KINGSLEY DAVIS AND PETRONELLA VAN DER OEVER
''Demographic Foundations of New Sex Roles''

Demographic changes such as increased longevity, widening sex differences in mortality, aging, and low fertility give rise to new circumstances between men and women that force alterations in sex roles. These circumstances give rise to ideological developments such as feminism, as well as strengthen the demand for equal treatment of the sexes while widening the differences between them.

The demography of age and sex
In addition to the above changes, there are decreases in household size, unbalanced sex ratios, shortened reproductive spans, and near universal survival 'til old age. all of these changes are interrelated, affect the sexes differentially, and alter the traditional organization of sex roles.

Mortality
Women's longevity outdistances men's longevity.

A demographic illusion
Despite sex differentials in mortality, overall sex ratios are balanced. This is because morality is not the only factor affecting the sex ratio and the influence of mortality rates varies according to the age group being studied. There are fewer men in older cohorts, but under age 50, the sex ratio is more masculine.

Determinants of sex ratio by age
In a stable population, the sex ratio is determined by two factors: the sex ratio at birth, and the survival rates of women and men up to a given age. In a stationary population, the surplus of male babies causes all age groups to be masculine up to about 50, after which the cumulative effect of greater male mortality becomes so large that it makes all older age groups feminine.

Marriage and the imbalance of the sexes
Since each person already has a marital status (married/unmarried), his or her chance of getting married depends less on the sex ratio of his or her age group as a whole than on the sex ratio of those who are unmarrried.

Age selection at marriage
Sex ratio imbalances among the married are greater than can be explained by the age-sex distribution alone. One reason is that not only are grooms somewhat older than their brides at first marriage, but after divorce or widowhood a larger proportion of man than women remarry and when they do, they tend to marry women younger than themselves by a margin wider than in their first marriages.
In the married population, the sex ratios are highly feminine at young ages and highly masculine at older ages. At older ages in the unmarried population, there are more women than men. This is because a sizable portion of men their age have married younger women.
Age and marital -status-specific sex ratios are similar in industrialized and non-industrialized countries.

The contribution of age choice to sex imbalances
If there were no age choice, the sex ratio of the married an the unmarried alike would be predominantly masculine at young ages and feminine at older ages, due to the original sex-age curve (more men at younger ages because there are more male babies, less men and more women at older age because of higher male mortality rates). However, there is age choice, typically in the form of competition for younger women by men of all ages. This competition, together with the masculinity of the sex ratio below age 45, maximizes the possibility of mating for women during their reproductive span.
In the married population, the surpluses in any age group run counter to the natural sex ratio. With young people, there is a surplus of married women while there is a surplus of males in the natural sex ratio. With older people, there is a surplus of married men while there is a surplus of females in the natural sex ratio.
Age choice is not influenced solely by culture or economics. The pattern of hypergamy is too universal to be attributable to arbitrary custom, there is little evidence that women of high economic status tend to marry younger men, and marriage normally involves sexual attraction that is linked with age. Age selectivity is an evolutionary product that concentrates the attention of men, regardless of age, on women in ages when reproduction is possible.
Age hypergamy is to deeply rooted in the human species to be extirpated by any type of legislative action. It is more probable that new social patterns will gradually emerge as unintended and largely unconscious adaptations to underlying demographic changes,

What are these patterns?

New social institutions
1)Marriage is falling out of fashion. it postponed or not done at all.
Underlying demographic changes have reduces the ''share'' of marriage and children in women's lives. People have a stronger need to build up secure, long-term employment.Women perform less services for husbands, and men see that they are of less value as husbands, economically.

2)the feminist movement.
The FM is an ideological reaction to alterations in the underlying conditions of life. It supports new female behavioral patterns by showing that they are widespread and not aberrant. It also legitimates a variety of innovations that are in women's interests under the changed circumstances of contemporary society. It advocates a rejection of all DOL based on sex, and claims that differences in rights and obligations should be base on merit, not on sex.
However, one modicum of the sex based DOL is unavoidable as long as women have to bear the children. Feminism wants to lessen the costs of reproduction for women, but is this fair? From a demographic point of view does the idea that men and women are to be treated exactly alike go to far? Fairness is not necessarily achieved by treating people who are different as of they were just alike. Some economic activities are more easily combined with childbearing than others.
The very demographic forces that underlie the feminist movement and give women more opportunity to be like men have widened the differences. The two sexes have become increasingly distinct in matters such as longevity, age structure, and marital chances. To ignore these differences is in some ways unfair to both men and women.
The feminist movement might undertake constructing an order that rewards women adequately for reproduction. If it does, it will have to be in keeping with the new demography found in advanced societies.

