There are two kinds of outsiders, both created in relation to a set of rules agreed on by a group. The first outsider, the deviant outsider, is s/he who breaks a rule and comes to be seen as ''a special kind of person, one who cannot be trusted to live by the rules agreed on by the group'' (1). The second outsider may be the judge(s), who the rule_breaker regards either as not ''competent'' to judge, or not ''legitimately entitled'' to do so.

Rules come in many kinds, from formal laws to informal agreements, attended by different kinds of enforcement, whether by the police power of the state or informal sanctions. Becker concerns himself with what he calls the ''actual operating rules of groups, those kept alive through attempts at enforcement'' (2).

''Different groups judge different things to be deviant.'' Therefore, we should be aware of the ''possibility that the person making the judgement of deviance, the process by which that judgement is arrived at, and the situation in which it is made all may be intimately involved in the phenomenon of deviance'' (2). Thus, a statistical definition of deviance (that which deviates from the average) is insufficient, since the conclusions arrived at are, in general, too far removed from questions of rule-breaking (eg, murderers, homosexuals and red headed people are all similarly deviant). Also, identifying deviance by 'medical analogy' is problematic, since it locates the source of the deviance in the individual and prevents us ''from seeing the judgement itself as a crucial part of the phenomenon'' (6). Close cousin to this explicitly medical analogy is a functionalist perspective which identifies things 'dysfunctional' for a society or social group as deviant. The functional view of deviance ignores the fact that ''the question of what the purpose or goal (function) of a group is, and consequently, what things will help or hinder the achievement of that purpose is very often a political question. The function of the group or organization then, is decided in political conflict, not given in the nature of the organization--'' (7), thus what is dysfunctional or deviant is also determined in ''political conflict.''

''Deviance is created by society, as ''social groups create deviance by making the rules whose infraction ''constitutes deviance--, and by applying those rules to particular people and labeling them as outsiders....[D]eviance is not a quality of the act the person commits, but rather a consequence of the application by others of rules and sanctions to an ''offender''.... [D]eviant behavior is behavior that people so label'' (9).

If follows then, since there may be labelling error (labeling as deviant may happen both to those who do and those who do not objectively commit an act so defined), that the category of deviant is heterogenous and may fail to include all cases that belong in it. Because of this heterogeneity, one can't expect to find common factors (being poor, being mean, etc.) that will account for ''supposed deviance'' (9).

Deviance is the ''product of a process which involves responses of other people to behavior'' (14). Since deviance is a product of an interaction (that between the rule breaker and some group who judges him/her as such), the response of other people should be regarded as problematic.
1. There is variation over time in what is regarded as deviant.
2. ''The degree to which an act will be treated as deviant depends... on who commits the act and who feels he [sic] has been harmed by it'' (12).
3. ''Some rules are enforced only when they result in certain consequences'' (eg, extra-marital pregnancy, rather than extra-marital sex) (13).

Not everyone has the equal ability to make and enforce rules. ''Differences in the ability to make rules and apply them to other people are essentially power differentials (either legal or extralegal)'' (17-18).... ''[W]e must keep in mind that the rules created and maintained by such labeling are not universally agreed to.... [I]nstead, they are the object of conflict and disagreement, part of the political process of society'' (18).

CHAPTER 8 -- ''Moral Entrepreneurs.''

Moral entrepreneurs are those who create and enforce rules.

The prototype of the rule-creator is the crusading reformer. S/He is interested in getting people to do what s/he thinks is right not only because it is right, but also because it will be good for them, or because it ''will prevent certain kinds of exploitation of one person by another'' (148). Often these folks want to help ''those beneath them to achieve a better status.'' Since moral crusaders are often from the upper strata, they ''add to the power they derive from the legitimacy of their moral position, the power they derive from their superior position in society'' (149); that is, they add social and economic power to moral authority. Frequently, the moral crusader ''requires the services of a professional who can draw up the appropriate rules in the appropriate form,'' so that the reform may be implemented into law(152). However, experts (lawyers, psychiatrists) have interests which may affect the legislation they prepare, so affecting the eventual rule.

If a moral crusade is successful, the crusader is out of a job. It is in his/her interests to find another problem to solve. Often, ''[h]e [sic] becomes a professional discoverer of wrongs to be righted, of situations requiring new rules'' (153). Organizations produced in the course of crusading for a cause also are likely to look for new causes.

