Problematizing Collective Action: Olson

Olson's groundbreaking work, the thrust of which is almost intuitive to modern students of politics and social movements, explores the nature and dynamics of collective action the essence of political activity. He laid the foundation for a voluminous literature addressing the barriers to effective collective mobilization.

I turn to Marwell & Oliver for help in placing Olson's work in its intellectual context. The former, though they are critical of some of Olson's theorizing and emphasize that his was not the first or the final word on the subject, still concede that

"the importance of Olson's argument to the history of social science cannot be underestimated. Before Olson, almost all social scientists assumed that people would instinctively or naturally act on common interests, and that inaction needed to be explained. After Olson, most social scientists treat collective action as problematic" (Marwell & Oliver, Critical Mass and Collective Action, p. 6).

Popular conceptions of the import of Olson's work abound. Though often credited with arguing or providing that individuals participate in collective action out of self interest, he in fact asserts that self-interest will prevent individuals from participating in collective action (his argument as to why this is the case will be detailed below). In Olson's words "The view that groups act to serve their interests presumably is based on the assumption that the individuals in groups act our of self-interest, in other words if the members of some group have a common interest or objective, and if they would all be better off it that objective were achieved, it has been thought to follow logically that that the individuals in that groups would, if they were rational and self-interested, act to achieve that objectiveÅc but it is not in fact rue that the idea that groups will act in their own interest follows logical from the premise of rational and self-interested behaviorÅcIndeed, unless the number of individuals in a group is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in their common interest, rational self-interest individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests" (1-2).

You'll note that unlike other analysts who have emphasized the role of solidarity and/or altruism as motivations for participation, Mancur, being an economist, focuses on the role of incentives and, secondarily coercion, in drawing individuals into collective action.

But why isn't it rational for an actor to participate in large-scale collective action? Group size is a key factor. You'll note that above that Olson makes an exception for small groups. In this respect his analysis is Simmelian. He actually alludes to Simmel and his emphasis on the influence of group size on the nature of interaction. But there are other considerations. M & O provide an illustrative example:

"For each individual member, the group and its needs are usually only part of his (sic) life. He has a broader array of interest that he is attempting to realize through his activities. For any specific activity, his interests may or may not coincide with the interests of the group; in fact we have reason to suppose that they frequently do not. For the people of a city, taken as a whole, the expenditure of $10,000 for a park might bring $40,000 worth of pleasure and be completely "rational". For Sam Citizen, the $10 he is asked to contribute for a park that he would enjoy once in a while might bring much more pleasure if spent on an evening at the movies or on his children's clothes. Besides he will get to use the park in any case" (5).

There are two key elements at work here:

Group size (as alluded to above): Larger group size tends to discourage individual participation in several ways. It simultaneously reduces the benefit that will accrue to any one member (Sam will have to share the park with thousands of other city residents) and increases the cost (with large group size organizational costs increase rapidly). He's getting less return at a higher cost. Secondly, the large group size, means that non-participation involves no social cost. Whereas in a small group, one would be risking social censure and possibly retaliation, in the case of the park, Sam's neighbors probably don't know where he stands on the issue and aren't in a position to do much even if they knew and disagreed with his position. In his Insurgent Identities, Gould identifies the role of social networks and sheer density (which allowed greater monitoring of behavior) in pressing recalcitrant Parisians into the service of the revolutionary cause.

Inclusive Versus Exclusive Groups: Most large collective actions are geared toward achieving goods that will benefit a community or society as a whole. Whereas in market situations, firms may limit the enjoyment of the good to those firms that actively participate in obtaining it, with most collective action is it impossible or undesirable to keep others who meet certain objective criteria (living close enough to the site of the proposed park or say in the case of the lobbying action of a group like the AARP, people who are old enough to qualify for the Federal programs the organization seeks to protect and expand, like Medicare and Social Security) from benefiting. Thus an individual will enjoy the benefits of the groups efforts whether he participates in their activities (in the Sam's case, coughing up $10 bucks) or not. If we assume, as an economic model does, that individuals are seeking to maximize their utility (get as much as they can for as little as possible) it would be senseless for an individual to participate in collective action. Why should Sam incur the $10 dollar cost when he can reap the benefits at no cost to him?

Sam is the consummate "free rider", the thorn in every social movement's side. How is Sam eventually enticed to participate? As mentioned above, Olson stresses the role of selective incentives. These serve as a way of introducing a certain exclusivity, and making participation attractive to hold-outs like Sam. Think of the Sierra Club calendar you get for joining the organization or the inevitably canvas tote bag that public television hawks during its seemingly interminable pledge drives.

An example from my checkered career as a public servant is a good illustration. Every Federal employee in a non-management position had the option of joining the Federal workers' union. Few of those who entered the agency when I did actually joined. Why should they have? They benefited from the collective bargaining agreements even if they weren't members of the union. Management was so terrified of the union that there had developed a culture of virtual non-accountability, one had little fear of being fired whether or not they were actually members of the union. Why did I ultimately join? Well, despite Olson's silence on the subject of ideology, I was motivated by a rather romantic belief in the importance of unions. But I also responded to the wide array of benefits that the union provided dues paying members. If I had not joined I still would have enjoyed a living wage, flextime, and job security, all products of union activity. But I would not have had access to the low-interest loans, free legal advice, supplemental dental, and those luscious deli platters at the monthly union meetings.

Though Olson also alludes to coercion as a means of compelling individuals to engage in collective action, his focus is really on the power of these selective incentives. Ironically though, it is the cost of providing such incentives that serves to drive up the organizational costs which reduce individual returns and ultimately discourage participation. Thus groups face the tricky business of striking just the right level of incentives, sufficient to foster participation, but not so high that the cost/benefit ratio of collective action becomes unacceptably high to would-be converts.