Ain't We An Odd Bunch: Lipset and American Exceptionalism

Introduction, Chapters 1 & 2

Lipset argues that though over the last several decades the U.S. and other Western democracies have all undergone similar processes of urbanization, democratization, and industrialization, there continue to be significant differences between American and European society. The U.S. is still profoundly unlike these other nations on a variety of parameters. Lipset is careful to avoid the assertion of American superiority that characterized many past accounts of the country's social and political singularity. He stresses that the U.S. is an "outlier", the best or the worst, depending on the criterion being considered.

Lipset observes that his work is merely the most recent in a long line exploring the exceptional quality of the U.S. political and social orders. It is a tradition that dates back to Edmund Burke and his observation that the colonists were different culturally, they were not simply transplanted Englishmen. The exceptionalist theme was very much apart of extensive "foreign-traveler literature" to which Tocqueville was one of the first and most significant contributors. Others include Harriet Martineau (responsible for a supposedly stunning comparison with the British situation) and of course the ubiquitous Marx & Engels who were the first of many to apply the term in the context of attempting to explain the virtual absence of working class radicalism in the U.S. But Lipset is using the term more broadly, to examine the many respects in which the U.S. stands apart (for better or for worse) from its Western European counterparts.

Ideology

Lipset notes that the U.S. is exceptional in having started from an revolutionary event. It was the "first new nation" the first colony, other than Iceland, to become independent. It has defined itself ideologically. Lipset quotes historian Richard Hofstadter who observed "It has been our fate as a nation not to have ideologies but to be one" (18). In contrast, most other nations, with the possible exception of the former Soviet Union, define themselves by a common history, as birthright communities. This ideological character of American identity has interesting, if frightening, implications. In that being American is an ideological commitment, to challenge this ideology is to risk being labeled un-American and denied one's basic rights, as communists and communist sympathizers found in the 1950's. Lipset characterizes this ideology, the American Creed, as being comprised of five key concepts: liberty, egalitarianism, individualism, populism, and laissez-faire.

The U.S. is seen by many of its own as the great conservative society, but it may also be seen as the most "classically liberal polity in the developed world" (35). This discontinuity flows from the differing conceptions of liberalism and conservatism. What those in the U.S. term conservatism is know to Europe as liberalism, anti-statism and a belief in the virtue of laissez-faire. Conservatism as it is known outside the U.S. derives from the alliance of the church and state and is associated with the emergence of the welfare state and is markedly absent from the U.S. tradition in that the nation is a child of the age of progress, being born well after the heyday of the organic conservatism of Burke, et al.

This said, Lipset acknowledges that the Creed, at least in its political manifestations, has changed since the 1930s. The Depression period introduced a social democratic tinge to the U.S. for the first time in its history. Government emerged as a strong regulatory actor. Lipset characterizes the effect of the Depression as a moderate Europeanization of politics and the labor movement, which, up until that time, had been stridently anti-statist. But with post-WWII prosperity, the nation saw a reversion to laissez-faire, a revival of classical liberalism (in the European sense), culminating in the Reagan administration.

Politics

As indicated above the U.S. is by far the most anti-statist of the Western democracies, exhibiting, relative to European nations, a virtual "statelessness". The United States has far lower rates of taxation, a less developed welfare state (more about that later) and many fewer government owned businesses that other industrialized nations. No other elected national government is as limited in its powers. This weakness of the state combined with the emphasis on individual rights explains, for Lipset, Americans' extreme litigiousness of Lipset asserts that it is the legal stratum, rather than the state, that has been instrument of social change in the U.S.

The American separation of powers also fosters behavior that is almost unheard of within European parliamentary systems and that is the voting by members of Congress with their constituents against their party or their president. As a result the presidency tends to be a far weaker office that a prime minister. Lipset notes that American presidents control foreign policy but have difficulty getting much done on the domestic front.

In the U.S., as compared with Europe, there are far more government offices, particularly in law enforcement on the state and local level, chosen by voters or appointed by elected officials and elections are held far more often. Proposed laws, bond issues and constitutional amendments are submitted to popular votes and the right to propose legislation through petition is frequently exercised. Both are almost unheard of elsewhere. Ironically it is this high degree of populism, argues Lipset, that is responsible for the U.S.' notoriously low voter turnout. The fact that folks are summoned to the polls so darn often, along with the mudslinging and character assassinations that flow from the fact that elections center on individuals rather than parties, all discourage participation.

Crime & Deviance

In short, there's lots. Rates for all categories of crime are approximately three times higher in the U.S. that in other developed nations, and the gap is growing. Lipset doesn't explore how this may be the product of American racism or moralism, or the sort of "moral entrepreneurship" that Becker describes. He looks to the work of Merton, with its emphasis on the pressures generated by the interplay of Americans' basic values (individualism and material success) and the fact of sharp social stratification and discrimination, for answers. He also looks to the emphasis on the rights of the accused as another contributor to the nation's high crime rates.

Under the heading of crime and deviance, Lipset, rather tellingly, includes a discussion of divorce and out-of-wedlock birth rates. American divorce rates are by far the highest among "advanced societies". By way of explanation, Lipset turns to the work of Bellah who note the importance of "self-fulfillment" and "expressive individualism" as part of the American value system. Teenage pregnancy rates are also higher in the U.S. than elsewhere, but interestingly, the likelihood that a young person will marry to legitimize the birth is far greater in the U.S. than in Europe or Canada, a function, Lipset speculates, of Americans' greater religiosity (a phenomenon that will be addressed below).

