REINHARD BENDIX
Tradition and Modernity Reconsidered

Modernity and tradition have been studied as ideal types, but people have taken these ideal types to be factual generalizations. In fact, much of the way 19th and early 20th C thinkers have viewed modernization is flawed. This article attempts to address these flaws. Bendix believes that social change is continuous, not simply then-and-now, although you can find big events that divide history into eras. He challenges the view that modernization is strictly internal to one society.

19th and early 20th century thinkers have taught us a lot about modernization, but they have tended to present an oversimplified version resulting from heavily ideological interpretations of the contrast between tradition and modernity. They tend to make broad generalizations based on European history. Many, such as Durkheim and Marx, tend to see the shift from tradition to modernity as sudden, and thus ''modernity'' is seen in stark contrast to ''tradition.'' In reality these views are simply ideal types, not general truths.

Weber alone had a view which differed from this trend. He warns against characterizing tradition as ''particularism'' and modernity as ''universalism,'' as such a characterization oversimplifies historical facts. He also warned social scientists against allowing these ideal-types to be confused with the actual gradual nature of social change. Bendix says Weber's perspective (from General Econ. History, I guess) is good, but only applies to the time when communication was slow, before the Industrial and French Revolutions. Even though social change is continuous, the Revolutions can be seen as a turning point in history.

3 myths/weaknesses of the usual view of modernization:
Tradition and modernity are two mutually exclusive concepts; with modernity resulting largely from the Industrial Revolution in England and the 1789 French Revolution, which revolutionized not the economy but political and social relations. In fact, many modern elements were evident long before the modern era (e.g., printing press). Christianity has long made universal claims associating itself with modernity, as Weber's life work establishes that Christianity sought to replace bonds of kinship and community as the overarching legal distinction.

18th and 19th C economic and political changes were overwhelmingly internal to the societies changing. In fact, following the breakthroughs in England and France, every subsequent process of modernization has combined intrinsic changes with responses to external stimuli (such as ideas and technology from advanced neighbors), and has involved government intervention in the process.

Industrialization will have the same effect wherever it occurs. In fact, diffusion of ideas, government intervention, timing, and the sequence of events are all crucial variables affecting how a country will turn out, so therefore effects are not all the same.

Towards a definition of modernization:
Should refer to change within a limited period. You want to show that within the designated period change will have certain overall characteristics, i.e., the period is in some way a coherent unit of time and not so random choice of yours. he wants to look at before-and-after type effects, but with a focus not only on one nation but on the diversity of modern societies to search for clues to an underlying pattern. This method leads to the following model:

The process of modernization:
Because of the breakthroughs in England and France, every other country was put into a state of relative backwardness and had to try to catch up. Advanced societies posed a challenge for others to live up to. Some follower societies have become advanced, such as Germany. (Modernization only refers in this model to the time since the late 18th C.)
Followers look for shortcuts, quick ways to bridge the gap. Easy to learn from others because of rapid and easy communication after Industrial Revolution and French Revolution. Since followers don't have to start from scratch, but can begin with state-of-the-art technology, they can catch up fast.
If a government can be unusually effective (in itself a modern concept) it can create policies to ''artificially'' speed up advancement. It can provide substitutes for the necessary condit
The division of the world into advanced and follower nations has put a premium on education as a means to modernization.

At the end (pp. 335-44) he uses his new model to discuss how separate classes emerged separately from the history previous to the big revolutions. (I'm not sure if this is important or not.)

In discussing the aristocracy, he makes a few key points; in this case, as in many cases, tradition and modernity are continuos; aristocracies tend not to change much before and after ''modernity'' sets in. Modernity comes from diverse, historically conditioned patterns, therefore, ''modernity'' means different things in different societies.

Unlike the aristocracy, the working class' role in politics is strictly a modern phenomenon, therefore you ca see sort of a before-and-after effect. But still, how the working class develops depends o internal history as well as external conditions. He points out that it's important to treat all stages of history as historically relevant, since social change is continuos (i.e., don't treat some stage as transitional).

He also has a brief discussion of the intellectual class as advisors to the aristocracy who are withdrawn from he rest of society. It's pretty dull.

One of the areas in which the dichotomy of the traditional and the modern can be seen is I the area of social class. Many theorists, including Toennies, Durkheim, Cooley and Marx, perceive huge shifts in class structure and class relations which they associate with the radical shift from traditionalism to modernity which as brought bout by industrialization. These discussions of social class and the alienation/exploitation of the individual worker greatly influenced the broader intellectual approach to modernity as a radical, sudden break with the past.

RONALD DORE
British Factory-Japanese Factory

Chapter 1: Four Factories - A First Look
Each company, English Electric Company and Hitachi company, has two plants. Bradford and Liverpool for England, and Furusato and Taga for Hitachi. The companies make the same product, and each company's two factories parallel the other company's. E.g., each company has a factory located in a mainly working class neighborhood, and the other is located in a technology neighborhood.

Chapter 7: Industrial Relations
Hitachi's union admits only employees of Hitachi and the ''union shop'' rule holds. Workers in EE are members of a variety of different unions, each specialized. White collar technical and lower-ranking supervisory and managerial workers - include. young university grads destined for higher management - belong to the Hitachi union. A smaller proportion of such workers in EE belong to any union, and if they do, it is different from the manual workers' union. the grass-roots basis of the Hitachi union is the workshop department unit within the factory. British unions have a dual structure. The grass-roots unit is the local branch in which membership is defined by residence: there are also ''weed-roots'' workshop units which often exhibit the sturdier growth. The Hitachi union collects more money from its members and has better resources. the Hitachi union has a more formal bureaucratic organization, more explicit rules. Wage bargaining is the main function of the unions in both firms. Negotiations are remote from the worker and his factory-level representatives, who are called on only for strikes. Negotiations over change in earnings provide frequent opportunity for overt conflict at the workshop level in EE. This doesn't happen in Hitachi. EE's workers have far less detailed contractual regulation of the extent to which union representatives are entitled to share in or exercise veto power over the making and enforcing of work rules. Hitachi has central and plant ''constitutional'' contracts which specify the rights and duties of both sides. The sense of a confrontational division between management and men is more salient in the minds of British workers. the workers of Hitachi are less often mobilized in protest against what is considered unjust exercise of authority by managers and supervisors. The large element of merit-rating in the Hitachi wage system puts power over individual workers in the hands of their supervisors which in Britain has been taken away from them by the unions. The wide membership range of the Hitachi union can make supervisors key men in, and often the formal representatives of, union workshop units. the absence of institutionalized confrontation and the lesser incidence of overt conflict at Hitachi reflect also the greater degree of consensus which exists between managers and union leaders at Hitachi then in EE.

This is hard to pin down in detail but one might hazard the following assertions: a.) Hitachi managers and union leaders are closer together in the relative values they place on efficiency, on investment for later reward, and on the cooperative integration of different functions in a harmonious whole, than their English counterparts; b.) Where there is a clash between the values of harmony and obedience to superior on the one hand, and individual dignity, freedom and equality on the other, EE unionists would take a stronger stand on the latter; c.) Hitachi union leaders share the managers' concern with the growth and prosperity of Hitachi as a corporation in competition with other corporations. Joint productivity councils based on the assumption of shared goals exist at Hitachi. EE does not have this because union workers and managers are hesitant that it might limit their freedom of action in the ''contest'' situation. The Hitachi situation is institutionally static, and the EE situation is institutionally fluid. The managers at EE are moving towards what might be called a Hitachi-type pattern of relations. Union leaders have responded with a mixture of pleasurable surprise and suspicion. Unions in both countries have ties to left-wing political parties.

Chapter 10: Two Employment Systems

I. The Hitachi system differs from EE chiefly in that it accords to manual workers those privileges - fringe benefits like pensions and sick pay, considerable security of tenure, a rising curve of earnings consonant with the increase in family responsibilities - which in Britain are restricted to middle-class workers and almost entirely denied to those who work with their hands (NM: This is the Japanese large-firm system, and the majority of Japanese manual workers are outside a full version of this Hitachi-type system.)

II. The British system is open, honest and contractual, frankly reorganizing conflicting interests and reconciling them in and adult and masculine (?) way, the Japanese system is a hypocritically devious form of exploitation by paternalism (go West?!?!).

Is the Japanese system exploitative and is paternalistic?

Exploitative:
The degree of inequality in the distribution of the proceeds of the companies' operations may well be greater in Hitachi than in EE, but the difference is not very great. It does not seem that the effect of Hitachi's greater ''paternalism'' is to brainwash the H workers into a less critical acceptance of the inequalities which exist.

Paternalistic (utilizing Parson's set of dichotomies)
1. Do ascribed characteristics affect the relationship? This deviates from the achievement principle.
- Positions in H are achieved, not given on the basis of ascriptive characteristics. Entrance is regulated by strict qualification, which might be bent only very marginally for someone with kin connections.
- Authority of the managers does not depend on the aura which attends birth in a hereditarily superior class H managers are mainly of fairly humbler middle-class origins.
- Position within the firm is also achieved, by job performance, though here the ascriptive characteristic of age acts as a qualifying factor.