IRWIN GARFINKEL AND SARA S. McLANAHAN
Single Mothers and Their Children

I. The New American Dilemma

A. Empirical Questions Relevant to the Dilemma
1. Economic Well-being and Prevalence
-how large is the effect of change in income on single-motherhood as compared with the change in social structure (e.g. expanded demand for female labor)
2. Well-being and Dependence
-increase in income leads to reduced incentive of mothers to work, an increase in reliance on public welfare and a decrease in support from noncustodial fathers.
B. Comparison with Previous Work on Female-Headed Families
-comparison to conclusions of Ross and Sawhill's Time of Transition
*old conclusion: average length of time in female-headed families short (3-5 years)--considered time of transition
new conclusion: length of time has increases (5 yrs for whites, 7 yrs for blacks)
*old conclusion: major problems are poverty and economic insecurity
new conclusion: agree, but for longer periods
*old conclusion: small effects on socio-economic achievement and future marital stability of offspring from mother-only families
new conclusion: greater effects
-both conclude that increased welfare benefits contributed to but were not major cause of growth of mother-only families
*most important cause for middle-income groups (mostly whites) was increased employment opportunities for women
*most important cause for low-income groups (mostly blacks) was poverty and declining employment opportunities for unskilled black men
-both stress the importance of public enforcement of child support, increased employment opportunities and subsidizing earnings of poor families -- their new recommendations are universal child support assurance and universal child-adult allowance programs rather than AFDC, and work relief rather than cash relief

II. Problems of Mother-Only Families

A. Poverty
-single women with children are the poorest of all major demographic groups--their economic position relative to other groups decreased in past two decades
-major causes of poverty:
*for two-parent family it is the change in earnings of the father
*for mother-only family it is the change in family structure (marital disruption and out-of-wedlock births)
B. Economic and Social Instability Following Divorce
-dropping living standards grater for divorced mothers than fathers
-loss of social status, family and friends
-change in residence -- loss of social networks and support
-change in employment (i.e. working hours, job changes, household composition, unemployment)
-implications for mental health -- psychological stress and anxiety
C. Causes of Poverty and Economic Instability
1. Earnings Capacity
-major source of income for single mothers (60-70%) their own earnings as primary breadwinners
-single mothers earn 35% of fathers in two-parent families; they also have a lower labor force participation rate
-why are wages of single mothers so low?
*they invest substantial amount of time and energy in child care
*less likely to have worked continuously since school and to have received on the job training
*large proportion bore first child as teenagers, which leads to low education and high fertility
*over half the gender wage gap is due to something other than differences in productivity -- likely to be discrimination
2. Inadequate Child Support
-earnings of other family members accounted for 21% of income for white single mothers, 34% of income for blacks
-additional payments would significantly reduce poverty gap (the difference between incomes of single-mother poor families and amount of money they would need to move above poverty level)
*would also help welfare mothers obtain jobs because it provides stable source of income that is not means-tested
3. Meager Public Transfers
-difference between widows and other single mothers due to difference between Survivors' Insurance and AFDC
*proportion of widows receiving Survivors' Insurance is greater than proportion of other female heads receiving welfare
*average Survivors' Insurance benefit much larger than average welfare benefit
-dilemma of becoming dependent on welfare vs. working full-time for marginally better economic position (assuming a job and child care can be found)
D. Intergenerational Consequences of Mother-Only Family Structure
1. Effects on Socioeconomic Attainment
a) Cognitive Ability and Educational Attainment: negative effects, but degree uncertain (most likely effect is on teacher evaluation)
b) Occupational and Economic Attainment: evidence for an effect
c) Family Formation Behavior: strongest evidence
-daughters marry early, have children early and are more likely to divorce
2. Reasons for Intergenerational Consequences of Family Structure
a) Economic Deprivation
-factors affecting school achievement: less money to invest in children's educational activities, effect on participation in extracurricular activities, length of and distance traveled on vacations, attendance at summer camps
-premature assumption of adult responsibilities
-instability and chronic stress
-income does seem to affect school performance and dropout rates, but not family formation behavior
b) The Absence of a Parent
-may give marital dissolution more legitimacy among offspring (stresses presence of single mother)
-supervision and support (stresses absence of father)
c) maternal Employment
-conclusion of research: no evidence for employment having harmful effects on children, in fact it has positive effect on daughters -- evidence is to be interpreted with caution (especially positive effects)
*neutral to positive effect on children at preschool and elementary level
*less certain for adolescents -- ironic finding because traditional theory focuses on young children; suggests that key factor may be supervision rather than interpersonal relationships
E. Welfare Dependence and Mother Only Families
-majority of those going on welfare will be off in two years
-substantial minority will be dependent for long time (they represent majority of caseload at any one time)
-degree of dependence high when on welfare
-in current debate, welfare seen as harmful for two reasons:
1. Welfare Stigma
-high value society places on independence
-evidence mixed on degree to which mother feels stigmatized
2. Welfare Dependence
-culture-of-dependence argument (affinity with culture-of-poverty thesis
-proof requires
a) showing that particular set of attitudes reduces economic mobility in adults (of offspring) -- researchers have shown relation between mobility and feelings of efficacy (sense of control over one's life)
b) being on welfare produces such attitudes -- weaker evidence that welfare leads to declines in efficacy; even when these attitudes do exist, there is no proof that welfare causes them

