Chapter 1 - Demographic Trends

In the first chapter of this book, Cherlin compares the experiences of two generation: the baby boomers and the parents of the baby boomers. He also predicts the experiences of the children of the baby boomers. He examines the trends of marriage, children, divorce, and remarriage.

One important argument he makes here is that the 1950s were a deviant decades from a long-term perspective and therefore comparing the 70s and 80s to the 50s is inappropriate. The 1950s is often used as a baseline category as if it represents the early twentieth centuries. Such a comparison makes it appear that the 70s and 80s were the deviant periods. In fact, "the timing of marriage in the 1970s and 1980s was closer to the typical twentieth-century pattern than was the case in the 1950s. In addition, the rate of childbearing in the 1950s was unusually high by twentieth-century standards. In some ways the 1970s and 1980s were more consistent with long-term trends in family life than were the 1950s" (pg. 7).
 
 

Marriage and Cohabitation

Throughout the 20th century, about 9 out 10 Americans married, sometimes earlier than others. People who were born during the depression and war years were the ones who married the earliest. In the 1970s and 80s, men's marriage timing fell in line with the pattern observed between 1890 and 1940. For women, the average age at marriage has increased since the 1970s and 1980s and is older than any time this century. However, to say that people are postponing marriage now is only justifiable when comparing the 70s and 80s to the 50s the overall trend is fairly stable.

Since the 1970s, cohabitation has increased greatly. Poor people have always cohabitated, but starting with people born around 1940, cohabitation increased among young adults of all education levels. However, at all times in the last several decades, persons with less education were more likely to live together. Cherlin predicts that a majority of the children of the baby boomers will probably live with a partner before marriage. So, if we consider unions (both marriages and cohabiting relationships), young adults are almost as likely to live with a partner as they were in 1970, despite marrying later.

Cherlin dismisses the fears of some researchers that cohabitation will replace marriage. He argues that there is no evidence for this. Cohabitation appears to be a temporary stage of intimacy that precedes or follows marriage and therefore will have little effect on whether young adults eventually marry. Cohabitation is often a trial relationship and so might be expected to lower divorce rates, but Cherlin notes that marriages that follow cohabitation are more likely to end in divorce than those that do not. He suggests that this is not an effect of cohabitation, but rather an effect of the type of people who choose to cohabitate (more individualistic) and those who do marry without cohabitation are more likely to have more traditional values(marriage for life). He compares the U.S. to Sweden and France, arguing that cohabitation and out-of-wedlock births will never be as common here as they are in Sweden. Basically, "neither the increase in cohabitation nor the later age at marriage has produced major changes in patterns of marriage, divorce, and remarriage" (pg. 17).
 
 

Childbearing

"The annual birthrate spurted upward just after the war and, after a brief respite, increased sharply during the 1950s. It then fell just as sharply in the 1960s and 1970s and remained low in the 1980s. We now know that during the 1950s women were having their first child earlier in their lives, and subsequent children were born closer together; after 1960 women had their first child at a later age and spaced subsequent children farther apart" (pg. 18). In the 1980s, women baby boomers began reaching ages at which the could no longer postpone childbearing and the share of births to older mothers increased. Even so, the fertility of baby boomers is significantly lower than that of their parents. The high fertility of the decade following WWII is at odds with the long-term historical decline in fertility over the last 150 years. This is the more unusual phenomenon, not the decrease that followed.
 
 

Marital Dissolution

The divorce rate has been rising since the middle of the 19th century. There are temporary increases after every major war and decreased during the depression. Divorce slowly increased until WWII. It dropped significantly after WWII and then rose dramatically thereafter. "Starting in the early 1960s, the annual rates rise sharply, so that by the end of the 1970s the rate of divorce is well above what would be predicted from the long-term trend" (pg. 22). However, comparing these high rates to the unusually low rates of the 1950s over-emphasizes the increase. The long-term picture should be kept in mind. "In sum, although annual measures of divorce often show large fluctuations from year to year or decade to decade, the lifetime proportions of ever-divorced for people marrying in a given year have risen in a regular fashion for the past century, with some variation. Those who married during the depression and those who married in the 1960s and 1970s experienced even higher levels of divorce over their lifetimes than the historical trend would predict. And those who married in the decade or so following the war were the only cohorts in the last hundred years to show a substantial, sustained shortfall in their lifetime levels of divorce" (pp. 24-25).

