States and Social Revolutions, Theda Skocpol, 1979

The assigned reading from this book includes all of "Part I," which is Chapters 2 and 3 of the book. I will cover each chapter separately. Virginia mentioned that Skocpol is a favorite author of Mr. Parish, so this is one author whose work we should know better than others. Besides this, Skocpol is a prominent author within the discipline of sociology- all the more reason to be familiar with some of her relevant publications.

Chapter 2. Old-Regime States in Crisis

Having never read any Skocpol before this piece, I am unable to vouch for the clarity or fluidity of previous publications by this author. I will say, however, that I found this piece to be well-written, easy reading compared to other authors in this section. The basic premise of the chapter is that France, China, and Russia all experienced social revolutions because they all were in similar [dire] straights at critical points in their respective histories. As I have done with previous summaries, I do not intend here to delve into the details of each separate case in this article review- we are unlikely to have to display intimate familiarity during the exam with the social conditions associated with the Romanov Dynasty or Manchurian China, and the major themes apply to all three, so the following discussion will be of a more general nature (though any useful specifics will be mentioned as necessary).

The argument begins like this: the revolutionary crises developed when the old-regime states became unable to meet the challenges of the changing world both around and within them. All three countries were held together by autocratic monarchies with the primary dual task of maintaining internal order and dealing with external enemies (the Prussians, the English, the Japanese, etc.). All three were well-developed imperial states- that is, both the military and the administration functioned under an absolute monarch, and some bureaucracy had developed in each (e.g., there was at least some kind of separation of state offices and the persons who held them, at least at some level; this was more the case in Russia than the other two nations).

All three were primarily agrarian nations, with ownership of agricultural produce going to either portions of the peasantry or the landed upper class (both types were present in each nation- the middle classes, such as they were, acquired food through purchasing it rather than "owning" it) and the landed upper class was the power-center of the government (despite the title of the absolute monarch, whose power was usually greatly limited by this class). Most trade was regional, not international, with agriculture remaining more important than other sources of state or local income (as opposed to industry or commerce). Capitalist relations of production did not exist in any of the cases, with more "feudal" relationships predominating: the landed class renting its property to the peasantry in exchange for a portion of agricultural products. "The fundamental politically relevant tensions in all three Old Regimes were not between commercial-industrial classes and landed aristocracies [largely because the former was minuscule]. Instead, they were centered on relationships of 'producing classes' [peasants] to the 'dominant classes' [aristocracy] and states, and in the relationships of the landed dominant classes to the autocratic-imperial states."

In a certain sense, the aristocracy and the state were working hand in hand to control the peasantry and keep it producing food- the state provided military might to crush/ prevent peasant uprisings, and the aristocracy staffed and funded the state (and amassed fortunes through exploiting state resources and through the power of personal political offices). However, this partnership was highly antagonistic. While the monarchs wanted to centralize power and resources ("resources" here meaning agricultural products), the aristocracy constantly undermined monarchical power to their own benefit. The aristocrats saw it as their primary goal to let the monarchy have just enough power to survive, but not enough power to prevent them from doing as they would with their personal estates (note the absence of a representative parliament in any of the cases- aristocrats could not "vote" on royal mandates, but had to influence decisions through their offices). In this sense, the aristocrats were constantly sapping the strength of the state to keep it in check, which made the monarchy a weak institution, ripe for being overthrown.

These are the internal conditions. Each nation was also dealing with external threats, and the need to deal with these threats was another catalyst for revolution. In fact, Skocpol argues that it was the direct inability of the states to adequately fend off foreign invaders that led to the social revolutions in each case: in France and China, the landed upperclasses overthrew the state because of its (the state's) attempts to draw too heavily on their (personal aristocratic) resources in support of its wars; in Russia, conflicts with more powerful (and sometimes more industrial) adversaries simply crushed the credibility (if not the infrastructure) of the monarchy (e.g., war with England, France and the Ottoman Empire during the Crimean war of 1854-5; war with Japan in 1904; war with Germany in 1917) creating a massive disgruntled peasant class.

