Protest/The New and Old Politics: Dalton

Chapter 4: Protest Politics

Dalton defines protest as a "direct-action technique of confronting political elites, instead of participating within a framework defined by elites" (59). This particularly demanding participation mode is by no means a new component of Western democracies and, despite the expectations of many observers that protest politics would fade with spreading affluence, has apparently increased in recent years (a rise attributable to the fact that small demonstrations over fairly modest issues are far more common). In fact cross-national comparisons reveal that protest levels are actually higher in more affluent nations. The fact that in these nations levels participation in moderate forms of unconventional politics are now as high as those of activity in more conventional forms has prompted some to assert that protest has become a regular form of political action in advanced industrial societies.

This regularization has three dimensions. First of all, protest, formerly the purview of the disadvantaged, is now embraced by the affluent and well-educated. Secondly, modern protest tends to be planned and well-organized activity. Lastly, protest is largely reformist, rather than revolutionary in character. The objective of protest is rarely the overthrow of the existing social or political order since the well-educated and financially comfortable protest participants are usually the beneficiaries of this order. There has also been a degree of institutionalization, groups like citizens lobbies and environmental groups provide a base for organization of future protest. Protestors employ the same tactics whether the issue is mundane (a proposed zoning change) or fundamental (nuclear disarmament). All told, "protest has become less unconventional; it is a continuation of conventional political participation by other means" (63).

Why do citizens protest? Two explanatory models dominate:

Model Key Elements

Deprivation ÅE Protest is primarily based on feelings of frustration and political alienation

ÅE Suggests that unconventional political activity should be more common among lower-status individuals, minorities, and other groups who have reasons to feel deprived or dissatisfied

Resource ÅE In contrast to the deprivation model which implies that protest is an irrational or deviant act, this model sees protest as a normal part of the political process

ÅE Protest just another political resource that a group may pursue in achieving its goals-protest becomes just another participation mode

ÅE Predicts that use of protest will be higher among more politically sophisticated individuals whether or not they are politically dissatisfied

Empirical evidence supports the resource model. Those who protest are only slightly more likely to be politically dissatisfied than those who don't and as was mentioned above the educated and affluent are well represented among protestors. But at the same time it may be going to far in asserting that protest is like any other form of political involvement. Whereas individuals tend to become more involved in conventional political activity as they grow older, protest is very much a young wo/man's game. Age is the strongest single predictor of protest activity in the four nations Dalton examines.

Chapter 7: Parties and Party Systems

General Comments on Political Parties in Western Democracies

Though protest politics are on the rise, the electoral connection, one facilitated/mediated by political parties is still the primary basis of citizen influence in representative democracies. As U.S. citizens it is difficult to fully appreciate this, for parties, while important, are less dominant than in other nations. Candidates in most European nations are selected by the parties and elected as party representatives, not as individuals and a large proportion of Europeans still vote the party slate. Open primaries are virtually unheard of outside the U.S.

Dalton, citing Lipset & Rokkan (see "Parties" write-ups), emphasizes that major modern political cleavages (and thus party alignments) reflect the consequences of two successive revolutions in the modernization of Western societies:

ÅE The National Revolution: the process of nation building that transformed the map of Europe in the 18th and 19th centuries. This revolution resulted in two types of cleavages that are still very much a part of the political landscape-

1. Center/periphery: the cleavage pitting the dominant national culture against resisting ethnic, linguistic or religious minorities

2. Church/state cleavage: the original split was between the state (and its Protestant allies) and the Catholic church which sought to preserve its corporate privileges

ÅE The Industrial Revolution: this also resulted in two cleavages, the land/industry and that between owners and workers.

Dalton stresses, using the words of Lipset & Rokkan, that "the party systems of the 1960's reflect, with but a few significant exceptions, the cleavage structures of the 1920's" (131).

But just as this sentiment began to achieve currency among political analysts party systems began to experience dramatic change. The traditional parties were faced by growing demands from an increasingly democratized citizenry. As the Offe piece emphasizes, a wide range of new issues were on the table, from women's rights to nuclear weapons. The unresponsiveness of parties to these interests has compelled citizens to form new parties. Conservative disgust with what was perceived as a kowtowing of the traditional parties to these "radical interests" resulted in the emergence of conservative alternative parties.

Some analysts like Bell and Inglehart claim we are witnessing a permanent restructuring, third revolution Bell coins post-industrialist, Inglehart post-materialist. Dalton only goes so far as to assert that party systems are certainly in a state of flux and only time will reveal the significance of these trends.

The Structure of Political Alignments

Dalton characterizes the party system as possessing two cross-cutting dimensions (please see attached diagrams which describes the U.S. case). The first of these he terms the Old Politics cleavage which is based on the conflict between Old Left, identified with the working class and labor unions, and the Old Right, synonymous with business interests and the middle class (in some nations this conservative coalition includes religious and rural voters). Second, newer dimension of cleavage he terms New Politics. The conflict here is over a new set of issues. These are those identified by Offe which center around quality of life and values and include issues of environmental quality, alternative life styles, minority rights, and social equality. Offe's "new social movements" Dalton terms the New Left. Those who take a circumspect view of these demands he labels the New Right.

Dalton observes that though the Old Politics cleavage is likely to remain the primary basis of partisan conflict in most Western countries for the immediate future, the New Politics is having a significant impact on the traditional alignments. We have seen some unprecedented alliances as of late, like that between business interests and unions against the opponents of nuclear energy. In the U.S. case though up until 1974 parties were primarily based on the Old Politics cleavage, with Reagan we saw New Politics at work. He managed to win by uniting economic (Old Right) and social conservatives (New Right).

Dalton's reading of the empirical evidence is that that in the U.S., at least, there is increasing overlap between the New and Old Dimensions. But there is clearly strain within parties, as evidenced by the ongoing squabbling within the Republican Party over issues like abortion.