Marriages can also be dissolved by death, but declining mortality rates have reduced the rate of death for married persons at the same time divorce was rising. The result is that the overall rate of marital dissolution barely changed between 1860 and 1970. Since 1970, though, the divorce rate has increased total dissolution above the historical high. Cherlin notes that dissolution of marriages by death and divorce have different consequences for families because they usually occur at different stages of family life. Divorce usually occurs early when children are still home, while death usually occurs after children reach adulthood. He points out that higher rates of divorce lead to larger numbers of single-parent families which has important social and economic ramifications. Finally, e briefly notes a third form of dissolution, separation. Some people separate for long periods, some briefly and then reconcile, but most obtain a divorce within two years (black men and women are less likely to obtain a rapid divorce).
 
 

Remarriage after Divorce

Remarriage has always been common but until the 20th century almost all followed widowhood. "Thus it is only since the depression that remarriage after divorce has become the predominant form of remarriage. And since the turn of the century, such remarriages have increased as a proportion of all marriages" (pg. 27). In the early 1960s, the remarriage rate for divorced people rose with the divorce rate. But in the 1970s, the divorce rate continued to skyrocket, but the remarriage rate fell and remained low and stable throughout the 1980s. Why? "We now know that separated and divorced adults were as likely to be living with new partners in the mid-1980s as in 1970-they just weren't as likely to have married them" (pg. 28). Cohabitation is even more common than cohabitation before first marriage. Most do eventually remarry. We would think that remarriages would be more successful than first marriages (maturity and experience) but statistics show otherwise. Finally, Cherlin notes that "the expanded families of remarriage after divorce may complicate the lives of remarried adults and their children.
 
 
 
 

Chapter 2 - Explanations

Cherlin identifies two types of explanations for the demographic changes described in Chapter 1. Some are period explanations: period-based effects are those that affect all groups at the same time (attitude shifts and economic situations can be period effects). Other explanations focus on cohort-based effects: these affect only people who grew up during a specific period (one important cohort effect is simply the size of the birth cohort, it can influence things such as wages, opportunity, etc.). So, for example, the depression was a period-based effect on everyone who lived through it, but it was a cohort-based effect on people who were growing up during it because it influenced the rest of their lives. As you might expect, it is often difficult to separate period-based and cohort-based effects.

Cherlin argues that, over this century, period effects have dominated marriage, divorce, and childbearing trends. For example, "when the probability of having a birth or getting married dropped in the 1930s, it dropped for all women, whether in their twenties or thirties. When it peaked just after World War II, it peaked for everyone" (pg. 32). However, there is some evidence of cohort effects. For example, since 1980 there has been an increase in birth rate for women in their thirties but not for younger women. Cherlin says that there is much debate among scholars over the causes of the demographic trends, particularly for the 1950s.
 
 

The 1950s

Cherlin attributes a large part of the increase during the 1950s of marriage and childbirth to increased prosperity, but not all of it. He points out that birth and marriage rates remained high long after the demand for them that resulted from wartimes should have dwindled out. He finds it quite likely that a spread of family-centered values was an important effect on the baby boom. The rise in standard of living allowed families to have several children and still live more comfortably than their parents. The ideal of the breadwinner/homemaker family flourished, although Cherlin notes that it concealed contradictions within it that led to its own demise after the mid-1960s. More women were going to work, and higher birth rates concealed a long-term change in the value of childrearing. Parents began to trade quantity for quality. Also the family values included a more individualistic element that would eventually extend beyond the nuclear family to the individual members.

The above are period explanations, but Cherlin points out that for the cohort that reached adulthood during the mid-1950s, the birth and early marriage rates were particularly high. This suggests that their behavior as young adults may stem from their similar experiences of growing up during the 1930s. Glen Elder suggests that there were long-term effects of the depression on children who grew up during it. Adolescent independence increased and adult responsibilities were thrust upon children earlier. Family life was highly valued by these children later in their lives. Richard Easterlin examined demographic effects. The small size of this birth cohort meant a high demand for workers and higher wages for young male workers. Easterlin also argued that a person's standard of living is determined by the conditions she/he lived in during childhood and adolescence. Since this cohort grew up during the depression, their material tastes were modest.

Cherlin argues "that period effects were more important, but that cohort effects also were operating. The two effects reinforced each other, thus strengthening the trends of the 1950s. The childhood and adolescent experiences of many of the men and women born in the 1920s predisposed them to place a greater value on home and family and, possibly, a lower value on material comforts; when the general shift in values about family life occurred in the 1950s, they may have been on the vanguard. Moreover, the small size of the cohorts of the 1920s and 1930s worked to their advantage during the postwar economic boom. Their relatively favorable economic situation, in turn, may have made it easier for them to achieve the kind of family life they desired" (pg. 43).