2. Is the employment relation diffuse - affecting the whole man? The paternalistic employer ''takes care of'' his employees and they respond with a general loyalty (e.g., voting for his nominees or performing domestic chores for him).
- Only in a very limited degree is there any personal discretion involved I the conferral of benefits.
- The elements of paternalism in Hi have been incorporated into the specific contractual definition of the employment relationship.

3. Is the loyalty universalistic or particularistic? In traditional forms of personal paternalism, the worker's overriding obligation is loyalty to his employer, or perhaps, in larger firms which retain these patterns, to his particular manager or supervisor.
- In H, the emphasis is all on loyalty to the company as a total entity: the employee's chief duty is to foster the interests of the firm as a collectivity.

III. Hitachi's form of organization is not foreign to Britain. It is the pattern of the British army or civil service.

Chapter 11: Some Implications

Japanese system:
J are less individualist, more inclined to submerge their identity in some large group to which they belong, and more likely to be obsessed by a sense of duty.
J are less self-confident and more neurotically preoccupied with retaining the good opinion of others.
J are more introverted.
J are less men of principle than the B.
J are imitative.
J are more ambitious.
J are more submissive to superiors.
J are more slavishly diligent.
J care less about what happens outside their own group, and have less sense of social responsibility to correct abuses in their society.
J are more childishly naive.

British system:
B are more selfish, more irresponsible, more inclined to tall Jack that they personally are all right.
B are more apt to be dogmatic and aggressive, being less sensitive to the feelings of others.
B are less hesitant about imposing their views and feelings on others.
B are less willing to forego the pleasures of self-assertion in the interests of social harmony.
B complacently fail to take opportunities to learn form others.
B have less concern with self-improvement.
B are more inclined to resent authority by virtue of its very existence and irrespective of its functional necessity.
B are more afraid of hard work
B are more given to busybodying, less willing to live and let live.
B are more suspicious and cynical, less good humored and cheerful.

(so much for stereotyping.....)

Chapter 15: Late Development

The later industrialization begins:
- the less likely that it will be dominated by a laissez-faire philosophy, the more likely that the state will play a predominant role,
- the less chance of any repetition of the slow evolution of putting-out systems into factory systems or of a slow transformation of peasant into capitalist agriculture preceding industrialization,
- the more likely the development of school systems is to precede the development of a substantial manufacturing sector,
- the bigger the technological leap from traditional skills to those required by the new technology imported from the advanced countries,
- the bigger the organizational leap; the more likely industry is to begin with rationalized bureaucratic forms of organization including specialist personnel managers operating objective recruitment and promotion schemes,
- the more the norms diffused to the late starter from the industrialized countries are likely to stress the rights of trade unions and workers and the need to treat workers as human beings not as mere sellers of a commodity called labor,
- the more secure the big firms (because the state cannot afford to let them collapse) and the more plan-oriented the management (partly as a result of the absorption of advanced-country business techniques) and the longer the time horizon for the cost-benefit calculation of personnel policies,
- the sharper the dualism between the big firm sector characterized above and the small firm sector, the more privileged big sector workers, the more their unions are concerned with job security, and the more likely plant or enterprise-based organization.

RICHARD EDWARDS
Contested Terrain

Chapter 1: Three Faces From the Hidden Abode

Capital accumulation has propelled workers and their employers into virtually perpetual conflict.

Conflict and control in the Workplace:

The market equality between buyer and seller of labor power disappears in the ''hidden abode'' of the work place. The task of extracting labor from workers who have no direct stake in profits remains to be carried out in the workplace itself. Conflict exists because the interests of workers and those of employers collide. Thus the work place becomes a battle ground as employers attempt to extract a maximum effort from workers and workers necessarily resist these impositions.

Capitalists have attempted to organize production in such a way as to minimize workers' opportunities for resistance and to alter workers' perceptions of the desirability of opposition. Work has been organized to contain conflict.

Dimensions of Control:

Employers retain their power to hire and fire and on this foundation they have developed methods of control which organize, shape, and effect the workers' conditions. The system of control involves the coordination of three elements: direction, evaluation, and discipline.

Types of Control:

The maturing labor movement and an emergent socialist party organized the first serious challenge to capitalist rule. Large firms developed structural forms of control. For instance, social control is really bureaucratic control as it is the institutionalization of hierarchical power and the embedding of social relations.

Continuing conflict in the workplace and employers' attempts to contain it have thus brought the modern American working class under the sway of three different systems for organizing and controlling their work: simple, technical, and bureaucratic control. Each form of control corresponds to a definite stage in the development of firms and stages of capitalism. Capitalism has developed unevenly. As long as uneven development produces disparate circumstances, alternate methods of control will exist.

Continuing class conflict has steadily expanded the role of limitations on business and this has momentous consequences for the future of democracy. Capitalists have attempted to restrict democratic government itself. The working class will increasingly be pressed to defend and extend democracy as a way of pushing for their more immediate economic and social needs. Democracy at work requires socialism. Industrial democracy should develop along side political democracy.

Chapter 2: The Personal Touch: Competitive Capitalism and the Simple Form of Control

With so little control over its environment, the small firms' success largely depended on the capitalists' ability to extract labor from labor power. The firm as an entity did not exist separately from the activities of the entrepreneur.

The Entrepreneurial Firm and Entrepreneurial Control:

The capitalist had great involvement with employees and was as technically competent as they were. The personal control by the capitalist made for equal power relations among workers. The capitalist could intervene personally at all level and in all activities to facilitate production. The personal ties between a capitalist and a worker obscured real class differences between them.

The Expanded Firm and the Contradiction with Entrepreneurial Control:

As firms expanded, direct personal control of the capitalist became increasingly difficult. Since then, the method of control has come into conflict with the requirements of production. Pressure built up for more regularized and structured management for methods that did not depend on the extensive personal intervention of the capitalist.

The Expanded Firm and Hierarchical Control:

Hierarchical control was the firm's first accommodation to its growth. Industries employ sub-entrepreneurs and foremen. Formal mechanisms of coordination replace the formal coordination of the past. Information flowed vertically for top-down control.

However, hierarchical control did not alter capitalist relations. What the capitalist was to the worker was replaced by what the foreman became to the worker. Hierarchical control contained contradictions and its system of production soon came under militant attack.

Chapter 3: Running Full - The Breakdown of Competition

Continued accumulation pushed American capitalism from its competitive to its monopolistic phase. The large corporation became the primary locus of workplace struggles. The transition to monopoly capitalism occurred between 1890 to 1920. Monopoly capitalists had to resolve conflicts within the capitalist class, establish new relations between the corporate economy and the state, and smash the growing labor and socialist opposition.

By the 1920's, big firms were involved in ''co-respective'' (Galbraith) price-setting and market-sharing behavior. Anti-capitalist groups were suppressed under the red scare. The corporate victory during this period created the foundation for the present stage of capitalism and established the context within which the relations of the labor process would again be revolutionized.

The Natural Limits of Competition:

Capitalists constantly search for new productive methods. When the stage is set for a new competition there are fewer competitors surviving to fight the next battle which will be a battle waged on a much grander scale. However, the pressure to expand creates overproduction.

The success of a few is directly tied to the misfortune of many. Continuing in increasingly fierce competition further eroded profit margins, forcing producers to intensify their efforts to cut costs, expand their volume, and thus restore profits. Eventually, remaining firms became sufficiently large relative to the market that the actions of any one of them would affect the whole market. In the eyes of capitalists, fewer firms made competition more clear and made collusion more possible.

Competition undermined the basis for future competition and thereby created the conditions for monopoly. However, there were problems with monopolies, such as dramatic price declines and unstable demand. All producers failed to gain the profits they anticipated.

Consolidation and the Rise of Big Business:

At the turn of the century, there was an enormous wave of mergers. Yet anti trust legislation and the lack of a credit market forced collusion to be approached as a short-term tactic. Nonetheless, when the depression ended in 1897, institutional barriers disappeared.

Thus, competition led almost invariably to the centralization of capital. The intervention of financial capital, i.e. credit, sped up the process. Consolidation forever altered the industrial core of the economy.

The Fruits of Consolidation:

Consolidation did create technical economies of scale, but it also fueled competition. In fact, the economy of scale argument is not an adequate explanation of the mergers. Evidence indicates that plant size had increased sufficiently enough before the turn of the century mergers so that all technical economies of scale were not realized. The new firms met with mixed success because centralization pushed them beyond the scale needed to achieve technical efficiency. Larger firm size produced meager results in technical economies.

Industrial giants were derived from characteristics other than economies of scale. Unless a firm achieves complete mastery of the industry, it can only realize the benefits of technical economies of scale through some kind of cooperation with other producers. The turn of the century mergers increased potential for market power. In fact, big firms' market power was a central element in their survival.

