"How Many Exceptionalisms?", Aristide R. Zolberg, 1986

This is the 9th chapter of the same book that Ira Katznelson wrote chapter 1 of, Working-Class Formation: 19th Century Patterns in the United States and America (1986). The basic argument is that the working class is a diverse conglomerate of nationalities and cultures, and that each needs to be understood, not so much as its own "exception" to the general rules-of-thumb that apply to the broad concept of the "working class" as a social category in western industrial society, but as unique and culturally-specific creations, each a kind of "working class": "It would make little sense... to approach the study of working class formation by positioning one national pattern as the theoretic norm in relation to which all others are treated as deviant cases. Yet this 'exceptionalist' problematic was established early and remains deeply anchored in our intellectual traditions."

When viewed in this way, the patterns of an emergent working class are shaped by local conditions and influences. "The objective of this chapter is not to achieve generalizations- in the statistical sense- but rather to enhance our general understanding of the process of working class formation by systematizing the observation of cross-national commonalities and variations."

Having made this project clear, Zolberg proceeds to examine the cases of Germany, Great Britain, France, and The United States, showing how the emergence of the working class in each was unique. Because this portion of the article is substantial, I will re-iterate it here in brief (one paragraph per country) so that you can get a still-better idea of what this article is all about... I very much doubt that any of us will be expected to be able to describe how Germany's working class differentiated from France's in the late 1800s, so the details will be omitted, but a few tid-bits will illustrate the topic.

Germany. This case is described as having the fewest ambiguities, and therefore being the easiest to dispense with. Virtually the entire working class, with the exception of a Catholic minority (this exception is never explained), quickly and firmly organized into a single entity that included both political party and labor union. The German political system was also neatly divided along class lines, which aided this process. Yet the working class was largely politically impotent: the Reichstag, where all elected officials conducted business, was itself a limited power center- cooperation with other parties was necessary to accomplish anything, so the Social Democrats, a group largely unwilling to compromise on its strict Marxist platform, was isolated.

Great Britain. Here, the problems of interpretation become more obvious: the British working class did not support a Communist party after WW I, despite the emergence of many such parties on the continent at the same time- this can be seen as a reflection of the "moderate" political tone of politics in England. Yet heightened class-awareness in Great Britain is matched by few other countries: people born into the working (i.e., "lower") class readily self-identify with this class and hold few if any expectations of ever leaving it. This rigidity often causes resentment, and class hatred runs deep. Yet this hatred, while fueling the labor-base of the Labor Party, is seldom harnessed to create genuine class-struggle or revolution in the Marxist sense; what remains is a deep, sometimes militant commitment to change within the framework of capitalism.

France. This case is the vaguest of the four. The emergence of the General Confederation of Work, an umbrella organization of labor unions, is often cited as the working class organization of the country, and this organization facilitated a high degree of class awareness and a radical rejection of capitalism among industrial workers. The problem was that so few Frenchmen actually belonged to the CGT, with many workers having no union affiliation and others belonging to other, less radical union groups. This created a "cause without rebels," as French revolutionaries attempted to rally the largely apathetic workers to their own cause. Another problem was the fact that the CGT was not a political party- the market place and the political arenas were separate for most French workers who cast their votes for one of several parties. The arrival of WW I blew apart virtually all French labor-based organization, leaving the country in a political wasteland as far as labor movements were concerned.

The United States. There has been a tendency to exaggerate the conservatism of the American working class by taking the word of the AFL as the definitive statement on the subject. While there was a distinct lack of interest in revolution in the US case, there was no lack of militancy, and violence certainly characterized the rise of the working class in the American case. Also it must be noted that the AFL was a diverse body, with a "considerable range of outlook within its ranks" (very unlike the German case); the level of genuine socialist sentiment was low, comparable to Britain and France around the beginning of WW I. The most distinctive feature of the American case was the orientation of workers as citizens overwhelming toward the political mainstream- radicalism was all but absent, the possibility of radical change discounted. The Democratic party was able to enact fair labor laws and reasonable working hours before the need for socialist intervention became necessary. Union membership exploded during WW I, with the AFL taking the traditional patriotic national stance with the rest of the country against Germany; the Socialists, who opposed the war, lost popularity- WW I spelled the end for socialism within the United States as an organized entity, vilified as it was by labels of unpatriotic behavior, anti-Americanism, and in league with the [Communist] German enemy.

From these examples we can see how the formation of the working class is largely determined by existing social conditions, with boundaries drawn around national/ ethnic groups. Variations in political organization and deliberate actions by political authorities play an important role in patterning economic structures, thereby patterning social, cultural, and labor structures: in this sense, politics and culture are more important variables in the formation of a working class than is the structural-economic variable of capitalism. There are as many exceptions as there are cases under consideration... THAT is the essence of the whole article.