The 1960s and 1970s

If only prosperity explained the rise in birth and early marriage rates, these trends should have continued through the 1960s, but they did not. Some scholars attribute the reversal of these trends that began in the mid-1960s and continued through the 1970s to the increased labor force participation of married women. Some focus on the economic difficulties that young men faced in the 1970s and other focus on improvements in contraception while others focus on the decline of traditional attitudes on women's roles, marriage, and divorce. Cherlin also point out that a possible argument is that the reversal of these trends simply represented a return to the long-term historical pattern, but this does not tell us enough. We need to be more specific.

Specific explanations: 1) increased tolerance of divorce, but this appears to be a result of the higher divorce rate not a cause of it; 2) changes in women's roles, particularly increased labor force participation. Cherlin finds 2) more plausible contributor to the higher divorce rate. He suggests three statements-a) a married woman who works may be more likely to divorce, b) young married women's labor force participation increased significantly after 1960, c) younger married women are more likely to divorce than older married women. However, Easterlin provides an alternative explanation: young women's increased employment, postponement of marriage and higher likelihood of divorce are all results of a decline in young men's income relative to the income of their parents. Baby boomer have higher standards of living, but less opportunity to achieve it. 3) improvements in contraception has also been put forth as an explanation, but Cherlin argues that its effects have not yet been demonstrated clearly.

Cherlin again point to the combination of period and cohort effects at work during this era, although it is difficult to determine which were more influential, and argues that "the increased labor force participation of young married women ultimately will be seen as the most important stimulus t the initial rise in age at marriage and in divorce after 1960" (pg. 56).
 
 

The 1980s

The 1980s seem to disprove Easterlin's cyclical model that focuses on cohort size. Smaller birth cohorts for children of the baby boomers should have led to a return to early marriage and childbearing, but this did not happen. Cherlin finds that the main flaw to this model is the assumption that married women were not committed to working and only did it to supplement her husband's income. The 1970s and 1980s showed a change in attitude about women, work, and family, especially regarding the acceptance of wives working. Cherlin expects women's labor force participation to remain high.
 
 

The General and the Particular

"Overall, the trends in marriage, divorce, and childbearing since World War II appear to have been the result of a general, long-term historical process, on the one hand, and two specific historical events, on the other hand. The long-term process is the development of advanced industrial societies, one characteristic of which has been an increase over time in the proportion of married women who work outside the home" (pg. 62). "The specific historical events that interrupted these long-term patterns were the Great Depression and World War II. The disruption of family life and childbearing in the 1930s and the war years seems to have brought about, paradoxically, greater stability of family life and an increase in childbearing in the 1950s" (pg. 63). Cherlin finds it unlikely that these two events will continue to influence marriage, divorce and childbearing in the 1990s and the 21st century. He also sees period effects as being more powerful in the postwar era.
 
 
 
 

Chapter 3 - Consequences

In this chapter Cherlin explores the consequences of the patterns of marriage, divorce and remarriage for family life in our society. He examines changes in the typical life course, in the household and family composition, and in the role of marriage. He also considers the effects of divorce and remarriage on the well-being of both children and adults.
 
 

Lifetime Histories

Cherlin examines four cohorts of women and notes that almost everyone in the first three have married, but the marriage rate of the youngest is slightly lower. He points out that the most notable change in marriage patterns during the 20th century and especially in the postwar years is that divorce and remarriage have gone from relatively rare experiences to much more commonplace experiences.
 
 

Households and Families

These increases in divorce and remarriage have greatly altered household and family composition. First, there are many more households maintained by divorced or separated persons. Also, unmarried individuals are much more likely to keep their own household independent from kin. So, the growth of households not containing married couples has quite overshadowed the growth of those that do.

Another consequence of these trends is the increased movement between households and the extension of families beyond household boundaries. Cherlin argues that "statistics about households are becoming less useful as a guide to the situation of families. Many separated, divorced, and remarried parents, for example, retain close ties to children living elsewhere, and many low-income single parents have strong family networks that extend across several households" (pg. 69). He sees the increase in the number of single parent families and families formed by remarriage as the most significant changes in marriage and family patterns

Cherlin acknowledges the persistence of family life (married couple families are still the numerically dominant form, but by a smaller margin). However, he argues that many changes have occurred and not all of them positive. Many more people experience the difficulty of the transition between married and divorced and more people must figure out how to blend into new families at remarriage, which is not an easy task. Marriages have become more focused on emotional needs because many of the functions of marriage can now be fulfilled in other ways as a result of cohabitation, declining fertility and the changing roles of women.
 
