"The Structure of the Labor Market," Sabel, 1982.

Despite the incredibly boring title of this piece, the actual article is well written and has some interesting points in it. This is the second chapter of a book titled Work and Politics: The Division of Labor in Industry, and as such, you can tell that it is about manual laborers (like so many of the readings in this section on social change).

The main argument of the piece is stated, neatly and succinctly (imagine that) in the introductory paragraph (of all places): "This chapter argues that the capitalist organization of production creates clusters of jobs offering workers systematically different opportunities for the use and acquisition of skills, and for regular employment. The capitalists create jobs of various types, and the worker tries to find the one suited to his ambitions." Pretty optimistic, huh? This chapter addresses two particular topic within this general subject:

1.) It examines the economy as having a core of large, innovative [industrial] firms who create new technologies to suit their purposes, and a periphery of laggards who hang in the shadows of the core group, scrounging technology as needed and rapidly dissolving when markets shift (the view "from above"), and...

2.) It examines the perspective of the economy as an attempt by entrepreneurs to match men (of whatever skill level) to machines (of whatever complexity and technology) according to the received wisdom of how such things are done in any given market and according to logistical demands (the view from "within"). In actual fact, this second objective is treated as an afterthought, and makes up only the last portion of the piece- I de-emphasize it.

To analyze these topics, Sabel begins with a lengthy discussion of Fordism, the great moment in history when mass production was born. With increased mass production came extensive increase in the division of labor, and the spit between the core and the periphery grew simultaneously: the core created technology for itself, and the periphery borrowed whatever it needed to compete and survive. Such a model provides a convincing explanation for the endurance of small firms in any market place dominated by a few large firms- the small firms are more flexible and innovative, filling the gaps in demand when the market fluctuates or turns slightly, and large firms moving slowly, carefully, and deliberately in one direction or another depending on market shifts and general economic trends. S. admits, however, that there is no reason to believe that the Fordist/ dualist model was the only one that could have developed, or that it will necessarily endure forever.

A key point about this dualism: the nature of the two-type system, based as it is on technology, has a surprising consequence for the peripheral firms: although they acquire and apply technology in various ad hoc ways, their distinguishing feature is their use of labor, not technology. Though they use technology in different ways, all secondary-sector firms have a common labor market strategy: they employ workers who require no training! Volatility in markets means that workers must come to the job prepared to work on day one, and with no long term expectations of employment (sounds like temp jobs to me!). This then divides workers within this sector into two types: largely unskilled workers, the majority, who can do the most basic tasks with no training, and skilled workers, the minority, who supervise the use of the technology and make sure it runs smoothly. These two belong to different worlds of work- those on the bottom are never promoted, since any skilled labor would be recruited from outside the firm for maximum efficiency. Unskilled workers are the first to lose their jobs if the economy changes. This type of firm is a dead end for the unskilled worker (aside: the archaeology firm I worked for in California for two years was definitely of this type). Sabel illustrates the point with an example from Bavaria (omitted here).

In the stable, large sector, a different pattern develops: an ever shrinking core of highly skilled workers sets the firm in motion, determining all mechanical demands and functions. These workers are slowly replaced by intermediate level workers who learn specialized parts of the machinery, and who cannot (and need not) grasp the technological complexity of the entire structure. Lastly, there is a bottom layer of unskilled workers who, as in the secondary sector, are the last hired and first fired, though they are usually able to hold their positions longer than their secondary sector counterparts due to the stability of the firm in general. In this context, the mid-level skill positions become the most sought: they are stable, higher paying, and can be acquired through on the job training (though these jobs have a hitch: they are largely non-transferable, geared as they are to the specific quirks and demands of particular machines in particular shops). Yet access to these jobs seems to go to people who have connections of one kind or another- this system encourages both subservience and competence, since you have to both know the skill and placate your superiors to get these jobs (S. gives an example from the white collar world: "No one seems to doubt, for example, that junior university faculty... must be both servile and competent to get ahead").

With this hierarchy of jobs in place, workers within the hierarchy have little stake in challenging it: the road to "getting ahead" is paved for them, even if few will actually get to travel it. The Marxist vision of workers in constant struggle with owners is undermined- twists and turns in market demands make the solidification or the work force of any industry impossible, and the complete subservience of workers difficult to obtain, though partial subservience is often possible.

S. ends with an analysis of the French car manufacturer, Renault. Other than knowing that this portion of the article supports the basic tenets outlined above, you probably do not need to be familiar with it in any detail.