III. The Increase in the Number of Mother-Only Families, 1940-83

-major demographic components of growth
*whites: increased proportion of formerly married mothers -- higher divorce rates and lower remarriage rates
*blacks: early growth due to increased marital disruption; later growth due to increased out-of-wedlock births
-factors causing growth
*whites: increase in women's labor force participation
*blacks: declining employment opportunities among males
A. Trends in the Increasing Number of Mother-Only Families
-prevalence lower for whites than blacks, but trends similar -- largest increase came in 1960s and 70s, with leveling off in early 80s (could be due to change in living arrangements)
1. Women's Paths to Mother-Only Family Headship
-see diagram on p. 50
-occupancy of status is fluid, many routes of entry and exit --- proportion of single women heading own family at any time depends on choices women make and rates at which they enter and leave various states
2. Components of Growth
-recent increase in mother-only families among blacks due primarily to decline in propensity to marry on part of young black men and women
-difference is that whites marry and increasingly divorce, while blacks are increasingly likely to never marry
-key point is that increase in prevalence among blacks is no longer due to rise in out-of-wedlock births, but to decreasing rates of marriage
B. Causes of Growth
1. Changes in Welfare Benefits
-welfare found to have no effect on divorce, but is associated with living arrangements and declining rates of remarriage -- relation between welfare and illegitimacy is weak to nonexistent
2. Changes in Women's Employment
-changes in wive's employment may increase marital conflict
*support for economic independence hypothesis -- that increase in women's economic independence results in increase in divorce
*support for hypothesis that wive's employment related to marital conflict and dissatisfaction (negative effects concentrated among couples with traditional values)
3. Changes in Male Employment Patterns
a) Moynihan's Hypothesis: unemployment among black men causes breakdown of black family
b) Wilson's Hypothesis: shrinking pool of marriageable men (number of employed men per 100 women of similar age) -- result of social transformation of city
c) Psychological Costs of Joblessness
4. Changes in social Norms and Sexual Mores
a) Changes in Male Attributes and Values
-Ehrenrich postulates a male revolt against traditional family values beginning in 50s -- liberated male image in 60s and 70s
b) Relationship Between Changes in Values and Divorce
-research shows that changes in values follow rather than cause changes in behavior
c) Sexual Permissiveness and Premarital Births
-changes in values can affect growth of families headed by never married women through:
1) changes in sexual permissiveness, or
2) changes in acceptability of single motherhood
d) The Value of Children -- finding that children are valued as an asset in and of themselves may explain part of young unmarried motherhood

JOHN GOLDTHORPE
Family Life in the Past: Continuity and Change in Four Revolutions

The Industrial revolution was not the cause of autonomous nuclear family households.