 

Family Life After Divorce

Developmental psychologists identify a "crisis period" that lasts about two years after a divorce. Emotional distress and a chaotic lifestyle are characteristic of this period for adults and children. Single mothers particularly are under extreme stress due to responsibility overload, task overload, and emotional overload. Single moms and their children also often experience a sharp drop in standard of living after the separation. After about a year, though "most separated adults have begun the process of reorganizing their lives, although it may take a few years more to establish a stable identity and a new life situation" (pg. 75).

Children also experience an initial emotional upheaval when their parents separate. Studies suggest the effects are different for boys and girls, boys reacting more aggressively. Girls appear to adjust better but may be internalizing their distress and suffer from depression and low self-esteem. Long-term effects are less clear, but it appears that the majority of children adjust fairly quickly and resume normal development, except perhaps those with mothers who are not adjusting well. Overall, it appears that "the negative effects of divorce are real and persistent, but only a minority experience severe negative consequences" (pg. 77). Cherlin draws two conclusion from research on the effect of divorce on children. 1) Children do better when the custodial parent can reestablish a supportive and orderly household routine; 2) they do better when there is less conflict between the parents (this applies to intact families as well). The benefit of continued contact with the non-custodial parent is less clear, although Cherlin finds such contact shockingly low anyway.
 
 

Family Life after Remarriage

Most divorced persons remarry and this trend has created more links between households and changed conceptions of family. Family must now be defined in terms of each individual member rather than in terms of people living in a household together. As a result of step-parents, step-siblings, half-siblings, and more distant and complicated relationships, within one household, each person living there may define their family as consisting of different persons some of whom live in other households (See Figure 3-2, pg. 82). "A household formed by divorce or remarriage that involves children from a previous marriage becomes the intersection of an overlapping set of relationships, each of which constitutes an immediate family for one or more members of the household" (pg. 83). Problems that result from this are difficulties in co-parenting (it tends to rather be parallel parenting); little guidance from society which still focuses on first marriages to divorced adults to help them manage these unfamiliar and complex family situations; the difficult relationships between children and step-parents (particularly the step-mother); and a modestly higher divorce rate for remarried persons.
 
 

Costs and Benefits

Cherlin argues that divorce does benefit many adults by freeing them from unhappy marriages and remarriage can improve the economic situation of single parents and provide stronger support networks for them. But the situation for children is more problematic. It is clear that children do not benefit from divorce, but many of the problems they may have after a divorce may have begun before the separation as a result of their parents' difficult relationship. Cherlin suggests that "most children suffer only moderately increased difficulties; some do better than before the break-up; and some experience serious, long-lasting problems. There may also be long-term effects that show up only in adulthood. And the evidence reviewed in this chapter suggests that, despite the material advantages that a parental remarriage usually provides, remarriage can cause further difficulties in children's adjustment, at least in the short term" (pg. 89).

In the earlier edition of this book, Cherlin argued that the difficulty of single and stepparent families might be reduced in the 1980s, but he now finds this prediction to be wrong. He had hoped that the increasing frequency of these experiences would lead to a greater understanding of the problems. He seems disappointed that this has not happened. "This lack of progress tempers my optimism about whether it will be easier to manage these transitions a decade from now" (pg. 90).
 
 

Chapter 4 - Race and Poverty

This chapter is an addition to the original text. He feels that black/white differences in family patterns deserves separate attention (in the Intro he says that he hopes to address Hispanics and gay/lesbian families in a future edition). He also wants to give special attention to families, black and white, living in poverty, especially since a growing number of them are single-mother families. He hopes to examine the connections between race, poverty, and the family.
 
 

Divergent Trends

"Since World War II, then, a historical difference between blacks and whites in marriage timing has been turned on its head: blacks used to marry earlier than whites, but now they marry later. They are increasingly less likely to ever marry" (pg. 94). Black marriages are more likely to break up, blacks are less likely to obtain a legal divorce, and they are increasingly less likely to remarry (all these statements refer to comparisons with whites). "Black women, in sum, are less likely to marry, stay married, and remarry. Those who marry do so at an older age than do whites. . . .As a result, black women spend far less of their life in a marriage than do white women" (pg. 95).

Differences in childbearing are more complex. Black and white women have become more similar in the number of children they have, but less similar in when they have them. "Whites, then, have postponed both marriage and childbearing over the past few decades, whereas blacks have postponed marriage even more but childbearing much less. These developments have led to what is perhaps the most striking difference between current family patterns of blacks and whites: a far higher proportion of black children are born to young, unmarried mothers than is the case for white children" (pg. 96). What has caused the increased proportion of black out-of wedlock births? Two causes: 1) a dramatic drop in the birth rate of married black women during the 1960s and 1970s; 2) fewer and fewer young black women married.
 