If a moral crusade is unsuccessful, either because it cannot garner support or because it fails at its mission, organizations created in the attempted crusade may give up their original mission and ''concentrate on preserving what remains of the organization that has been built up'' (154). Or, the organization may become an outsider itself, ''continuing to espouse and preach a doctrine which sounds increasing queer as time goes on'' (155).

Rule enforcers. Once rules enforcers have been established, the crusade has been institutionalized. However, the enforcer may not be interested in the content of the rules s/he must enforce as much as s/he is concerned with the fact that the existence of the rule provides him/her with a job and a purpose. Enforcers have 2 interests which condition their activity:
1) they must justify the existence of their position; and 2) they must win the respect of those they deal with.
The rule enforcer must both point out the continuing existence of the problem with which s/he's charged, while giving evidence of his/her effectiveness in keeping that problem under control. In order to get the respect of those s/he deals with, the enforcer may coerce respect, and so label as deviant those who have been disrespectful without breaking a rule. Since s/he has discretion in whether or not to apply rules, s/he applies them selectively, depending on the attitude of the offender, the volume of transgressions faced, etc. ''His attitude toward his work, in short, is professional. He lacks the naive moral fervor characteristic of the rule creator.'' The enforcer may have no stake him/herself in the content of the rules, and so may develop his/her ''own private evaluation of the importance of various kinds of rules and infractions of them'' (161). Thus they enforce rules to create outsiders ''in a selective way'' (161).

Deviance is the product of an enterprise in two senses. The larger enterprise required to get rules made (engaged in by the rule creator). And, the smaller, more particular sense of the concrete application of the rule to individuals, when offenders must be ''discovered, identified, apprehended and convicted (or noted as 'different' and stigmatized for their non-conformity'' (163): the work done by the rule-enforcers.

''We must see deviance, and the outsiders who personify the abstract conception, as a consequence of a process of interaction between people, some of whom in the service of their interest make and enforce rules which catch others who, in the service of their own interests, have committed acts which are labeled deviant'' (163)

DALE DANNEFER
Adult Development and Social Theory: A Paradigmatic Reappraisal

Three Major Developmental Approaches:

1. Adult Development Stage Theory = a common and universal human pattern of sequential stability and change (stages and transitions)
* underlying conception of human development as a process of maturational unfolding
* the traditional paradigm of developmental changes assumes the following characteristics: sequentiality, unidirectionality, an end state, irreversibility, qualitative-structural transformation, and universality
* the image of self-society relations is idealized as one of a mutual and harmonious balance of social and individual processes in which conflict or opposition should not exist Problems with Stage Theory:
a. the escape clause = what would constitute counter-evidence?
b. the omnibus variable problem = confounding variables

2. Life Span Developmental Psychology = development or change is an indeterminate but continuous process involving multiple causes and multiple outcomes
* caution with respect to accepting a biological or maturational model
* describe cohort-specific developmental patterms
* identify the statistical ''norms'' for the particular cohort
* only within cohort differences are important
* this scheme treats environmental influence as a source of deviation from the norm

3. Dialectical Life-Span Psychology = this perspective emphasized the contingency of development in adulthood, and the importance of organism-context interaction
* Two important factors: 1) luck or the ''random walk''; 2) autonomous self-direction
* This perspective ignores the impact of social structure as an organizer of development

Toward an Alternative Paradigm:
* linking variations in development to variations in the environment is a required theoretical strategy
* the contributions of sociological research and theory provide the basis for understanding human development as socially organized and socially produced
* Three major sociological principles:
1. The ''openness'' of the organism = the organism is constituted as a human being in interaction with the environment
2. The structure of environments = look at institutional, organizational, and micro levels
3. The role of knowledge in the relation of individual and environment = the importance of language and cultural knowledge
a. culturally shared notions of development
b. notions of development in micro-interaction

RUTH ROSNER KORNHAUSER
Social Sources of Delinquency -- Chapters 1 and 2.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978

Below is my swing at old Ruth. I've tried to sketch out what I see to be her main points without evaluating them too much. I've gone for parsimony. Hope it's ok.

CHAPTER 1
In her introduction, Kornhauser lays out what she considers conceptual building blocks to good theories of deviance.