What Skocpol has done is piece together the exact conditions for the appearance of Marxist revolution at a nation-wide level. The argument is almost a "necessary and sufficient" one: when the pieces are in place, and only when all of the pieces are in place, will there be a revolution- and there will be a revolution. This certainty is somewhat disquieting; Skocpol does not discuss any exceptions to the rule, nor suggest ways that the revolutions might have been prevented. The revolutionary circumstance is as certain as the motion of time. But the argument is a very compelling one, and, if you are a student of history, a very interesting one. The argument is difficult to contradict, and that is what makes it so powerful. Chapter 2 is blueprint for Marxist revolution much more than Marx ever was... Put that in your pipe and smoke it, Karl.

Chapter 3: Agrarian Structures and Peasant Insurrections

A critical factor in the various revolutions was that for a "precious" moment, government control was relaxed enough for the peasants to begin their respective revolts. A strong government is a preventative measure against [successful] social revolution. Previous authors have emphasized the role of the urban poor as revolutionaries, yet the role of the peasants is in many ways the more important one- no successful revolution has not had a strong peasant constituency, and the French, Russian, and Chinese cases are perfect examples of this.

This chapter is about those aspects of peasant participation that made it such a powerful, even overwhelming force. The peasant revolts were directed primarily against local landlords- those people who were actually physically taking the peasants' surplus products and were producing nothing themselves; by attacking the "soft underbelly" of the aristocracy, literally its stomach, the peasants were able to have a significant impact on the economic and political orders of the regimes.

In all three cases, and in many cases throughout the world even today, laborers (whether peasant or industrial) have grievances with their superiors (whether landlords or bosses); the question is not "how much unrest is necessary for a rebellion," though such unrest is no doubt an important component- the question is, "how can existing grievances be collectively perceived and acted on in concert?" Skocpol argues that three factors determine whether the peasants will revolt or not:

1.) The degree of solidarity among peasant communities. Are these communities closely knit, or are they made up of recent immigrants with nothing in common? In this sense, "A house divided cannot stand." United peasant communities are a precondition for rebellion.

2.) The degree of peasant autonomy in day-to-day activities. Are they being watched constantly by landlords and their agents, or do they have time and space where they are unobserved in which to foment rebellion? Peasants must have time on their hands to plot any potential uprising.

3.) The degree of state coercion against peasant revolts. To prevent a peasant revolt from becoming a full-blown revolution requires that the state be ready to deal immediately and harshly with any rebellions that do arise.

If all three factors are in the favor of the peasants, and if the peasants are disgruntled in the first place, you have a pressure cooker which will blow itself apart in a matter of time. By observable standards, the French peasantry was much better off (in absolute terms) than the Chinese peasants, yet both rebelled- the sufficient and necessary conditions were met.

This quote seems worth including here: "...[T]o investigate class structure means to look for the historically specific institutional arrangements by which two analytically basic kinds of social relationships are simultaneously established: on the one hand, relations of direct producers to one another, to their tools and to the land... and on the other, relations by which an unpaid-for part of the product is extracted from the direct producers to a class of non-producers." Yet we must go beyond class structure itself if we are to understand the conditions for and against peasant revolts. Other conditions, specifically the existing conditions of peasant life and the position of peasants in the social order, play enormous roles in determining revolutionary conditions.

Consider this: the peasant revolts were largely not attempts to completely alter the existing social order. The peasants in all three cases had limited intentions in their rebellions: they wanted better living conditions, greater autonomy and self-determination, and freedom from indentured servitude through debts to capricious landlords. The fact is, most peasants wanted nothing more than this!!! They would have been happy to continue to live as they had (more or less) provided the landholding class was willing to provide them enough concessions to make life more bearable. Large-scale marxist revolution was NOT on their minds! This is a classic example of how both attitudes and social conditions go into making an uprising, and how that uprising will not be seen the same way by all participants.

The remainder of the chapter, like the previous one, is a case-by-case analysis that I am not including here. If you really want to know more about French peasants, I encourage you to read the text firsthand; it is an interesting story.