The following features of Western life were pre-Christian in origin: 1) almost certainly, the primacy of the nuclear family, bilateral kinship, and a lack of organized kin groups such as clans or lineages; 2) probably, monogamy; 3) just possibly late marriage, especially of women.

Family Life in the Pre-industrial Economy and Society

The IR took place during these times: in Britain, 1760-1850; in France 1830-1900; in Germany and the USA 1850-1900; in Scandinavia, 1860-1930.

Characteristics of pre-industrial life:

1) Rampant disease, which is no respecter of persons or ranks. The wealthy may in fact have been worse off, since they were likely to be able to afford medical treatment, at that time bad (eg., widespread use of bleeding for various complaints; instructions to purge newborn children and then not feed them until the fourth day after birth).
2) Lack of privacy (for instance, the hall or corridor was not invented until 17th century; the only way of getting into many rooms was by going through other rooms).
3) In England, from 1574 (date of data available), mean household size remained at 4.75 until 1901. There was no sign of large extended coresidential groups. However, household sizes differed widely within each local community. Well-to-do households were large due to the presence of servants; poor households were depleted especially of their young adult members who left to go into service. Mean household sizes were a bit larger in America, around 5.5 or 6 (lpresumably higher fertility among a small population facing a vast empty continent with seemingly limitless resources; not because of some extended family system which has since been abandoned).
4) Outside the nuclear family, people's wider kinship relations were not any more extensive in the pre-industrial past than they are today; in fact, they may even have been less extensive than they are today.
5) There was a good deal of mobility.
6) Childhood was not as dismal as folks like Aries and Shorter have portrayed it. Stages of development and children's need to play were recognized; most parents were affectionate and kind, certainly not indifferent.

The Demographic Revolution: 1 Population Growth

Societies pass through four stages
1. High stationary stage (high fertility maintains popn numbers in the face of high and fluctuating mortality)
2. Morality falls and population grows at a more rapid and accelerating rate.
3. Corresponding fall in fertility as people adopt fertility limitation practices.
4. Low stationary stage (slow or zero popn growth).

It is possible and important to distinguish the demographic and industrial revolutions. The first IR occurred in Britain at a time of popn growth. A number of factors likely contributed to the fall in mortality from the 1740's onwards:
1) Agricultural improvements. Increased agricultural productivity, along with improved transport, no doubt reduced ''subsistence crisis mortality'' from recurrent local famines, and contributed to a general fall in the death rate, whose extreme fluctuations disappeared from then on.
2) Medicine: immunization against small pox, better advice about breastfeeding

Industrial Revolution

A most important factor making for change in family life at the time of the IR, and partly related to it, was the decline of the century's old traditions of apprenticeship and living-in service. These had obviously gone well with late marriage. With the IR, more young adults and adolescents went to work daily and lived with either parents or in lodging; they remained at home longer. Most old people lived with their kin, especially the widowed (grandma provides free childcare while ma weaves down at the mill). *** It seems, then, that the rise of industry led to family members living together or in close proximity, and created bigger family groups and greater cohesion than in pre-industrial times, not the other way around. *** This redistribution of people among households (large households with servants got smaller, while poorer households got larger, since the kids hung around and grandma moved in) took place at a time when mean household size was increasing, presumably due to a rise in fertility which began before the IR, and culminated in the early 19th c.

The family itself must be judged to have had an independent effect on industrialization; a form of family emphasizing the husband-wife-child unit may well have been a facilitating factor of industrialization, rather than the other way around.

The Demographic Revolution: 2 Family Limitation

Almost everywhere in Europe, fertility began to fall sharply and markedly at dates between 1880 and 1920. Both quantitatively and qualitatively this was a new development resulting, not from decisions to postpone or forgo marriage, but mainly from married couples' decision to have only a limited number of children. The link between nuptuality and fertility was broken, and marriage ceased to be the hinge on which the demographic system turned.

Apart from France, the adoption of the small family system seems to have occurred everywhere in Europe at about the same time around 1900.

Assessing the consequences of the dem rev for western family life: we now live much longer than our ancestors; we marry earlier, certainly, than our ancestors did in the 18th c.; we have fewer children, and we have them while we are younger, exercising deliberate control over our fertility, and stopping when we judge we have enough. Mean household sizes have fallen very low, but as people live longer to enjoy grandparenthood, three-generation family ties have become more important, and four-generation family relationships are not uncommon.