For an adequate analysis of social life, culture must be conceived as distinct from social structure (rather than subsuming it or isomorphic with it). Further, both culture and structure must be seen as variables. ''Since societies , and subgroups within them, confront situations that vary in the problems and resources presented, the structural and cultural solutions they devise must also vary'' (1-2). Recognizing differential social organization (structure) leads to the recognition that ''the kind[s] and degree[s] of integration'' variable social structures entail lead to variability in structure's ''capacity to support or embody culture'' (2). [Safe to suspect Kornhauser's a structuralist.]

So, ''there are conditions of culture, and... cultures therefore vary in their scope and effectiveness'' (1). If we accept that cultures vary in strength, we need to assume that other forces hold societies together and make for social order, since, in spite of their ''weak cultures'' modern societies are not in a state of social disintegration. So, we need to think about the fact that ''Order and conformity can be independently secured by interlocking positions and affiliations and the lines of actions they constrain. [In modern societies] complex modes of social organization partially substitute their integrative and controlling functions for those formerly provided by... culture'' (2). Subcultures don't necessarily thrive in modern, highly differentiated society. ''Functional interdependence is the other face of social differentiation'' (3); so, activities become too specialized to allow for the isolation which permits the growth and maintenance of strong subcultures. Further, social mobility requires assimilation to dominant culture, and social mobility leads to internal stratification of groups (ethnic, racial, etc.), which also weakens subcultures and cohesion. Subcultures, like cultures, are variable in their strength and effectiveness, and even more strongly conditioned by structural positioning and processes.

Then Kornhauser reviews conceptions of culture in a variety of authors, making the general point that separating culture from structure, and treating both as variables has tremendous analytic utility, and demonstrating that point with examples of how others have failed. In particular, she attempts to destroy cultural deviance theories. One problem with them is that they assume that ''any experience... can be culturally valued. Consequently, cultures cannot be viewed as variable in effectiveness, for there are no cross_cultural standards by which to judge them'' (14). This relativist assumption can be addressed with evidence, she asserts, ''Can cultures be found in which, for example, privation, insecurity, unbridled power, and death are valued over economic sufficiency, security, mastery, responsibility and life?'' (15).

These foolish treatments of culture are often extended to subcultures. However, she cites three examples of 'good efforts' at treating subcultures as variable: Yinger, Gerald Suttles, and Eliot Liebow. All these show, though incompletely, a ''renewal of the classic tradition, in which culture, social structure, and situation were implicitly distinct and each was explicitly treated as a variable'' (20).

CHAPTER 2 -- Underlying Assumptions of Basic Models of Delinquency Theories.
There are two contrasting models. One kind locates causes of delinquency in social disorganization, the other in cultural deviance. ''Social disorganization refers to the relative lack of articulation of values within culture as well as between culture and social structure. Cultural deviance refers to conduct which reflects socialization to subcultural values and derivative norms that conflict with law'' (21).

There are four causal models of delinquency that dominate the current scene: cultural deviance, strain, control, and the combo of either of those in mixed models of cultural deviance.

Social disorganization models: ''[A]ssume consensus on certain basic values codified in criminal law and view delinquency as infraction of legal norms resulting from weakened commitment to conformity'' (23). The causes of delinquency lie in ''malfunctioning social structures, malintegrated cultures, or faulty links between the two'' (23). ''Candidates for delinquency are socially selected from incumbents of social positions burdened with undue strain, or from those isolated from controlling bonds'' (24).

''Strain is a product of universally distributed human needs or uniformly distributed cultural values in a context of structured inequality of access to them'' (24). ''Controls are implicitly treated as constant across persons and situations and are therefore ignored'' (24).

CONTROL: ''Control models assume... strain is relatively constant across persons, for wants can be gratified only at the cost of forgoing the gratification of other wants, so that everyone has unfulfilled wants. Since nonnormative means usually provide quicker and easier routes to such gratification, everyone has sufficient motivation to delinquency'' (24). ''Differential vulnerability to delinquency is determined by variation in the strength of social controls, the sum of which account for the net costs of delinquency'' (24). ''Frustrated needs, however pressing, do not cause delinquency unless they also weaken controls'' (25).

