Inequality and Democracy: Dahl
Dahl seeks to answer the question, In a democratic society, but one marked by sharp economic and social inequality, who actually rules? How does democracy operate work amid inequality of resources? He notes that there is wide range of opinion on the subject, ranging from those who extol the continuing viability of political parties which do succeed in representing citizens' interests (Klingemann, in this section) to that of Hunter (see Urban) with his view of power as concentrated in the hands of a small, cohesive groups of economic elites. Dahl stakes out a middle ground, portraying some actors as having greater influence on the workings of government, but others having an important indirect influence, one that is underappreciated by political analysts in that it is comparatively difficult to observe and measure. He also sees the relationship between citizens and leaders as essentially reciprocal in that leaders influence the decisions of constituents (recall Schumpeter's "manufactured" will) but that the decisions of leaders are also determined, at least in part, by the preferences of their constituents. This mutual conditioning he terms the fundamental "ambiguity of leadership".
Dahl notes that the majority of citizens are uninvolved in politics beyond voting in major elections. Homo civicus, as he terms this apolitical stratum, has an awareness of a variety of strategies she has at her disposal to achieve her goals. One of them is to make a contribution to a political campaign or participate in the political process in some other capacity. But because the political process seems rather remote from the main focus of his life (a condition whose genesis and implications Dahl leaves unexplored) and represents a rather indirect means of attain her desired ends, she opts channel her energy instead into her job, her relationships, and her home, thereby opting for more concrete and immediate ways of coping with an uncertain future. When the action of government directly threatens her interests she is compelled to join with others who have similarly much to lose in political action, but once the danger has passed, she immediately reverts to political inactivity, a tendency that Marx identifies as fundamental, and fundamentally revolting, to bourgeois society. Pursuit of individual interest punctuated by hiccups of political consciousness and activity.
In contrast, those of the political stratum, are individuals to whom politics are highly salient. Dahl contrasts the political and apolitical strata along several dimensions, summarized in the table below:
Political Apolitical
Calculating in their political behavior More strongly influenced by habit, emotions, transient impulses, and unexamined loyalties
Political attitudes have a relatively high degree of internal consistency Political orientations tend to be more disorganized, disconnected, and unideological
Possess extensive knowledge of policy and issues Relatively uniformed
Active participation in politics-politics as vocation Relatively inactive-where involved it is an avocation
Posses a sometimes extraordinary degree of direct influence
Less direct, but significant indirect influence
Issues can only make their way to the political table if taken up by a member of the political stratum. Dahl insists, based on his study of the political past and present of New Haven CT, that the political stratum, contrary to accounts like those of Hunter, is relatively open and can not be described as cohesive in that it is marked by many cleavages. The penetrability of the political stratum is a function of the democratic nature of the U.S. political system: "elections and political parties give politicians a powerful motive for expanding their coalitions and increasing their electoral following" (91). This high degree of penetrability, coupled with the heterogeneity among various segments of the political stratum, ensures that virtually any constituency will find a spokesperson, though effective political action is by no means guaranteed in that politicians will only pursue those issues that will prove politically profitable.
Dahl also stresses the fact that this political stratum is comprised of leaders, but also an army of subleaders upon which those at the top depend for a variety of services, from formulating policies to getting supporters to the polls on election day. These subleaders of course must be rewarded, either monetarily or by the bestowal of political positions. In order to subsidize these rewards leaders must look outside the political stratum to Homo civicus, from who they seek either direct contributions, in the form of cash, or indirect contributions, in the form of votes. Leaders will also shape their policies to ensure an adequate flow of rewards to this subordinate but vitally necessary substratum. This need to reward subleaders can result in conflicts between leader's overt policies, which are designed to win support from constituents, and covert policies, which are shaped to win/keep the support of the subleaders on which they so depend. But Dahl reassures us that the keener the competition among candidates the more likely these conflicts will be resolved in favor of overt commitments.
Political Resources
Dahl emphasizes that to understand the U.S. political system it must be recognizes that there are a wide variety of political resources available to citizens:
". . . all too often, attempts to explain the distribution and patterns of influence in political systems begin with an a priori assumption that everything can be explained by reference to only one kid of resource. On the contrary, the various manifestations of influence in New Haven described in earlier chapters can be explained, as we shall see, only by taking into account a number of different political resources" (227).