Economy

Lipset notes the emphasis on meritocracy, as is reflected in the incredible socioeconomic diversity of the U.S. educational system relative to European nations. The U.S. economic system has always been characterized by more market freedom, more individual landownership, and a higher wage income structure (people tend to keep more of what they make) than Europe nations. In sum "from the Revolution on, [the U.S.] was the laissez-faire country par excellence" (54). It has also been far more materialist, work and ambition, eschewed by the European aristocratic tradition as vulgar and immoral, being viewed as the very trademark of the moral person.

Lipset also goes to great lengths to characterize recent claims of the U.S. economic decline as greatly exaggerated. His reading of economic data leads him to assert that the U.S. remains one of the richest and most productive nations in the world. He also notes though, but makes no connection between the two phenomena, that while the European work week continues to shrink, U.S. workers are spending more and more time in the workplace and continue to make far lower wages.

Religion

American religious traditions which have tended to be dissident, sectarian, focused challenging the hierarchy of the traditional faiths, have served to reinforce, and have in turned been reinforced by, the nation's traditions of political and economic individualism and egalitarianism.

Moving away from qualitative assessments for a moment, U.S. religiosity differs from that of Europeans in terms of it's prevalence and intensity, as well. Americans attend church more often and place a higher importance on religion in their lives compared with Western Europe as a whole.

Dissenting sectarianism has also given rise to a degree of moral absolutism among Americans that is unrivaled. In opinion polls, Americans are far more likely to agree with the statement "There are absolutely clear guidelines about what is good and evil. These apply to everyone, whatever the circumstances" where as Europeans were more likely to agree with the statement " There can never be absolutely clear guidelines about what is good and evil. What is good and evil depends entirely on upon the circumstances of our time".

This belief has had implications for the U.S. approaches to foreign policy. It produces the tendency of the U.S. to utterly demonize its enemies and insist on unconditional surrender in various conflicts. It also explains the U.S. response to communism. Unlike many other countries, the U.S. is loath to acknowledge that it is merely defending its national interests. All international conflicts are inevitably framed as a battle between good and evil.

Welfare

The rejection of a powerful central state and church establishment has had two major implications with regard to social welfare: minimal investment in social programs and a high commitment to private philanthropic activity. Americans give far more to charity than the citizenry of any other Western nation. The high level of corporate giving is a reflection of an entrenched belief that commerce should go hand in hand with philanthropy, if only out of self-interest. Lipset quotes corporate magnate James Buchanan Duke who explained his concern for the expansion of health facilities in the following way: "People ought to be healthy. If they ain't healthy, they can't work . . . and if they can't work there's no profit in them" (69).

As far as the U.S. social welfare state, suffice it to say that relative to Western Europe, the U.S. has few social programs and what programs it has were introduced far later and involve relatively minimal investment. Americans have never been keen on redistributive strategies, even during periods of great economic distress, like the Great Depression. As a result, the U.S. is one of the most unequal industrialized nations in terms of wealth. We have the highest poverty rate (in terms of income) in the world. But at the same time we have the greatest mobility into the elites. Can you say polarization?

Chapter 6

In these pages Lipset chronicles the evolution of political sentiment among American intellectuals. Lipset's title for this chapter "American Intellectuals-Most on the Left, Some Politically Incorrect" really says it all.

He begins by noting that intellectuals are the only occupational stratum in American society in which radical leftist doctrines have made significant headway. They also differ from the general population in that they are more likely to be agnostics or atheists. In general, American intellectual arenas have been centers of opposition, comprising an "adversary culture" (178), in contrast to European intellectuals who, even with a leftist orientation, tended to find themselves at the center rather than the periphery of society. Lipset sites various explanations ranging from pure self-selection to the nature of academic work itself. Though Marxism is alive and well in the American academy in the 90's, Lipset notes somewhat disdainfully (he claims the European and Japanese intellectual establishments have all but abandoned Marxism), leftist sentiment and activity within American academe reached its height in the 1960s. With the arrival of the Vietnam war though a split that had existed within the Academic left since the 1930's, that between communist sympathizers and opponents, intensified and resulted in the emergence of a camp which defined itself as Neo-Conservative.

Lipset explains that though the term neo-conservative has become interchangeable with social conservative it was employed initially by the likes of Michael Harrington and other influential American academics to describe a political orientation that was leftist in its liberalism and emphasis on the role of government in providing a social safety net, but which objected to communism as institutionalized in the Soviet Regime. These thinkers were courted by both of the major political parties, and though some joined the Republican camp, most threw their lot in with the Democrats, many supporting McGovern, who proved to be a stunning disappointment. Though many sought posts within the Carter administration, only a few were appointed and to minor posts. Lipset reports that by 1980 many of the anti-communist leftist had become deeply disenchanted with Carter, as a result of their marginalization and frustration with what they saw as Carter's softness when it came to foreign policy. Recognizing the neo-conservatives' discontent, the Republican party actively courted these intellectuals. But it was an unhappy marriage in that though neo-cons shared the Republicans commitment to meritocracy and suspicion of affirmative action, the former were far more liberal than the average Republican when it came to social policy. They did not share the Republican Party's disdain for the New Deal or its enthusiasm for Jeffersonian individualism.

The dislike was mutual. More rightist Repubs like Patrick Buchanan launched a wholesale attack on the neo-cons and their endorsement of "big government". Thus neo-conservatives became an intellectual camp without a political home. Lipset concludes with the observation that neo-conservatism has "basically ceased to exist. The "term lost its meaning as commentators applied it beyond its original application to strongly anti-communist leftists" (200). Those thinkers to whom the term was originally applied have opted for more eclectic self-characterizations. Lipset sites Daniel Bell as an example. Bell characterizes the political views of people like himself by saying "I am a socialist in economics, a liberal in politics, and a conservative in culture" (199).

Lipset concludes the chapter with a priggish and mercifully short account of growing intolerance among American leftist intellectuals, the supposed scourge that has come to be known as "political correctness".