The Divorce Revolution

The latest revolution in family life has been the long, slow, gradual but eventually overwhelming increase in the numbers of divorces and the availability and social acceptability of divorce. This has had its full effect only since 1960.

Legal and administrative changes have made divorce less costly and most available to people of all classes. In addition to this generally rising trend, the enforced separations, hasty marriages and other abnormal circumstances associated with WWI and WWII led to big increases in the numbers of divorces. Since 1960, there have been important shifts in legal (eg, no-fault divorce), public and religious opinion regarding divorce.

Although it is difficult to assess the possible long-term consequences of this last revolution, we can see the effects in a wider diversity and greater complexity in family relationships (eg., blended families with his,mine and ours). Serial monogamy is becoming more common and accepted.

(Note: Compare to Bumpasses contention that the Dem Tran is continuing.)

MICHAEL J. GREENWOOD
''Human Migration: Theory, Models and Empirical Evidence'' (1985)

During the last 15 years, fundamental changes have occurred in US internal migration patterns. Migration research, however, has maintained its strong orientation toward the determinants as opposed to the consequences of migration.

Greenwood focuses on two important trends that have occurred since 1990: The South has had a volume of net in-migration about twice that of the West, contrary to a long-standing trend. This is the result of three factors:
A.) international migration
B.) natural increase
C.) internal migration

2. Net migration changed direction from metropolitan to nonmetropolitan areas due to:
A.) changing relative costs of doing business in older urban centers
B.) growth of resource-based industries in nonmetropolitan areas
C.) rising income and wealth and increasing demand for location-specific amenities
D.) changing demographic structure of the population and the labor force
E.) government policy

These trends have spurred researchers to explore new theoretical and empirical ground searching for explanations.

On the theoretical level, researcher have begun exploring:
lifecycle and family considerations and their relationship to migration
equilibrium vs. disequilibrium systems: Earlier work has taken the perspective of a disequilibrium system, assuming the system is initially at disequilibrium and any adjustments (e.g., migration) are assumed to be equilibrating. However, theorists now assume the system is in equilibrium and migration only occurs to facilitate and adjustment to a new equilibrium. (This is an important point to Greenwood, but it's a little fuzzy to me.)

On the empirical level, microdata and temporal studies can contribute greatly to migration studies. Microdata (especially the Panel Study for Income Dynamics) can be sued to look at:
personal characteristics that lead to migration decisions
the decision-making unit (family, household, individual)
prior migration experiences
life-cycle influences
the influence of unemployment
repeat and return migration

Temporal studies, especially time-series data, allow for dynamic models of migratory behavior and can be used to understand lags in the migration process.

DAVIDSON R. GWATKIN
''Indications of Change in Developing Country Mortality Trends: The End of an Era?'' (1980)

The remarkable rapid rates of mortality decline that have prevailed since WWII have begun to falter, to give way to a confused, diverse, ambiguous situation marked by unexpected slowdowns in the pace of health improvements observed in many large areas of the developing world.

During the century's first 50 or 60 years, the dominant trend in mortality rates was one of accelerating progress. In the late 1800's Western Europe and the US began the first major decline n mortality rates. Shortly afterwards, Easter and Southern Europe began to experience even more rapid progress. And finally, after WWII, rates began to decline in the Third World. In fact, the most impressive life expectancy increases occurred in the developing countries, which had the lowest initial levels of life expectancy.

However, these accelerations in mortality decline have largely come to an end. They appear to have been succeeded by slowing progress and increasing diversity. This deceleration in the developed countries had been expected, due to the ''natural'' limitations imposed by physiological degenerative processes. However, it was expected that third world progress would continue until mortality patterns converged with those of the West. This, however, has not happened. In analyzing data (UN as well as other sources) from Latin America, Asia, and Africa, Gwatkin concludes that there is a general slowing down of progress against mortality in all of these regions. More noteworthy is the early stage at which the pace of developing world mortality progress has fallen off. In addition, there is greater diversification of mortality rates and trends within each region.