 

The Marriage Market

The best known model of the marriage market was developed by our old friend, Gary Becker. It involves trading income for household production. Given the long tradition of labor force participation of black women and the narrowing of the gender gap in earnings between black men and black women, the black marriage market seems to fit Becker's predictions. Black women have less to gain by trading household production for a husband's income. Becker and others suggest that welfare reduces the incentive for poor people, black and white, to marry. However, the evidence does not support this argument. Single parent households have increased even when welfare benefits have significantly decreased.

Limitations of Becker's model: it assumes that black and white marriage markets work the same way, but this does not seem to be true. For example, it would predict that fewer employed women would be married. This is true for whites, but not for blacks. Also, most people tend to marry people with similar education levels. When differences exist, white women tend to marry men with more education whereas black women tend to marry men with less education.

Cherlin argues that, while it is unclear why differences in black and white marriage markets exist, they are likely to stem from the greater need of blacks to pool income and the long tradition of employment for black women.

A related set of explanations involves the relative numbers of women and men in the black marriage market. There are literally fewer men than women (due to lower birth rates and higher death rates, especially at young ages) and of those men, many are not available (they marry white women, are incarcerated or institutionalized, they do not earn enough to support a family). However, evidence attributing low marriage rates to declining job opportunity (Wilson and Neckerman) is surprising weak. Cherlin draws two main conclusions from research on marriage markets. "First, the forces of the market-some combination of the increasing earnings of black women, the continuing employment problems of black men; the higher out-marriage among black men; the toll of violence, imprisonment, and drugs; and perhaps the expansion of the welfare state in the late 1960s and early 1970s-contributed to the dramatic decline of marriage among blacks. Second, trends in employment and income cannot explain most of the decline. T be sure, at any point in time, black men (and women) who are employed are more likely to marry. But over the past few decades, the flight from marriage has occurred among employed and better-educated blacks as well" (pg. 107).
 
 

History and Culture

Cherlin suggests we look beyond economics to history and culture for an explanation of racial differences in family patterns. African American culture places a greater value on ties to kin that cross household boundaries. In particular, the black grandmother often are a source of strength for their children and grandchildren and are more involved in their lives. Cherlin points out that "black families have long been distinct from white families in ties to extended kin, childbearing prior to marriage, sending children to be raised by other relatives, and women' work outside the home" (pg. 112).

In the last half of the 20th century, black families responded to two developments: a society wide shift in values (the weakening of the institution of marriage); and a labor market change that was particularly damaging to blacks. The way that blacks responded to these cultural and economic shifts was conditioned by their history and culture. "This response relied heavily on extended kinship networks and de-emphasized marriage. It tapped a traditional source of strength in African American society: cooperation and sharing among a large network of kin" (pg. 113).

This reliance on kin helped black families survive difficult economic situations, but it also had costs. What keeps them going may also prevent them from moving out of poverty.
 
 

Family Structure and Poverty

Overall, the health of the economy, not family structure, has been the main influence on poverty among blacks over the last several decades. However, some have argued, and Cherlin agrees, that living in a female-headed household makes it difficult to escape poverty. He also notes the negative impact of the extended network of kin discussed above. Group loyalty, the strength of these networks, can conflict with individual goals. These cooperative networks prevent individuals from being able to accumulate enough resources to significantly improve their situation, unless the situation of the entire network improves. In addition, some other problems for black families exist. Not all single parent black families have these supportive networks although many writers assume they do. Also, extreme poverty and danger in the inner cities can overwhelm the network. And there is also a lot of pressure on family members, especially grandmothers in taking on the responsibilities of parenting more children.
 
 

Public Policy

Cherlin argues that public policy-makers must accept the extended kinship networks of black families, while understanding that such support is not available to all. He recommends two goals: encouraging marriage among those who desire it and assisting single parents and children in the remaining kin networks. The best way to encourage marriage would be to improve the connection between black men and the labor force. Direct assistance to single parents is also recommended and Cherlin dismisses the idea that such assistance will discourage marriage. Finally, he argues that we must recognize the dual impact of the extended kin network. "The increased reliance on extended kin, and the de-emphasis on marriage, is an altruistic strategy that has allowed many poor mothers and children to survive by sharing what little they have with a broad network of relatives and friends. It is rooted in African American culture; nevertheless, it is a response chosen under duress. . . . Consequently, just as we must resist condemning this response as pathological, we must not commit the opposite error of celebrating it" (pg. 122). Both economic and cultural explanations together account for the changes in the black family.