Potential market power must be translated into effective market power. Hence, capitalists had to created mechanisms for achieving cooperation. This called for new strategies such as finance capital and communication. Nonetheless, big capital was still threatened by militant workers and the anti-trust middle class.

Chapter 6: Experiments, Beginnings, and Failures

Monopoly capitalism created two types of labor problems: 1.) the crisis of control on the shop floor which was squelched with brute repression, and 2.) the rising burden of the nonproduction staff which signaled the need to reorganize once elite workers into less costly but still devoted employees. The first response to these problems was welfare capitalism. It arose out of the concern for finding a way of creating a sense of loyalty in workers. The plan was that corporations would provide (selected) workers with benefits and services in order to persuade workers of the corporation's genuine concern for their well-being and, by actually improving their existence, undermining worker militance. Welfare capitalism increased worker dependence and served as good PR. At first, welfare capitalism represented a sophisticated, well-financed, and widely implemented plan for controlling labor. However, it failed because it did not deal with the fundamental issue of power within the firm. Welfarism was too peripheral to effectively change power relations in the workplace itself.

Another response was Taylorism. Taylor labeled the labor problem ''soldiering,'' i.e., workers habitually chose to produce at less than their maximum possible rate. This could be eliminated through ''scientific management.'' Employers had to dispossess workers of their special knowledge of production and they themselves had to mastery productive expertise. Three elements of control were especially important: 1.) the direction of work tasks, 2.) the evaluation of the work done, and 3.) the distribution of reward and punishment (differential rate piece-work). Taylorism, however, failed to control workers because: 1.) the system was complicated and employers were often too impatient to fully implement it, 2.) most big corporations failed to try it, and 3.) workers fought against it.

A third response to labor problems was company unions. This was a way to establish a formal grievance procedure within the context of rigorously defined limits. Given a channel for expression of legitimate grievances, ''loyal'' workers would not be driven into the ranks of the unions. This was unsuccessful because it provided no mechanism for workers to press their collective interests.

These three approaches to labor problems all failed, but hey contributed to the making of 'structural control,'' the means by which the modern core corporation has achieved stability. The lessons learned were that control must emanate from a legitimate overall structure, that it must be concerned with the work itself, that jobs must be defined precisely on the basis of management's control over special knowledge, that there must be positive rewards for proper work, and that management itself must also be subjected to systematic control.

Structural control meant that the organization, coordination, and assignment of work tasks became embedded in a larger structure of work, which could be technological (technical control) or social-organizational (bureaucratic control).

Chapter 8: Bureaucratic Control - Policy No. 1.1 Bureaucratic control (BC) is embedded in the social and organizational structure of the firm and is built into job categories, work rules, promotion procedures, discipline, wage scales, definitions of responsibilities, etc. It establishes the impersonal force of ''company rules'' as the basis for control. It also institutionalizes the exercise of hierarchical power within the firm and attempts to routinize all of the functions of management. BC has become the predominant system of control, but it has not completely eliminated elements of other systems of control (simple, technical). BC has not only transformed relations among various strata of workers and between workers and their employers, but it has also altered the image of the ''good'' worker. Three types of behavior are especially important:
rules orientation = awareness of rules and propensity to follow them
habits of predictability and dependability
internalization of the enterprise's goals and values

BC tends to be a more totalitarian system in the sense of involving the total behavior of the worker. Hard work and deference are no longer enough; now the corporation demands the worker's ''soul'' or at least his/her identity.

Contradictions of Bureaucratic Control:

Contradictions in the Workplace: the conditions favorable to BC are also favorable to demands for workplace democracy. BC has created discontent, dissatisfaction, frustration, and boredom with work.

Contradictions in the Firm: BC speeds up the process of converting the wage bill from a variable to a fixed cost. High-priced labor replaces low-priced labor. BC creates more secure workplace control and a new cause for profits to disappear in downswings of the business cycle. The increasing importance of quasi-fixed labor costs leads to ''stagflation.''

Contradictions in the Private Sector: BC has sped up the erosion of the ''natural'' boundaries between the public and private sectors. This means that corporations are becoming subject to more public regulation and control. Workers have turned away from unions and instead look to government to regulate, protect, and provide for them. BC establishes an explicit structure around which broader struggles in the political area coalesce. Modern control resolves the problem of local conflict only at the cost of raising it to a more general level.

TED GURR
Why Men Rebel, chaps. 2 and 10

General Argument: Collective violence is caused by widespread frustration that ensues when a population is not able to get the goods which it believes it deserves. This frustration leads to anger which may lead to political violence, especially if the violence is justifiable in terms of ''socially implanted attitudes'' and may be checked by a strong regime of coercive and institutional control.

Chap. 2 Relative Deprivation and the Impetus to Violence

Relative deprivation (RD) is the individual's perception of discrepancy between the 'ought' and the 'is' of collective value satisfaction. In lay person's terms, it denotes the feelings of an individual who lacks some status or thing that he/she thinks he/she should have. These feelings arise in comparison to some other person or group, it what puts the 'relative' in 'relative deprivation.' Gurr's hypothesis is that the potential for collective violence varies strongly with the intensity and scope of relative deprivation among members of a collectivity. The emphasis is on the perception of deprivation. This perception is subjective (e.g. an observer may interpret someone as being in abject poverty, even though the individual may perceive him or herself as working class. )

Some definitions:
- values: the desired events, objects, and conditions people strive to obtain. Values take different forms which include: welfare (which includes both economic and self-actualization values) , power, and interpersonal (psychological) values.
- value expectations: the goods and conditions of life to which people feel they are rightfully entitled.
- value capabilities: the goods and conditions people think they are capable of attaining and maintaining.
- value opportunities: the courses of action people have available to them for achieving desired value positions.

RD is the discrepancy between a person's or group's value expectations and value capabilities. It will vary in scope and intensity. Value opportunities play an important role in determining the potential for political violence.

Gurr summarizes 4 theories concerning sources of aggression and potential for violence.
- Instinct theories say that aggression is solely instinctive (Freud, Hobbes). They assume that most people have within them an autonomous source of aggressive impulses.
- Learned theories are the opposite of instinctive theories. They say that aggression is solely a learned behavior (Parsons, social psychologists). Some aggressive behaviors are learned and used strategically to obtain goals. Violence is a rationally chosen, leaned response.
- Response theories argue that aggression occurs as a response to frustration and its source is inherent in humankind. Target is often random.
- Frustration -Aggression theories (sort of a combo theory) argue that an angry individual targets the object he/she thinks is responsible for his/her frustration and applies aggression to that object. If frustration subsides after the attack, the behavior is reinforced. The greater the perceived threat to life, the stronger the response. The frustration-aggression mechanism provides the basic motivational element in RD models for political violence.

The primary source of the human capacity for violence lies in the frustration - aggression mechanism. RD is a step above other theories which purport to explain violent collective behavior because it provides the causal mechanism for action.

There are analogous theories to RD. Gurr outlines three of them. (1) Dissonance refers to the inconsistency between two cognitive elements or clustering of elements. Dissonance overlaps RD but does not contradict it. (2) Anomie (Durkheim) is a situation in which either ends outweigh means, or ends remain constant while means are severely restricted. 3 types of anomie: weakness of norms, existence of several strong, but conflicting, norms, and ignorance of norms. Most potent effect of anomie is on value opportunities. (3) Conflict in its collective sense is sometimes defined as a condition, sometimes as a process, and sometimes as an event. It is of limited usefulness to RD.

There are also three patterns of relative deprivation, and neat graphs to demonstrate them.

Decremental RD - group's expectations remain constant but their value capability declines. Occurs when people are angry over the loss of what they once thought they had or could have.

Aspirational RD - group's capabilities remain constant while aspirations increase. People experience this type of relative deprivation b/c they cannot attain new expectations.

Progressive RD - long run, steady improvements in people's value positions leads them to expect continued improvement . If their value capabilities stabilize or decline after a period of continued improvement, progressive RD arises.

Chap. 10 Causes and Processes of Political Violence, a conclusion

The disposition to collective violence depends on how badly societies violate socially derived expectations about the means and ends of human action. It is most likely to occur in societies that rely on coercion to maintain order instead of providing adequate patterns of value-satisfying action. The potential for, actualization of, and magnitude of ,collective violence varies with the intensity of discontent, and the proportion of its members who are intensely discontented.

One can determine the level of a group's potential violence by examining the extent to which other groups in society are experiencing a more rapid increase in value position, extent to which values are thought to be expandable, and the number of value opportunities open to group members. The determinants of (the potential of) collective, political violence are societal ones.

3 forms of political violence:
- turmoil : relatively spontaneous and unstructured, with popular participation; mobilizes the lower classes, but with a substantial number of middle class participants.
- conspiracy : highly organized, relatively small-scale, a regime and middle class from of opposition.
- internal war : large scale, organized violence aimed at overthrowing a regime or dissolving a state, and accompanied by extensive violence.