It is important to assess these demographic statistics in conjunction with what is known about recent developments concerning factors thought to be responsible for developing world mortality trends. For example, there has been a marked decline in the capacity of public health and medical care programs to deal with evolving developing world disease problems, and therefore to contribute to mortality decline. In addition, the degree of diversity among developing countries is a result of different rates of economic and social progress in different areas. One must look at factors such as food production and distribution, education, civil disorder, and natural disaster to get a more complete explanation of mortality trends.

DENNIS HODGSON
''Demography as Social Science and Policy Science''

There are two different types of demographers: those who want to ''understand'' (social science approach), and those who are policy oriented. During the late '40's the sharp decline in mortality and the ensuing population increase in LDC's precipitated a major reorientation in demographic research from social science to policy.

The pre-existing perspective (Social Science)

The social science perspective saw fertility as a dependent variable. An understanding of fertility trends was to be gained by identifying the socio-ec. forces at work and by specifying the means by which they influenced reproductive behavior. The approach presented several links between lower fertility and developed countries:
the standard of living would be higher with fewer children (social pressure)
there is an inverse relationship between class and fertility level
urban birth rates are lower than rural ones; link of industry to fertility decline

The development of transition theory

Transition theory specifies the relationship between socioeconomic change and demographic change. Two assertions:
1)the demographic pattern of high vital rates associated with an agrarian society will gradually shift to a regime of low vital rates as that society increasingly becomes industrial.
2)this demographic shift will be accomplished by mortality declining more rapidly than fertility, thereby producing a period of population growth.
Notestein, Davis, and Thompson, some of transition theory's original formulators, expanded the theory beyond the industrialized world, with the ''colonial explanation.'' Traditional societies experienced colonial domination -- an attenuated, one-sided modernization experience which produced mortality decline, population growth, but no fertility decline. This was because the mother countries of the colonies, failed to adequately industrialize them.
In both the colonies and industrial countries, socio-structural changes were seen as the causal agents affecting demographic trends in both settings. However, in the LDC's, there was no fertility decline, which should have been part of the full process of ''demographic evolution.''

Confronting population growth in the non-industrialized world

The population explosion in the US after WWII raised questions about the predictive power of transition theory. Also, rapid population growth in LDC's was hindering the socioeconomic changes that would induce fertility decline and the eventual cessation of population growth in transition theory. Pessimism about transition theory was mounting.

Notestein
Notestein initially believed that a change in the social structure that came with modernization would make fertility rates decline. However, he came to see that pop growth was a major factor inhibiting modernization. He decided that economic development needs to be accompanied by explicit efforts to reduce fertility. he began to advocate direct measures for lowering the birth rate, such as communication about contraception, etc. Hence, whereas his initial version of transition theory purported that socio-structural variables were independent, and the demographic variables (fertility rates) were dependent, Notestein realized that fertility had to be lowered intentionally for economic development. Then the demographic variables became independent, and the socio-ec variable became dependent.

Davis
By the mid-1950's this steadfast advocate of the social science perspective contended that planned fertility control prior to urban industrialism was a viable policy for LDC's to pursue However, whereas transition theory predicted somewhat of a lag b/w death rate decline and birth rate decline, Davis observed an extra long interval here in his studies in India. He accredited this to colonialism, stating that Indians had been given no internal structure to motivate them to reduce fertility. The ''texture'' of Indian life was not altered by colonialism and this resulted in an unstable demographic situation.
Davis began to advocate taking an indirect approach to reducing fertility by promoting modernization. Then, like Notestein, he began to see that population growth was really the independent variable and socio-economic change was the dependent variable. He then argued for the direct approach of teaching about contraceptives, etc., saying that the indirect approach would be too slow. Davis urged LDC governments to consider the direct approach policy because newly industrializing countries would still face overwhelming poverty unless their populations decreased.

Hence, both theorists reversed their approaches, because they realized that comprehensive modernization -- reducing fertility -- had to take place before real modernization.