Definitions of Delinquency in SD models Assume definition of delinquency is uniform across all groups in society. People commit deviant acts not due to differing values, but because of indifference to, or the weakness of, shared norms (30). People are usually assumed to buy in to the norms they violate (31). However, its important to note that the weak institutional controls produced by social disorganization may also result in defective socialization (thus, people may not internalize those non_deviant norms). The assumption, though, is that the ''[c]ontent of moral values is not a significant source of variation in delinquency'' (31). Subgroups from which delinquents are disprorportionately drawn do not condone delinquency. Delinquents are selected for delinquency on the ''basis of their prior condition of normlessness resulting from either severe strain or weak controls'' (31).

If delinquents do share beliefs, they consist not of oppositional values, but ''of beliefs that rationalize public values to make easier the pursuit of private gain'' (32).

Human Nature, Socialization, and Cultural Variability in SD models Man has some human nature. Either weakened controls or increased strain let loose the ''strength of instigation to need gratification,'' which can lead to pursuit of those needs by non_normative means. ''Man is potentially unruly'' (39).
- Socialization is never perfect. This is because 1) people are active participants in their socialization, and 2) ''social disorganization is [always] present... [precluding development of] the conditions of perfect socialization'' (39).
-Cultural variability has some limits. -1. Positing universal human needs leads logically to belief in common values (eg, security). -2. There are some minimum rules required for the existence of any group. -3. In SD theory, the same processes that weaken culture weaken subcultures, while sometimes strengthening culture at the expense of subcultures.
-Theories of Social Order in SD m -Control models: rely heavily on exchange as foundation of order. ''The strength of social bonds is the foundation of social control; it's variability accounts for delinquency'' (45). Also, these models recognize coercion in the maintenance of social order: eg, supervision and surveillance by family, school, etc. These model can give power to normative explanations because ''nonmoral norms built up prudentially in exchange (or coercive) relations are usually assumed to have reached the status of cultural norms'' (46).

Strain models. These fall back on the exchange solution ''The inability of some actors to enter exchange relationships on terms deemed sufficiently beneficial to them is the source of disorder'' (46).

Cultural Deviance Models: Delinquency is always normative. Subcultures are deviant; people never are. People are perfectly socialized into the norms and values of their particular group; the ''cause of delinquency thus lies in the plethora of conflicting subcultures among the constituent groups of highly differentiated society'' (25).
Kornhauser differentiates this from a cultural conflict model, which she says runs like this: ''culture conflict results in disintegration of parental control..., or tensions between conflicting groups that weaken community controls, or reduced commitment to any system of values'' (25-6). This is obviously different from saying someone is perfectly socialized into holding non-dominant norms.

Definitions of Delinquency in CD models:
People can't be delinquent. They never violate the norms of their own group. Some subgroups are more powerful than others, and get their norms codified into law, which automatically makes everyone who doesn't subscribe to those norms deviant.

Human Nature, Socialization, and Cultural Variability in CD models:
Man has no human nature, only a social nature. Kornhauser argues this isn't true of CD theories. Cultural deviance theory posits a vision of human nature where ''original sin has been replaced with original virtue'' (35). Human nature is 'wholly' passive, docile, tractable and plastic [but otherwise good, and so people must learn to be willful, greedy and cruel (36)
Socialization is perfectly successful. People cannot commit acts they believe to be wrong. Further, people are socialized into fearing others' negative reactions if they did deviate from learned norms. [Cites Dennis Wrong's criticism of this 'oversocialized' view of human nature.]

In CD's schema: ''Social disorganization... is not in any way a cause of delinquency: it cannot by itself undo the effects of socialization.... If stress and availability happen to increase [people's] exposure to delinquent subcultures, delinquency will result from their socialization to delinquent patterns. Otherwise, delinquency is unthinkable'' (35).

Cultural variation is unlimited. Dissensus about the constitutive rules of society is assumed. Cultural deviance theorists commit that bad deed of not separating structure from culture; Kornhauser discusses implications of this. She points out that structural differentiation, as well as cultural differentiation, can be a source of value dissensus within a society. It's important separate out culture and structure because one can then begin to separate norm conflicts from conflicts of interests.

Theories of Social Order in CD models:
Assumes: Only value consensus produces social order. Deviance is produced because there is value dissensus in society. How then, does modern society, which has value dissensus, have order? CD theory can't explain this. Whence arises this explanatory failure?: the failure to distinguish social structure from culture.

