Don't Count Them Out: Klingemann on Parties

Recent analysis within political sociology and other disciplines has stressed a supposed crisis within representative democracy. Parties are seen as "no longer functioning as agents selecting and aggregating citizens' demands" (1).

On the basis of an empirical study in which he examined the congruence between party platforms and subsequent government policy decision, Klingemann concludes that parties' formal election programs are far more important in the electoral and governing processes of representative democracy that either experts or lay people believe. Basically he finds beneath the chaos of electoral politics that there tends to be greater congruence between policy and the winning parties' programs than between policy and losers' programs.

The above analysis is actually described in detail in a latter section of the chapter. The chunk we were asked to read deals primarily with trends within both party programs and public policy between 1940 and 1950. K finds very similar trends across ten nations over this period.

Party Program Trends

Contra Downs, parties have tended to keep their ideological distance, at least the leading parties. He finds little evidence of "power hungry clustering around the median at the risk of loss of ideological identity" (246). There is also little evidence of "center-fleeing", the tendency to take up extreme positions, either. The rule seems to be flexibility, but not at the expense of ideological identity.

The Right has demonstrated more flexibility (less rigid commitment to principle) than the Left. The fact that the Right's essential orientation is toward preserving that which is, as opposed to pursuing a utopian goal, gives it more room to maneuver.

Leftist parties tend to tilt a tad more rightward over time. But Klingemann sees this not as an abandonment of principle but more a recognition of general success in building the welfare state.

Policy Trends

Nine out of 10 nations show a steady movement of policy leftward between 1950 and 1970. Thought he common perception is that defense spending rose steadily up until the fall of Communism, most nations demobilized almost immediately after WWII. Defense spending in fact reached its apogee in the early 1950's, with defense's share declining thereafter in favor of domestic projects-first infrastructural modernization and then commitment to services and redistributive programs.

In the 1970's there occurred a leveling or at least a reduction in the leftward slope which denotes the completion (if not the success, Klingemann adds) of the welfare state. But there is no evidence of a reversal or a reversion to the right. Policy is in somewhat of a holding pattern. He notes this "hesitation" has been lasting and non-partisan, with even Leftist governments acknowledging that "the drive toward entitlements and away from defense and infrastructure was not to be permanent" (253).