The impact of a policy-oriented perspective

Questions of feasibility
The social science approach saw the consequences of direct intervention as minor because it adhered to the notion that societies had strong social control of fertility. Groups which would respond to direct family planning would be urbanites and the middle class. Not poor ruralites.
However, the policy approach assumed that a lack of contraceptive knowledge was a major cause of the high fertility level. It disregarded the soc. sci. argument that fertility change was a consequence of socio-ec change. By presenting evidence that the ''ordinary Indian'' would prefer to limit family size, Davis turned the soc. sci. argument on its head. By shifting from a macro-level approach to a micro-level one, Davis was able to generate a theoretical justification for the direct approach. He demonstrated a ''ready market'' for birth control in India.

Convincing policy makers
Policy-oriented demographers had to convince policy-makers of the feasibility of the direct approach. They used techniques such as describing future conditions pessimistically or optimistically, simulating fertility trends on computers, and ignoring analyses of past trends.

Past, Present, and Future

The demographer who took the soc.sci. perspective was detached, prone to macro-level analysis, and considered structural features to be the prime determinants of individual behavior. The policy-oriented demographer was an advocate, prone to micro-level analysis, who considered behavior to be primarily determined by utilitarian consideration of the individual. The majority of policy-oriented demographers still believed that structural changes associated with the modernization process had been the prime determinants of past demographic changes, that these changes had followed the general pattern described by transition theory, and that contemporary non industrialized societies would have undergone a ''normal'' demographic transition if they had also undergone a western modernization experience.

The gap between critics and advocates of the direct approach has lessened because agricultural production has outpaced pop growth (it has??! per individual country -- I doubt it! -EA), birth rates have declined in a significant number of LDC's --at different levels of indus. development, in different geographic regions, and with different cultural heritages. Therefore, the focal point of controversy diminishes. Social scientists and policy scientists can merge because of the need to understand contemporary fertility decline. Abstract concepts are needed to find patterns in the pace and spread of fertility decline. Thus in the future, most demographers are likely to work again within a soc. sci. perspective. At least until another ''crisis'' occurs.

RON LESTHAEGE
A Century of Demographic and Cultural Change in Western Europe: An Exploration of Underlying Dimensions

Key phrase: secular individualism.

A fertility decline is in essence part of a broader emancipation process. Demographic regulatory mechanisms, upheld by the accompanying communal or family authority and exchange patterns, give way to the principle of individual freedom of choice, thereby allowing an extension of the domain of economic rationality to the phenomenon of reproduction.

Persons engage in evaluations of utilities and disutilities on the basis of a preference map. There is a meaning-giving or ideational structure which directs this preference structure; we want to find out what this ideational structure is, and how it may have changed.

In the last quarter of the eighteenth century, the time of the demographic transition in Western Europe, the basic elements of the philosophy of the Enlightenment had disappeared. The notion of social contract was replaced with the notion of solidarity, which reflected better the restructuring of society along interest groups and the pursuit of common goals of a direct economic nature. Also, secular individualism, or the pursuit of personal goals devoid of references to a cohesive and overarching religious or philosophic construct had become fully legitimate. And, in the duality between social solidarity and individual interest, the rationality of the individual gained the upper hand.

Recent fertility drops in Western Europe are a new development. (Ron is interested in the rapid fall of martial fertility since 1963... fertility dropped below replacement level). This drop in fertility is not a drop in cohort fertility, according to Ron, but, in fact, all cohorts, irrespective of their stage of family formation, slowed their pace of fertility. This drop in final family size (completed fertility) was, according to Ron, due to shifts in the parameters of the DEMAND FOR CHILDREN function. (For example, increasing opportunity costs of children, especially to women, and decline in the relative income of younger generations socialized at the time of substantial economic growth.) Further, there has been a legitimation of voluntary childlessness; it is justified not only in terms of time or economic constraints, but people also defend it as a lifestyle or a preference in its own right.

In addition, divorce rates have climbed, and remarriage rates have fallen. First marriage is being postponed, or shelved entirely. These trends indicate that larger and larger proportions of persons are living in single-person households and in consensual unions of as yet unknown (at the time of his writing) stability. These, he says, are not reassuring findings with respect to the robustness of the institution of marriage.

Then, he does factor analysis, a statistical technique the aim of which is to reduce a set of indicators to some underlying, more comprehensive factor(s) (he reduces separate attitude questions from surveys, such as, ''is divorce ok,'' etc. to a set of three general themes). This exercise is supposed to be an empirical investigation of the value/meaning shift he claims has happened.