Kornhauser's comparison of strain versus control models: ''Strain models ignore variations in internal and external controls; control models ignore variations in the strength of motivation to delinquency'' (46).
1. Control theory must grant that strain is a variable, not constant.
2. However, control theory may ignore variation in strain. K. cites a few arguments for this.
3. The most compelling reason control theory may ignore strain is that, in the context of control theory, ''strain will not cause delinquency unless it simultaneously weakens controls'' (49). ''The sum of social controls sets the relative costs of enduring alternative strains'' (49).

''The control theorists can safely ignore strain because its effect on delinquency is registered in weak controls or none at all. But the effect of controls on delinquency is partly independent of prior strain level. The strain theorist cannot ignore controls because they determine the relative tolerability of all relevant types and levels of strain'' (50).

ROBERT K. MERTON
''Social Structure and Anomie'' ASR 3 (1938): 673-682

According to Merton, social structures pressure certain individuals into nonconformist behavior. This is the result of a dissociation between culturally defined goals and socially acceptable means of achieving these goals. There are 5 possible relationships between goals and means, determined by the pattern of acceptance or rejection, as seen in the following chart:

................Conformity...Innovation....Ritualism...Retreatism...Rebellion Cultural. . . . + . . . . . + . . . . . . - . . . . . - . . . . . +/-
Goals

Acceptable . . + . . . . . - . . . . . . + . . . . . - . . . . . +/-
Means

(+) = Acceptance
(-) = Rejection
(+/-) = Rejection and Substitution of new goals and standards

Crime is a form of innovation, which Merton claims is the result of inadequate socialization. A person accepts the culturally defined goals of a society, but is not able to attain these goals through acceptable means. The person then becomes frustrated and seeks out alternative means to achieve these goals and free him/herself from the frustrating situation. Merton argues that this type of explanation can be used to explain crimes committed by the lower class in particular because achieving desired success symbols is difficult for those 'handicapped' by low education and economic resources.

It is important to understand that Merton assumes that people are 'good' by 'nature' and are only driven toward antisocial behavior because of pressure created by the social structure. This assumption is contrary to that of control theorists like Hirsci.

In trying to apply this to a micro level in order to determine which individuals in a given situation will resort to antisocial behavior, Merton claims that the choice each individual makes depends upon the particular cultural background of the individual.

MERCER SULLIVAN
Getting Paid (1989)

Getting Paid is a comparative ethnography which looks at the career patterns of young men in three neighborhoods. Sullivan tried to choose 3 ethnically different lower class communities, however the white neighborhood is admittedly not as economically disadvantaged as the 2 minority neighborhoods. The sample of respondents was recruited from networks of friends and the researcher actively sought out youths involved in crime. This study looks at how individual choices take place within locally (neighborhood) specific ranges of choices and emphasizes an interactionist view of culture, society, and economy.

Sullivan explores the demographic, educational, and economic influences on the youths. He also outlines the crime patterns of the youths in the different communities, emphasizing how they began their criminal careers, the types of crimes they participated in, their motives for engaging in criminal activity, and the length of their criminal careers and transitions to legitimate employment.

In assessing the similarities of crime patterns among the 3 groups, Sullivan notes that the pattern of initial involvement was quite consistent. The youths in all 3 neighborhoods were involved early on in street fighting; then they were recruited by peers to exploratory theft; this often then led to more serious crimes such as 'sneaky' theft, robbery, drugs, work-related theft, auto theft, and/or criminal organization.

The main difference among the neighborhoods was the greater concentration of high risk, low return theft as a primary source of income in the 2 minority communities. In general, as teens got older and found legitimate employment, their criminal activities declined. Therefore, the neighborhood with the greatest employment opportunities (the white neighborhood) had less criminal activity.

Sullivan employs 3 concepts to explain these differences:
1. Segmented labor markets: youths are barred from much of the legitimate labor market, especially in minority neighborhoods, thus crime is an alternate source of income
2. Redistribution: the more redistributive a crime, the less likely it is to elicit social control from within the community; the meaning of the act of 'crime' emerges from patterned interaction
3. Interaction: culture and economy are both productions of social interaction; interaction produces not just behavior, but also specific forms of consciousness and structures of meaning

Though most of his conclusions focus on between-group differences, throughout his book Sullivan tries to emphasize within-group differences as well. He argues that the main source of individual variation is family background, which admittedly did not receive much attention in this research.

Sullivan concludes by saying that public policy should address the issues of crime and social control at a community level and stress the need for the political participation of the poor and disadvantaged in order to make their own neighborhoods safer.