Dahl defines "resource" as anything that can be used to sway the specific choices or the strategies of another individual. Thus we must look beyond simply financial resources to such elements as social esteem, control over information, charisma, the rights pertaining to public office, ability to evoke support on the basis on ones religious/ethnic status, suffrage, education, and even one's energy level. He notes that the political systems of older American cities have evolved from a state of a high degree of concentration of resource to one in which they are highly dispersed. This dispersion is not equality though, it is more aptly described as fragmentation. He identifies six key attributes of this modern system of "dispersed inequality":
1. As stressed above, many different kinds of resources for influencing public officials are available to different citizens
2. With few exceptions these resources are unequally distributed
3. Individuals best off in their access to one kind of resource are often badly off with respect to many other resources
4. No one influence resource dominates all the other in all or even in most key decisions (it ain't only about dollars)
5. With some exceptions, an influence resource is effective in some issue-areas or in some specific decisions but not in all
6. Virtually no one, and certainly no group of more than a few individuals, is entirely lacking in some influence resources
But it's not as simple as more resources = more influence. All the elements listed above must be thought of as potential resources. Actual influence is determined by a variety of factors including:
ÅE The level at which resources are brought to bear
ÅE The particular area of policy a group seeks to affect
ÅE The skill or efficiency with which individuals use resources (This separates members of the political stratum from Homo Civicus is not only that they tend to have greater political resources at their disposal but that they use them far more effectively, being highly skilled. Such expertise is born of both a higher degree of motivation and the more time these individuals spend engaged in political pursuits. In the political real practice truly makes perfect.)
ÅE The likelihood individuals will deploy their resources (U.S. political system is marked by a high degree of what Dahl terms slack. The average person uses only the smallest fraction of his resources to affect political outcomes. In liberal societies, Dahl observes, politics is a sideshow in the great circus of life" (305).)
As to latter, individuals vary in the extent to which they use their political resources according to:
ÅE Age-negligible in the young, reaches its peak with in middle life, decreases among the aged
ÅE Events-people employ their resources sporadically, around election time or in response to a salient issue
ÅE The Issue-some groups will be more active around certain types of issues, i.e. business leaders will be more active around development than school issues
ÅE Access to resources-if you have fewer resources to work with, you will be more sparing, selective in your activity
ÅE Differences in alternative opportunities for using resources-a young person attempting to build a career may opt to invest her energies there rather than in political activity.
Variety along these dimensions Dahl sees as the result of both objective factors (education, occupation, area of residence) and subjective factors (individuals' goals, predispositions, perception of the way in which the political system operates). These objective and subjective factors are not unrelated. Objective circumstances tend to influence and produce subjective tendencies. Dahl does not take a determinist view but does note that though "individuals in the same objective situation may not respond in the same way because they have different subjective interpretations of the situationÅcnonetheless, the objective differences in individual situations are frequently so great that they largely explain why subjective differences arise" (27).
Sources of Stability
But if the political stratum enjoys far greater actual influence than the average citizen, what keeps it from running away with the system? It comes back to the principle of slack. Though it is this principle (the fact that they vast majority of the populace is not taking advantage of their political resources) that gives political leaders (those hardy souls who actually deploy their resources) their power, it is also limits their power in that if they were to overstep their bounds, Homo civicus could rise from its slumber and oppose them. It is this great uncertainly as to the resources that potential opposition might have in reserve that makes leaders circumspect and somewhat judicious in the forging of policy and their exercise of power.
Dahl concludes with an examination of another factor contributing to the stability of the U.S. system, one that prevents it, despite the influence of the political stratum, from descending into totalitarianism. This is the American creed of democracy and equality, a belief system that perhaps only a minority fully embrace, but one that is tolerated in that it is the only choice upon which everyone can agree (see his interesting demonstration in the middle of page 314 for details). But this creed is inordinately abstract. When it comes to specific beliefs about the democratic process, consensus must not be seen as a static or unchanging attribute of the citizenry. Dahl characterizes it as a "recurring process of interchange" between the political stratum and the populace. When it comes to minor changes in democratic procedure on which there is great consensus among the political elites and little public interest, negotiation over changes will occur within the political stratum itself. But whenever one element of the political stratum begins to believe that the accepted political procedures represent an obstacle to their achieving its desired ends, it has the option--one legitimated by the creed--of opening up to the public what began as a closed debate with in the political stratum in the hopes that once a significant proportion of the public has come over to their side other leaders, a group of leaders will be forced to relent. At the same time, in making such appeals, polticos are limited by the creed from proposing anything that is too overtly undemocratic.
In sum, its not that an appeal to the creed ensures the stability of
democratic systems. History is filled with instances in which the invocation
of democracy has precipitated its destruction ( a clear example being Nazi
Germany), but Dahl reasons that a significant decline in its legitimacy
greatly enhances democratic instability.