Conclusion: Gurr does not support the view that political violence is a resort for only the vicious and the criminal, nor is it caused by deleterious or vicious doctrines. Collective, political violence is the result of relative deprivation and discontent. Discontent is not a function of the discrepancy between what men want and what they have, but between what they want, and what they believe they are capable of attaining. If their means are limited of threatened, they are likely to revolt.

PATRICK JOYCE
The Historical Meanings of Work, ch.1 1987

This is an introduction to a collection of articles on the ideological nature of work. Joyce's central point is that the meaning of work is more than economic maximization. In this perspective, the meaning of work is socially constructed. This book is in the same vein as the Pahl book we read for Abbott, except while that focuses more on the meaning of ''domestic'' work, this book edited by Joyce focuses on industrial labor.

According to Joyce, production can only be understood in terms of reproduction, reproduction both of class relations and of meaning. He proposes a ''social economics'' which recognizes that the labor market is ordered by institutions and values, and must be understood in relation to other factors such as ethnicity and gender.

Joyce suggests that class, like work, is a symbolic construct. He gives an overview of the recent work in anthro and economics on labor, many of which point to the constructed nature of workplace relations and the meanings of certain types of work which are particular to distinct cultures. (For example, one study discusses how the French have no word for ''skilled'' as we do for skilled labor.) Class roles are played over in rituals of labor interaction, and these roles are ideological in nature.

This type of work is a step beyond the Bowles and Gintis or Willis type argument, saying that class is reproduced not just through school and other sort of conscious forms of socialization, but through language, communication, technology -- in short, culture -- the very terms in which people think and construct their world-views. The meaning of work -- for instance, the difference in pride a typical parent will have between their kid choosing to become a doctor vs. a mechanic; or the status attached to an occupation -- has to be attached, learned, and sustained. These meanings vary over time, and from place to place.

Additional Comments:
I don't recommend reading this. It sounds interesting; but since it's only the intro to a collection of essays, it's basically a really broad literature review which lacks substance.

IRA KATZNELSON AND ARISTIDE ZOLBERG
from Working Class Formations

Believe it or not, this reading - albeit quite long - was actually very interesting (imho). It gave a really quality account of working class formation in the United States, Britain, France, and Germany and put them in context with some theoretical framework. Although I would give this piece thumbs up, it poses some real difficulties for summary. I'll try to latch on to the author's major conceptual points since this is probably the most relevant thing for us for the time being. It would be impossible to summarize the historical information for the four countries examined, but I will try to add some specific tidbits that seem especially interesting or useful. If you ever have the need for an account of working class formation/politicization in the future I would recommend these chapters (the rest of the book apparently goes in to more detailed material about specific countries.

CHAPTER 1: Working Class Formation: Constructing Cases and Comparisons (Katznelson)

I

The purpose of this book is to examine different kinds of reactions to proletarianization in Western nations. It seeks to explain variation in the formation of working classes in these countries at the moment when class emerged as a way of organizing, thinking about, and acting on society; it asks how initial patterns of sentiment, behavior, and organization shaped subsequent class relations. A central theme is the recognition of the importance of proletarianization as a key theme of modernity, and the pivotal significance of class for understanding ties between the states, economies, and civil societies of the countries studied. Looking at the literature on class, IK is no big fan of objective classificationists like E.O. Wright or Raymond Williams who believe that class ideas, organizations, and activity can be inferred from class structure - i.e. that classes in themselves will/must act for themselves. IK opposes this notion of class as an all or nothing phenomenon. As he sees it, making class formation the logical outcome of class structure and by avoiding a direct engagement with the actual lives of working people in favor of taking only ultimate societal transformations seriously, class formation is reduced to a formula - which is bad, and not especially useful when trying to understand real-life goings-on. Prime culprits in this tradition are various strains of Marxists, political sociologists, and ''post-Marxists.''

IK much more agrees (but not totally) with the kind of view of class held by EP Thompson. He states that class formations arise at the intersection of determination and self-activity: the working class ''made itself as much as it was made.'' Class and class consciousness are not separate phenomena but are coexistent and must be considered together, with these concepts recognized as existing as a dynamic relationship between/struggle with other classes evolving over time. IK identifies this conception of class as part of a current of scholarship he calls ''new social history'' - which consists of a body of historical studies about western working classes.

This tradition argues a number of propositions:
- Working-class formation is a process not identical from country to country (or from place to place within a country). A variety of such factors involving dynamics of the workplace, labor organization, presence of inherited preindustrial/capitalist traditions, and other non-class patterns of social division affect class formation. Class, society and politics are contingent upon one another and cannot be conflated or be expected to operate similarly in different societal contexts.
- A somewhat ironic characteristic of the ''new social history: because historical facts can only be made to appear within the framework of a conceptual perspective (even if implicit), the new working-class history has adopted a weak version of the structural ''class in itself-for itself'' model for class formation as a hidden and unexamined functioning tool to order the multitude of facts generated by the study of working-class activity and culture. IK believes that this is largely due to the inordinate influence exerted by Thompson's Making of the English Working Class as a ''seminal'' (or ovular) work in this field - basically the crime is to treat a British model as normative. According to Thompson, working-class formation is defined as the emergence of a relatively cohesive working class, self-conscious of its position in the social structure and willing and capably of acting to affect it. The absence of such collective formation is treated as a deviation from ''true'' working-class formation.

IK also believes that there is an unnecessary polarization in the treatment of theory and history in the literature, and that steps should be taken to examine both together. IK thinks that the role of theory should be to make sense of a series of comparative and historical puzzles about similarities and variations in the dynamics and character of class relations in different societies and to provide us with the tools to ask systematic questions about historical variation and their causes.

II

''It is not worth it, as Thoreau said, to go round the world to count the cats in Zanzibar.'' - Geertz IK tends to think that to get beyond the purely categorizationist or descriptive traditions and assimilate them in a meaningful way, a better concept of ''class'' is needed. He suggests that class in capitalist societies be thought of as a concept with four connected layers of theory and history: structure, ways of life, dispositions, and collective action. As a contribution to social theory, the effort to distinguish between levels of class is an attempt to provide tools to construct cases of class formation systematically in order to promote what he calls comparative historical analysis. This scheme of four levels does not imply a series of necessary stages or a natural progression, but rather a classification that aims to promote the development of theory free form developmental assumptions.

Levels of Analysis:
1) Structure
Structure of capitalist economic development, whose main elements include an economy based on privately owned autonomous firms that seek to make profit-maximizing decisions. Capitalism is unthinkable without proletarianization; and, as Marx observed as the centerpiece of his political economy, capitalism is impossible without a quite specific mechanism of exploitation. IK states that this level of (structural) analysis deals with characteristics common to all capitalisms, using class analytically as a construct that is ''experience-distant.'' Used in this way as a tool to analyze the ''motion'' of capitalist development, class has no direct or unmediated phenomenological referents. Family patterns, demography, cultural traditions, inherited practices, state organization and policies, geopolitics, and other broad factors help determine the specific empirical contours of macroscopic economic development of various societies at this first level of analysis.

II) Ways of Life
This second level, determined in part by the structure of capitalist development, refers to the social organization of society lived by actual people in real social formations - theories that deal with this level of class must be ''experience-near.'' The growth and expansion of capitalism has proved capable of fostering many different kinds of workplaces and work - variations in capitalist development and in social organization of work for the content and forms of class formation in different societies. The level of ways of life deals with how actual capitalist societies develop both at work and away from work. For example, residential communities segregate by the class position of their residents. With separations between work and home, and between the social classes in space, class relations are lived and experienced not only at work but off work in residence communities. IK believes that it is appropriate to construct classifications of class relations (primarily in regard to structural definitions) only at these first two levels of analysis.

III) Disposition
Classes at this level consist not of heuristic or analytical constructs nor of members of some cell in a typology, but of formed groups, sharing dispositions. Such cognitive constructs map the terrain of lived experience and define the boundaries between the probable and improbable. IK thinks this third level is what Thompson means by the following: ''Class is a social and cultural formation (often finding institutional expression) which cannot be defined abstractly, or in isolation, but only in terms of relationships with other classes.'' A class, in this sense, is ''a very loosely defined body of people who share the same cogeires of interest, social experiences, traditions and value-systems, who have a disposition to behave as a class, to define themselves in their actions and in their consciousness in relation to other groups of people in class ways.'' It is at this level that a Geertzian cultural analysis of the ways people construct meaning to make their way through the experienced world is most compelling and relevant, especially because shared dispositions are interactive.

IV) Collective Action
Separating class in itself from class for itself, IK believes that groups of people sharing motivational constructs (dispositions to behave) may or may not act collectively to transform dispositions into behavior. The fourth level refers to classes that are organized and that act through movements and organizations to affect society and the position of the class within it. This kind of behavior is self-consciousness and refers to activity that is more than just the common but unself-consciousness shared behavior of members of a class. Class conflict of any particular kind is not necessarily entailed in the class organization of patterns of social life, nor even in the development of groups of people inclined to act in class ways. There are always impediments to collective action that vary from one context to another, so both the content and form of collective action are highly variable.