He concludes that he is right. Changes in rates and types of family formation and reductions in fertility are not independent phenomena, but rather are manifestations of a long-term shift in the Western ideational system. The underlying dimension of this shift is the increasing centrality of individual goal attainment, the individual's right and freedom of defining both goals and the means of achieving them. In the development of this, a number of historical factors have been of major significance: 1) capitalism in the West and the historical dominance of the nuclear family have been largely responsible for the development of behavioral patterns that were oriented around the welfare of the household rather than larger kinship groups or the community; 2) during the 19th century, the increasing orientation toward the welfare of children in such households; 3) especially among those born after WWII, a shift toward an even greater preoccupation with the welfare or the self-fulfillment of individuals.

Increasing secular individualism has met with resistance from religion and the props of more traditional forms of solidarity (responsibility, altruism, sacrifice, the sanctity of long-term commitment); this accounts for maps of traditionalist versus non-traditionalist regional subcultures in some Western European countries each time new patterns of demographic behavior merge (to put it differently, this explains why, within one country, there will be regions with high fertility next to regions with low fertility). Older fertility decline was tied to the family's change to ''child-centeredness.'' The more recent one is tied to the growth of secular individualism (self-orientation); however, both of these (shift to child-centeredness and shift to self-centeredness) lie on the logical continuum of increasing freedom of individual choice (according to Ron).

Demographic responses to economic forces are lagged. Demographic trends continue their course during the first years of an economic slowdown. At a later stage, when everyone realizes that much harder times are ahead, a stabilization of the new pattern occurs. The two accelerations in fertility reduction, the one at the time of the Dem Tran, and the other, more recent one, took place in the latter half of periods of rapid economic growth. The basic reason for the association between economic growth and the change in the demographic parameters of family formation, dissolution and reproduction are that rapid increases in real income fuel individual aspirations, and that the opening up of new employment opportunities creates an impression of lowered economic vulnerability. This in turn allows individuals to be more self-reliant and more independent in the pursuit of their goals, which ultimately stimulates self-orientation and greater aversion to long-term commitments. Such a shift tends to be transmitted and amplified through the socialization process.

DOUGLAS S. MASSEY
The Social and Economic Origins of Immigration

History of International Migration
1. 1500-1800
--- Dominated by Europe, stemmed from colonization.
--- Sufficient to establish colonial rule over a large part of the world:
- agrarian settlers
- administrators and artisans (est. colonial towns and cities)
- entrepreneurs (formed plantations) - slave labor

2. 1800-1915 International Migration from Europe
- Industrialization -] displaced people from traditional lands
- Sparsely settled frontier societies -] high labor demand
- Ended by W.W.I

3. 1950 + Contemporary (Global Phenomenon)
- Supplier shift from Europe to the 3rd world
- Europe is area of immigration rather than emigration

The Economic Foundations of Immigration: Two Misconceptions
1. Immigration is caused by wage differentials
- Wage differentials are an incentive, neither necessary nor sufficient
- Risk aversion also important
- Availability of jobs more important than higher wages

2. Pressures for emigration stem from a lack of economic development in sending region. So, if we encourage development, emigration will be eliminated.
--- The development process is inherently destructive and destabilizing (in the short run) and enhances pressures for emigration initially through 3 processes:
a. Substitution of capital for labor (development is labor saving rather than labor generating)
b. privatization/consolidation of land holding
c. creation of markets
--- These three lead to a pool of socially and economically displaced people with weak ties to the land.
--- The conditions in Europe are not wholly generalizable.
- fertility decline patters are different
- technology of production increasingly capital intensive. (displaces far more people)
- modern mass communication

- economic foundations lie not simply in low wages, lack of development, rather in spread of increasingly capital-intensive economic development to rapidly growing 3rd world countries.

Social Foundations of Immigration
-Feeds back on itself through social channels. Becomes progressively independent from original economic conditions (migrant networks). The cost of movement becomes lower (e.g., friends in the destination country can help).
- Risk diversification or cost benefit analysis

Foundations of Immigration Policy
- Governments in developed countries only consider economic factors (try to manage immigration incorrectly) e.g., hiring ''temporary workers'' increases flow
- Most policies based on family reunification (US is solely based on this)
- Immigration breeds more immigration