as the advertising establishment creates a market for products. He notes the way in which information about the nations affairs is "almost always adulterated and selective and that effective reasoning in politics consists mainly in trying to exalt certain positions into axioms and to put others out of court" (264). This analysis is very much in keeping with that of more contemporary theorists who emphasize the way in which the framing of issues by politicians and the media influence popular perception and political behavior. But S. notes, more than a little ruefully, that the more numerous and sophisticated these critiques become the more completely the ideology of Rule by the People has come to "dominate official phraseology and the rhetoric of the politician" (249).

To what does the Classic Doctrine owe its longevity? S. attributes the ideology's continuing credibility to a number of factors ranging from its congruence with protestant Christianity to the fact that the Doctrine does fit with a decent degree of approximation certain social patterns. But S. seeks to offer an alternative conception of democracy that better describes the reality of democratic processes.

S. accomplishes this by employing a somewhat Feuerbachian strategy. Just as Marx used Feuerbach's transformative criticism to stand Hegelian idealism on its head (reversing the causal order, portraying humans not as the product of consciousness but as the producers thereof), S. suggests we take the Classical Doctrine, which sublimates the selection of representatives to the supposed primary purpose of democracy which is to vest the power of deciding political issues and reverse the order of these elements, making the deciding of issues secondary to the election of those who are actually to do the deciding. In this way he arrives at the following definition: the "democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote" (269).

S. notes several advantages of this conception. In general, it allows us to account for key elements of democratic systems that could not be explained by the Classic Doctrine. These include:

The role of leadership: S. observes that the Classic Doctrine attributed an altogether unrealistic degree of political initiative to the general populace that permitted us from examining the role of political figures. They can't exist in that supposedly the people themselves are the decision makers. The concept of manufactured will, outlined above, is no longer outside the theory-"an aberration for the absence of which we piteously pray" but is instead one of its foundations.

Monopoly of major parties/fraud: The incorporation of the term "competition" allows us to account for the fact that voters choices are constrained and for the seedier side of the electoral process. For just as "competition" in the economic sphere is acknowledged to never entirely lacking but never entirely perfect, political competition can be seen as ruling out certain means of obtaining power, like a military coup, but allowing for the wide range of practices that we commonly refer to as unfair (the many obstacles, including the vast financial resources or a required number of petition signatures, to third parties making their way on to the ballot) or fraudulent (ballot box stuffing, etc.).

Thus S. seeks to offers us a de-romanticized, non-idealized conception of democracy that better captures the reality, but at the same time, the distinctiveness of the political form. For S. the primary function of the elector's vote is not to decide the nation's course or future, but rather to produce government. This alternate conception of democracy then forces us to reconceptualize parties. They are no longer, as classical doctrine would have it, a group of individuals who intend to promote public welfare "upon some principle on which they are all agreed" (Burke). They are instead "a group whose members propose to act in concert in the competitive struggle for political power" (283). They are to political competition what a trade association is to economic competition. They constitute an attempt to regulate political competition.