Again drawing on Thompson, IK stresses class as a ''junction term'': class lies at the intersection of structure and process, social being and social consciousness. Structural changes give rise to changed experience. IK believes that class formation can be thought of more fully and more variably as concerned with the conditional (but not random) process of connection between the four levels of class - each of which will necessarily vary from society to society.

IV

This section deals with looking at how class formation can emerge differently in different nations. IK thinks that rather than asking whether class formation occurred, we should inquire about the terms and content of class formation with respect to a quite specific, but deliberately open, object of analysis: the ways in which the newly emerging working classes expressed their claims to their employers and the state. Several observations seem relevant major areas of variation in the processes of working class formation and organization in the U.S., France, and Germany:
1) The degree of centrality/retention of artisan values, cultures, organization, and leadership.
2) The degree to which demands presented to employers and the state took a linked or divided form.
3) Orientations toward integration with their respective states and societies, and also in the concomitant levels of militancy that they exhibited in their patterns of collective action.
4) Mix of local and national affiliations.
5) Relative importance of socialist and Marxist appeals.
6) Extent to which there was a hiatus between early and late 19C patterns of class formation.

V

The hypotheses developed in this book to explain each country's exceptional history of class formation come in three broad interrelated clusters:
1) Economy-centered: concerned with the internal analysis of capitalist and class development. More precisely, what are the effects of factors such as the character and timing of economic developments, variations of labor market conditions, and the organization of work in accounting for variations in class formation?
2) Society-centered: looks outside the process of capitalist development and proletarianization for sources of variation in the linkages between the levels of class. E.g. religion, demographic trends, feudal tradition (or not), variations in spatial configuration in cities, or urban/rural balance.
3) The State: that state appears as both an actor and as a shaper of the motives, interests, strategies, and activities of other actors. Some of the important issues here are: nation-state formation; impact of the French Revolution; state bureaucratization; state authority to implement and execute policy; and citizenship and the franchise.

Since an account of the differences between the U.S., France, and Germany is way beyond the scope of a summary, let it suffice to say that the major dimensions of variation run along the three lines immediately above - their more specific points correspond the examples of points of difference.

CHAPTER 9: How Many Exceptionalisms? (Zolberg)

I

So what is this exceptionalism all about. Basically, it refers to the notion that there is some normative pattern for the development of working-class formation against which all other cases are to be judges as more or less deviant. Although given the infinite variety of the reality of working class conditions and situations, it would seem to make little sense to take this kind of exceptionalist point of view. Yet just such a problem was established early in this field and remains deeply anchored to its intellectual traditions. The notion that socialism (in the sense of a mass party committed to fundamental change, inspired by Marxist doctrine, and drawing support from a substantial proportion of the working class) was the normal outcome of working-class formation is traceable to the remarkable success of the German Social Democrats, who had gained substantial political influence between 1890 and 1912. Alternative to this approach is to examine working class-formation from a country-by-country perspective, each state of affairs appearing to make sense sui generis as a unique configuration shaped by a particular set of local factors. (That seems to me like a ''sack-of-potatoes'' kind of approach, and is not any more useful than the former.)

AZ thinks that one way out of this dilemma is to treat each historical situation as a case of working-class formation - as something akin to one of several possible states of a dependent variable and that can be accounted for by reference to variation among a set of factors considered for this purpose as theoretically grounded independent variables. He refers this generic method as comparative historical macroanalysis. The objective of such an exercise would not be to achieve generalizations - in the statistical sense - but rather to enhance our general understanding of the process of working-class formation by systematizing the observation of cross-national commonalties and variations. This eliminates interpretations founded on a mistaken attribution of uniqueness to certain aspects of national configurations, while identifying the combination of factors that best appears to account for the variation that is found - keeping in mind that structural factors merely determine a range of possibilities within which actual outcomes result from constant strategic interactions among a number of players.

Historical Outcomes as Dependent Variables
The first thing that needs to be done in developing a framework to examine the variation in working-class formation is to construct the dependent variable - you need to know exactly what you are trying to explain (the explicandum). AZ thinks this has been done poorly in the past and he identifies four distinct conceptual weaknesses found in the literature in this field: (1) an anachronistic retrojection into the early 20C of variations in outcome that surfaced only after WWI, the Russian Revolution, and the Great Depression, and which these events in fact helped bring about; (2) a lack of specificity with respect to the time frame of the relevant outcome, particularly confusing in cases where the state of affairs changed significantly over time; (3) conflating the outlook or disposition of the working-class with its organization (levels 3 and 4 from Katznelson), which makes it impossible to explore relationships between these two levels; and (4) a drastic reduction of the variety found at levels of Class 3 and 4 in each of the countries into some sort of modal pattern - merging often-distinct relationships to the market and to the political arena, which is then assigned a single location on a unilinear continuum

War and Revolution as Intervening Variables
AZ wants to fine tune the conceptualization of the explicandum in this case to an array of multidimensional national configurations that articulates salient variations in the disposition and organization of working classes under industrial capitalism in the years immediately preceding WWI. He would like to use WWI as a marker on the basis of the fact that effects of the ensuing cataclysm were so overwhelming that prewar configurations were profoundly altered. Altered, in the sense that post WWI trends cannot be projected on the basis of conditions before the war. War-time mobilization had the effect of enlarging the working class by accelerating the movement from rural areas toward the urban wage market. Concurrently, there were important modifications in the structure of capitalism and in its relations with the state. Although working class organizations generally supported national war effort, a stance of opposition to the war rendered some radical working-class organizations extremely vulnerable to charges of disloyalty and legitimized the unleashing of governmental repression against them in the immediate postwar period. In this manner, for example, processes associated with the war consummated the elimination of socialism as an organized expression of the American working class. The impact of the outbreak of the Russian revolution effected working class formation in the West in a similar direction. After 1917, working-class organizations were placed before an unprecedented choice: reform v. revolution. In many cases commitment to revolution was generalized, but revolution came to mean the achievement of fundamental structural change, a long-term objective for which reform was an appropriate means, rather than commitment to rapid change by way of violent action.

II

This section contains the detailed historical accounts of the four countries under consideration (US, France, Britain, Germany) with the purpose of highlighting the principal dimensions of variation with respect to the disposition and organization of the working-class in relation to the marketplace and the political arena. These can't possibly be summarized, but a few of the most relevant observations appear below:

Germany
What distinguishes the German pattern of class formation from all others was the precocious and widespread sharing by workers of a class interpretation of social reality and the extensive mobilization of nearly the entire working class - with the exception of a Catholic minority in certain regions - into a single organizational world (dominated by the SPD - Social Democratic Party) that included both party and unions, as well as a comprehensive network of ancillary bodies. Over the course of its steady expansion to encompass the working class as a whole, social democracy was also undergoing a steady transformation from a revolutionary movement into a mediating organization within capitalism.

Great Britain
Did not support a Communist party after WWI, a time when they appeared in a number of nations on the Continent. This is generally taken as an indication of the British working-class's moderate disposition expressed by the ''new model'' trade unions, cautious organizations with limited economic objectives. Although the unions eventually supported the formation of a class-based party (Labor), this was merely a practical response to changing circumstances and reflected their leadership's instrumental orientation toward action in the political arena rather than a doctrinary commitment to class politics. Although generally recognized that a strong awareness of class and class affiliation pervade most aspects of British life (including electoral alignments), we should remember that a strong class disposition (level 3) does not necessitate a particular form of class organization (level 4) - radical, violent, or otherwise.

France
Most accounts of French working-class formation around the turn of the century emphasize as its most characteristic feature the emergence of the Confederation Generale du Travail (CGT), a nationwide federation of unions whose official doctrine was revolutionary syndicalism. On that basis, French industrial workers are regarded as having achieved a very high degree of class awareness and as having opted collectively for a separatist stance, the most radical conceivable rejection of capitalism. It should be recognized that only a very small percent of secondary sector workers belonged to any sort of labor organization at all, and further that there are indications that the majority of the CGTs supported a much more moderate stance than the party's official doctrine. Some have called French revolutionary syndicalism a ''cause without rebels.'' In the late 1900s working-class formation/organization took two forms: syndicates (producers' cooperatives) which were designed to deal with the ongoing demands of the working-class, and bourses (labor exchanges) which were regarded as uniquely suited to educate the proletariat.

United States
There has been a tendency to exaggerate the conservatism of the American working class by viewing the policies of the AFL era as indicative of the outlook of workers and by anachronistically projecting into the pre-WWI epoch orientations that owed a great deal to later developments. In reality, however, American industrial relations were characterized by a high incidence of violence, high levels of union membership (~25% in 1914, a level comparable to Germany), and there are indications that there was a considerable socialist component of labor interests (and also in politics of the prewar era). Much of the Socialist thunder, however, was stolen by the Democrats, who made sweeping reforms affecting labor during Woodrow (Julius) Wilson's first term. The most distinctive feature of the American outcome: orientation of workers as citizens overwhelmingly toward the political mainstream.

III

Disparate Incarnations of Industrial Capitalism
The question has often been raised whether capitalism makes any difference when talking about working-class formation. AZ contends that contemporary sociologists and political scientists would tend to say ''No.'' Much greater causal weight is attributed to variations in the character of the state and in the political environment more generally than to economic structures of any sort. The basic vision of classic Marxism, against this, places industrial capitalism on the historical stage as a universal demiurge, wreaking revolutionary transformations that render all societies very much alike in most important respects. This section reviews a whole mess o' information in light of this distinction. The following will probably be a real hodgepodge.

The fact that the British class struggle did not escalated with increasing industrialization can in part be chalked up to the formation of a ''labor aristocracy'' in consequence of Great Britain's paramount position in the world economy, a general rise in the standard of living, and steady extension of political participation.

The relevant literature in economic history suggests that the national configuration with which we are concerned can be conceptualized as representing the interaction of two variables: (a) timing and pace of industrialization, and (b) structures of the economy. The latter can itself be thought of as a combination of several variables, especially the extent of industrialization; degree to which the individual sector is capital intensive; and the mechanism for procurement of an industrial labor force.
-It is generally agreed since British and American working class formation were largely endogenous, timing would not be an important factor. The case of Germany is up for grabs. Some, like Sewell contend that because of the theoretical bend of German working class development lateness does matter in this case - due to existence of a pre-existing discourse on the matter.
-Whether couched in terms of a rapid/sluggish growth dichotomy or per capita growth (ability of a system to deliver satisfaction to workers), theories of pace of development have provided generally unconvincing in explaining working-class dynamics.
-Approaches focusing on the extent of industrialization also are problematic, even when employing multiple indicators (% primary sector, % secondary sector, and horsepower as measure of capital intensivity). The problem here is that is assumes a monolithic capitalism that doesn't take into provide for consideration of the diverse ways capitalism has developed in various nations and the ways this might influence the ways in which working-class formation occurs: e.g. France's continuing strong primary sector or America's rapid growth, availability of cheap land, highly capital-intensive and productive industry, early but massive development of a tertiary/white collar sector, and heavy immigration.

The Political Regime as a Conceptual Variable
There seem to be two major approaches as to how to conceptualize the variations surrounding the political environment: (1) the character of the ''state,'' usually conceptualized as a dichotomous variable, in terms of strength/weakness or in a more Marxist tradition whether it exists or not; (2) the character of the regime more generally - usually expressed as combined variation along two dimensions: degree of liberalism and extensiveness of political participation.

So what is ''stateness''? According to Nettl, it is a property of culture, pertaining to different conceptualizations of the focus around which a political collectivity organized its identity. In practice, ''stateness'' as a variable generally collapses into two dimensions of variation: centralization, and institutional differentiation of legal and administrative structures.

AZ reviews a number of various formulations and interprets them as pointing to a single general process: Wherever the state had historically emerged as a highly differentiated political actor - e.g. where a monarchy succeeded in achieving absolutism - and managed to survive as such into the period of the industrial revolution, liberalization did not lead to a sharp separation of politics and economic into mutually exclusive institutional spheres along the lines of British and especially American development.

Also, the combination of sharp separation between the institutional spheres of politics and economics - this is, between the public and private sectors - with institutional decentralization and diffused political power, as in the U.S. prior to its imperial age, would tend to result in narrowly focused working-class organizations and a tendency to confine their action to the appropriate institutional sector.

A study by Lipset, as well as the individual country accounts presented in the rest of this book, suggests that the single most important determinant of variation in the pattern of working-class politics (here a combined level 3 and 4) is simply whether at the time this class was being brought into being by the development of capitalism (level 1) it faced an absolutist or liberal state.

Another approach looks at the importance of party politics and working-class formations. For instance, in Belgium and Britain the state institutionalized, coordinated, and enforced compromises reached by a class coalition that encompasses capitalists and the middle classes. This development made party politics and compromise with the working-class central, thus allowing these regimes to escape the upheavals of 1848.

DOUG McADAM
Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency 1930-1970
Ch. 1-3, 6, 7, 9

McAdam claims to differentiate himself from resource mobilization theory by emphasizing political process as a key ingredient to explaining social change. In the initial two chapters, he criticizes relative deprivation and resource mobilization as biased/incorrect views which mischaracterize the political process. Chapter 3 lays out the political process model, while 6, 7, and 9 provide empirical support for the model.

Chapter 1: The Classical Model of Social Movements Analyzed

This chapter critiques the classical model of social change (similar to Ted Gurr's relative deprivation model). Classical models of social change reflect the assumptions of the pluralist model of the American political system. Classical models move from the specification of some underlying structural weakness of society (e.g., structural strain, social isolation, status inconsistency) to a discussion of the disruptive psychological effect (e.g., alienation, anxiety, frustration) to the emergence of a social movement.

Problems with the classical model:
''social movements are not, as the classical theorists contend, only the product of factors endemic to the aggrieved population (12).'' The classical model lacks any discussion of the larger political context in which social insurgency occurs. Social insurgency is said to arise in conditions of social strain, yet since social insurgencies are relatively rare this implies that social strain is also rare. This view of society would appear to overstate the extent to which the social world is free of strain. Within the classical model, ''system strain is seen as the structural cause of social movements (but) the motive force behind social insurgency remains some form of individual discontent.'' This suggests that movement participants are distinguished by some abnormal psychological profile -- empirical evidence fails to support this suggestion.

In a nutshell, social movements are a collective phenomena and not the emergent effect of collections of discontented individuals. Social movements are political, not psychological phenomena.

Chapter 2: Resource Mobilization: A Deficient Alternative''

RM models are based on elite theories of the American political system Elite theories rest on the assumption that groups in society differ markedly in the amount of political power they wield...powerful groups are able to exclude the powerless from utilizing institutional mechanisms of social change. As such, social movements are tactical responses to the harsh realities of a political system rather than as a form of irrational behavior. Focus is upon resources as the proximate cause rather than the aggregate level of discontent or strain.

Problems of RM theory:
SM lit it too expansive to be purely explained in terms of resources. Hence, McAdam finds RM defensible only when applied to certain classes of social actions. On limit stems from the models failure to differentiate organized change efforts generated by excluded groups from those exerted by established members (McAdam emphasizes organizational strength and effects of pre-existing organizations). challengers, or outsiders may contribute more to social change than elite groups. Furthermore, mass base movements often have political capabilities. Wheat the black movement shares in common with many insurgent challenges is the existence of an indigenous organizational network in which it developed (pre-existing organizations which are not elite). RM does not acknowledge the enormous potential for variability in the subjective meanings people attach to situations. Segments of society will not submit to oppressive conditions if oppression is collectively defined as both unjust and subject to change.

RM is good for analyzing organized reform efforts by established groups already within the polity, but not to social movements per se. This is because RM sees little differentiation between challenger groups and views them as politically impotent. Problem is that some insurgent movements have a greater capacity for mobilization than elites.

Chapter 3: The Political Process Model

Generally, the model emphasizes that a SM is a political rather than a psychological phenomenon (meaning that the factors shaping institutionalized political processes are important points of analysis), and that a SM represents a continuos process (from generation to decline) rather than as a discrete series of developmental stages. His model explains: 1.) the generation of insurgency and 2.) the development and decline of insurgency.

Three factors crucial to the generation of insurgency:
The structure of political opportunities for the SM (shifts in opportunities to challengers may be caused by things such as wars, industrialization, internal political realignments, prolonged unemployment, and widespread demographic changes).
Indigenous organizational strength: resources of the group.
Cognitive liberation: while 1 and 2 are necessary causes, they are not sufficient. What is important is whether the groups is able to collectively define their situations as unjust and subject to change through group action.

The development and the decline of the movement, then, depends upon how these three factors combine over time, through a process, and in combination with an added factor: the shifting control response of other groups to the movement (elite response).

Chapters 6,7, and 9:

Hence the generation of the black insurgency in the mid-50's is accounted for by the three factors of the political process model:
structure of political opportunities came about as a result of broad social processes (from 1930-54, such as industrialization and migration), and afforded insurgents more leverage with which to press demands (reduction power discrepancy): a) gradual collapse of cotton; b.) migration of black vote to democratic party; c.) W.W.II and the end of American isolationism (international pressure). growing sense of political efficacy enhanced by such occurrences. growth of churches, colleges, NAACP: the southern black population developed the indigenous organizational strength needed to mount and sustain the SM

Parish's GOP Scheme:
Grievances: McAdam agrees with Snow that grievances are subjective. His notion of cognitive liberation means a higher awareness of grievances.,br> Organization: a sufficient factor for McAdam. SMS need pre-existing, non-political organizations, such as churches, black colleges, etc. which can be politicized. Mobilization occurs as a result of three factors: a.) background events (decline in cotton), b.) political opportunity (voting power), c.) cognitive liberation (awareness of grievances).,br> Process: generation/emergence and then decline. Emergence occurs with pre-existing organizations a political process to mobilize them. Movement is demobilized when many organizations enter movement and make aims pluralizes... Plus, success makes some feel less grievances so as to drop out.,br> Elite response: initial encouragement since positive response arose in court ruling (can't ignore elite system). However, as movement gets closer to elite interests and is more violent, elite withdraw support and begin repression.

NOTE: the GOP scheme is really grievances, organization, and polity; also see figures 3.1 and 3.2 in McAdam

JOHN McCARTHY AND MAYER ZALD
''Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A partial theory ''

This is a concise introduction of resource mobilization theory as the new principle perspective on social movements. Resource mobilization depends more on political sociology and economic theories than on the social psychology of collective behavior. Contrary to collective behavior theory (Chicago School, Smesler), or relative deprivation theory (Gurr), resource mobilization theory attributes rationality to movement participants, and posits a fundamental continuity between institutionalized and movement politics. Focus in resource mobilization theory is on empirical studies. This essay is primarily concerned with outlining the resource mobilization theory and providing a framework for analysis.

Resource mobilization assumes that there is never a lack of discontent to fuel a movement, but discontent is not enough. A social movement must harvest, manipulate or even create that discontent and efficiently manage it for some end. There are several important emphases. the study of aggregation of resources (money and labor) is essential. Also, resource aggregation requires some minimal form or organization, so McCarthy and Zald focus on social movement organizations. Third, one must explicitly recognize the importance of participants and organizations which lie outside the specific collectivity which a social movement represents. Fourth, a crude supply and demand model is applied to the flow of resources in the social movement field as a whole. Finally, there is a sensitivity to the importance of costs and rewards in explaining individual and organizational involvement in social movement activity.

Certain things distinguish the resource mobilization perspective:

Support base - the support base of a social movement may consist of those of may potentially benefit from a movement; those who may not benefit, but support the goals of the movement (conscience constituents); or even those who may have no commitment to the values which underlie a certain movement. Supporters provide time, money, facilities, etc.

Strategy and tactics - Movement organizations have a number of strategic tasks and concerns which include: mobilizing supporters, neutralizing or transforming publics into supporters, achieving change in targets, and other activities aimed at survival of the organization. Moreover, tactics are influenced by inter-organizational competition and cooperati

Relation to larger society - Society provides the infrastructure which social movement industries and other industries utilize.

In order to understand resource mobilization theory, you got to know the lingo.

Social Movement is a set of opinions and beliefs in a population which represents preferences for changing some elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution of a society. A countermovement is a similar entity which is opposed to a given social movement.

Social movement organization (SMO) is a complex or formal organization which identifies a set of target goals with the preferences of a social movement. Each SMO must have resources of some kind in order to work towards goal achievement.

Social movement industry (SMI) : all SMOs that have as their goal the attainment of the broadest preferences of a social movement.

Social movement sector (SMS) consists of all SMIs in a society.

For the appropriate SM there are adherents and non-adherents. Adherents are those individuals or organizations that believe in the goals of the movement. Constituents of an SMO are those providing resources to it. SMOs try to present goals in such a way as to mobilize adherents and constituents, but are limited by the constraint of the environment.

Over time, the relative size of the SMS in any society may vary significantly. IN general it will bear a relationship to the amount of wealth in a society. McCarthy and Zald offer 3 growth hypotheses.

1. As the amount of discretionary resources of mass and elite publics increase, the absolute and relative amount of resources available to the SMS increases. - More resources also allows for greater SMO differentiation and heterogeneity, as well as overall growth of the system.

2. The greater the absolute amount of resources available to the SMS the greater the likelihood that new SMIs and SMOs will develop to compete for these resources.

3. Regardless of the resources available to potential beneficiary adherents, the larger the amount of resources available to conscious adherents the more likely is the development of SMOs and SMIs that respond to preferences for change. - i.e. What's in it for me?

Like any other organization, SMOs are concerned with survival and will devote resources to that end. Target goals may become secondary. This leads to several structural hypotheses regarding strategy tactics and the like.

4. The more a SMO is dependent upon isolated constituents, the less stable will be the flow of resources to the SMO. -i.e. If I'm the National Wildlife Conservatory, and most of my donations come form mail solicitations, the less my constituents will know each and reinforce support to the SMO, so funding may become unstable. Also, the SMOs within any SMI will tend to compete with one another for the resources of these isolated adherents. Mail campaigns play on this instability and capitalize on short ''issue attention cycles.'' This leads to 2 subsidiary hypotheses: (4a) The more dependent and SMO is upon isolated constituents, the greater the share of its resources which will be allocated to advertising. (4b) the more a SMO depends upon isolated constituents to maintain a resources flow, the more shifts in the resources flow resemble the patterns of consumer expenditures for expendable and marginal goods.

5. A SMO which attempts to link both conscience and beneficiary constituents to the organization through federated chapter structures, and hence solidary incentives, is likely to have high levels of tension and conflict.

6. Older, established SMOs are more likely then newer SMOs to persist throughout the cycle of SMI growth and decline. - refers to Stinchcombe's ideas about liability of newness. Also important is past history of success and level of trust.

7. The more competitive a SMI (a function of the number and size of the existing SMOs) the more likely it is that the new SMOs will offer narrow goals and strategies. - Division of labor argument.

8. The larger the income flow to a SMO the more likely that cadre and staff are professional and the larger are these groups. - As in any organization, task complexity requires specialization.

9. The larger the SMS and the larger the specific SMIs the more likely it is that SM careers will develop. - e.g. lobbyists and community activists.

10. The more a SMO is funded by isolated constituents the more likely that beneficiary constituent workers are recruited for strategic purposes rather than for organizational work.

11. The more a SMO is made up of workers with discretionary time at their disposal the more readily it can develop transitory teams.

Thus, McCarthy and Zald have laid out resource mobilization theory. The resource mobilization model emphasizes the interaction between resource availability, the pre-existing organization of preference structures, and entrepreneurial attempts to meet preference demand. Emphasis in empirical examples has been the modern American context.

BARRINGTON MOORE, JR.
The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy

The book compares revolutions and modernization in China, England, the United States, Russia, France and Japan, and develops a theory about when and why these processes result in what kinds of political systems.

Moore studies three different 'social origins' of modern nations:
1) Capitalist democracy (England, France, U.S.). Transition from bourgeois revolution.
2) Fascism (German, Japan). Capitalist, but, in the absence of a strong revolutionary surge, it passed through reactionary political forms to culminate in fascism. Through a revolution from above, industry did manage to grow and flourish.
3) Communism (Russia, China). Transition from peasant revolution.

The methods of modernization chosen in one country change the dimensions of the problem for the next countries who take the step.

WAY-SIMPLIFYING TWO BY TWO TABLE!!!

	
		ELITES WEAKER	ELITES POWERFUL
PEASANTS
		Democracy		Fascism

'Low'		England			Japan
		France			Germany
		U.S.

'High'					Russia
					China

The Democratic Route to Modern Society:

Moore sees the development of democracy as a long and incomplete struggle to do three closely related things: 1) to check arbitrary rulers; 2) to replace arbitrary rules with just and rational ones; 3) to obtain a share for the underlying population in the making of rules.Some ''starting points'' with respect to structural differences in agrarian societies, while not decisive in themselves, are more favorable to democratic developments than others. Western feudalism contained certain institutions that distinguished it from other societies in such as way as to favor democratic possibilities. The most important aspect was the growth of the notion of the immunity of certain groups and persons form the power of the ruler, along with the conception of the right of resistance to unjust authority. Together with the conception of contract as a mutual engagement freely undertaken by free persons, derived from the feudal relation of vassalage, this complex of ideas and practices constitutes a crucial legacy from European medieval societies to modern Western conceptions of a free society. This complex arose only in Western Europe. Feudalism did arise in Japan, but with heavy stress on loyalty to superiors and a divine ruler: it lacked an engagement among theoretical equals.

The persistence of royal absolutism, or more generally of a preindustrial bureaucratic rule, in to modern times has created conditions unfavorable to democracy of the Western variety (eg, China, Russia and Germany). A decisive precondition for modern democracy has been the emergence of rough balance between the crown and the nobility, in which the royal power predominated but left a substantial degree of independence to the nobility. The notion that an independent nobility is an essential ingredient in the growth of democracy has a firm basis in historical fact. If the nobility seeks freedom in the absence of a bourgeois revolution, the outcome is highly unfavorable to the Western version of democracy. This is one reason why a vigorous and independent class of town dwellers has been an indispensable element of growth in a parliamentary democracy (Germany had very weak towns, apparently). No bourgeois, no democracy.

However, among the most decisive determinants influencing the course of subsequent political evolution are whether or not a landed aristocracy has turned to commercial agriculture,a nd, if so, the form that this commercialization has taken.

The advance of commerce in the towns and the demands of absolutist rulers for taxes had among their many consequences the result that the overlord needed more and more cash. Three main responses to this occurred in different parts of Europe. (1) The English landed aristocracy turned to a form of commercial farming that involved setting the peasants free to shift for themselves as best they could (enclosures) (2) The French elite generally left the peasants in de facto possession of the soil. (3) In eastern Europe, the manorial reaction: formerly free peasants were reduced to serfdom.

In England, the turn toward commercial farming by the landed aristocracy removed much of what remained of its dependence on the crown and generated a great deal of hostility to fumbling Stuart attempts at absolutism. Likewise, the form commercial farming took in England, in contrast to eastern Germany, created a considerable community of interest in the towns. Both factors were important causes of the Civil War and the ultimate victory of the parliamentary cause. Its effects continued to be important and to be reenforced by new causes in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

If the commercial impulse is weak among the landed upper classes, then the result will be the survival of a huge peasant mass that is at best a tremendous problem for democracy and at worst the reservoir for a peasant revolution leading to a communist dictatorship. The other possibility is that the landed upper class will use a variety of political and social levers to hold down a labor force on the land and make its transition to commercial farming in this fashion. Combined with a substantial amount of industrial growth, the result is likely to be what we recognize as fascism.

1) the form of commercial agriculture was just as important as commercialization itself
2) the failure of appropriate forms of commercial agriculture to take hold at an early point in time still left open another route to modern democratic institutions (eg, France, US). In parts of France, commercialization left peasant society largely intact, but took more out of the peasantry, thereby making a contribution to revolutionary forces; over most of France the impulse among the nobility toward commercial agriculture as weak compared with england. BUT, in France the revolution crippled the aristo. and opened the way toward parliamentary democracy.

How do we explain the ways in which the transition to commercial agriculture took place or failed to occur? Difference in opportunities to adopt commercial agriculture, such as, above all, the existence of a market in nearby towns and the existence of adequate methods of transportation. The bourgeoisie once again lurks in the wings as the chief actor in the drama. Political considerations have also played a decisive role. Where it has been possible for landlords to make use of the coercive apparatus of the state in order to sit back and collect rents, a phenomenon found widely in Asia and to some extent pre-revolutionary France and Russia, there is clearly no incentive to turn to less repressive adaptations. By and large, the elimination of the peasant question through some transformation of the peasantry into some other kind of social formation (eg, the Enclosures) appears to augur best for democracy (otherwise, there is a massive reservoir of peasants to serve the reactionary ends of the landed upper classes (German and Japan) or provide the mass base for peasant revolutions (Russia and China)). Part of the cause of the instability of democracy after the revolution and in the 19th and 20th centuries was rooted in this problem of a massive reservoir of peasants.

Thus we have three major variables: the relationships of the landed upper classes with the monarchy; their response to the requirements of production for the market; and the relationship of the landed upper classes with the town dwellers. Also,

1. A fusion needs to take place between the landed aristo. and the upper classes in the town in opposition to the royal bureaucracy (rather than in opposition to the peasants and working classes).
2. The commercial and industrial leaders must be on their way to becoming the dominant element in society. Under these conditions the landed upper classes are able to develop bourg. economic habits. This makes it easier for the landed upper classes at a later stage to hold the posts of political command in what is basically a bourg. society. If there is a substantial degree of antagonism between commercial and industrial elements and the older landed classes, and if the landed classes maintain a fairly firm economic footing, the upper class is prevented for forming a solid form of opposition to demands for reform and a certain amount of competition for popular support is encouraged (competition between town and country elites).

Conditions of development of democracy:
1) development of a balance to avoid too strong a crown or too independent a landed aristo.
2) turn toward an appropriate form of commercial agriculture, either on the part of the landed aristo or the peasantry.
3) weakening of the landed aristo.
4) prevention of an aristo-bourg coalition against the peasants and workers.
5) a revolutionary break with the past

Revolution form Above and Fascism

The second main route to the world of modern industry we have called the capitalist and reactionary one, exemplified most clearly by Germany and Japan. There capitalism took hold quite firmly in both agriculture and industry and turned them into industrial countries; but, it did so without a popular revolutionary upheaval.

In the process of commercialization, a landed upper class may, as in the case of Japan, maintain intact the preexisting peasant society, and introduce just enough changes in rural society to ensure that he peasants generate a sufficient surplus that is can appropriate and market at a profit. Or, the landed upper class may pursue a policy of ensurfment. Or, something in between. Moore calls such systems ''labor repressive.'' He wants to show, then, how and why labor-repressive agrarian systems provides an unfavorable soil for the growth of democracy and an important part of the institutional complex leading to fascism.

Common Factors:

1. A commercial and industrial class which is too weak and dependent to take power and rule in its own right and which therefore throws itself into the arms of the landed aristo and the royal bureaucracy, exchanging the right to rule for the right to make money. However, even if the commercial and industrial element is weak, it must be strong enough to be a worthwhile political ally. Otherwise, a peasant revolution leading to communism may intervene.

2. Japan and Germany, trying to modernize without changing their social structures, needed militarism which united the upper classes, and a strong central governments/state apparatuses. These systems turned in to fascism, before their ultimate failure.

3. Plebeian anticapitalism is the feature which most clearly distinguishes 20th c. fascism from its predecessors, the 19th c. conservative and semi-parliamentary regimes. It is a product both of the intrusion of capitalism into the rural economy and of strains arising in the postcompetitive phase of capitalist industry. Eg, Nazi propaganda romanticizing ''the free man on free land'' was appealing to small peasants who suffered under the advance of capitalism, with its problems of prices and mortgages that seemed to be controlled by hostile city middle men and bankers.

The Peasants and Revolution

The process of modernization begins with peasant revolutions that fail. It culminates during the 20th c. with peasant revolutions that succeed.

A large rural proletariate of landless labor is a potential source of insurrection and revolution. Which types of agrarian and promodern societies are more subject to peasant insurrection and rebelling than others, and what structural features help explain the difference?

A highly segmented society that depends on diffuse sanctions for its coherence and for extracting the surplus from the underlying peasantry is nearly immune to peasant rebellion because opposition is likely to take the form of creating another segment. On the other hand, an agrarian bureaucracy, or a society that depends on a central authority for extracting the surplus, is a type most vulnerable to such outbreaks.

Turning to the process of modernization itself, the success or failure of the upper class in taking up commercial agriculture has a tremendous influence on the political outcome. Where the landed upper class has turned to production for the market in a way that enables commercial influences to permeate rural life, peasant revolutions have been weak affairs. If this doesn't happen, the landed aristo may leave beneath it a peasant society damaged but intact, with which it has few connecting links. Meanwhile, it is likely to try to maintain its style of life in a changing world by extracting a larger surplus out of the peasantry. By and large this was the case in 18th c. France and in Russia and China during the 19th and 20th c's.

Where there is a strong link between overlord and peasant community, the tendency toward peasant rebellion is weak. Two conditions are probably essential for this link to be an effective agent of social stability: 1) there should not be severe competition for land or other resources between the peasants and the overlord; and, 2) political stability requires the inclusion of the overlord and/or the priest as members of the village community who perform services necessary for the agricultural cycle and the social cohesion of the village, for which they receive roughly commensurate privileges and material rewards. The contributions of those who fight, pray and rule must be obvious to the peasant.

Generally, the creation of centralized monarchy has meant that the peasants' immediate overlord lost his protective functions to the state, while the peasants still had obligations to the overlord. The failure of commercial farming to take hold on any very wide scale meant that there was scarcely any alternative to squeezing the peasant.

Peasant solidarity is an important determinant of whether there will be any political action. In a rebellious and revolutionary form of solidarity, institutional arrangements are such as to spread grievances through the peasant community and turn it into a solidary group hostile to the overlord. The opposite kind of solidarity, the conservative one, derives its cohesion by tying those with actual and potential grievances into the prevailing social structure.

Most important causes of peasant revolution:
1) Absence of a commercial revolution in agriculture led by the landed upper classes; and
2) the concomitant survival of peasant social institutions into the modern era, where they are subject to new stresses and strains.

Moore believes that the costs of modernization have been at least as atrocious as those of revolution. The comforting myth of gradualism (smooth, gradual modernization and democratization), he says, should be recognized as such. In the Western democratic countries, revolutionary violence was part of the whole historical process that made possible subsequent peaceful change. In the communist countries too, revolutionary violence has been part of the break with a repressive past and of the effort to construct a less repressive future.

Also, it is well to recollect that there is no evidence that the mass of the population anywhere has ever wanted an industrial society, and plenty of evidence that they did not. At bottom of all forms of industrialization so far have been revolutions from above, the work of a ruthless minority.